







GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN





GENERAL VON STEUBEN
From Original by Earle, 1786.

FREDERICK WILLIAM VON STEUBEN

AND

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

AIDE TO WASHINGTON AND INSPECTOR GENERAL
OF THE ARMY.

WITH ACCOUNT OF POSTHUMOUS HONORS
AT VARIOUS PLACES.

BY JOSEPH B. DOYLE.

AUTHOR OF MEMORIAL LIFE OF E. M. STANTON,
JEFFERSON COUNTY TWENTIETH CENTURY
HISTORY, ETC.

Under the Auspices of
The Stanton Monument Association

STEUBENVILLE, OHIO

THE H. C. COOK CO.

1913.

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LIMITED EDITION

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Joseph B. Doyle.
Published October, 1913.

TO THE
SOCIETIES OF THE SONS AND DAUGHTERS
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

WHOSE EFFORTS TOWARDS PRESERVING THE MEMORIES
OF MEN AND EVENTS WHICH SECURED THE INDEPENDENCE
OF OUR NATION, HAVE BEEN SUPPLEMENTED BY
ALL THAT MAKES FOR CIVIC RIGHTEOUSNESS AND
GOOD CITIZENSHIP THIS VOLUME IS RESPECTFULLY
DEDICATED.

PREFACE

An apology seems scarcely necessary for offering to the reading public at this time a new biography of Baron Frederick William Von Steuben. It frequently happens that one's true place in history is not fixed at or near the period when the events in which he participated occurred, but long after, when the lengthening perspective allows a more mature and better judgment of what the characters were or what they accomplished. This is true especially of the Revolutionary heroes. So far as Washington was concerned there was never any serious doubt as to his position, although even he did not escape the detraction of factions or disappointment of friends. But, like the sun, whose influence is so decided that there could be no question as to it being the controlling factor in holding and regulating the whole solar system, Washington's figure looms so far above all others connected with the Revolution that the superiority so generally accorded him by his contemporaries has only become more evident with each succeeding year. Great, however, as he was in patriotism, enlightened in statesmanship, skilled in military affairs, albeit most of his early experience was in the backwoods, he was but human, and even his most enthusiastic admirers will not claim that he could have brought his wonderful work to a successful issue without the counsel and assistance of the strong and capable men he gathered around him. In fact there could be no better tribute to his genius than recognition of the fact that in his mind petty jealousy was non-existent, and that in choosing his immediate military family especially he recognized no qualification save loyalty to the cause,

integrity of purpose and ability to carry out the work assigned. Opinions may differ as to the relative standing of these associates, but there can be little doubt as to the two most closely allied to Washington in that memorable conflict whose skirmishes, as Napoleon has justly observed, changed the entire history of the world. These two were Alexander Hamilton, whose great achievements towards laying the foundations of this Government we are just now beginning to appreciate, and the subject of this biography.

This latter statement may surprise some who have regarded Steuben simply as a drillmaster, but it is sustained by a close study of the facts. From the time he joined the famishing little army at Valley Forge until he received the overtures for the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, he was at Washington's right hand, planning campaigns, looking after the troops, bringing order out of chaos, turning defeat into victory, and, on more than one occasion averting what threatened to be a fatal disaster. It is saying too much of any one man to assert that without him the conflict for freedom would have failed, although it certainly appears as though Washington was very nearly if not quite in that class, but where the scales are so closely balanced as they were more than once during the progress of the American Revolution, it is not too much to say that had it not been for Steuben the result at that time might have been different. Prof. G. W. Greene in his able monograph, declares that: "In the military history of our Revolution, if we class men according to their services, no one after Washington and Greene stands so high as Steuben. For the services which Lafayette rendered, important as they were, were rather the effects of influence and position, rather than of individual superiority. All that Steuben owed to posi-

tion was the opportunity of action, the action itself was the fruit of his own strong will and thorough knowledge of his service. He was the creator of our regular army, the organizer of our military economy. The impress which he made upon our military character remained there long after his hand was withdrawn. His system of reviews, reports and inspection gave efficiency to the soldier, confidence to the commander, and saved the treasury not less than \$6000,000."

Although professing liberal principles it is not claimed that when Steuben first turned his thoughts towards America he was actuated solely by the philanthropic desire to aid a struggling cause. He was still comparatively a young man, and doubtless had his ambitions, but his every action proves the absence of any low mercenary motive, and from the day he set foot on American soil he embraced the patriot cause with all the ardor of his nature, in which no discouragements ever caused him to falter for a moment. The tardy pecuniary recognition which he received for his services fell far short of what he had given up when he embraced the American cause, so, that, following the example of Washington, he may be said to have served this country entirely without compensation.

His recent citizenship naturally precluded Steuben from taking a leading place along with Washington and Hamilton in the formation of a permanent Government, but this did not prevent him from manifesting an active interest in the matter, and assisting by his counsel and influence towards the preparation and adoption of the Constitution.

Sketches of Baron Steuben have appeared from time to time in various publications, and in 1859, Friedrich Kapp published a biography which was the result of sev-

eral years industrious and painstaking research. Himself a German he visited this country and made a thorough investigation of the Baron's voluminous papers as well as consulting other original authorities, and the result was a work that will always be a valuable standard of reference. But the very detail and thoroughness of this task has prevented its popularization to the extent that the merits of the work deserved.

As the city of Steubenville, Ohio, has been honored by the gift of a portrait of Steuben by one of her artists the present is regarded as an opportune time for a presentation of the great German's life to the people whom he served so well and so faithfully. While acknowledgments are freely due to pre-existing publications, without whose aid the present work would have been hardly possible, yet advantage has been taken of all available new material, in a manner which it is hoped will add to the value of this production.

Some space is given to the efforts of Beaumarchais in behalf of American independence, not only because he furnished the means which enabled Steuben to come to America, but because his activities have been largely a sealed book to American readers, the historians generally dismissing the subject with a line. A publication in the fifties entitled *Beaumarchais and His Times*, wherein original documents are first published, demonstrates that this curious character exercised more influence on French politics than has been generally been supposed, but although this book was translated into English it is now rare and out of print. From it we have gleaned much valuable information.

If this biography shall in a measure result in aiding ever so little in giving Baron Steuben his true place in the

history of our revolutionary struggle, the writer will be more than satisfied.

It may be added that the original pronunciation of the Baron's name was Stoyben with the accent on the first syllable, but the American use has Anglicised it into Stoo-ben, retaining, however, the original accent. The practice in some quarters of accenting the second syllable either of the Baron's name or of the city of Steubenville is without any warrant of authority.

In addition to the authorities mentioned above and others referred to later, special acknowledgment is due Dr. R. M. Griswold, of Kensington, Conn.; George W. Featherstonaugh, of Schenectady, N. Y.; Wm. M. Storrs, Corresponding Secretary of the Oneida Historical Society, and C. M. Underhill, Librarian of the Oneida public library, for valuable assistance, and to Charles P. Filson for illustrations.

Trusting that this work may do something, if ever so little, towards locating Steuben's true place in history it is given to the public.

J. B. D.

Steubenville, O., October, 1913.

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Decorated for Three Wars Celebration.

GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN

GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN

INTRODUCTION

The differences which arose during the second half of the eighteenth century between Great Britain and her American colonies were not long in attracting the attention of observers, both civil and military, in continental Europe. Britain was coming to the front as a world-power, and no important movement within her borders or in any part of the world which acknowledged her supremacy, could fail to interest those nations which had contended with her for mastery, or associated with her as allies. Even though there was no general comprehension of the doctrines asserted by the restless Anglo-Saxons beyond the ocean, the mere fact that these pioneers challenged the authority of the Mother Country, no matter to what extremes it might be carried, was sufficient. Less than a century before England had established parliamentary government on a firm foundation, but on the continent absolutism ruled from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean. Theorists and Utopians existed, but they were beyond the realm of practical government. The term, "Soldiers of Fortune," still retained its liberal meaning, and when George III. later sent a detachment of his

Hessian mercenaries into the colonies, he only did what any other ruler in Europe would have done as a matter of course. It received no condemnation outside of England, at least, in government circles. Even the brutality with which these levies were made excited scarcely a remonstrance beyond the immediate sufferers. Subjects were simply chattels to be exploited for the benefit of the ruler, and more than a peasant uprising was necessary to convince the powers that were, that the people had some rights which rulers were bound to respect. There had been rebellions previous to this, when the central government, weak and decaying, had not sufficient vitality to control the extremities or the designs of ambitious leaders, or when a certain class, goaded to the quick by oppression and outrage, made a fruitless effort to break its bonds, and there were mutterings of a coming storm in France, but the world had not yet grasped the conception of going to war for an idea, especially the idea of protesting against taxation without representation. So, as we have said, the conflict attracted attention not only from the position of the parties but from the novelty of the principles involved. When it became evident that the question could not be solved without recourse to arms, and that the American patriots were not averse to receiving foreign help in their struggle, the situation powerfully appealed to three classes of individuals. First: the Utopians of that day, who thought they saw in America the rise of a new star whose beams should diffuse the light of liberty over the whole world. Second, the soldiers of fortune already mentioned, who had no hesitancy in enlisting under any banner which gave promise of a profitable return. Third, men trained to the profession of arms, who, while not altogether unmindful of their material interest, yet sympathizing with the cause in which the colonists

were engaged, were ready to share its hardships and its perils, determined to render it true and loyal service without regard to the final outcome. In this last class we can safely place Frederick William Augustus Henry Ferdinand Von Steuben, generally known by his familiar title, Baron Von Steuben.

STEUBEN'S LIFE AND WORK

CHAPTER I.

THE VON STEUBENS

A Family of Soldiers—Rise of the Prussian Monarchy—Baron Von Steuben's Birth and Early Career—Prominent in Seven Years' War—Humiliation of France—Retirement—Momentous Visit to Paris.

The family from which Baron Steuben claimed descent traced a definite genealogy back for a period of at least six hundred years, and the name was variously written Steube, Stoebe, Stoyben (the present pronunciation) and finally Steuben. Mr. Kapp, who has been most industrious in tracing this genealogy, first hears of the Steubens in Franconia, one of the duchies of mediaeval Germany lying along the river Main, and south of Saxony. In the early part of the thirteenth century a portion of the family, at least, came into Mansfield, now a part of Saxony, where they took up their abode, and were classed among those feudal noblemen invested with manors and estates. Conveyances of real property and other important legal documents attest their position in the community. The Steubens ranged themselves on the side of the Reformation in the sixteenth century, and seemed to have attached themselves at an early date to the Electors of Brandenburg, predecessors of the Kings of Prussia. In the course of time they lost most of their

landed estates, and it is chiefly as soldiers that they have left a reputation to posterity.

Without going into their transactions in detail we come to Ernest Nicholas Von Steuben, a captain under the German Emperor, Ferdinand II., during the thirty years' war (1618-1648). It would be a puzzling and unprofitable task to attempt to unravel European and especially German politics during this period. A reference, however, to the general situation may assist the reader in understanding the condition of affairs in these and subsequent years.

"The Holy Roman Empire," revived by Charlemagne, still existed so far as its name was concerned, but it had long since ceased to have any connection with Rome, and it would require a rather broad definition of the term "Holy" to thus describe it. The great hereditary kingdom founded by the Emperor of the Franks had degenerated into a loose confederacy of Teutonic states held together by an elective monarchy, but which were so nearly independent that they not only waged war against each other, but sometimes against the empire itself. The succession in the provinces, however, was hereditary except in the case of ecclesiastics, and upon the death of an emperor, sometimes before, his successor was chosen by seven Electors, they being the Archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier, and four lay magnates, the palatine of the Rhine, duke of Saxony, margrave of Brandenburg, and King of Bohemia. They were not obliged to choose one of their own number or even an inhabitant of their own provinces, in fact, choice of a non-resident ruler was the more usual custom. Francis I, of France, and Henry VIII., of England, were both competitors for the Imperial crown when Charles V., member of the Austrian House, of Hapsburg and King of

Spain (Charles I.), was the successful candidate, in 1519. At that time Spain claimed all the American continent except the eastern part of South America, which the Pope had kindly given to Portugal, and this with his hereditary possessions including Austria, most of Italy and the Netherlands, together with the helplessness of France, made Charles's authority almost world-wide, so far as civilization was concerned, with England on the west and half-barbaric Russia on the east to alone seriously dispute his authority. As a ruler with such powerful backing the Emperor was a tremendous force, which had to be reckoned with in the religious wars of the sixteenth century, but in that sense Charles had no successors. Nevertheless the Empire ambled along amidst stress and strife, with varying fortunes for two centuries and a half until Napoleon in 1806 compelled the abdication of Francis II., who had occupied a shadowy throne for fourteen years, and "The Holy Roman Empire" ceased to exist as a figure, as it had long previously ceased to exist in reality. When William I., King of Prussia, was, on January 18, 1871, at the palace of Versailles, proclaimed German Emperor, it was not a revival of "The Holy Roman Empire," but the consolidation of a new nation, which had for sometime been crystalizing out of old material.

Captain Von Steuben was compelled by wounds to retire during the early part of the 'Thirty Years' War, and at his death left a son, Ludwig, born in 1642. He, in turn, had one son, Augustine Von Steuben, born in 1661, and the latter had ten children, seven of them being sons. The fourth son, Wilhelm Augustine, father of the subject of this memoir, was born on April 22, 1699, doubtless in Brandenburg. Two years later Frederick I., Margrave of Brandenburg, which may be translated

"Count of the Marshes," brought sufficient pressure to bear on the Emperor Leopold I. to have the present province of East Prussia (of which he was duke) elevated to the rank of a Kingdom of Prussia, including all the territory heretofore controlled by the Electors of Brandenburg. Under his able administration a new power had come to the front. Wilhelm Von Steuben entered the Prussian military service in 1715, and held one military post after another, part of the time in Russia until his death on April 26, 1783. In 1729 he married Mary Dorothea Von Iagow and from this union was born the son who was destined to play an important part in the American Revolution.

There has been some dispute both as to the date and place of General Von Steuben's birth, and whether he was, after all, a native born subject of the King of Prussia. In Sparks's series of American biographies, Steuben is quoted as saying that had he been a native Prussian he would never have dared to petition for his discharge at the close of the Seven Years' War under penalty of being cashiered. Hence it has been supposed by some of the historians that he was born in Suabia or some other part of the Empire outside of Frederick's jurisdiction. Mr. Kapp, however, after careful investigation into original sources, places his birth on November 15, 1730 "at Madgeburg, a large Prussian fortress on the Elbe." Now Madgeburg is the capital of Saxony, and Saxony did not become a Prussian province until 1815, when it was made so by the treaty of Vienna after the downfall of Napoleon. It had an administrative independence, however, during the Middle Ages, the chief officer seeming to be the Archbishop, with secular powers, and with whom the citizens were generally at variance. It was almost destroyed during the Thirty Years' War, and at the peace of West-

phalia, in 1648, the Archbishopric was converted into a secular duchy to come under control of the Margrave of Brandenburg on the death of the administrator, Prince Augustus, of Saxony, which occurred in 1680. Thus, while not a native of Prussia proper, Von Steuben was to all intents and purposes a subject of Frederick William I., whose father, thirty years before, had had himself declared King of Prussia, and in whose army Von Steuben's father was a captain of engineers. While our subject was quite a small boy his father was ordered to the Crimea at the request of the Russian government to assist in the war against Turkey, and afterward to Cronstadt as instructor of Russian officers, and he did not return until 1740. In the meantime, Frederick II., known as Frederick the Great, had ascended the throne. Young Steuben pursued his education in the Jesuit Colleges at Neisse and Breslau in Silesia, which had been recently conquered by the Prussians. He seems to have become proficient in mathematics, history, German and French. Concerning this period he writes: "The troubles of a military life, the narrow circumstances of my parents and their frequent changes of residence, did not permit them to give me any better education than that which a poor young nobleman in Prussia always receives. But while other young officers led a dissolute and extravagant life, I applied myself closely to study, and exerted myself not only to learn my profession, but to enlarge my knowledge of belles-letters and the practical science. Nevertheless, from want of time and the necessary means, I made only slow progress."

Von Steuben's school life evidently did not exceed four years, for we find him with his father as a volunteer at the siege of Prague in 1744, when Frederick wrested Prague from Maria Theresa, Archduchess of Austria,

and Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, who had previously taken the city from Charles VII., of Bavaria, then Emperor of the so-called Holy Roman Empire. Francis of Lorraine, later Grand Duke of Tuscany, had married Maria Theresa in 1736, who made him co-regent, and by her influence he was elected Emperor to succeed Charles VII., on September 13, 1745. In the meantime, Frederick was operating pretty much as a free lance in Germany, and converting what had been considered the phantom title of King of Prussia into very much of a reality. Although he spoke German incorrectly and preferred French literature, yet he was a born leader, and around him clustered the first impulses of German (at least Prussian) nationality, which more than a century later were to bear their full fruition.

Young Steuben was promoted to the rank of Ensign in 1749 and Second Lieutenant in 1753, becoming First Lieutenant in 1755. That his duties were not always pleasant, and that the Seven Years' War was already casting its preliminary shadows is disclosed by a letter from Schweidnitz in Silesia, written to his friend, Count Henkel Von Donnersmark, of the Supreme Count of Silesia, dated June 14, 1754, in which he says:

"While you, my dear Count, are figuring in the Temple of Themis, I am condemned to a most revolting occupation. A work that Mr. De Balby has traced across a cemetery, requires the cutting of a deep ditch, in the course of which half-decomposed dead bodies are continually disinterred. I fear for my poor soldiers. The noisome exhalations will become more insupportable as the season advances. I order vinegar, brandy, tobacco, in short, everything that I can think of for their protection, to be served up to them. As yet I have no sick, but I fear the month of July. In order not to alarm them,

I am continually at work, notwithstanding my disgust for this abominable occupation, and my subordinates are obliged to follow my example—*Ora pro nobis!* The fortifications are extensive, and appear to be well planned. I should like them to be more solid, and then this place would be well adapted for the King's purpose, to serve him as a great depot in case we go to war with *la grande dame*. I am occupied in taking a plan of the entire fortress, which we shall discuss when we meet. Unfortunately that will not be before the end of September.

* * * What do your Berlin correspondents say? Are Mesdames Elizabeth and Mary Therese vexed with our Great King? I should be happy if they were. Although I am more gallant with the ladies than my master, I am extremely anxious to have an encounter, even as apprentice, with these two Amazons. Yes, my dear Henry, if there is a war, I promise you, at the end of a second campaign your friend will be either in Hades, or at the head of a regiment."

In another letter Steuben tells of a visit to Glatz, also in Silesia, describing the fortifications of that place with the precision of an expert.

Frederick's movements had not been unnoticed by his neighbors, who viewed his increasing strength not only with jealousy but with apprehension that if not crushed or at least curbed he would become a serious menace to them. He was already too strong to be attacked single-handed, so in 1756 a coalition was formed consisting of Austria, Russia, France, Sweden and Saxony to overcome him. He could raise an army of 150,000 men, and the coalition proposed to hurl 500,000 soldiers against him, but lack of concentration on the one side, and Frederick's military genius on the other placed the contending parties more on an equality than their

comparative resources seemed to indicate. England joined with Prussia, and furnished a welcome contingent of troops, but her greatest service was keeping France busy in America and India. Of course Frederick was in war against his Emperor who was the husband of Maria Theresa, although to do Francis justice, he was little more than Secretary to his vigorous minded wife, whose generals took care of her interests in the field. There was the "Army of the Holy Roman Empire" under command of the Prince of Saxe-Hildburghausen, but, as a writer remarks, "This latter army was not as formidable as its title, and totaled only some 60,000 mostly undisciplined and heterogenous combatants." This is only mentioned to show the shadowy character of what had once been a world power.

It would be foreign to the purpose of this memoir to follow the varying fortunes of the Seven Years' War except as they were directly connected with our subject. Steuben's regiment was known as the Thirty-First, being part of the army of Field Marshal, Count Schwerin. This regiment performed arduous service, and especially distinguished itself at the second battle of Prague on May 6th, 1757, where Steuben was wounded, but not seriously enough to compel his withdrawal from the service, for on November 5 of the same year we find him engaged at the battle of Rossbach, where Frederick gained one of his most brilliant victories, completely routing the allied army of 64,000 by a comparatively small force. His part in that battle remained as a fond memory with Steuben until his death.

The next year Steuben withdrew from the regular army and entered the service of Gen. John Mayr, probably the most prominent soldier of fortune of his day, then in the service of the King. Although standing armies

had largely replaced the desultory levies of the feudal system, yet there were still some free lances who had considerable latitude, and Von Mayr was one of them. An illegitimate child, of scarcely any education, and of less character, he entered the military service of the Duke of Lorraine at the age of 18 as a band boy, and was soon after made Sergeant. He attained a reputation for skill and daring during the Turkish war, and served the ten years from 1744 to 1754 in the army of the Elector of Saxony and afterward in the Netherlands. Having killed a brother officer in a duel, he was compelled to leave the Saxon army, and took service under Frederick the Great, to whom he was a welcome acquisition, who gave him an appointment as aide-de-camp, and afterwards charge of the semi-independent corps referred to above. Here he performed herculean service and became a terror to his enemies, for which he was given the rank of Major-General. Here it was that Steuben learned thoroughly those tactics and infantry management generally which were to prove so valuable in later years. Von Mayr died in January, 1759, and Steuben, who had won laurels sufficient to be attract the attention of military experts, returned to the regular army. He was appointed Adjutant to General Von Hulson, then operating in Saxony. On June 5, 1759, Gen. Hulson with about 10,000 men, left Dresden and united his forces with Gen. Von Dohna, near Frankfort on the Oder, where Steuben met his old comrades of the 31st regiment. On July 23, 1759, Gen. Wedell, who had succeeded Dohna, with only 26,000 men, engaged a force of 70,000 Russians. He was defeated with a loss of 6,000 men, which gave an opportunity for the Austrians and Russians to concentrate a force of 90,000 men entrenched at Kunnersdorf. Frederick attempted to flank

them with 43,000 but met with a terrible defeat, losing half his army, and being wounded himself. Among the wounded was Gen. Von Hulson, as well as Steuben. It was owing largely to the courage and skill of the 31st regiment in covering the retreat of the Prussians that Frederick's army was not completely annihilated, with possibly the capture of the King himself, as it guarded him from the field, a service which he recognized by awarding a week's extra pay to each member of the regiment. But, although beaten, Frederick was not conquered, and continued with varying success to maintain a bold front to his foes, in which he was aided by a strong British contingent. Steuben took an active part in the campaign of the next two years, and in September, 1761, he was sent by the King, then at Bunzelwitz, with General Platen and 7,000 men to Poland, to make a diversion in the Russian rear. Frederick's fortunes were almost as desperate as those of Rome when Scipio decided to carry the first Punic war into Africa, and the results were somewhat similar. Platen's corps started on its march on September 11, and four days after met a convoy of Russian provisions and ammunition near Gostyn in Poland, defeated 4,000 troops, burned the train with its provisions, and captured 1,900 prisoners. It is a somewhat interesting coincidence that Steuben's father, while an engineer in the Russian service, built a bridge over the river Wartha by which the Prussian troops were enabled to cross. Platen's next movement was to the relief of Colberg, and Steuben's brigade of 2,000 troops was sent to Treptow, nearby to guard supplies intended for Colberg. This latter place was besieged by a force of 8,000 men, and running short of ammunition General Knobloch, the commandant, was compelled to surrender, Steuben negotiating terms with the enemy. This occur-

red on October 23, 1761, and Steuben with the other officers was sent to St. Petersburg as prisoner of war. This turned out to be a blessing in disguise for Frederick, whose fortunes were now well nigh desperate. Steuben and his associates became very friendly with the Grand Duke Peter, who was also an admirer of Frederick. The Empress Elizabeth (one of the two Amazons whom Steuben in his youthful days desired to meet) died on January 5, 1762, and was succeeded by Peter, who at once withdrew from the alliance and opened peace negotiations with Frederick. It is said that he even ordered his troops in the field to co-operate with the Prussians. Be this as it may, an armistice was signed on March 16, and shortly after a treaty of peace was concluded by which Pomerania, which had been wrested from Prussia, was given back, and a contingent of 18,000 men placed at Frederick's disposal. Of course Steuben and his friends were released, and flattering offers made to the latter to induce him to join the Russian army. He preferred returning home, however, with General Knobloch, where the King manifested his appreciation of Steuben's services by appointing him aide-de-camp on his personal staff with the rank of captain. Certainly the honor was none too great, for, humanly speaking, Russia's defection at this time was Frederick's salvation, and this was largely due to Steuben. Russia's withdrawal was followed by that of Sweden, and although Spain by this time had been drawn into the fray, yet her aid, which was chiefly naval, could not offset these losses, coupled as they were with the exhaustion of France and Austria.

William North, Steuben's aide-de-camp, gives another reason for Steuben's advancement at this time, which Mr. Kapp discredits, although he publishes North's statement as follows :

The Baron had been for sometime in the family and friendship of Prince Henry (William) the King's brother, of whom he never spoke but with the greatest tenderness and affection. In an unfortunate campaign of the Seven Years' War, the prince incurred the displeasure of his harsh brother, who directed him to retire from the army and ordered his aides-de-camp to their different corps, or put them on such unpleasant duty as might make them feel the misfortune of belonging to a man who had dared to displease, perhaps to disobey him. Steuben was sent into Silesia to recruit, equip and discipline within a certain period, a corps broken down by long and hard service. The pecuniary allowance for this object was entirely inadequate, but who in the Prussian service dared to murmur or remonstrate! By the assistance of friends funds were found, and the regiment, complete, was marched to headquarters within the time. Pleased with the prompt performance of a duty, of the arduousness of which the King was well apprised, the Baron received his compliments, and, in a little time after, the appointment of aide-de-camp to the monarch, with the charge of superintending the department of the quartermaster general.

Whether all this detail is true or not, certain it is that Steuben was receiving a technical training which most thoroughly qualified him for the great work he afterwards accomplished on this side of the Atlantic. He is his own authority for the statement that in the last year of the war he was Quartermaster General and Adjutant General to the King, and that in the winter of 1762-3 he had command of the regiment Von Salmuth, subsequently Hesse Cassel. During this period he was also member of an academy of young officers appointed by the King for the special purpose of studying the science of war and military tactics under the personal supervision of the monarch himself.

The withdrawal of Russia and Sweden did not end the war, but the odds being now more even if not reversed Frederick and his generals, who had been trained in the hard school of experience, had matters pretty much their own way. The siege of Schweidnitz in 1762, and the victory of Prince Henry over the "Empire" army at Frei-

berg, on October 29 of that same year, practically ended the struggle. The assassination of Peter III. on July 18, deprived Frederick of further assistance from Russia, but that had now ceased to be a necessity, and on February 15, 1763, a treaty of peace was conducted at Hubertsburg, recognizing Frederick's *status quo ante*, and that position has never since been questioned.

If we except Frederick's successful establishment of his position, England was the greatest gainer by this war, and France the heaviest loser. By it were laid the foundation of the present British Empire, largely at the expense of her continental neighbor, who lost all her American possessions except four small islands in the West Indies, while she was entirely ousted from India proper. Probably her most humiliating position, however, was the order still in force dating back to the treaty of Utrecht in 1713, by which the fortifications of Dunkirk, her principal seaport, had been razed and the harbor filled up, an English resident being appointed to see that these conditions were not violated. There seems, however, to have been a gleam of hope with a foresight into the future that the very completeness of England's victory would react upon itself. Count de Vergennes, then French Ambassador at Constantinople, is said to have declared that this treaty had removed from the English colonies their only fear of foreign aggression, and that so far as the mother country was concerned, "They will no longer need her protection; she will call upon them to contribute toward supporting the burdens they have helped to bring on her, and they will answer by striking off all dependence." We are not sure that Vergennes expressed himself as clearly as is here quoted, but he very likely, with the rest of his countrymen, counted on a day of reckoning.

The ending of the Seven Years' War naturally threw a great many officers out of active service, although a large standing army was retained, the beginning of that military burden which has rested so heavily on modern Europe. Von Steuben, however, decided to quit the military service, the reasons for which have not been made very clear. The King in recognition of his services had given him a lay benefice attached to the religious chapter of Havelberg, which was equivalent to an annual pension of 400 thalers, about \$300, but nevertheless, it is said that he did not consider his claims to promotion sufficiently recognized. Others say he had a duel with one Count Anhalt, while a third report ascribes his retirement to discontent with the monotony of garrison life. A letter written in his later years ascribes his act to "an inconsiderate step and an implacable personal enemy." This would seem to give weight to the duel theory, but the baron's reticence leaves the matter somewhat obscure. In order to get his discharge he pretended to have poor health, but the King was apparently not willing to let him go. Residing a short time in Halle and Dessau, he then went to Hamburg, where he met Count St. Germain, at that time in the service of Denmark, who had something to do with his subsequent career. In May, 1764, he was at the springs of Wildbad, in Suabia in company with Prince Frederick of Wurtemberg, where he met the Prince of Hohenzollern-Hechingen. By the latter he was tendered the office of Grand Marshal of his Court, upon the personal recommendation of Prince Henry, of Prussia, and the Princess of Wurtemberg. In the meantime, Steuben having received his discharge from the Prussian army he accepted the new position, and left for Henchingen, the local capital. His apparent duties were largely ceremonial, such as court presenta-

tions &c., of more importance in those days of detailed etiquette than would seem at first sight. In addition the Grand Marshal, if a man of ability, was usually the confidential adviser of the sovereign, where he had ample room to display his tact and genius. He held this office for ten years to the general satisfaction of the Prince and those with whom he came in contact. He seems to have been more than satisfied with this position after the arduous labors of an active military life for he declined an offer to enter the service of the King of Sardinia in 1764, and similar offers made by the German Emperor, Joseph II., in 1766 and 1769. He accompanied the Prince on his visits to various courts, especially to that of France in 1771, where he made acquaintances who were destined to materially affect the future. During this period he purchased a county seat near Hechingen, where he no doubt expected to end his days, but this was not to be. The religious dissensions of the sixteenth century were still a disturbing element in Germany, and the Baron being a Lutheran, was obnoxious to the Roman Catholic influence which was prevalent at court. Not caring to be the subject of intrigues then prevailing, he resigned his position, with the best of feelings between the Prince and himself, and went to Carlsruhe. Here he took service in the court of the Margrave of Baden, who, on May 28, 1769, had honored him with the cross of the order, "De la Fidelite." This was an order established on June 17, 1715, by Charles, Margrave of Baden, and was limited to thirty members of noble extraction, unsullied lineage and irreproachable conduct. Steuben was the 167th member from the foundation of the society. Lossing was in error when, in his Field Book of the Revolution he ascribed this decoration to the King of Prussia.

Although Steuben had been released from the Prus-

sian military service he held an honorary position under the Empire, being General of the Circle of Suabia, a sort of militia rarely called into active service. Possessing both leisure and a competency he spent a portion of his time in travel, thus meeting some prominent men, among them Count St. Germain, already mentioned. Steuben was still in the prime of life, and soon tired of this dilettante method of living. He desired to re-enter the military service, where there was a prospect of active work in a controversy then in progress, afterwards culminating in an armed conflict, over the Electorship of Bavaria. In accepting positions in foreign armies Prussian officers usually demanded a higher rank than they had at home, which demands interfered generally with their prospects. The German Emperor had more offers than he could accept, especially in time of peace, but notwithstanding this Steuben was urged to pay his respects to him at Stuttgart, in 1777, with the probability that he would be taken into the Imperial army. Steuben, however, did not act on the suggestion, and the favorable opportunity, if it existed outside the mind of Steuben's advisers, passed by.

In April of 1777, Steuben started to visit some English friends whom he had met the previous year in the south of France. He went by way of Paris where he had many old friends, among them Count De St. Germain, then French Minister of War. This was on May 2d, and having informed the Count of his arrival, the latter sent him word not to come to Versailles, where the audience would be public, but he would meet him privately three days later at the Paris Arsenal, when he would have something of importance to communicate. This naturally aroused considerable curiosity in Steuben's mind, especially as an officer was to be sent to conduct him to

the rendezvous. In his notes he says, "I had formed no ambitious schemes, and was perfectly satisfied with my situation. I could not define the meaning of this enigma. I can certify, upon my honor, that among all the conjectures I made, the truth never occurred to me."

CHAPTER II.

A CRITICAL PERIOD.

Rise of a Romantic Character—Beaumarchais and the American War—Inside Movements of the French Court—A Politico-Mercantile House.

What was then a mystery to the Baron is of course clear to all now in the light of subsequent events. As we have seen the peace of 1763 had left France despoiled of all her American possessions except a few small islands in the West Indies, and England became her beneficiary here as well as in Hindostan, while the degrading conditions in regard to Dunkirk and restriction of the navy continued, and the Kings of England added the title of France to that of their own land. As if this were not sufficient, England as mistress of the seas, boldly claimed the right to search neutral vessels for contraband of war, and this claim was exercised in a manner calculated to provoke the greatest possible irritation. That the ruling classes in France should be more than restive under such conditions could be counted on as a certainty, but where was the remedy? For two hundred years bad government and ruinous wars had so exhausted the country that it was on the verge of bankruptcy. Louis XV., under whom the treaty of 1763 had been signed, was dead, and his amiable but inefficient son had ascended the throne in 1774. Eleven years of peace had somewhat mitigated the condition of the wretched peasantry, but it was the conviction that the country was in no condition to attempt a war with anybody, much less all powerful England. There was, however, in literary circles at that time considerable doctrinaire discussion of freedom and

the rights of men, and to these the uprising in America promised an illustration of their theories. Consequently that cause was earnestly espoused by a class of which Marquis de Lafayette was the best exponent. Should America succeed in breaking the English fetters it might mark the beginning of the downfall of the British Empire, a consummation devoutly to be wished by every loyal Frenchman. Louis XVI. himself, was not very eager to send aid to the colonists. However anxious he may have been to get even with England, a rebellion of subjects against their King was not a cause which would appeal to an absolute monarch. The colonists themselves were at first rather slow to assert their independence. What they wanted was a redress of grievances, and there was always danger to an outsider who should inject himself into a family quarrel, lest the combatants might patch up their differences and, if not turning on the intruder with their combined forces, at least leave him to his fate. And could America even with the assistance of France, hope to carry on a successful conflict with England? This was very doubtful, and hence the greatest caution and circumspection must be used to avoid everything that would provoke English suspicion which would be promptly followed by severe retaliation. Lord Stormont, the then English Ambassador at Paris, had his detectives at work, and kept his government well informed of the progress of events.

Fully aware of the resentment on the part of France against England the Americans counted on taking advantage of it, and almost immediately after the Declaration of Independence, Silas Deane, Arthur Lee and Benjamin Franklin were appointed a commission to contract foreign alliances, especially with France. Deane was already in Paris, Lee was the agent for Massachusetts in

London, while Franklin, though still in America, was well known in France, where he had visited several years before. At this time Count Vergennes, whose prediction has already been quoted, was now Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Count de Maurepas was President of the Council of State, both being confidential advisers of the King, and in a position to exercise a controlling influence on the course of events. But before pursuing the thread of our narrative it is first desirable glance at another person who certainly held a most unique position in this or any other period.

In the year 1732 in the St. Denis quarter of Paris lived a watchmaker named Andre Charles Caron, who had come from the province of Brie. On January 24 of that year, was born to him a son to whom was given the name of Pierre Augustin Caron. He was the only boy in a family of six children. He received a moderate education, his father intending to bring him up as a watchmaker, to which trade he was apprenticed on arriving at suitable age. A literary and musical taste shortly developed, and although he followed his trade of watchmaking until the age of twenty-four, yet his compositions along these lines attracted the attention of friends, to the disgust of his father, who preferred a good tradesman to a poor poet. That he was skillful in his calling is evidenced by the invention of an escapement for clocks and watches which was pirated by another party, but which a committee of the Royal Academy of Science found to belong to Caron.

Having presented one of his new timepieces to Louis XV. he now signs himself "Watchmaker to the King," and as such had an entree to the palace at Versailles. A favorite with the ladies Caron attracted the special attention of the wife of the Controleur de la

Bouche, in other words an officer of the King's pantry, apparently not a very elevated position, but one of those sinecures with which monarchs were wont to reward their favorites, and which carried with them a certain social standing as well as a salary, generally a small one. M. Frauquet, the present incumbent, was considerably older than his wife, who in turn was about six years older than Caron. The aged husband was subsequently persuaded to give up his post in favor of Caron, and two months later was accommodating enough to die of apoplexy on January 3, 1756, and on November 22 of that year, Caron married his widow. Then he added to his own name that of Beaumarchais, by which he is generally known. The title is said to have been borrowed from a small fief belonging to his wife, which, however, his enemies did not fail to insist existed only in imagination. But one step more was needed to enroll his name in the list of the nobility, and this was taken five years later when he purchased the office of Secretary to the King for 85,000 francs, and henceforth he was legally entitled to call himself Monsieur de Beaumarchais. In the meantime his wife died on September 29, 1757, from an attack of typhus fever. Years after, when engaged in lawsuits with his wife's relatives, he was charged by them with having poisoned her, but this charge was fully disproved.

Beaumarchais had become proficient on the flute and harp, and by this means helped the four sisters of Louis XV. to while away many hours of a monotonous existence. In a court permeated by petty jealousies this favoritism was provocative of insult from the courtiers, with one of whom he became involved in a duel in which his adversary received a fatal sword thrust, a result which Beaumarchais mourned until the day of his death. Subsequently he purchased another office having the high

sounding title, Lieutenant-General of the Preserves in the Bailiwick and Captainry of the Warren of the Louvre. His duties here were sort of a judgeship to preserve the right of the King to exclusive sporting within a radius of twelve or fifteen miles around Paris. Misfortune now fell upon him, and by a letter de cachet, for what reason is not very clear, he was consigned to the prison of For-l'-Eveque. His detention does not seem to have been very long, for we find him the next year (1764) making a journey to the Spanish court on behalf of his sister, whose betrothal to a Spaniard had been repudiated by the latter. He remained more than a year at Madrid, engaging in speculations as well as gallantries for which his musical and other accomplishments well fitted him. Returning to Paris in 1765, he became involved in another love affair, the details of which do not concern us, and in 1767 put forth his first drama, *Eugenie*, and from this time was prominent in literary as well as court circles. He remarried in April, 1768, his wife dying November 21, 1770. He was wealthy and prosperous at this time, although his enemies did not hesitate to insinuate marital poisoning a second time, but without offering any proofs. He soon after became involved in a series of lawsuits lasting some seven years, which greatly embarrassed him, and at times threatened his complete ruin. He again found himself at For-l'-Eveque, but secured his liberty on May 8, 1773, and the following March was sent by Louis XV. on a secret mission to London to prevent the publication of some court scandals which an adventurer proposed to print. The errand was successful, and the blackmailer reaped a rich harvest, but when Beaumarchais returned to Paris for his reward Louis XV. was dying, and on May 10, 1774, he passed away.

Louis XVI. doubtless was not sufficiently interested

in the scandals of his father's court to feel under very deep obligation to the agent who had succeeded in suppressing undesirable disclosures, but he soon had troubles of his own. There were threats of blackmailing pamphlets from London affecting the new Queen Marie Antoinette, and, mindful of his previous work, Beaumarchais was naturally invoked to do what he could toward having them suppressed. So in June, 1774, he was sent back to London. We have not space to recount his adventures here, at Amsterdam and in Germany, while pursuing the object of his search. They would furnish materials for a serio-comic opera quite as lively as his subsequent dramatization of "The Barber of Seville." He reached Vienna in the course of this journey where he had an interview with the Empress Maria Theresa, mother of Marie Antoinette, at Schoenbrunn castle. Although possessing a warrant in the handwriting of the King of France, Beaumarchais was arrested as an adventurer and confined a month, when he was released with the offer of a thousand ducats from the Empress, which he refused, and made his way back to Paris. He gave his services gratis, but the expense connected with the affair amounted to 172,000 francs (\$35,000) to suppress a couple of unimportant poems.

The next adventure of Beaumarchais is more remarkable than any of its predecessors. There was at this time in London one Chevalier d'Eon, who had played a leading part in French politics, been a captain of dragoons, Secretary of Legation and temporarily Minister Plenipotentiary from France to England. Having quarreled with the Ambassador, Count de Guerchy, he was recalled by Louis XV., but was secretly detained by him at London with a pension of 12,000 francs. In some way about 1771, d'Eon then being 43 years of age, doubts

were raised concerning his sex, and bets were made on this question. Instead of settling the matter at once the Chevalier encouraged this mystery, and furthermore claimed to possess State secrets from 1763, which if disclosed would start another war between France and England. Beaumarchais was sent to London to secure the papers bearing on this matter, and to him the Chevalier declared himself to be a woman. An order was received from Louis XVI. in 1775 to make this declaration public, and for d'Eon to assume the habit of his (or her sex). This was done, and at the age of fifty d'Eon donned female garments in which he appeared at Versailles in 1777, and followed that attire until his death in 1810. Beaumarchais appears not to have doubted d'Eon's confession to him, and to have entertained the belief that d'Eon was actually in love with him. The authorities at the French Court, however, were no doubt skeptical, but adopted the theory for political reasons. A postmortem examination proved that d'Eon was a completely formed man.

The motives of the different parties to this deception have been the subject of much controversy into which it is not necessary here to enter. Beaumarchais's visits to London during this period have a deeper interest to us than speculations concerning a chevalier's sex, for it is at this time that he begins to take an interest in American affairs, and in his dispatches to the King he passes abruptly from the lesser to the greater subject. His residence in London at this time not only brought him in contact with both the friends of America and the Court followers, but his business furnished a convenient cloak for acquiring information which was promptly conveyed to his government. At that time, John Wilkes was Mayor of London. He was a great demagogue, but

partly by his address and still more by the unconstitutional methods adopted by the Parliamentary majority to deprive him of the seat to which he was elected, he had created a strong following among the masses. He took up the cause of the colonies, more doubtless to annoy the government party than through any love for the Americans, and his house was a sort of rendezvous where Beaumarchais met disaffected partisans from both sides of the Atlantic. It was now 1775, Lexington and Bunker hill had demonstrated that the Americans would contest by force the exactions of the British Ministry, while the latter was preparing to put forth every exertion to prevent the rebellion from becoming a revolution. Beaumarchais carefully studied the signs of the times, and concluded that now or never was France's opportunity to humble her hereditary foe and to restore her fallen prestige. On September 21 of that year he addressed a long memorial to King Louis XVI., urging active aid to the insurgents. In fact his ardor is such that he wonderfully exaggerates the military strength of the Americans as well as the power of their advocates in England. Among other things, he says:

I have received particulars from an inhabitant of Philadelphia, who had lately arrived from the Colonies and had just been present at a conference of the English ministers, who were thrown into the greatest trouble, and struck with terror by his recital. The Americans, determined to suffer everything rather than give way, and full of that enthusiasm for liberty, which has so often rendered the little nation of Corsica redoubtable to the Genoese, have 38,000 effective men, armed and resolute beneath the walls of Boston; they have reduced the English army to the necessity of dying of hunger in this town, or of seeking for winter quarters elsewhere, which it will do forthwith. About 40,000 men well armed, and as determined as the former, defend the rest of the country, without these 80,000 men having taken away a single laborer from the ground, a single workman from the manufactories. All those persons who were engaged in the fisheries, which the English have destroyed, have become soldiers, and feel that they have to avenge the ruin of their families and

the liberty of their country; all those persons who took part in maritime commerce, which the English have brought to an end, have joined the fishermen to make war on their common persecutors; all the persons who worked in the harbors have increased the army of furious men, whose actions are all animated by a spirit of vengeance and hatred.

I say, sir, that such a nation must be invincible, above all when it has at its back as much country as it can possibly require for retreating, even if the English could make themselves masters of all their seaboard, which they are far from having done. All sensible persons, then, are convinced in England, that the English colonies are lost to the mother country, and that is also my opinion. The open war which is taking place in America is less fatal to England than the intestine war which must yet break out in London. The bitterness between parties has been carried to the greatest excess since the proclamation of the King of England which declares the Americans to be rebels.

* * * The least check which the royal army receives in America, by increasing the audacity of the people and the opposition, may decide the affair at London at a moment when it is least expected, and if the King finds himself forced to yield, I say it with a shudder, I do not think his crown more secure on his head than the heads of ministers upon their shoulders. This unhappy English nation, with its frantic liberty, may inspire the man who reflects with true compassion. It has never tasted the sweetness of living peaceably under a good and virtuous King. They despise us, and treat us as slaves because we obey voluntarily, but if the reign of a weak or bad prince has sometimes caused a momentary evil to France, the licentious rage, which the English call liberty, has never left an instant of happiness and true repose to this indomitable nation. King and subjects are equally unhappy. Now, to increase the trouble still more, a secret subscription has been opened in London at the houses of two of the richest merchants of the capital, where all the disaffected send their gold to be forwarded to the Americans, or to pay for the assistance which is supplied to them by the Dutch.

It is apparent that Beaumarchais was not interested in America as such at this time. He was acting solely in the interest of France, keeping the King informed of the progress of events as he saw them. Either his own enthusiasm or that of his informers led him into making some very wild statements. The heterogeneous army before Boston never exceeded 20,000, and half of that was useless from lack of supplies, while, there was no army at all in the rest of the country unless a few scattered

companies of militia be considered such. Neither was the English public convinced at this time that the colonies were lost. The gold forwarded to America at this period was also largely mythical, and the predictions concerning the future prospects of the English and French thrones furnish curious reading in the light of subsequent events. He does not advocate any alliance at this juncture or open assistance, for that would at once provoke a war with England, for which France was not prepared. But he soon reaches the conclusion that "The Americans will triumph, but they must be assisted in their struggle, for if they succumbed, they would join the English, and would turn round against us. We are not yet in a fit state for making war; we must prepare ourselves, keep up the struggle, and with that view send secret assistance in a prudent manner to the Americans."

But Vergennes was cautious and the King less than luewarm, which moves Beaumarchais on February 29, 1776 to indite another long epistle to his master in which he reviews the whole situation, and vividly portrays the consequences which must inevitably result to France from her continued inaction. After a discussion of the political situation in London, he adds:

A secret deputy (Arthur Lee) from the colonies to London, quite discouraged by the inability of the efforts he has made, through me, with the French ministry, to obtain assistance in the shape of powder and ammunitions of war, says to me now, "For the last time, is France absolutely decided to refuse to us all assistance, and to become the victim of England and the fable of Europe through this incredible apathy? Obligated to give a positive answer, I wait for reply in order to give my own. We offer France in return for her assistance, a secret treaty of commerce, which will transfer to her for a certain number of years after the peace, all the advantages by which we have, for more than a century, enriched England, besides guaranteeing her possessions according to the forces at our disposal. Do you not accept this? I only ask from Lord Shelburne the time a vessel would take to go and return, to inform the Congress of the

propositions of England, and I can tell you at present what resolutions the Congress will take on the subject. They will immediately make a public proclamation, by which they will offer to all the nations in the world, in order to obtain their assistance, the conditions I now offer unto you in secret. And in order to take vengeance on France, and force her publicly to make a declaration with respect to them, if we commit her beyond recall, they will send into your ports the first prizes they take from the English; then, on whatever side you may turn, this war which you avoid and fear so much, becomes inevitable, for either you will receive our prizes in your ports, or you will send them back; if you receive them, the rupture with England is certain; if you send them back, instantly the Congress accepts peace on the conditions imposed by the Mother Country; the Americans in indignation, unite all their forces to those of England to fall on your islands, and to prove to you that the fine precautions you had taken for preserving your possessions were just those which were to deprive you of them forever. Go, sir, go to France, set before them this picture of affairs; I will shut myself up in the country until your return, so as not to be forced to give an answer before receiving yours. Tell your ministers that I am ready to follow you there, if necessary, in order to confirm these declarations; tell them that I hear the Congress has sent two deputies to the Court of Madrid with the same object, and I may add that they have received a very satisfactory answer. Could the French council possess now the glorious prerogative of being the only one to be blinded as to the glory of the king and the interests of his kingdom?"

Such, sire, is the terrible and striking picture of our position. Your majesty wishes sincerely for peace. The resume of this memorial will furnish you, sire, with the means of preserving it. Let us submit all possible hypotheses, and let us reason. What follows is very important.

Either England will have the most complete success in America during the campaign, or the Americans will repel the English with loss.

Either England will come to the determination already adopted by the King of abandoning the colonies to themselves, or parting from them in a friendly manner; or the opposition, in taking possession of the government, will answer for the submission of the colonies on condition of their being restored to the position they were in 1763.

Here are all the possibilities collected together. Is there a single one of them which does not instantly give you the war you wish to avoid? Sire, in the name of God, deign to examine the matter with me:

First, if England triumphs over America, she can only do so by an enormous expenditure of men and money. Now the only compensation the English propose to themselves for so many losses is to take possession on their return of the French islands,

and thus make themselves the exclusive vendors of the valuable supply of sugar, which can alone repair all the injuries done to their commerce, and this capture would also render them forever the absolute possessors of the advantages derived from the contraband commerce carried on by the Continent with these islands. Then, sire, there would remain to you nothing but the option of commencing at a later period an unprofitable war, or of sacrificing to the most shameful of inactive peaces all your American colonies, and of losing 280,000,000 of capital, and more than 30,000,000 of revenue.

Second, if the Americans are victorious they instantly become free, and the English, in despair at seeing their existence diminished by three-quarters, will only be the more anxious, the more eager to seek a compensation which will have become indispensable in the easy capture of our American possessions; and we may be certain that they will not fail to do so.

Third, if the English consider themselves forced to abandon the colonies to themselves without striking a blow, as it is the secret wish of the King they should do, the loss being the same for their existence, and their commerce being equally ruined, the result for us would be similar to the preceding one, except that the English, less weakened by this amicable surrender than by a bloody and ruinous campaign, would only derive from it more means and facilities for gaining possession of our islands, which they would then be unable to do without, if they wished to preserve their own, and to keep any footing in America.

Fourth, if the opposition takes possession of the government, and concludes a treaty of reunion with the colonies, the Americans, indignant with France, whose refusal will alone have caused them to submit to the Mother Country, threaten us from the present moment to unite all their forces with England in order to take possession of our islands. They will, indeed, only re-unite with the Mother Country on this condition, and heaven only knows with what joy the ministry, composed of Lords Chatham, Shelburne and Rockingham, whose dispositions towards us are publicly known, would adopt the resentment of the Americans, and carry on war against you without cessation, the most obstinate and cruel war.

What, then is to be done in this extremity, so as to have peace and preserve our islands? You will only preserve the peace you desire, sire, by preventing it at all price from being made between England and America, and in preventing one from completely triumphing over the other; and the only means of attaining this end is by giving assistance to the Americans, which will put their forces on an equality with those of England, but nothing beyond. And, believe me, sire, that the economy of a few millions at present, may, before long, cost a great deal of blood and money to France. Believe me above all, sire, that the necessary preparations for the first campaign will alone cost

you more than all the assistance you are asked for now; and that the wretched economy of two or three millions (francs) will certainly make you lose, before two years, more than three hundred.

If it be replied that we cannot assist the Americans without wounding England, and without drawing upon us the storm which I wish to keep off, I reply in my turn that this danger will not be incurred if the plan I have so many times proposed be followed, that of secretly assisting the Americans without compromising ourselves; imposing upon them as a first condition that they shall never send any prizes into our ports, and never commit any act which shall tend to divulge the secret of the assistance, which the first indiscretion on the part of Congress would cause it instantly to lose. And if your majesty has not at hand a more clever man to employ in the matter I undertake and answer for the execution of the treaty, without any one being compromised, persuaded that my zeal will supply my want of talent better than the talent of another could replace my zeal.

How much of the above was bluff on the part of Arthur Lee and how much evolved from the brain of Beaumarchais it is impossible to say. But it makes very clear the underlying motive which was influencing those in control of French affairs, so far as it concerned the American war. It was not specially to aid an oppressed people struggling for liberty, it was not even revenge for past injuries or present humiliation, although these were strong factors. It was the instinct of self preservation. Possible future conditions exercised a more potent influence than past history, although that had taught them what to expect. Should England either retain or lose the colonies without being crippled she might be expected to further increase her strength at the expense of France, and in this she would probably be aided by the very colonists who a few years before had aided in expelling the French from Canada. The policy should be to assist the weaker side in this contest, to make it equal, all things considered, with the stronger, "but nothing beyond." It was not peace between the combatants that was desired,

but a war which should exhaust both sides to an extent that they would no longer be a menace to their neighbors. Sentiment had nothing to do with the matter, so far as the authorities were concerned it was a mere calculation of cost in men and money, and what course should be adopted which would best conserve the interests of France.

American independence had not yet been formally declared, and this, of course, made Vergennes the more cautious upon entering upon a course which, to say the least, was beset with difficulties. But Beaumarchais kept up his importunities, and the conduct of the British in reference to neutral ships was not calculated to soothe the susceptibilities of the French. It will be noted that Beaumarchais in his memorial to the King suggests that two or three million francs be advanced to the Americans, and intimates that he will be the secret agent to forward it if desired. This was too direct for Vergennes, but during the subsequent correspondence he gives a hint to the effect that "It would be contrary to all reasons and propriety to pretend that we ought not to sell any article of commerce to any person because it would be possible it might pass, at second hand, into America." This finally crystalized into the following suggestions:

We will give a million (francs) secretly, we will try to induce the Court of Spain to unite with us in this affair, and supply you on its side with an equal sum; with these two millions and co-operation of individuals who will be willing to take part in your enterprise, you will be able to found a large house of commerce, and at your own risk can supply America with arms, ammunition, articles of equipment, and all other articles necessary for keeping up the war. Our arsenals will give you arms and ammunition, but you shall replace them or pay for them. You shall ask for no money from the Americans as they have none, but you shall ask them for returns in products of their soil, and we help you to get rid of them in this country, while you shall grant them, on your side, every facility possible. In a word, the operation, after being secretly supported by us at

the commencement, must afterward feed and support itself; but on the other side, as we reserve to ourselves the right of favoring or discouraging it according to the requirements of our policy, you shall render us an account of your profits and your losses, and we will judge whether we are to accord you fresh assistance, or give you an acquittal for the sums previously granted.

In accordance with this arrangement Beaumarchais on June 10, 1776, received one million francs from the French government, and two months later another million from Spain, which, however, was transmitted through the French authorities. These transactions afterwards proved a fruitful source of litigation.

About this time Silas Deane arrived in Paris as the accredited agent of the American colonies to solicit money and military supplies, in which the insurgents were woefully lacking. Deane was presented to M. de Vergennes on July 17, 1776, and pleaded the cause of the colonies. Of course Vergennes could do nothing directly, but sent Deane to Beaumarchais as a "merchant," with whom it might be advantageous to enter into business relations. On July 18, Beaumarchais wrote to Deane that he proposed forming a business house for the purpose of providing the Americans with those things which they required and could not obtain in London. On the 20th, Deane wrote another letter to Beaumarchais asking a year's credit on supplies and promising payment in tobacco, which Congress had purchased. This was agreed to, a large house known as Hotel de Hollande was hired, and Beaumarchais, watchmaker, comic opera writer and diplomat, suddenly developed into a Spanish merchant at Paris, under the somewhat fantastic title of Roderique Hortalez & Co. Within a few months he had quietly secured from the public arsenals some 200 mortars and cannon with shells and balls, 25,000 guns, 290,000

pounds of powder with clothing and tents for 25,000 men. He also provided three vessels, the *Amphitrite*, *Seine* and *Mercury*, to carry this cargo, besides enlisting a number of French officers in the enterprise. Quietly as this project had been carried out it could not fail to attract some attention, and Lord Stormont on behalf of Great Britain addressed the most vigorous remonstrances to the French Government. Neither King nor ministry was ready to assume the consequences of an open rupture, and an order was issued forbidding the vessels from sailing. The *Amphitrite*, largest of the three ships, had already sailed from Havre but for some trifling cause stopped at Nantes and L'Orient, at which latter place she was detained. Finally, however, all three vessels got away, and, early in 1777, arrived at Portsmouth, N. H., with their welcome supplies for the American army. Two more ships followed, and by September, 1777, there had been sent to America stores to the amount of a million dollars. Remittances even in kind from America were very uncertain, and although the French authorities advanced another million francs yet our "merchant" was considerably embarrassed.

CHAPTER III.

STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS.

Germain's Plans Disclosed—Meeting of Steuben and Beaumarchais—Former Concludes to Go to America, the latter to Furnish Funds—Beaumarchais Subsequently Faces Bankruptcy and Death—Long Controversy With Congress.

We now return to Baron Steuben, who, as we have seen, had arrived in Paris on May 2d, 1777, where a private rendezvous was appointed by Count St. Germain, for what purpose Steuben could not conceive. A few days after he was conducted by Baron De Pagenstecher, Colonel of the Legion Conde, to Germain's Cabinet or private room, where the Count after congratulations, spread out a map of America with the declaration, "Here is your field of battle. Here is a republic which you must serve. You are the very man she needs at this moment. If you succeed your fortune is made, and you will acquire more glory than you could hope for in Europe for many years to come."

Germain discoursed for sometime on the American situation, the resources of the country, the assurance of aid from France and Spain, and intimated the prospect of an open alliance between the Bourbon rulers of these two countries and the insurgents. The present needs of the Americans were shown to be that their army had no permanent formation, the enlistments were for short periods, that through lack of proper management the waste was tremendous (as Washington had frequently pointed out) and that among those officers who had already sailed for America there was none specially qualified to take up this work. In short unless there was reform in

this direction neither their own resources nor help from friends in Europe would enable the Americans to continue their resistance to a successful end. To all this and much more the Count added: "You perceive now why I wished you not to appear at Versailles; I would not even wish you to be seen much in Paris; you must, however, see the Count De Aranda (the Spanish Ambassador) and the Prince De Montbarey, who are acquainted with this project; and in order that you may have every possible information with respect to the United States I will send Mr. Deane to you."

It was hardly to be expected that such a proposition would appeal at once to Steuben. Brought up as he was among the leaders of his time, both military and civil, accustomed to the pageantry of the courts of Europe, to the civilization and culture of his day, the suggestion meant that he should sever the associations of a lifetime, and, as it turned out, forever; to cross the 3,000 miles of stormy Atlantic which was then no slight undertaking, only to reach what was by many considered a wilderness with a fringe of civilization along a hinterland of boundless extent; unfamiliar with the language, uncertain as to what reception he might expect, and at most to labor with untrained levies against the most powerful empire of the world; these were considerations which might cause any thoughtful man to hesitate. Baron Steuben was no adventurer in the generally accepted sense of that term. His reputation was high, he had a small but assured income for life, and there was no occasion for him to engage in any desperate interprise in order to enhance his fame or secure a livelihood. In fact it was more than doubtful whether either would be enhanced by the project now presented.

Naturally the Baron hesitated, and asked Germain

for his advice. The latter replied, "Sir, as a minister I have no advice to give you on these subjects; but as your friend I would never advise you to do anything which I would not do myself were I not employed in the King's service."

Steuben gave up his proposed trip to England for the present, and met Germain again the next day who repeated his advice not to visit Versailles, but gave him a letter to Caron de Beaumarchais, with whom we have already become acquainted, cautioning him to talk as little as possible concerning the matter. Beaumarchais, as before related, was already actively engaged in American affairs. By him Steuben was introduced to Deane, and a few days later he met Benjamin Franklin, the other American commissioner who had arrived the preceding December, and taken quarters at Passy, a suburb of Paris. Both of the commissioners were favorably impressed with Steuben, and from their information concerning him believed he would be most efficient in reducing the raw recruits of the American army into a condition which would enable them to contend on somewhat even terms with the trained soldiers of Great Britain. Although quite a number of French officers had embarked in Beaumarchais's ships it was not believed that they were fitted for this much needed work, and the sequel showed that most of them were not of much account in any direction. Among them was the marplot Thomas Conway, of Irish descent, who afterwards gave his name to a cabal against Washington. The conference, however, soon met with an obstacle in the shape of Steuben's expenses for the journey. He did not feel like embarking at his own cost, and 2,000 acres of land which Franklin offered him were useless as a means of raising the ready cash for the journey. Franklin declared that

he could advance him no money, and that he could not make any permanent engagement. This was not unreasonable as the American Commissioners had no funds, and the utmost they could do was to recommend him to the consideration of Congress. While there was no serious friction the conference seemed to have taken an air of brusqueness that irritated the Baron, who subsequently declared that Franklin addressed him in terms to which he "was then little accustomed." He consequently left Passy and returned to Beaumarchais, telling him of the result of the conference, that he proposed returning to Germany and wished to hear no more of America. The latter informed him if money was the only obstacle he would furnish him with a thousand *Louis d'ors* (about \$4,000) and more if needed. The Baron, while grateful for the offer remained inflexible, and announced his determination to leave the next day for Rastadt in Baden after calling on Count St. Germain. He met the latter on July 24, and told him that he had abandoned the American project, that he had not sufficient ready money to equip himself and suite. Besides that the whole matter rested on an uncertainty, that not long before one Du Coudrai had been rejected by Congress notwithstanding a pre-engagement with the American Commissioners, and, last, but not least he might be intercepted by British cruisers before reaching America, in which case he would have no claim whatever on America for the resulting loss and inconvenience. Germain was vexed at the outcome, but requested Steuben to remain a couple of days at Versailles and meet his former friend, Prince De Montbarey. That day after dinner Count de Aranda, the Spanish Ambassador, joined the party, and to him Germain introduced Steuben with the remark, "Here is a man who will risk nothing, consequently he will gain nothing."

It may be noted here that Spain was as anxious as France to see Britain humbled. In addition to the minor conflicts which had been carried on with more or less frequency since the destruction of the Great Armada, nearly two hundred years before, the capture of Gibraltar in 1704, and its subsequent retention ranked as a sore spot equal to that of Dunkirk in France. At the same time the result was too doubtful to justify an open conflict, besides the building up of an independent Anglo-Saxon power in America to threaten or furnish an example to the great Spanish Colonies was the last thing to be desired. Consequently the policy of Spain, like that of France, was to furnish sufficient aid to the Americans to keep England busy, with the hope that with the exhaustion of both combatants the two Bourbon kingdoms might reap some advantage. There was this difference, however, in France there existed a decided sympathy with the American cause on its merits, while in Spain there was nothing of the kind. In fact there could hardly be said that there was such a thing as public sentiment of any kind in Spain outside of Court circles. Bourbonism controlled everything.

Baron Steuben's notes, which furnished the basis for accounts of his personal movements at this time, do not disclose his conversation with Aranda, if he had any, but the same day he met Prince de Montbarey, who was also an active supporter of the American project. Both he and Germain urged Steuben to reconsider his determination, but he said he would visit Germany first, and then think over the matter.

He left for Rastadt the next day, where he met Prince Louis William, of Baden, who was a lieutenant-general in the Dutch Army, and Governor of Arnheim. Almost immediately he received a letter from Beaumar-

chais to the effect that Germain was expecting his return to Versailles, that a vessel was ready to leave Marseilles for America, and that he, Beaumarchais, would place at his disposal such funds as might be necessary. A similar letter was received from Germain urging his immediate return. Prince William was consulted, who urged Steuben not to hesitate but take his chances, and that such an opportunity to win distinction was not likely to repeat itself. This turned the scale, and Steuben decided to cast his lot with the insurgents. By arrangement with the King of Prussia he transferred his canonry at Havelberg, worth 4,600 francs per annum, to his nephew, Baron Van Canitz, and left for Paris. Arriving at Paris on August 17, 1777, the Baron on the 18th held a conference with St. Germain and Montbarey, where it was agreed that he would not endeavor to secure from the American Commissioners any money for traveling expense or otherwise, but inform them of his intended departure for the United States, and request letters of introduction to leading members of Congress, as he desired to enter their army simply as a volunteer. His reasons for this course were afterwards given in a letter to Alexander Hamilton, dated January 27, 1790, in which he says:

From the information I received from the ministers of France, that the preferment of foreigners to military employments had been a cause of discontent in the American army, I foresaw the necessity of pursuing a different course from that which had been adopted by my predecessors, in order to gain admission into your army. Being sure of success in my enterprise, as soon as the Commander-in-Chief should be aware of the advantages of my military arrangements, there was but one difficulty to surmount, and from the complexion of the times, that difficulty was of the greatest magnitude. It depended upon obtaining such a post in the army as would enable me to make use of the knowledge of my profession, and to render it beneficial to the interest of the United States, without exciting the

dissatisfaction and jealousy of the officers of your army. Any conditions proposed by me, under these circumstances, tending to insure me a recompense proportioned to my sacrifices and my services, would have rendered all my negotiations abortive. But proposals to serve the United States as a volunteer, without rank or pay, could give no umbrage. No person, sir, is better informed than yourself, how difficult it was, at that time, to introduce a foreigner into your army, even without any condition whatever. If, however, I should be charged with having made use of illicit stratagems to gain admission into the service of the United States, I am sure the army will acquit me, and I flatter myself, so also will the citizens of this republic in general.

By advice of the French ministers the Baron took the title of General, no doubt from his position in the Circle of Suabia already mentioned, which was in the main honorary, but which would be more effective in procuring him respectful attention abroad than that of Captain or aide-de-campe.

On August 19, by the introduction of Montbarey, Steuben had an audience with Count de Vergennes, who remarked: "You are determined then to go to America?" and upon Steuben asking him if he thought the idea extravagant, he replied, "On the contrary it is the road to fame and distinction, but I strongly recommend you to make arrangement before hand, and not rely too implicitly on republican generosity." This advice was timely as events proved, but Steuben replied that he had no conditions to make with the Americans, and if the republic proved ungrateful that the French authorities would not forget him. To this Vergennes replied, "You know very well that it is impossible for us to make conditions with you. I can only say to you, go—succeed, and you will never regret the step you have taken."

There seems to have been considerable discussion as to the reforms which Steuben was expected to introduce into the American army, such as better inspection of arms, accoutrements and everything pertaining to the

troops, more economical management of supplies, manœuvres, drill, battle formation &c. He secured letters of introduction from Franklin to Washington, Samuel Adams, Laurens, President of Congress, Robert Morris the financier, and other prominent men. The amount of money furnished by Beaumarchais is not stated, but that it was satisfactory appears from a letter written by him to his nephew, M. D. Francy, then in America, under date of December 6, 1778, in which he says:

Recall me often to the memory and good wishes of Baron de Steuben. I congratulate myself, from what he told me, of having given so great an officer to my friends the "free men," and having in a certain way forced him to follow his noble career. I am in no way uneasy about the money I lent him to start with. Never did I make so agreeable use of capital, for I have put a man of honor in his true place. I hear that he is the inspector general of all the American troops. Bravo! Tell him that his glory is the interest of my money, and that I do not doubt that on those terms he will pay me with usury.

Steuben had the choice of two ports from which to sail, L'Orient and Marseilles, and at the suggestion of Aranda he chose the latter. Beaumarchais had secured from the government the twenty-four gun ship, *Heureux*, which had been altered and the name changed to *Flamand*. It had been laden with a quantity of military stores including 1,700 pounds of powder, 22 tons of sulphur, 52 brass cannon, 19 mortars with a quantity of smaller items which would make a welcome addition to the scanty resources of the Americans. The party sailed from Marseilles on September 26, 1777, and besides the Baron included Peter S. Duponceau, his secretary and interpreter, De l'Enfant, De Romanai, Des Epinieres and De Pontiere, his aides; and M. De Francy above mentioned, who was traveling as Beaumarchais's agent in the endeavor to get his accounts straightened out with Congress. Steuben took the name of "Frank," and for

the benefit of any British cruisers which might overhaul them he bore dispatches from the French ministry to Marquis De Bouilly, Governor of Martinique. It is more than doubtful, however, if this would have availed anything had they been overhauled, for, although England and France were still nominally at peace their relations had become so strained that every movement was viewed with suspicion, and the captain of a British cruiser would have had little hesitancy in taking his prize into port once his suspicions were aroused.

Having started the Baron on his journey to his new field in what afterward became his adopted country, it will not be amiss to follow a little further the fortunes of the man who was largely if not chiefly instrumental in furnishing the facilities which enabled Steuben to take the step which changed his entire career. We have seen that by this time Beaumarchais under the name of Roderique Hortalez & Co., had involved himself in the American enterprise to the extent of five million francs, and although he had received 3,000,000 from the French and Spanish governments, yet that did not prevent him being seriously embarrassed. All his private means had gone into this scheme, and expectations of recoupment by supplies of tobacco and other American products had not been realized. The American deputies even claimed as their own a cargo of rice worth 150,000 francs, which had been brought over by the *Amphitrite* on her return trip. The deputies had by this time begun to ask and receive advances of money from the French government directly, and Congress was, for awhile, uncertain whether Beaumarchais was really carrying on business as a merchant or was in fact merely a political agent of France. Beaumarchais himself stoutly maintained the former, but Arthur Lee, who had returned to America, gave out the

latter impression. Congress was slow enough in carrying out its plain obligations, and hence it was not surprising that any claim upon which rested the least shadow was likely to receive slight attention. Nevertheless Beaumarchais did not relax his efforts, and on December 6, 1778, he writes to Francy that he has a fleet of more than twelve sail, well armed, ready to proceed to the colonies, laden with stores of every kind. He also approves of advances made to Lafayette and others, who, to our discredit, had been "devoured by American usurers." In the meantime, the capture of Burgoyne, in which the supplies furnished by Beaumarchais were an important factor, had so far raised the credit of the insurgents at Paris that the government had no hesitancy in advancing money to Deane and Franklin.

England was not ignorant of what was going on, and in August, 1777, possibly as much with the intention of bringing matters to a crisis as from any other motive made a suggestion to France to enter into a treaty guaranteeing to each other the possessions of the two Kingdoms in America. Threats were made that terms might be made with the Americans, when England would be at liberty to turn all her forces against France. This spider and fly proposition was declined, and Beaumarchais, fearful that the threat might be carried out, drew up numerous memorials to the government, protesting against further inaction, even drawing a form of manifesto, which could be and was afterwards used in notifying the Court of London that France had recognized the independence of the United States.

News of Burgoyne's surrender reached Paris on December 4, 1777. For months the outlook had been very discouraging, but it now appeared as though America would be able to hold her own. The ability to environ and defeat a large army of regular soldiers commanded

by experienced officers argued the existence of at least a defacto government, with which it would be good policy to enter into a treaty of commerce and amity. This was all that was contemplated in the first instance. John Adams was opposed to to anything more than a commercial connection by which arms, cannon, saltpetre, etc., could be purchased in France, and the original instructions to the commissioners contemplated nothing more.

An intimation to the commissioners that the matter would be taken up led to an interview on the 12th between Vergennes and his Chief Clerk Gerard (afterwards minister to the United States), on one side, and the commissioners on the other, and on the 16th Gerard called at Passy and informed the latter that the King was ready to recognize American independence and enter into a treaty of commerce as well as an eventual treaty of alliance. There was not much trouble in arranging the details, but it was at once recognized that the moment this treaty was promulgated England would make open war against France, with or without a formal declaration. Hence a treaty of alliance was made, to be kept secret and only to become operative in case England declared war against France. In that event the contracting parties were to make common cause, and neither party was to lay down its arms until the independence of the United States was acknowledged by England. The King was to make no conquests on the American continent outside of Florida and Louisiana, and the possessions of each of the contracting parties were respectively guaranteed to each other. Provision was also made for the admission of other parties to the alliance.

The treaties were signed on the 6th of February, but they were kept secret, and notice was not sent to London until March 13. Lord Stormont left Paris as soon as

he got word of the matters from his government, arriving at London on the 27th. As was expected England immediately began preparing for war with France, and the first shot was fired on June 18, 1778, when two English and French frigates came together in which the former, was worsted, but reinforcements having come up the Frenchman retired into Brest with twenty-five men killed and fifty-seven wounded.

At this point it may be profitable to inquire to what extent the aid extended by France contributed directly or indirectly to the successful issue of the war for independence, and whether national freedom could have been obtained without that aid. As has been noted there was a party in Congress opposed to an alliance with France or any other nation other than what a treaty of amity and commerce would naturally bring. Great as was the British empire the distance of its centre from the seat of war gave it a serious handicap, especially with the small and slow-going vessels of that day. On the other hand the Americans had a comparatively immense territory, which the thinly stretched line of Britain's small army could hardly expect to cover, and they had a goodly array of fighting men. The population of the thirteen colonies in 1774 was estimated at about 2,600,000, of which Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts held about half, and of which 500,000 were blacks. By the census of 1860, the State of Ohio had a population of 2,339,511, and during the four years of Civil War which followed, sent into the field an aggregate of 317,133 enlistments. Of course many of these men enlisted at least twice, but reducing the whole to a three-year average, gives 239,976 or nearly one in ten of the entire population. A similar basis would have given the revolutionists an army of 260,000. Massachusetts alone had 120,-

000 men capable of bearing arms. Of course nobody expected to put an army of even half that size in the field. The population was scattered over too great an extent of territory, and the proportion of those who were loyal to the British government was too large to permit anything of the kind. But allowing for all this the results were pitifully small. When Washington took command at Boston he found an army of 16,000 men of which 11,500 were from Massachusetts, and this was increased to 19,000 by reinforcements from Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia. This was the largest single army of the war if we except the combined American and French forces at Yorktown in 1781, while during the dark days at Valley Forge the effective force was below 3,000 men. Small as was this force it was poorly equipped, there was a deficiency of guns, powder, provisions and everything which goes toward making the army an efficient military machine. The men were enlisted for short periods, and not all the efforts put forth by Washington could induce Congress to make suitable provisions for these things. As we shall see later that body was powerless to accomplish all that was desired, but the prejudice against a standing army had much to do with the condition of affairs. When a colony was invaded the neighboring militia would come to the field, and frequently rendered efficient help, but it was untrained, and as soon as pressure at that particular point had been lifted (and sometimes before) it would disperse, leaving a mere skeleton of Continentals or regulars to hold the field or retreat as the situation permitted. On one occasion Washington called for 6,000 Massachusetts militia, to which 120 persons responded. The country was rich in natural resources, and had it been able to secure command of the sea could doubtless have acquired all that was needful to equip its



PORTRAIT OF STEUBEN, BY ANDREWS.
In the Public Library, Steubenville, O.

armies. But British cruisers prevented that, and the country being largely agricultural it was absolutely needful to procure these things from the outside as well as money. The latter probably could have been obtained, at least in the earlier years of the war, had there been an efficient system of taxation which there was not. Here was where the aid of France operated most strongly. Without the money and supplies sent from that country it is difficult to see how any sort of an army could have been kept in the field. To such an extent had this come to be relied on that the French authorities more than once protested, and advised the American authorities to help themselves. The French government was reimbursed after the war for the advances made. It should be noted, however, that no effective military operations were carried on by the allied forces until Rochambeau brought his troops to Washington's support at the siege of Yorktown. An abortive attempt was made on Rhode Island (not the present state but the island on which Newport stands) and a repulse was suffered in an effort to recapture Savannah, but whatever was accomplished on land was the work of Americans alone. A united America under good management could doubtless have effected its independence without outside aid, but America was far from being united, and the inefficiency, jealousies and even treason were so great, that only the wisdom and herculean efforts of Washington were able to conduct the ship of state through the stress and storm of those years into a safe harbor.

It may be interesting to note here the subsequent career of Beaumarchais who during this period had occupied the centre of the stage. We may also note here the fact that he was better known at that day, by the general public at least, as the writer of a popular comic operas

than as confidential agent of the government or the main-spring in furnishing supplies to the American insurgents. To-day, however, very few who listen to "The Barber of Seville," have any idea that it is based on Beaumarchais's original composition. He began this work in 1772, but owing to lawsuits and the efforts of his numerous enemies it was not presented until February 23, 1775, when it proved a failure. The author retouched it, however, and upon second trial was an unbounded success. Afterwards the inspiration of Rossini gave it a dress that insured its immortality. Its companion piece, "The Marriage of Figaro," was completed in 1778, but it also had its tribulations, mainly on account of its supposed political sentiments, and it was not presented until April 27, 1784, when it took Paris by storm. There were those present who persisted in discerning hidden political allusions in the composition, and as a result upon an order issued by the King, said to have been written at the card table with a pencil on the seven of spades, Beaumarchais was arrested and taken to St. Lazarre prison, from which, owing to murmurs of the people, he was released five days after. His specific offense was that he had compared Louis XVI. to a tiger. The enterprise as a whole, however, was profitable, and netted the author 2,275,625 francs. The Parisian popularity of the drama was doubtless due more to the libretto than the music, and it probably would soon have sunk into oblivion had it not been taken up and re-arranged by Mozart, whose melodies have given it a permanent place as a favorite with each succeeding generation.

The declaration of war by England and the treaty of alliance between France and the United States disposed of any further surreptitious dealings (if the almost open transactions of the preceding year could be called

such), and the firm of Hortalez & Co. went out of business. In the meantime Beaumarchais had collected a fleet of ten vessels laden with supplies to be conveyed across the ocean by the *Fier Roderique*, a sixty-gun frigate, which was expected to be more than a match for any accidental British cruiser which it might meet. When off the island of Grenada in the West Indies it encountered the fleet of Admiral d'Estaing, who was preparing to fight the English Admiral John Byron. Recognizing that the *Fier Roderique* would make a welcome addition to his force d'Estaing took possession of the vessel without regard to the transports, and in the engagement which followed the ship was riddled with balls and her captain killed. The French claimed the victory in this battle of July 6, 1779, as the British fleet retired, and great credit was given to Beaumarchais for the assistance rendered by his vessel. But this did not recoup his financial loss which was so heavy as to almost bankrupt him, but the French government subsequently indemnified him. He was active afterwards in raising funds to repair the loss of Count de Grasse's fleet in 1782 for which he received the commendation of M. de Vergennes. He also engaged in numerous private speculations, some fortunate and some otherwise, among the latter a great edition of Voltaire's works, then tabooed in France. Then came his presentation of "The Marriage of Figaro" to the advantage both of purse and reputation, although he devoted a considerable portion of the proceeds to charitable purposes. Other popular dramas kept him before the public no less than a series of lawsuits which prevented the people from forgetting him. In 1790 he built for himself near the site of the Bastille one of the most magnificent houses in Paris, in fact one which the people even of that gay city went to see a curiosity. The cost was over 1,600,000

francs, but when the government took over the property in 1818 to extend a boulevard, his heirs received only 500,000 francs. The furniture and ornaments were in keeping, in fact it is hard to tell just how much money was spent in this enterprise of which in less than thirty years not a trace remained.

Beaumarchais superintended the destruction of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, and during the early period of the revolution expected great things from that movement. He was still writing plays which drew crowds to the theatres, without anticipation of the troublous times which were to follow. In 1792 he undertook to procure for the revolutionary government, which was the only one then in France, 60,000 guns which had been deposited in Holland by Austria upon disarming of the Low Countries, but which were to be sent to the colonies to prevent their possible acquisition by France. De Grave, the minister of war, advanced for this purpose assignats of the face value of 500,000 francs, but whose actual value then was only about sixty per cent., as security for which Beaumarchais deposited paper worth more than twice that amount. He was to have further advances when needed. Events now succeeded each other with dazzling rapidity, and before arrangements could be completed with one ministry for the balance necessary to secure the guns it was succeeded by another. It was rumored that he had secreted the guns in his cellar, and a mob searched his house from top to bottom, but found nothing. Notwithstanding this he was arrested on the 23d of August, but on the 30th, just two days before the September massacres, he was released. Notwithstanding his narrow escape he went only a few miles from Paris, returning each night to urge the ministers to fulfill their contract. Finally he was sent to Holland for the guns with the promise

that a remittance should be sent him through the French Ambassador at the Hague. He went via London, where he borrowed quite a large sum from an English mercantile friend, but on arrival at the Hague found neither remittance nor instructions, and events proved that he was sent away merely to get rid of him. Finally he learned that he had been accused before the Convention of secret correspondence with Louis XVI. and divers other things. Private letters warned him to return to England as he was liable to be abducted, and the guillotine was sure to be his fate in Paris, provided he was not murdered on the way. He returned to London, and on receiving details of the accusations against him proposed returning to Paris to confute them, but his English creditor clearly anticipating the result of such a proceeding, declared that it would be too much "to lose both his money and his friend," and arrested the latter for debt. His detention at the probably not uncomfortable King's Bench prison was certainly preferable to a Parisian dungeon with release only through the guillotine, but sixty years of vicissitude had not daunted the vigor of our subject, and he spent his enforced retirement in preparing a memorial which would vindicate him with the people if not with his judges. His Paris agent having raised sufficient funds to secure his release, and learning that the Convention held his family and property as hostages, he returned to Paris in March, 1793. "I have come," he wrote to Santene, Commandant of the National Guard, "to offer my head to the sword of justice if I cannot prove that I am a great citizen." His address was long and daring, and unique in the annals of that period. He ridiculed Murat, then in power, and defended two ministers of Louis XVI., who had been joined in the accusation with him. His very audacity possibly caused a hesitancy on the part of

the cut-throats who controlled the Convention, but a more potent influence was the fact that the revolutionists now needed the guns, and the only way to get them was through Beaumarchais. The task was more difficult than at first, for rumors of the affair had reached the British government which was disposed to seize them as French property. So the Committee of Public Safety (what a misnomer) gave Beaumarchais a choice between condemnation or going a second time to Holland after the guns. The English merchant above referred to had been induced to claim the guns as his property, which delayed proceedings until Beaumarchais could reach them. He succeeded in retaining the guns at Tervere, where they were located, but the Reign of Terror was now on in full force at Paris, so that not only was nothing done towards securing them, but the Committee of Public Safety allowed the name of its own agent to be placed on the list of emigres, his property to be confiscated anew, and his wife, sister and daughter to be imprisoned. They would have undoubtedly have gone to the guillotine, but before they were reached the 9th Thermidor (July 27) had come when Robespierre was overthrown, and eleven days later they were released. But they were in poverty, the husband, brother and father was in Hamburg, a prey to anxiety and conflicting emotions; their property was put up for sale, and it was a problem as to how they were to live.

The English finally seized the guns, but after threatening to confiscate them paid a portion of their value to Beaumarchais's agent. Returning to Paris on July 5, 1796, Beaumarchais found himself practically ruined. Creditors were pressing him on every side, and even the state, which was found by one commission to owe him 997,875 francs, now claimed him to be a debtor to the

extent of 500,000 francs. He still lived in his palace, but had no money with which to pay taxes or make repairs. Nevertheless he continued to take interest in public affairs, pursued his literary labors, became friendly with Napoleon, and died suddenly of apoplexy on May 18, 1799.

While the affairs of Beaumarchais at his death were so complicated that his fortune was apparently dissipated yet by good management his estate in the course of ten years had been brought up to nearly a million francs. This seems to have been exclusive of a large claim against the American government which Beaumarchais had urgently pressed during his lifetime, and was carried on by his daughter after his death. It will be recollected that on June 10, 1776, Beaumarchais received from Count Vergennes one million francs, for which he obligated himself to render account to said Vergennes. There was nothing in the receipt showing the source of the fund or what was to be done with it, but everybody including the principals to the transaction knew that it came from the French government, and that it was to be used in the purchase of supplies to be forwarded to America. With this, supplemented subsequently by another million from Vergennes and one from Spain as well as his own private means, Beaumarchais opened the Hortalez establishment, and began the forwarding of supplies &c. to America, to be repaid in the products of that country, until as before stated, by the fall of 1777, he had shipped products to the value of fully 5,000,000 francs. But returns were slow, and although Congress passed a vote of thanks to Beaumarchais for his work yet that did not pay his debts. As the original transactions were secret there was considerable doubt in Congress as to whether he should be paid anything, especially as Arthur Lee had stated that these

goods were all furnished by the French government and that Beaumarchais was a mere figurehead. Finally this part was arranged, and on April 6, 1778, a formal contract was made by Congress acknowledging these claims, and in October of the following year bills of exchange amounting to 2,544,000 francs due three years after date, were sent to him through Franklin as payment on account. This was not very satisfactory, especially as an effort was afterwards made to avoid payment of these bills, but they had passed into the hands of third parties. Disgusted with Congress Beaumarchais tried for awhile to deal with the states separately, and sent two cargoes, one to Virginia and the other to South Carolina, which were promptly paid for—in paper money, whose depreciation made it almost worthless. In 1781 Silas Deane returned to France, when Beaumarchais presented his unsettled account of 3,600,000 francs, which hung fire for two years.

In the meantime, although the war was over, the American Congress, possessing no power of taxation, and the states treating requisitions with contempt, was under the necessity of making another appeal to France for funds, and in 1783, asked for a loan of 6,000,000 francs. The latter government before making this loan desired a re-statement of the accounts between the two governments. It was soon figured that the King had loaned 18,000,000 francs directly, and had guaranteed 10,000,000 loaned by Holland on which he had paid the interest, and now proposed to advance 6,000,000 more, making a total of 34,000,000. He also had inserted in the contract that previous to the treaty of alliance in 1778 he had gratuitously given 3,000,000 francs and 6,000,000 more in 1781, or 9,000,000 in all. Nobody disputed the item of 1781, but as Franklin and Deane had only received

2,000,000 previous to 1778 the query naturally arose as to whom was paid the other million. It was true that a concern known as the *Fermiers Generaux* had advanced a million previous to 1778, which was partly repaid in tobacco, and Franklin surmised that this might have come from the Crown. But inquiry being made of Vergennes the reply was that the King had nothing to do with it, but that the amount referred was a million delivered from the royal treasury on June 10, 1776, which was the exact date that Beaumarchais received his first advance. While the Congress of that day was better at borrowing than paying, yet this reply was a sufficient justification for holding off the claim of Beaumarchais until the matter should be cleared up, for if he had been furnished with this sum as a gratuity to America then certainly the latter country should receive credit for it in the final settlement. The subsequent conduct of the French authorities, however, indicated a shifting of ground, either because, as Beaumarchais claimed, he was to account to it and to it only for this disbursement, or from an unwillingness to embarrass a subject in his settlement with a foreign power. A copy of the acknowledgement was denied, and even the name of the party to whom the million was delivered was refused. The present writer does not make even a pretense towards unraveling a mystery which was a subject of dispute and a puzzle to able financiers for over half a century, but it occurs to us that the original inclusion of this million francs in the contract of 1783 was a *lapsus lingue* which was afterwards attempted to be avoided when it was found that it involved a French subject. It must be remembered that Beaumarchais was not a party to the contract of 1783, in fact knew nothing about it, and nothing was mentioned therein of the million subsequently advanced him or the

million advanced by Spain. We have no account of him ever having been called upon by either of those Courts to repay any of these advances, but inasmuch as America had benefited by these operations they doubtless thought that she should not be suffered to offset them against valuable services which had only partially been remunerated. Vergennes intimated as much, and his home government gave Beaumarchais moral support in pressing his claims. The Continental Congress passed into that of the Confederation and the Confederation into the Nation, and still our claimant was pressing for a settlement. Finally, in 1793, Congress referred the matter to Alexander Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, who, after careful investigation fixed the amount due at 2,280,000 francs, but suggested that settlement be deferred until further light be received from the French government concerning the disputed million. On June 24, 1794, Gouverneur Morris, United States Minister to the French republic, applied to Buchot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the receipt given by Beaumarchais, which was turned over to him. This was sufficient for Congress to refuse further allowance, although Beaumarchais vigorously declared that he had not received this or any sum as a gift, but that all the money furnished him was as a loan or investment. So the controversy went on year after year, and the persistence of Beaumarchais was met by Congress with equal stubbornness, that body taking the position that the interest on this million francs had absorbed the balance due as found by Hamilton, and consequently they did not owe the claimant anything.

Upon Beaumarchais's death the claim was taken up by his daughter, and in 1816 the United States Government asked the Duke de Richelieu, French minister of foreign affairs if his government would declare formally

that this million furnished June 10, 1776, had nothing in common with the supplies furnished by Beaumarchais to the United States. He did so, but that did not settle the matter. Presidents Madison and Monroe in special messages to Congress advised settlement of the claim, two Attorneys-General declared in favor of its legality, one committee of Congress had reported in its favor and one against, and in 1824 the daughter of Beaumarchais with her grandson, appeared personally at the Capitol. Finally the claim was pushed in the name of France, and in 1835, the matter was finally settled on the payment of 800,000 francs. Beaumarchais estimated his loss in the Virginia transaction at 3,000,000 francs through the depreciation of paper money, so that even granting that he had received a subvention of 3,000,000 francs which was never expected to be repaid, his American transactions do not seem to have been very profitable.

CHAPTER IV.

JOURNEY TO AMERICA.

An Eventful Voyage—Storms, Fire and Mutiny—Reception at Portsmouth and Boston—Journey to York—The Continental Congress—Resume of That Body and Its Authority—Desperate Condition of the Colonies.

We interrupted the story of Baron Steuben's career to trace the character of one but for whose aid the Baron would probably not have come to America, and whose operations at a critical period were of greater importance than might be inferred from the meagre outlines usually given in the histories.

Returning to the subject of this biography, it may be said that like an ancient navigator who had left his native land in search of a new country, much was he tossed about at least on sea if not on land. From almost the day of sailing the *Flamand* encountered violent gales, the first of three days' duration off the African coast with no Father Neptune present to calm the elements. Three times did her forecastle take fire, and the destruction of the ship with its 1,700 pounds of gunpowder on board seemed almost a certainty. Then the crew mutinied and there was a battle of fourteen to eighty-four, the passengers being in the former list, before the ringleaders were secured. Off the coast of Nova Scotia (they were evidently on the northerly route) another storm threatened to send the ship and contents to the bottom. Mr. Kapp writes of the Baron as "hastening to his journey's end, and trying to relieve the monotony of life on shipboard by mathematical calculations, exercising his companions in shooting at a mark, or reading books like the *Abbe*

Raynal on America." We are not disposed to take issue with this statement, but from the facts related above, and which are also taken from Mr. Kapp's work, it can hardly be claimed that the voyage was a monotonous one or very favorable for target practice, although the shooter who could hit a mark while the vessel was on its beam ends, would have no occasion to blush for his work under more favorable circumstances. But all things, even ocean voyages, must come to an end in some way and on December 1, 1777, after a most temptuous voyage of sixty-six days the Flamand sailed into the harbor of Portsmouth, N. H., which was at the time the usual port for vessels coming from France. Duponceau thus writes of their arrival: "It was a fine, clear, bright day. Nature had put on her gaudiest attire, no doubt to receive us."

We have some doubt as to the gaudiness of nature at that date on the New England coast, but to the seaworn mariners anything on earth under a bright sky looked good. That the Baron was of the same opinion is apparent from the following letter written at this time to his friend, Frank, in Hechingen:

The more disastrous the passage the more flattering was my arrival in America. Before entering the port of Portsmouth I ordered my secretary to go ashore in a boat, and to inform General Langdon, the commander of the place, of my arrival, who came on board himself to take me and my officers ashore in his boat. While we were landing, we were saluted by the guns from the fortress and from the ships in the port. Several thousand of inhabitants welcomed me in the most flattering way. Mr. Langdon took us to his house to dine. In the meantime all the inhabitants of the place crowded together "to see the elephant?" Although exhausted by the hardships of the voyage I went the next day to examine the fortifications; on the following day I received the troops of the garrison.

It had been understood by the Baron that the Americans had adopted the British uniform, and consequently he and his suite were arrayed in red coats with blue trim-

mings, which at first caused them to be taken for enemies, but this was soon rectified. News of Burgoyne's surrender on October 17, previous, was announced to the guests at Langdon's dinner the next day, at which everybody felt greatly encouraged. Steuben's first care was to write to Congress and General Washington announcing his arrival and tendering his services, also inclosing copies of introductory letters from Deane, Franklin and Beaumarchais. His letter to Congress, dated December 6, is as follows:

Honorable Gentlemen: The honor of serving a nation engaged in the noble enterprise of defending its rights and liberties, was the motive that brought me to this continent. I ask neither riches nor titles. I am come here from the remotest end of Germany, at my own expense, and have given up an honorable and lucrative rank. I have made no condition with your deputies in France, nor shall I make with you. My only ambition is to serve you as a volunteer, to deserve the confidence of your general in chief, and to follow him in all his operations, as I have done during seven campaigns with the King of Prussia. Two and twenty years spent in such a school seem to give me a right of thinking myself among the number of experienced officers; and if I am possessed of the acquirements in the art of war, they will be much more prized by me if I can employ them in the service of a republic such as I hope soon to see in America. I should willingly purchase, at the expense of my blood, the honor of having my name enrolled among those of the defenders of your liberty. Your gracious acceptance will be sufficient for me, and I ask no other favor than to be received among your officers. I venture to hope that you will grant this, my request, and that you will be so good as to send me your orders to Boston, where I shall await them, and take suitable measures in accordance.

To Washington he wrote much to the same effect:

Sir: The enclosed copy of a letter, the original of which I shall have the honor to present to your excellency will inform you of the motives that brought me over to this land. I shall only add to it, that the object of my present ambition is to render your country all the service in my power, and to deserve the title of citizen of America by fighting for the cause of your liberty. If the distinguished ranks in which I have served in Europe should be an obstacle, I had rather serve under your

Excellency as a volunteer than to be an object of discontent to such deserving officers as have already distinguished themselves among you. Such being the sentiments I have always possessed, I dare hope that the respectable Congress of the United States of America will accept my services. I could say moreover, were it not for the fear of offending your modesty, that your Excellency is the only person under whom, after having served the King of Prussia, I could wish to follow a profession, to the study of which I have wholly devoted myself. I intend to go to Boston in a few days, where I shall present my letters to Mr. Hancock, member of Congress, and there I shall await your Excellency's orders.

It is not to be supposed that the excellent English in which the above letters are couched came directly from the Baron. We have already seen that one objection to him coming to America was that, unlike German officers of to-day, he knew little or nothing of the language of his new associates, and although he doubtless applied himself to study and practice in this direction, yet there had not been sufficient time or opportunity to acquire more than a mere smattering of his new tongue. In fact his deficiency in this direction was a serious handicap during the early part of his American career, and he did not speak English fluently until long after his arrival in this country. He doubtless dictated his letters to Duponceau in German, or French, who rendered them into good English.

Before following the Baron on his travels, it may be interesting to note the military situation at this time. Since Washington had compelled the evacuation of Boston on the 16th of March, 1776, Massachusetts had been entirely free from British troops, in fact the war was over so far as any occupation of that colony was concerned. With the exception of sporadic forays and harrowing of the coast the same might be said of all New England except the posts at Penobscott and Rhode Island, whose limited occupation had no appreciable influence on the

fortunes of war, and whose effect did not extend any distance into the interior. The surrender of Burgoyne through Schuyler's well laid plans, had relieved all immediate apprehension as to the highlands of the Hudson or that the northeastern portion of the Confederacy could be cut off, from the remainder. The British had command of the sea which, while not sufficient to suppress American privateering, was invaluable in the movement of troops, as there were no interior communications except over unimproved roads which in the rainy season were converted into bottomless pits. There had been one or two abortive expeditions against the South, but their failure saved that section from the horrors of war for two years longer. In the centre, however, the situation was different. With a strong fleet and army the British held New York in a firm grip, and "Philadelphia had taken Howe" on September 26th preceding. Congress had retreated to Lancaster, Pa., and then to York, where it was carrying on the shadow of government, while Washington with the remnant of his forces had taken refuge in the woods of Valley Forge, twenty-three miles distant, where they were to spend the winter. New Jersey was destined to be the field of contending armies until near the close of the war, and from that cause probably suffered more than any other state. It will thus be seen that by keeping a sufficient distance from the coast to escape marine marauders and yet not so far as to be within the recognized territories of the Indians, there was reasonable facility of communication from one end of the Confederation to the other, barring the ordinary perils of travel in a primitive country, including those from robbers and false brethren, otherwise Tories.

After a delay of twelve days in Portsmouth, Steuben left for Boston, where he arrived on the 14th, the journey

taking two days. Here he was well received and met John Hancock, who had just come from Congress at York, of which he had been president. Congress had ordered that preparations be made as complete as possible for the Baron's journey to York, and Hancock superintended the arrangements which were quite extensive, five negroes being engaged as drivers and grooms, and everything else in proportion. Washington's reply had directed Steuben to go to York, as it was only with Congress that negotiations could be made. All this took about five weeks, and in the meantime the Baron was hospitably received at dinner parties and elsewhere. Among the amusing incidents of that time Duponceau tells of a dinner party given by Mr. Hancock to the Baron where he (Duponceau) sat next to Samuel Adams, and happened to call him Mr. John Adams: "Sir," said he, looking sternly at Duponceau, "I would have you know that there is a great difference between Mr. Samuel Adams," striking his breast and laying a strong emphasis on the word Samuel, "and Mr. John Adams," (they were second cousins). Duponceau says this remark let him into the little jealousies that existed between some of the great men of the day, and he was afterwards on his guard against addressing people by their Christian names.

The party left Boston on January 14, 1778, and the Baron's secretary has fortunately preserved a pretty full account of their travels through the hinterland towards Pennsylvania. Duponceau tells us that—

"Our party consisted of Baron Steuben and his servant, Carl Vogel, a young lad whom he had brought from Germany, M. De Francy, an agent of Beaumarchais and myself. We traveled on horseback. Notwithstanding the recent capture of General Burgoyne, the situation of the United States at that time was extremely critical. The

enemy was in possession of Rhode Island, New York and Philadelphia, with well organized and disciplined troops, far superior in number to our own. Our army (if army it might be called) was encamped at Valley Forge, in the depth of a severe winter, without provisions, without clothes, without regular discipline, destitute, in short, of everything but courage and patriotism, and what was worse than all, disaffection was spreading through the land. In this dismal state of things the Baron was advised to keep as far from the coast as possible, lest he should be surprised by parties of the enemy or by the Tories, who made frequent incursions into the country between New York and Philadelphia. We, therefore, shaped our course westward, crossing the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York and Pennsylvania. We employed about three weeks in a journey of four hundred and ten miles in all, which at present (1836) would hardly require as many days."

The party were at Springfield on Sunday, January 18, Hartford, Conn., on the 20th, crossed the Hudson at Fishkill, 58 miles above New York on the 28th, reached Bethlehem, Pa., on the 30th, Reading on February 2, Manheim on the 4th, and York on the 5th. No accident or misfortune befell the party while en route, but some of their adventures as related by Duponceau were quite interesting, among them the following:

"We had been cautioned against putting up at a certain tavern in Worcester County, Massachusetts, not far from the frontier of Connecticut. We were told that the landlord was a bitter Tory, and that he would refuse to receive us, or at least treat us very ill. We determined to avoid that place if it were possible. Unfortunately, when we were some distance from it, we were surprised by a violent snow storm; it was in the evening, and we

were compelled to take shelter in the very house we wished to avoid. We had not been misinformed. The landlord at once said that he could not accommodate us. He had no beds, no bread, no meat, no drinks, no milk, no eggs; all that he could offer us were the bare walls. In vain we remonstrated and prayed, he remained inflexible. At last Baron Steuben grew impatient and flew into a violent passion. After exhausting all his store of German oaths, he called in that language to his servant to bring his pistols, which he did. Then the Baron, presenting the deadly weapon at the frightened landlord, repeated the questions that he had in vain asked before: "Have you any bread, meat, beds, &c.?" The answers were such as we desired; we were accommodated with good beds and a good supper, and our horses were properly taken care of. In the morning after our breakfast, we politely took leave of our host, who though a Tory did not refuse the continental money in which we liberally paid him.

"Another anecdote which I now recollect, is strictly characteristic of those times. As we passed through the State of Connecticut, we put up one night at a house, where, for some reason that I do not remember, we were all obliged to sleep on the floor in the same room with the family, some on feather beds and some on blankets; men, women and children, had all to bundle together, as it was called. The bedding was spread all around the room, and everyone took his place and went very composedly to sleep. The utmost decency was observed, though no fuss was made about it. There was so much innocence and simplicity in the manner in which these arrangements were prepared and made, that the idea of indelicacy did not even occur to us, and if in the morning we indulged in a smile at manners to which we were so little accus-

tomed, nothing was said or thought to the prejudice of the morality of the good people who had entertained us in the best manner they were able. (The same conditions prevailed among the inhabitants of the Virginia mountains down at least to the Civil War period, and similar instances may no doubt yet be found in out of the way places).

"A great number of inns in town and country, bore the sign of the King of Prussia, who was still very popular, particularly among the Germans. I remember that at Manheim, the Baron with a significant look, pointed out to me, at the tavern where we dined, a paltry engraving hung up on the wall on which was represented a Prussian knocking down a Frenchman in great style. Underneath was the following appropriate motto:

"*Ein Franzman zum Prenzen Wie eine Muecke.*"

(A Frenchman to a Prussian is no more than a mosquito.)

"The good Baron appeared to enjoy that picture exceedingly, and so no doubt did the German landlord to whom it belonged."

Baron Steuben's reception at York was a repetition of that at Boston. Gen. Gates, who was then cabaling against Washington, invited the Baron to become his guest during his stay, which offer was prudently declined. On the next day after his arrival he writes to Hancock:

Please to accept my grateful thanks for all the kindness you have shown me during my stay in Boston. In this very moment I enjoy the good effects of it, having taken the liberty of quartering myself in an apartment of your house in this town. My journey has been extremely painful, but the kind reception I have met with from Congress and General Gates on my arrival here has made me forget those past inconveniences. Now, sir, I am an American, and an American for life; your nation has become as dear to me as your cause already was. You know that my pretensions are very moderate; I have submitted them to a committee sent to me by Congress. They seem to be

satisfied, and so am I, and shall be the more so when I find the opportunity to render all the services in my power to the United States of America. Three members of Congress have been appointed for concluding an arrangement with me to-morrow; that will not take long, my only claim being the confidence of your general in chief.

It will not be amiss here to say a few words concerning the body before which Steuben was to appear. As early as 1765, upon the suggestion of James Otis, of Massachusetts, that colony with Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and South Carolina selected delegates to a gathering at New York to prepare a joint protest against the stamp act and other proceedings of the English parliament. Governor Dunmore prevented the assembling of the Virginia legislature, and so no delegates were present from that colony, although public sentiment favored the Congress. This assembly, which met on October 7, adjourned after preparing suitable memorials to the King, and did not attempt to exercise any legislative power. Events progressed rapidly during the next nine years, and in 1774 Virginia took the initiative in proposing a general Congress in spite of the efforts of the Royalist governor to prevent it. It may be news to many persons that the principal grievance set forth by the statesmen of the Old Dominion, of that day, so far as they were personally concerned, was that in spite of their repeated protests the King of England had forced them into tolerating human slavery. The troubles in the northern colonies, such as the matter of tea, the billeting of troops &c. were to them matters of principle and sympathy with their troubled brethren, rather than the experience of personal suffering. But slavery they did not want, and they proposed to get rid of it if possible. Had any one at that time ventured the prediction that Virginia would at some

future time engage in a war for the preservation of slavery he would have been classed as an idiot. In fact it would probably not be too much to say that negro slavery was more popular in New England than in Virginia until climatic conditions demonstrated its undesirability.

Thomas Jefferson was prevented by illness from attending the convention which was called to consider the situation, but sent a paper that was presented by Peyton Randolph in which, after enumerating general wrongs he proceeds to this pointed declaration: "The abolition of domestic slavery is the great object of desire in those colonies where it was unhappily introduced in their infant state. But, previous to the enfranchisement of the slaves we have, it is necessary to exclude all further importations from Africa; yet our repeated attempts to effect this by prohibitions, and by imposing duties which might amount to a prohibition, have hitherto been defeated by his majesty's negative, thus preferring the immediate advantage of a few British corsairs to the lasting interests of the American states, and to the rights of human nature, deeply wounded by this infamous practice."

Brave words these, which the convention unanimously endorsed by the following resolution: "After the first day of November next we will neither ourselves import nor purchase any slave or slaves imported by any other person, either from Africa, the West Indies, or any other place."

George Washington, Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, Edmund Pendleton and Peyton Randolph were elected delegates, and when the first Congress met in Carpenters' Hall in Philadelphia, on September 5, 1774, the last named was elected President. Forty-three delegates representing eleven colonies were present, North

Carolina coming in on the 14th, and Georgia not until the following year.

As to personnel this gathering probably never had a superior in the world's history. The two Adams's, John Hancock, Roger Sherman, Edward Rutledge and Livingstones were only leading illustrations of the representative men from every colony. The new body called itself the Congress, but what were its powers and duties, and whence were they derived? One historian writing of it at this period speaks of it as the Government, but qualifies his expression by adding, "If such a body could be called a government." "The delegates themselves were not clear on this point; some had been sent by legislatures of the different colonies, and some by conventions of the people, some claimed their authority to rest upon the natural rights of man, and others upon historical precedents which it must be confessed were not very strong. It could hardly be called anything more than a committee, whose acts unless ratified by some power behind them, had no more legal force than the resolutions of a literary or historical society." Yet during the seven years of its existence "it exercised some of the highest functions of sovereignty which are possible to any governing body. It declared the independence of the United States; it contracted an offensive and defensive alliance with France: it raised and organized a Continental army; it borrowed large sums of money, and pledged what the lenders understood to be the national credit for their repayment; it issued an inconvertible paper currency, granted letters of marque, and built a navy. All this it did in the exercise of what in later times would have been called implied war powers, and its authority rested upon the general acquiescence in the purpose for which it acted, and in the measures which it adopted." [Fiske].

Von Holst in his able Constitutional History takes the advanced ground "that Congress being a revolutionary body from its origin, the people by recognizing its authority placed themselves on a revolutionary footing, not as belonging to the several colonies but as a moral person;" for to the extent that Congress assumed power to itself and made bold to adopt measures national in their nature, to that extent the colonists declared themselves prepared henceforth to constitute one people, inasmuch as the measures taken by Congress could be translated from words into deeds only with the consent of the people. Reasoning from these premises our historian concludes that there never was any such thing as a sovereign state in this country, that when the people of the colonies sent their delegates to the Congress, and that body assumed the sovereign functions of carrying on war, making treaties &c., the authority which had been recognized in the British crown was transferred bodily to Congress, which by virtue of its revolutionary authority became the sole repository of power. Hence the Articles of Confederation which were afterwards proposed were not only a limitation of the powers previously possessed by Congress, but their adoption by the legislatures of the different states was illegal, null and void. This was a matter of not much moment, however, as these Articles were found from their start to be unworkable, and the country was fast drifting into anarchy, when the genius and patriotism of Washington and his associates again came to the front and framed the present Constitution, where the "One people" of the Declaration of Independence, obscured or ignored by the "Union between the States" according to the Articles of Confederation," was restored by "We the People," of the existing instrument, and this Constitution was ratified, not by the legislatures of the

various states, but by Conventions chosen directly by the people for this purpose.

But whether we regard the powers of the Continental Congress as theoretically autocratic, according to Von Holst, or simply those of a committee of recommendation, according to other historians, it will be more profitable to consider what it actually did, rather than according to precedents it was empowered to do. There is no doubt that its force in the beginning existed largely in the character of the men who composed it. Those who controlled its councils exercised a similar influence in the local assemblies, and this with public opinion at their backs gave to their recommendations the force of law. The idea of independence was not formally considered in either the first or second Congress. Memorials to the King, voluntary abstention from commercial intercourse and passive resistance were the weapons with which it hoped to restore to the people their rights as British subjects. But Lexington, Concord and Bunker's Hill shattered the hopes in that direction, and when Congress on June 15, 1775, elected George Washington, Commander in Chief of the "Continental Army," then back of Boston, it assumed in effect the highest functions of government, although more than a year was to elapse before the formal declaration of independence was made. Canada was invaded and Montgomery lost his life, Washington had compelled the evacuation of Boston, and the Southern states had actively resisted aggression, yet still America was counted as part of the British Empire. But the colonies were already practically independent, and Virginia formally so by the adoption of a bill of rights which furnished the model for the great state paper, which, published on July 4, 1776, created the American Nation. Thus Congress proceeded as a body with unlimited pow-

ers to the culmination of its work. It authorized armies, appointed commanders, and issued state papers *ad libitum*, and at the beginning the patriotism and enthusiasm of the insurgents prevented the weakness of the government from becoming too apparent. But the wit of man has never yet devised a government that can exist on enthusiasm. It may call spirits from the vasty deep, but will they come? Congress soon discovered that they would not. As it had no power to coerce a state or the citizens thereof it could only request money, men and supplies, and frequently none was forthcoming. The Continental army was at all times pitifully small, and more than once on the verge of starvation, without sufficient clothing to cover its nakedness. Almost the sole material resources of the Government were derived from French loans, voluntary contributions or the costly expedient of paper money issues which soon became practically valueless. As a result of this condition the character of Congress itself rapidly deteriorated; the original leaders were in the army or at home taking part in the state governments. Had there been unity much of these evils might have been overcome, but, as if the situation were not bad enough, there were cabals and factions which threatened disaster, and while Washington with his little army was doing his best to confine the British to New York and neighborhood there were plots to displace him and put Gates in his place. There was such a prejudice against anything like a standing army that it was some time before Congress, in response to the General's earnest appeals, agreed to authorize a national force of eighty-eight battalions, about 44,000 men, and even then the matter might almost as well have been let alone, as only a small fraction of that force was ever raised, and to the end the battles of the Revolution were fought by insignifi-

cant forces of Continentals, supplemented in most cases by militia from that or adjoining states.

That Duponceau fully realized the situation is evident from his following description of the situation during his stay at York:

The Congress of the United States were not at that time the illustrious body whose eloquence and wisdom, whose stern virtues and unflinching patriotism had astonished the world. Their number was reduced to about one-half of what it was when independence was declared; all but a few of the men of superior minds had disappeared from it. Their measures were feeble and vacillating and their party feuds seemed to forebode some impending calamity. The enemy were in possession of our capital city; the army we had to oppose to them were hungry, naked and destitute of everything. No foreign government had yet acknowledged our independence—everything around us was dark and gloomy. The only ray of light which appeared amidst the darkness was the capture of Burgoyne, which cheered the spirits of those who might otherwise have despaired of the commonwealth. But that brilliant victory had nearly produced the most fatal consequences. Saratoga was then what New Orleans has been since, the watchword of the discontented. A party was formed even in Congress, to raise the conqueror of Burgoyne to the supreme command of our armies. But the great figure of Washington stood calm and serene at his camp at Valley Forge, and struck the conspirators with awe. With the exception of a few factious chiefs, he was idolized by the army and by the nation at large. The plot was discovered and the plan frustrated without a struggle. Without any effort or management on his part, and by the mere force of his character, Washington stood firm and undaunted in the midst of his enemies, and I might almost say, looked them in the face. Such was the state of things when we arrived at York. Parties were then at their height, but as Congress sat with closed doors, the country at large was not agitated as it would otherwise have been. There were not wanting out of doors disaffected persons who railed at King "Cong.," and the bunch of "Kings" (such was the slang of the day among the Tories) but the great mass of the people was still in favor of the Revolution, and the press did not dare to utter a sentiment inimical to it.

CHAPTER V.

CONGRESS AND VALLEY FORGE.

Final Arrangements Made—Departure for the Army—Terrible Condition of the Troops—Supplies and Discipline Equally Absent—Enormous Waste—Welcomed by Washington—Appointed Temporary Inspector—Radical Reforms Introduced.

Upon information that Baron Steuben had arrived at York Congress appointed a committee consisting of Dr. John Witherspoon, of New Jersey; Messrs. Henry, of Maryland, and Thomas McKean, of Delaware, to wait on him and ascertain the terms on which he was willing to serve in the Continental army, and whether he had entered into any arrangement with Deane and Franklin. The conversation was carried on in French through Dr. Witherspoon, who acted as interpreter. As to previous arrangements the Baron declared that there were none, and he did not demand any rank or pay. He desired to join the army as a volunteer under the direction of the commander-in-chief, stating that he had relinquished places and posts in Germany amounting to about 600 guineas (\$3,000) per annum, and in consideration of this he expected the United States to defray his necessary expenses while in the service; that if this country should fail to establish its independence, or if he should not succeed in his endeavors, in either of these cases he should consider the United States as free from any obligations towards him; but if on the other hand, the United States should be fortunate enough to establish their freedom, and if his efforts should be successful, in that case he should expect full indemnification for the sacrifice he had made in coming over, and such marks of their liberality

as the justice of the United States should dictate. He required commissions for the officers attached to his person, that of major and aide-de-campe for De Romanai, captain of engineers for De l'Enfant, captain of cavalry for De Depontiere, and captain for his secretary, Duponceau.

More generous terms could hardly have been offered as the Baron not only tendered his services freely to Congress, but had given up a substantial income and home comforts and surroundings to embark in a doubtful adventure in a new country. The committee reported to Congress at once, which forthwith adopted the following resolutions:

Whereas Baron Steuben, a lieutenant general in foreign service, has in a most disinterested and heroic manner offered his services to these states as a volunteer,

Resolved, That the President present the thanks of Congress in behalf of these United States, to Baron Steuben, for the zeal he has shown for the cause of America, and the disinterested tender he has been pleased to make of his military talents, and inform him that Congress cheerfully accept of his services as a volunteer in the army of these states, and wish him to repair to General Washington's quarters as soon as convenient.

All arrangements being complete the Baron and party left York for Valley Forge on the morning of February 19, and arrived at Lancaster, Pa., early in the afternoon of the same day. Lancaster was 24 miles east of York in an air line, of course a little farther by the usual roads. It was then the largest inland town in the United States, and on his arrival the Baron was received by a committee with Colonel Gibson at the head, and the party were invited to a subscription ball to be given that evening in their honor. The elite of the vicinity were present, and the Baron was no doubt highly pleased that many of the young ladies could converse with him in his native tongue, the community having been largely composed of

German settlers, whose thrift with that of their descendants has made that section one of the garden spots of the country. There was a banquet, and the festivities continued until 2 A. M.

Here he met William North, who afterwards became his aide-de-camp and adopted son, who remarks in a note, "His reputation had preceded him, and those who remember his graceful entry and manner in a ball room, the novel splendor of his star and its accompanying ornaments, can easily conceive the feelings of his countrymen and of their assembled wives and daughters; they might indeed, with honest feeling, have thanked God that they had no reason to be ashamed of him."

Whether the Baron remained over the next day at Lancaster to recuperate from the festivities we are not told. It was something over fifty miles from there to Valley Forge, which was easily covered by the 23d when the cavalcade arrived at its destination. Washington was already apprised of its coming, and Steuben writes; "Upon my arrival in camp I was again the object of more honors than I was entitled to. General Washington came several miles to meet me on the road, and accompanied me to my quarters, where I found an officer with twenty-five men as a guard of honor. When I declined this, saying that I wished to be considered merely as a volunteer, the general answered me in the politest words that the whole army would be gratified to stand sentinel for such volunteers. He introduced me to Major-General Lord Stirling and several other generals. On the same day my name was given as watchword. The following day the army was mustered, and General Washington accompanied me to review it. To be brief, if Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, or the greatest field



JONATHAN STEUBEN'S BIRTHPLACE.



CONGRESS HALL, YORK, PA., 1778.

marshal of Europe had been in my place he could not have been received with greater honor than I was."

Four days later Washington in notifying Congress of the Baron's arrival, says: "He appears to be much of a gentleman, and as far as I have had an opportunity of judging, a man of military knowledge and acquainted with the world." The first favorable impression which these two great men received of each other only deepened upon close acquaintance.

While the sufferings of the patriot army at Valley Forge during the dark winter of 1777-78 have not been exaggerated it is not necessary to recapitulate them here. The whole story may be summed up in the statement that of the 17,000 men who at least nominally composed the force at the beginning of the winter sickness, nakedness, death and desertions had reduced the number in February to a little over 5,000. There were provisions in the country, but not all Washington's vigorous remonstrances and petitions could move Congress to act effectively in furnishing the suffering troops with the necessities of life, let alone a proper military equipment. Thomas Conway, born in Ireland, educated in France, and an adventurer in America, had been appointed inspector-general of the army sometime before, but he was more occupied in fomenting conspiracies against the commander-in-chief than in performing the duties of his office, finally resigning his commission in April, the most commendable act of his official career. Washington was also aware that in order to make effective soldiers of the Continentals they must be taught regular military tactics, to maneuver in concert, to obey promptly and automatically and operate generally as an effective machine. The militia, acquainted with the use of arms, as were all the frontiersmen of that day could do most effective work

while behind entrenchments at Bunker's Hill, and later at New Orleans, but under reversed conditions or in the open field they were practically useless before the trained veterans of Europe. With his multiplicity of duties Washington could not undertake this work, even if he were fitted for it, which is doubtful, for it has been demonstrated that the qualities of a great general and drillmaster are seldom if ever united in the same person, as was demonstrated at awful cost in our late Civil War. Had Washington been a McClellan, it is safe to say that American independence would never have been won. So it is not surprising that Steuben was a welcome addition to the military family at Valley Forge, and that Washington, who was not slow in discerning the good qualities of his associates, soon realized that he had a valuable asset in Frederick's aide-de-camp. It will not be amiss to detail some of the Baron's impressions on reaching camp. He says:

My determination must have been very firm that I did not abandon my design when I saw the troops. Matters had to be remedied, but where to commence was the great difficulty. In the first place I informed myself relative to the military administration. I found that the different branches were divided into departments. There were those of the quartermaster general, war commissary, provisions commissary, commissary of the treasury, or paymaster, of forage &c. But they were all bad copies of a bad original. That is to say, they had imitated the English administration, which is certainly the most imperfect in Europe. * * * Each company and quartermaster had a commission of so much per cent. on all money he expended. It was natural, therefore, that expense was not spared—that wants were discovered where there were none; and it was also natural that the dearest articles were those that suited the commissioners best. Hence the expense of so many millions.

The effective strength of the army was divided into divisions, commanded by major generals; into brigades commanded by brigadier generals; and into regiments, commanded by colonels. The number of men in a regiment was fixed by Congress, as well as in a company—so many infantry, cavalry and artillery. But the eternal ebb and flow of men engaged for three, six and

nine months, who went and came every day, rendered it impossible to have either a regiment or a company complete; and the words company, regiment, brigade, and division were so vague that they did not convey any idea upon which to form a calculation, either of a particular corps or of the army in general. They were so unequal in their number that it would have been impossible to execute any maneuvers. Sometimes a regiment was stronger than a brigade. I have seen a regiment consisting of thirty men, and a company of one corporal. Nothing was so difficult, and often so impossible, as to get a correct list of the state or a return of any company regiment, or corps. As in the English service, there was a muster-master general, with a number of assistants. It was the duty of this officer to ascertain and report every month the effective state of the army, for the payment of men and officers. This operation took place as follows: each captain made a roll of his company, whether absent or present, after which he made oath before a superior officer that this return was correct "to the best of his knowledge and belief." The muster-master counted the men present, and the absent were marked by him for their pay upon the oath of the captain. I am very far from supposing that an officer would voluntarily commit a fraud, but let us examine the state of the companies, and we shall see the correctness of such returns. The company had twelve men present; absent, one man as a valet to the commissary, two hundred miles distant from the army, for eighteen months; one man valet to a quartermaster attached to the army of the north, for twelve months; two as drivers of carriages; and so many more as bakers, blacksmiths, carpenters, even as coal porters, for years together, although the greater number were only engaged for nine months at the outset. But a man once on the roll of a company remained there everlastingly, as forming part of the effective strength, except in case of death or desertion, under the very eyes of the captain.

According to these rolls the strength of the army for pay and provisions was calculated. The regimental returns furnished to the adjutant general every week, for the information of the general in chief, as to the strength of the army, were not much more exact. I am sure that at that time a general would have thought himself lucky to find a third of the men ready for action whom they found on paper.

The soldiers were scattered about in every direction. The army was looked upon as a nursery for servants, and every one deemed it his right to have a valet; several thousand soldiers were employed in this way. We had more commissioners and quartermasters at that time than all the armies of Europe together; the most modest had only one servant, but others had two and even three. If the captains and colonels could give no account of their men they could give still less an account of their arms, accoutrements, clothing, ammunition, camp equip-

age, etc. Nobody kept an account but the commissaries, who furnished all the articles. A company which consisted, in May, of fifty men, was armed, clothed and equipped in June. It then consisted of thirty men; in July it received thirty recruits, who were to be clothed, armed and equipped; and not only the clothes but the arms were carried off by those who had completed their time of service.

General Knox assured me that previous to the establishment of my department there never was a campaign in which the military magazines did not furnish from 5,000 to 8,000 muskets to replace those which were lost in the way I have described above. The loss of bayonets was still greater. The American soldier, never having used this arm, had no faith in it, and never used it but to roast his beefsteak, and indeed often left it at home. This is not astonishing when it is considered that the majority of the states engaged their soldiers for from four to six months. Each man who went away took his musket with him, and his successor received another from the public store. No captain kept a book. Accounts were never furnished or required. As our army is, thank God, little subject to desertion, I venture to say that during an entire campaign there have not been twenty muskets lost since my system came into force. It was the same with the pouches and other accoutrements, and I do not believe that I exaggerate when I state that my arrangements have saved the United States at least 800,000 French lives a year.

The arms at Valley Forge were in a horrible condition, covered with rust, half of them without bayonets, many from which a single shot could not be fired. The pouches were quite as bad as the arms. A great many of the men had tin boxes instead of pouches, others had cow horns; and muskets, carbines, fowling pieces and rifles were to be seen in the same company.

The description of dress is most easily given. The men were literally naked, some of them in the fullest extent of the word. The officers who had coats had them of every color and make. I saw officers at a grand parade at Valley Forge mounting guard in a sort of dressing gown made of an old blanket or woolen bed cover. With regard to their military discipline, I can safely say no such thing existed. In the first place there was no regular formation. A so-called regiment was formed of three platoons, another of five, eight and nine, and the Canadian regiment of twenty-one. The formation of the regiments was as varied as their mode of drill, which only consisted of the manual exercise. Each colonel had a system of his own, the one according to the English, the other according to the Prussian or French style. There was only one thing in which they were uniform, and that was, the way of marching in the maneuvers and on the line of march. They all adopted the mode of marching in files used by the Indians. Mr. De Conway had in-

roduced platoons and many other things, but as he was not liked, they had allowed all his instructions to fall into disuse, so that I scarcely found a trace of them. It is also necessary to remark that the changing of the men, the reduction and continual incorporations deprived the corps and regiments of all consistence. There was another evil still more subversive of order in an army: the captains and colonels did not consider their companies and regiments as corps confided to them by the United States for the care of the men as well as the preservation of order and discipline. The greater part of the captains had no roll of their companies, and had no idea how many men they had under their orders. When I asked a colonel the strength of his regiment, the usual reply was, "something between two and three hundred men." The colonels, and often the captains, granted leave of absence as they thought proper, and not only that, but permissions to retire from the service. The officers were not accustomed to remain with the troops when the army was in camp; they lived in houses, often several miles distant. In winter quarters they nearly always went home, and there were often not more than four officers with a regiment. In the campaign of 1779 I found a Massachusetts regiment commanded by a lieutenant. The idea they had of their duty was, that the officers had only to mount guard and put themselves at the head of their regiment or company when they were going into action. * * * Each colonel encamped his regiment according to his fancy. There were guards and pickets, and sometimes too many; but the officers did not know their duty, and in many instances, did not understand the object of the guard. An infantry of internal guards for the commissaries of forage and provisions, and for the quartermaster, weakened the strength of the army, the more so, because these guards were never relieved, and remained from one year to the other. Their arms were lost and they were all the servants of the commissary, who often granted them leave not only for six months, but without limitation. It would be an endless task to enumerate the abuses which nearly ruined the army. The above is a general view of the situation of the American army as I found it at Valley Forge in the month of February, 1778.

Having given the views of a military expert as to the condition of the army at Valley Forge it may not be amiss to turn for a moment, at least as a relief, to another side of the picture. Washington's headquarters were in the old two-story stone house still standing at the foot of the valley near the present Reading railway station. In front was a little stream which emptied into

the Schuylkill, the ground at that time sloping from the side of the house down to the river, which is now shut off by the high railway embankment. Here and close by was located Washington's immediate military family, beginning with Alexander Hamilton and including Greene, Laurens, Meade and Tilghman. Lafayette had comparatively comfortable quarters on a neighboring hill, and besides the American officers there was the somewhat heterogeneous collections of foreign notables including Steuben, Du Portail, De Neuville, Custine, Fleury, Du Plessis, three Armands, Ternant, Pulaski and Kosciuski.

They were not altogether without the presence of the gentler sex, for Duponceau says: "We dined twice or thrice a week with General Washington. We visited him also in the evenings, when Mrs. Washington was at headquarters. We were in a manner domesticated in the family. As to the situation of our army suffice it to say that we were in want of provisions, of clothing, of fodder for our horses, in short of everything. I remember seeing the soldiers popping their heads out of their miserable huts, and calling out in an undertone, 'No bread, no soldier!' Their condition was truly pitiful, and their courage and perseverance beyond all praise. We who lived in good quarters did not feel the misery of the times so much as the common soldiers and the subaltern officers, yet we had more than once to share our rations with the sentry at our door. We put the best face we could upon the matter. Once, with the Baron's permission, his aides invited a number of young officers to dine at our quarters, on condition that none should be admitted that had on a whole pair of breeches. This was, of course, as *pars pro toto*; but torn clothes were an indispensable requisite for admission, and in this the guests were very sure not to fail. The dinner took place. The guests clubbed

their rations, and we feasted sumptuously on tough beefsteak and potatoes, with hickorynuts for our dessert. Instead of wine we had some kind of spirits, with which we made 'salamanders', that is to say, after filling our glasses, we set the liquor on fire, and drank it up flames and all. Such a set of ragged, and, at the same time, merry fellows, were never brought together. The Baron loved to speak of that dinner and his 'sansculottes', as he called us. Thus this denomination was first invented in America and applied to the brave officers and soldiers of our revolutionary army. In the midst of all our distress there were some bright sides of the picture, which Valley Forge exhibited at that time. Mrs. Washington had the courage to follow her husband to that dismal abode, and other ladies also graced the scene. Among them was the lady of General Greene, a handsome, elegant and accomplished woman. Her dwelling was the resort of foreign officers, because she spoke the French language and was well versed in French literature. They often met at each other's quarters, and sometimes at General Washington's, where the evening was spent over a cup of tea or coffee. There were no levees or formal soirees, no dancing and playing or amusements of any kind, except singing. Every gentleman or lady who could sing, was called upon in turn for a song."

Bad as was the situation Washington had in mind the driving of the British out of Philadelphia in the spring, as he had driven them out of Boston two years before. But with the army in its present condition any movement against the trained levies of Great Britain would be worse than futile. Although Congress the preceding December had created the office of inspector general with the ostensible object of correcting these evils, yet in the hands of the intriguing if not traitorous Conway, the situation was

aggravated to the breaking point. Being answerable to Congress and not to the general in chief, the latter was powerless to compel the inspector to perform his duties, with the outcome as given above. But with the advent of the Baron ready and anxious to serve under Washington, the situation was at once changed, and with Conway out of the road there was no delay in instituting necessary reforms. So he promptly accepted the position of temporary inspector to which Washington appointed him, and entered upon his duties early in March.

The task was not merely to bring order out of chaos. There were prejudices to overcome, state pride and other idiosyncracies to be handled carefully, and several plans of operation were drawn up before any was finally adopted. In this work the Baron had the valuable assistance of General Greene, Colonel Laurens and Colonel Hamilton. Time was, of course valuable, and the Baron and his associates worked late each night to develop their plans. Finally an outline was proposed by which an inspector general should be appointed at once who should establish a uniform system for forming the troops, exercises and maneuvers, and for the duties of guards, pickets and sentries. Also define the duties of every officer, the manner in which lists and accounts should be made, or books kept; review the troops at least once a month, and make written reports to the commander-in-chief and war committee of Congress, with a number of other details not necessary to enumerate here, but whose carrying out would bring order and system where there had heretofore been confusion.

Washington approved the plan and asked Steuben if he were willing to undertake its execution. An affirmative answer was given, provided the necessary support and assistance were afforded which was done at once, and

brigade and division inspectors appointed, whom the Baron praised highly for their assistance. He thus tells how he began his work :

I commenced operations by drafting one hundred and twenty men from the line, whom I formed into a guard for the general in chief. I made this guard my military school. I drilled them myself twice a day, and to remove that English prejudice which some officers entertained, namely, that to drill a recruit was a sergeant's duty and beneath the station of an officer, I often took the musket myself to show the men that manual exercise which I wished to introduce. All my inspectors were present at each drill. We marched together, wheeled, etc., and in a fortnight my company knew perfectly how to bear arms, had a military air, knew how to march, to form in column, deploy and execute some little maneuvers with excellent precision.

It must be owned that they did not know much of the manual exercise, and I ought to mention the reasons why I departed altogether from the general rule of all European armies, and commenced with the manual exercise in drilling recruits like children learning their alphabet. In the first place I had no time to do otherwise. In our European armies a man who has been drilled for three months is called a recruit; here in two months I must have a soldier. In Europe we had a number of evolutions very pretty to look at when well executed, but in my opinion absolutely useless so far as essential subjects are concerned. * * * I nevertheless taught my company to carry arms, stand at ease, present arms, to load, take aim, fire by platoons, and to charge bayonets. Another reason that induced me to pay but little attention to this eternal manual exercise, was that several of my predecessors commenced with it, and before they had surmounted these preliminaries, were obliged to quit the service, having lost their influence and before the officers had an opportunity of seeing the practical advantage of this elementary instruction. This induced me to revise the old system, and instead of commencing with the manual and platoon exercises and ending with maneuvers, I commenced with maneuvers and ended with the exercise.

I had my company of guards exactly as I wished them to be. They were well dressed, their arms cleaned and in good order, and their general appearance quite respectable. I paraded them in the presence of all the officers of the army and gave them the opportunity of exhibiting all they knew. They formed in column, deployed, attacked with the bayonet, charged front etc. It afforded a new and agreeable sight for the young officers and soldiers. Having gained my point, I dispersed my apostles, the inspectors, and my new doctrine was largely embraced. I lost no time in extending my operations

on a large scale. I applied my system to battalions, afterwards to brigades, and in less than three weeks, I executed maneuvers with an entire division in presence of the commander in chief.

The Baron's efforts met with favor, and leading American officers were ready to bear testimony to the good that he was accomplishing. Instead of carelessness there was a generous rivalry among the regiments and divisions as to which should make the best appearance, and do its work most efficiently, and officers, who previously had a contempt for that sort of thing now vied with each other in instructing their men in the manual of arms. Of course the Baron was considerably hampered by his want of familiarity with the English language, although it may be presumed that he had acquired some knowledge of it since his departure from France in the preceding month of September. Mr. North relates his experience at the first parade, when the troops, neither understanding the command nor how to follow in a changement to which they had not been accustomed, even with the instructor at their head, were getting fast into confusion. At this moment, Capt. B. Walker, then of the second New York regiment, advanced from his platoon and offered his assistance to translate the orders and interpret to the troops. "If I had seen an angel from Heaven I should not have more rejoiced," said the Baron. Walker was appointed his aide-de-camp, and remained a close friend during the rest of his life.

During this period the Baron rose at 3 A. M., smoked a pipe while his valet dressed his hair, drank a cup of coffee, was on horseback at sunrise, and with, or without, his suite, galloped to the parade. The tardy were not reprimanded, a look from the Baron was sufficient to induce resolutions for future reform. So the work was inaugurated whose efficiency and good results were to be

tested 'ere many months on the field of battle, as well as on the march.

Baron Steuben had been at Valley Forge about a month when he extended his instruction to general, although elementary, movements of the army. In this line Washington on March 28. issued the following general order :

On Sunday, the 29th of March, at ten o'clock in the forenoon, all brigade inspectors, with the officers who are to mount guard on Monday, will attend at headquarters, where the inspector general will instruct them in what is to be done the next day. Then Baron Steuben, a lieutenant general in foreign service, and a gentleman of great military experience, having obligingly undertaken the exercise of inspector general in the army, the commander in chief, till the pleasure of Congress shall be known, desires he may be respected as such, and hopes and expects that all officers, of whatever rank in it, will afford every aid in their power in the execution of his office. Lieutenant Colonels Davies, Brooks and Barber, and Mr. Ternant, are appointed to act as sub inspectors, the three former retaining their rank and order in the line. The importance of establishing a uniform system of useful maneuvers and regularity of discipline, must be obvious; the deficiency of our army in those respects must be equally so; but the time we probably shall have to introduce the necessary reformation is short. With the most active exertions, therefore, of officers of every class, it may be possible to effect all the improvements that may be essential to success in the ensuing campaign. Arguments need not be multiplied to kindle the zeal of officers in a matter of such great moment to their own homes, the advancement of the service, and the prosperity of our armies.

In a subsequent order he said :

The sub and brigade inspectors are to be pointedly exact in pursuing the written instructions of the inspector general, that the strictest uniformity may be observed throughout the army. They are not to practice one single maneuver without his direction, nor in a method different from it. Any alteration or innovation will again plunge the army into that contrariety and confusion from which it is endeavoring to emerge.

CHAPTER VI.

DRILLING THE ARMY.

Steuben's Success at Converting a Mob Into Soldiers—Commendation of Washington—Congress Fixes His Status—Official Jealousy—The French Alliance.

Such was Steuben's skill and industry that by April 29, he was able to put the whole army through the "grand maneuvers," but as yet he was a mere volunteer, acting at the request of Washington, without rank or pay. But the month's trial had evidently been fully satisfactory to the commander-in-chief, for on the 30th we find him sending this report to Congress :

The extensive ill consequences arising from a want of uniformity in discipline and maneuvers throughout the army, have long occasioned me to wish for the establishment of a well-organized inspectorship, and the concurrence of Congress in the same views has induced me to set on foot a temporary institution, which, from the success that has hitherto attended it, gives me the most flattering expectations, and will, I hope, obtain their approbation. Baron Steuben's length of service in the first military school in Europe, and his former rank, pointed him out as a person peculiarly qualified to be at the head of this department. This appeared the least exceptionable way of introducing him into the army, and one that would give him the most ready opportunity of displaying his talents. I therefore proposed to him to undertake the office of inspector general, which he agreed to with the greatest cheerfulness, and has performed the duties of it with a zeal and intelligence equal to our wishes. * * * I should do injustice, if I were to be longer silent with regard to the merits of Baron Steuben. His knowledge of his profession, added to the zeal which he has displayed since he began the functions of his office, leads me to consider him as an acquisition to the service, and to recommend him to the attention of Congress. His expectations with respect to rank extended to that of major general. His finances, he ingenuously confesses, will not admit his serving without the incidental emoluments, and Congress, I presume, from his character and their own knowledge of him, will, without difficulty, gratify him in these particulars.

Congress, on May 5, responded to Washington's appeal by approving his plan for the institution of a well organized inspectorship, and appointed Steuben to the office of inspector general, with the rank and pay of major-general, his pay to commence from the time he joined the army and entered into service of the United States. It was ordered that there be two ranks of inspectors under the direction of the inspector general; the first to superintend two or more brigades, and the second to be charged with the inspection of only one brigade. In response to this on May 16, Steuben (now General) wrote to Congress expressing his thanks for the honor conferred on him, and promising that he would endeavor to deserve, more and more, the good opinion it had entertained of him in intrusting to him so extensive a department as the inspection of the army.

Matters had already been looking much better in camp when, on May 4, was received intelligence of the French alliance. This naturally raised everybody's spirits to a remarkable degree, and all sorts of rejoicing made the woods resound during those bright spring days. The reaction was so great that it threatened a detrimental effect. If they had been able to withstand Great Britain alone what might they not be able to do with the aid of their powerful ally? Many relaxed their efforts, supposing the war to be practically over. They, especially the foreign element, did not understand the bulldog tenacity of Great Britain, a trait inherent in the Anglo-Saxon race. It has been claimed indeed, that the French alliance actually deferred the termination of the war instead of hastening it; that after Burgoyne's surrender the strength of the peace party in England had grown to such an extent that overtures looking to independence would probably have been made during 1778 had not the French al-

liance intervened, which event roused the pride of every Briton and united all parties against their hereditary enemy. Among those who thought they saw peace in sight was Baron Steuben, who, on May 7, before receiving his commission as Major General, wrote to Henry Laurens, President of Congress, congratulating him on the treaty so advantageous to both powers and expressing his pleasure in seeing the independence of America established on so solid a basis. He adds: "I may not, perhaps, have an opportunity of drawing my sword in your cause, but no matter, be free and happy, and I shall not regret having undertaken the voyage to offer you my services."

Laurens did not lose his head, and four days later deprecating any hasty conclusions from recent events, he cautions, "That we are not to roll down a green bank and toy away the ensuing surrender. There is blood, much blood in our prospect, and in all appearance, in my view, there will be opportunity and incitement to unsheath your sword. Britain will not be humbled by a stroke of policy; she will be very angry, and if she is to fall, her fall will be glorious. We, who know her, ought to be prepared. A powerful army in our field may, I should say will, be the only means of securing an honorable peace. If we universally adopt and indulge the idea of peace, it would be presumptuous in me to intimate to a gentleman of Baron Steuben's experience, what probably will be the consequence. I am desirous of banishing from the minds of the people the assurance, even the hopes, of a peace for the present year."

As a matter of fact three years and a half of bloody conflict were ahead before even the glimmer of peace was in prospect. As an appropriate commemoration of the alliance, however, Washington requested a general man-



VALLEY FORGE, TOP OF HILL, ENCAMPMENT SOUTHERN REGTS.



WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS, VALLEY FORGE.

The wing on the left was a log dining room built by Washington, since replaced by stone.

euver by the entire army, which passed off successfully. The right was commanded by Major General Lord Stirling, Lafayette on the left, with Baron De Kalb on the second line. The army advanced in five columns to the signal of a cannon shot, taking a position on the hill top where it deployed and fired a shot. This was followed by a grand dinner, no doubt with a more plentiful supply of provisions than was manifest during the cold winter days of their discontent now made a joyous summer. While still standing at the table Washington delivered to Steuben the latter's commission of Major General and inspector of the army, which he had just received from Congress, and and congratulations and felicitations were in order. We must remember that the pictures of Valley Forge are not all sombre. The next day Washington issued the following order :

The commander in chief takes great pleasure in acquainting the army that its conduct yesterday afforded him the highest satisfaction. The exactness and order with which all its movements were formed, is a pleasing evidence of the progress it has made in military improvement, and of the perfection to which it may arrive by a continuance of that laudable zeal which now happily prevails. The general, at the same time, presents his thanks to Baron Steuben and the gentlemen acting under him for their exertions in the duties of their office, the good effects of which are already so apparent, and for the care, activity and prosperity with which they conducted the business of yesterday.

Notwithstanding this encouraging outlook trouble was brewing. At first sight one would suppose that military officials from the importance of their duties and the arduousness of their work, especially in time of war, would be the last persons to waste time and labor in stickling for points of etiquette or precedence. Certainly when the bullets begin flying the leaden balls are no respecter of persons, and will ruthlessly cut down the highest rank quite as readily as the lowest if it is in the way. But

everybody who has had anything to do with soldiering knows, sometimes to his cost, that he cannot be too careful lest somebody's prerogative be infringed, and the slightest breach in this respect, even if done through ignorance or inadvertance, is at least next to an unpardonable sin. The most rigid dinner party rules are nowhere in comparison. It is difficult to see how the new arrangement for drilling the army, and making the troops subject to the call of the general drillmaster for that special purpose could interfere with the authority of the regular commanders, but they evidently thought differently. Mr. Kapp says that a cabal was formed against the Baron, headed by Major Generals Lee, Lafayette and Mifflin, but is not necessary to adopt this term in the more offensive sense. These officers considered, however, that the inspector was unwarrantably interfering with the troops under their command, and, doubtless through their influence, the general in chief issued an order that major generals should, in future exercise their divisions themselves, and that the brigadiers should do the same with their brigades, but they must adhere to the system prescribed by the inspector. The result was that the officers having neither leisure nor inclination to perform this work it was neglected, to the great detriment of the army. Referring to this Steuben afterwards wrote:

All the brigadier generals threatened to quit the service. I, however, in no way changed my conduct; I continually pursued the object I had in view, and flattered nobody, not even the general in chief. The nature of my office in the army obliged me to a severity to which our officers were then little accustomed, but I was equally severe towards my inferiors, and am so still at present. And here is my greatest triumph. The same brigadiers who opposed the inspectorship, are eager today to serve under my orders. These same officers, whom I never had flattered, honor me now with the title of friend and father. In the military career the testimony of the inferiors is the most honorable; our subalterns used to be our most severe judges.

The affection and estimation of my officers fill my heart with the greatest pride and satisfaction.

The situation thus became rather strained. It is possible and not unnatural that the Baron would be disposed to magnify his office, and were the soldiers still in recruiting camps he could no doubt have exercised his powers to the fullest extent without serious conflict. But they were in the field, practically confronting the enemy, and consequently the claim of the generals to authority over their commands, subject only to the general-in-chief, could not be ignored. So when Steuben made a trip to Congress to have his affairs arranged on a more permanent footing, Hamilton, doubtless under the direction of Washington, wrote to that body as follows :

The Baron is a gentleman for whom I have a particular esteem, and whose zeal, intelligence and success, the consequence of both, entitle him to the greatest credit. But I am apprehensive, with all his good qualities, a fondness for power and importance, natural to every man, may lead him to wish for more extensive prerogatives in his department than it will be for the good of the service to grant. I should be sorry to excite any prejudice against him on this account; perhaps I may be mistaken in my conjecture. The caution I give will do no harm if I am right; if I am not it may be useful. In either case the Baron deserves to be considered as a valuable man, and treated with all the deference which good policy will warrant. On the first institution of this office the general allowed him to exercise more ample powers than would be proper for a continuance. They were necessary in the commencement to put things in a train with a degree of dispatch which the exigency of our affairs required; but it has been necessary to restrain them even earlier than was intended. The novelty of the office excited questions about its boundaries; the extent of its operations alarmed the officers of every rank for their own rights. Their jealousies and discontents were rising to a height that threatened to overturn the whole plan. It became necessary to apply a remedy. The general has delineated the functions of the inspectorship in general orders, a copy of which will be sent to Congress. The plan is good and satisfactory to the army in general. * * * There is one thing which the Baron has much at heart, which, in good policy he can by no means be indulged in—it is the power of enforcing that part of discipline which we understand by subordination, or an obedience to orders. This

power can only be properly lodged with the commander in chief, and would inflame the whole army if put into other hands. Each captain is vested with it in his company; each colonel in his regiment; each general in his particular command, and the commander in chief in the whole.

With this statement before it Congress was naturally slow to comply with the wishes of Steuben, and the war was practically over before he realized his desires. There was considerable correspondence, and the war board of Congress bore willing testimony to the good work which had been accomplished between February and June under most disadvantageous circumstances, whose value was soon to be tested in a practical way. In fact the committee drew up quite an elaborate report, which was presented to Congress, formally creating the office of inspector general with a corps of brigade inspectors under his immediate orders. These were to be approved by the commander in chief and reported to Congress, and were to have the rank of lieutenant colonels or majors. All regulations for the discipline and police of the army were placed in the hands of the inspector general, with the approval of the commander in chief, until Congress should establish a permanent system; he should also have the privilege of selecting six young men to act as light dragoons, who should receive the pay and rations of ensigns. They were to be instructed in laying out camps and other such proper service as the inspector general should order. Other officers were authorized to be appointed as needed, in fact the machinery was so elaborate that to a lay mind it appeared likely to clog by its own weight. Certainly it was sufficiently complicated for an army much larger than the Continental force was then or likely to be in the near future. But, however that may be Congress did not adopt it, and this department was left to get along under temporary arrangements made by

the commander in chief. Steuben continued to conduct his work as best he could, and there does not seem to have been any interruption in the harmonious relations existing between Washington and himself, although he must have known that the general had not encouraged Congress to give him supreme authority so far as his duties were concerned. On June 15 Washington issued orders providing that the brigadiers should exercise their brigades and the colonels their regiments according to the rules established by the inspector and approved by the general in chief with "grand maneuvers" occasionally under charge of the inspector, whose directions relative to the exercise and agreeable to the rules laid down are to be observed by every officer of inferior rank who might command. On the daily parade of the guards the inspector general or the sub-inspector of the day was to exercise the parade under the general order of the day. This seemed to satisfy the general officers, for we hear no more complaints, and if Steuben was dissatisfied he concealed his feelings, for on the 18th he wrote to Washington:

It gives me great satisfaction to see that your Excellency has taken such a wise step in my department as to engage the general officers and field officers of regiments to take command of the troops in our daily exercise. Nothing could be more useful in the present moment. I had wished, sometime ago, it might be the case, but in meanwhile I was endeavoring with the gentlemen under me, to make the officers and soldiers a little more perfect, in order to enable the general officers to pass immediately to grand maneuvers, and save them the trouble of descending to those toilsome and fastidious details which we cheerfully encountered from the beginning for the good of the service. No pains will be spared on my part to help on the general officers, and I shall always think myself happy if I can contribute in any manner whatsoever to the advancement of the American army, and prove a useful instrument in your hands. As it will take a few days for the general officers to become acquainted and familiar with the instructions and principles heretofore approved of and established by your Excellency, and for

the officers and soldiers to arrive at a tolerable degree of perfection in the performance of the evolutions and maneuvers before practiced, I will seize this opportunity with your Excellency's leave, to take a short journey to York, there to settle some affairs with my friend, Mr. De Francy, and take my leave of him before he goes to South Carolina, as Congress has not yet come to any positive determination about the department. If your Excellency foresees that I can be of some use, I beg you will give me such orders and directions about the whole as you think proper. I must likewise beseech your Excellency to give me the satisfaction to let me know whether you are satisfied, as I am, with the officers your Excellency has appointed under me, and whether you are willing to have them continued in the exercise of that office. I will likewise propose to your Excellency the reuniting the office of brigade inspector to that of brigade major with the denomination of brigade majors, which officers will be taken from the line of majors, and not as it was before, some being captains, others majors or colonels. There is such an analogy between both offices as renders it, in my opinion, almost indispensable to join them in one office, were it but to prevent difficulties naturally arising between two officers acting in two different analogous departments, between which there is no certain line drawn. Upon these different heads I beg your Excellency's opinions and orders.

While the Baron appears thus ready to accept the situation and make the best of it, the opinion of competent judges is that the army suffered by the change, and although much had been accomplished yet it would have been in far better condition to accomplish the work before it, had there been better opportunity for the Baron to work out his plans in his own way. But the stirring events which were now to follow produced such an entire change in the state of affairs as to put the whole question of drills and maneuvers at least temporarily in the background.

CHAPTER VII.

FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH.

Howe Evacuates Philadelphia—Movements Across New Jersey;
Battle of Monmouth Court House—Treason of Lee—
Steuben's Well-Drilled Troops Turn Defeat Into Victory.

By the middle of June the 5,000 half clothed, half starved motley force at Valley Forge had been increased to 15,000 fairly well drilled troops, thanks to the untiring energy of the inspector general. The French alliance had not yet brought any substantial aid, in fact, as we have seen, the first effect was detrimental, but there was a feeling of encouragement that the situation on the whole had been bettered. The first instinct was naturally towards Philadelphia, where Lord Howe had passed a very comfortable winter. Balls and dinners, cards and other recreations whiled away the cold months, and if the revelers thought of the little army out at Valley Forge, it was with a feeling of contempt and perhaps a determination to go and clean out the nest as soon as spring opened. Washington to some extent did interfere with supplies reaching the city from the back country, but Philadelphia was not situated on a peninsula connected by a narrow neck with the mainland as was Boston, nor was the Continental force as large as in the other case. Then in front of the city were the fertile Jersey farms, and so long as British ships commanded the Delaware there was little danger of the city being starved out. So they went along with their gayeties which culminated in a sort of carnival on May 18 called the Michianza. Among those who were prominent in those festivities were Miss Margaret Shippen, subsequently the wife of Benedict Arnold,

and the ill fated Major Andre. After this demonstration Lord Howe sailed for England leaving Sir Henry Clinton in charge of the invading army. When the latter heard of the French alliance and that Count D'Estaing was approaching with a strong fleet, he was alarmed at the prospect of losing control of the Delaware in front with Washington in his rear, and concluded to retreat towards New York. The movement began early in June, and 3,000 Tories with their effects having been sent around by water the army began its retreat across New Jersey encumbered with twelve miles of baggage wagons. The rear guard left Philadelphia on the morning of the 18th, and that evening American troops encamped in the city. General Arnold was placed in command from York, and Philadelphia once more became the capital.

The main American army did not enter Philadelphia, but crossed the Delaware into New Jersey, at Corryell's ferry fifteen miles above Trenton, near where Washington had crossed on Christmas night, 1776, to win the battle of Trenton. Steuben on learning of the evacuation and that the army had moved, left York to rejoin it, stopping at Philadelphia en route, where he was joined by Duponceau. Sanitary matters received little public attention in those days, but the British authorities seem to have been grossly negligent even for that period, for Duponceau describes the city as being in a most filthy condition. He says, "I joined Baron Steuben at the State House in Second street, the celebrated boarding house so much spoken of in Graydon's memoirs. Such was the filth of the city that it was impossible for us to drink a comfortable dish of tea that evening. As fast as our cups were filled myraids of flies took possession of them, and served us as the harpies did the poor Trojans in the AENEID. Some said they were

Hessian flies, and various jokes were cracked on the occasion, for the evacuation of the city had put us all in good spirits, and we enjoyed ourselves very well, the filth notwithstanding. The next day a house was provided for us in New street, where we stayed but a few days, being anxious to join the army. That quarter of the city was then inhabited almost entirely by Germans; hardly any other language than the German was heard in the streets, or seen on the signs in front of the shops, so that Baron Steuben fancied himself again in his native country. A great number of the inns in town and country bore the sign of the King of Prussia, who was very popular, especially among the Germans. We were, however, not captivated with the delights of Capua; we bade adieu to Philadelphia and all its German attractions, and joined General Washington's army in New Jersey."

When Clinton left Philadelphia he had 17,000 men, a force slightly larger than that of the Americans, but he was hampered by the long wagon train already mentioned, which not only impeded his march but required a considerable force for its protection. He crossed the river to Gloucester Point opposite the lower end of the city, and moved eastward to Haddon heights and Mount Holly, the latter about twenty-five miles east of the present city of Camden. From here there were two routes to New York, one via Brunswick to South Amboy, which would bring them to the lower New York bay, and the other via Freehold, which would bring them to Sandy Hook, a little farther from their ultimate destination. There was very little difference in distance, but there was enough to be said in favor of the northerly route to make the choice doubtful were the way clear. But it could not be said to be clear. Washington was twenty-five or thirty miles above, moving on almost a parallel line.

Would he attack Clinton? was the question. The moment he heard of the preparation for evacuation Washington determined to strike a blow, notwithstanding there was some disparity of strength in favor of the British. A council of war was called on the 17th, at which Lee declared the enemy would move south and it was not advisable to attack. What motive Clinton could have for moving south, with the French fleet daily expected in the Delaware, is not discernable at this late day. Nevertheless, Lee carried all the generals with him except Greene, Lafayette, Wayne and Cadwallader. Washington was not deterred, but pushed across the river as above related. There he sent a force of six hundred men under command of Maxwell, with a thousand Jersey militia to destroy the roads, a work in which they were as much at home as had been their contemporaries who hampered Burgoyne's army the preceding Autumn. Morgan with a force of six hundred men was ordered to annoy the enemy's flank while the main army moved to Hopewell near Princeton. There on the 24th another council was called where Lee declared that they should rather build a bridge of gold for the retreat of their enemies than attack such a well disciplined army. Lafayette protested that it would be a disgrace to allow the British to make their way unopposed across New Jersey; that without extreme risk they could attack the rear, and take advantage of anything that might occur. Steuben, who had again reached the army, concurred in this, and Washington decided to follow that policy, which was in accordance with his own views.

In order to a full understanding of these and subsequent events it is necessary to diverge a little to glance at the career of General Charles Lee, who will occupy quite a prominent place in the following pages. He was

in no way related to the Virginia Lees, and never became an American in the true sense of the word. He was born in England in 1731, being the son of Lieutenant Colonel John Lee, who married the daughter of Sir Henry Bunbury, and afterwards became a general. Through family influence he received a commission when only eleven years of age, and although his education was not thorough he became quite a linguist. When twenty-four years old he commanded a company of grenadiers in the 44th British infantry, which took part in the French and Indian war along the New York border. He became so familiar with Johnson's Mohawk warriors that he was adopted into one of the tribes under the name of Boiling Water. He was shot through the body while assaulting the French breastworks at Ticonderaga, but was present in the next campaign at the siege of Fort Niagara, which was successful. Afterwards he took a military journey across Lake Erie, and down the Allegheny river (then called the Ohio) to Fort Pitt, and back seven hundred miles across the country to Crown Point. Here he joined General Amherst and remained with him until Canada was conquered. Two years later as a colonel he served under General Burgoyne in Portugal, where he won some renown by capturing an old Moorish castle which had been occupied by the Spaniards. Being quite as ready with pen as with sword he became mixed up in English politics, and like Wilkes, was soon out of favor with the government. Seeing there was no chance of advancement at home he concluded to go to Poland, where war was anticipated. Stopping to see Frederick the Great en route he discussed American affairs with that King, and on arriving at Warsaw secured the appointment as aide to Stanislaus Augustus, who had been elected King of Poland. The latter was not strong enough to engage in

war at that time, and at the King's suggestion he accompanied the Polish ambassador to Constantinople, meeting with almost as many adventures as the redoubtable Captain John Smith. By 1766 he was back in England with a letter from the King Stanislaus, favoring his appointment to some military duty. But the ministry turned a cold shoulder to him, and in 1768 he again left for Poland where he expected to get a command in the Russian service, which he evidently did not consider inconsistent with his previous relations with Stanislaus, in fact it was apparently with the approval of the latter. Writing in anticipation of his new position he says: "I am to have command of Cossacks and Wallacks, a kind of people I have a good opinion of. I am determined not to serve in the line. One might as well be a church warden." The next year he was given the rank of major general in the Russian army, which crossed into Moldavia, where occurred a battle with the Turks near Chotzim in which Lee's Cossacks suffered severely. The conflict was doubtful, but the threatened approach of another Turkish army of 17,000 men caused the Russians to retreat, and the campaign was abandoned. After this Lee spent some time traveling over Europe, being afflicted with rheumatism, gout and "Hungarian fever," and was mixed up in several duels, in one of which he killed his antagonist.

He continued his attacks in the public press upon the British ministry, wielding a caustic pen, and for a while he was suspected of being the author of the celebrated Junius letters. Coming to America in 1773, he took up the cause of the colonies, not because he cared anything for the Americans or their principles, but as a means of getting even with the then British ministry. His European adventures, of which we have given only the merest outline, naturally gave him considerable prestige, and it

was generally considered that he would be a most valuable acquisition to the patriot cause. The two foci of disaffection were Virginia and Massachusetts. While matters in the latter colony were rapidly converging to a dramatic climax, in the former the whole community was preparing for the crisis which her statesmen foresaw could not much longer be delayed. The natural leader and adviser in this condition of affairs was Washington, and visitors to Mount Vernon to discuss public affairs were both frequent and numerous. Among them were Charles Lee and Horatio Gates, both natives of England, and the latter the reputed son of a captain in the British army, although it has been hinted that his father was an English peer. He was a volunteer under General Edward Cornwallis, Governor of Halifax, was wounded in the Braddock campaign, served in the West Indies, and afterwards in a troop known as the Royal Americans. He desired, however, a better office, but failing to secure it he left London for America in 1772 as deeply soured against the British ministry as Lee, with whom his career furnishes a very close parallel, although he never went to the length of selling out to the English. Gates purchased an estate in Berkeley County, Virginia, where Lee also came and settled on an adjoining tract. Both of these gentlemen having had considerable experience in military affairs their visit was no doubt quite welcome to Washington, but, as Irving remarks, "It is doubtful whether the visits of Lee were as interesting to Mrs. Washington as to the general. He was whimsical, eccentric, and at times almost rude; negligent also, and slovenly in person and attire, for though he had occasionally associated with kings and princes, he had also campaigned with Mohawks and Cossacks, and seems to have relished their 'good breeding.' What was still more annoying in a well regu-

lated mansion, he was always followed by a legion of dogs which shared his affections with his horses, and took their seats by him when at table. 'I must have some object to embrace,' said he, misanthropically, 'when I can be convinced that men are as worthy objects as dogs, I shall transfer my benevolence, and become as staunch a philanthropists as the canting Addison affected to be.' "

What the Americans wanted, however, or thought they wanted, were trained soldiers without regard to their social qualities, so on the outbreak of the hostilities Lee was welcomed to the army at the inflated value which he set upon himself. He was made second major general by Congress, thus placing General Ward the only one between him and Washington, and was sent to assist in the siege of Boston. Here he chiefly distinguished himself by opening correspondence with the British authorities in that city, but the Massachusetts Congress promptly repudiated him as a negotiator. Desiring a separate command Washington assigned him to New York, then threatened by the British, where he carried matters with a high hand. Sir Henry Clinton who with two companies of infantry and a few Highlanders had anchored in the harbor, moved down the bay, and on January 11th, 1776, disappeared. This bloodless victory raised Lee higher than ever in public opinion, as well as in his own conceit. He wrote to Washington, "When I leave this place the provincial Congress will relapse into their hysterics, the men of war will return to their wharfs, and the first regiments from England will take quiet possession of the town."

On March 1st Congress, to the relief of Washington who had already discovered him to be both "violent and fickle," placed Lee in command of the forces south of the Potomac, and on the 7th he left for that section. He

went to Charleston, S. C., which was threatened with an attack from the sea, where his principal occupation seems to have been to ridicule a palmetto fort which Colonel Moultrie had erected on Sullivan's island, and advise its abandonment. Moultrie, however, held on to the fort, and repulsed the British fleet and army with such success that the expedition sailed back to New York, not to return until more than two years after. Coming north, and apapropriating to himself the honors won by Colonel Moultrie, a prototype of some of our Civil War generals, Lee took part in the retreat from New York, more than once disobeying the orders of Washington and thus imperiling the safety of the entire army. By the resignation of Ward he had become senior major general, and by the death or other displacement of Washington he would become the general in chief. To this end he cultivated disaffection which was already bordering on treason. He even wrote letters hinting that he might accomplish something of importance were he made dictator, if only for a short time.

While these movements were going on across New Jersey, Lee spent a night at a tavern four miles from Moristown. The next morning he wrote a confidential letter to Gates, saying, among other things, that "a certain great man is most damnably deficient." He had barely finished the letter when a party of thirty British dragoons surrounded the house, and carried him off dressed only in a flannel dressing gown and slippers. He was alarmed lest he might be treated as a deserter, having been an officer in the British army, fears which his captors took no means to allay. Had they only known it the capture of Lee was the greatest blessing that could have happened to the Americans, and had they been wise they would have left him to his fate. But they did not

know this, and the occurrence was regarded as one more added to the list of disasters. In truth everything looked desperate, only Washington retained his poise, until the battles of Trenton and Princeton again revived the drooping spirits of the patriots. In the meantime Lee was confined a prisoner in New York City Hall, not without danger of the halter, in which situation Sir William Howe was very willing to place him. He concluded, however, to write home for instructions, and was ordered to send Lee to England for trial. He was already on board ship, when Washington, hearing of these proceedings notified Lord Howe that he held five Hessian officers as hostages for Lee's safety, and no further exchanges would be made until he was assured that Lee would be treated as prisoner of war. While all this was going on a full year passed away and Lee had made up his mind to "sell out." His treason, which was not discovered until eighty years after, and consequently was unknown to his contemporaries and the early historians, was worse than that of Arnold's because it was without provocation, deliberate, selfish and cold blooded. He first induced the Howes to believe that he had some influence with Congress, which might induce that body to consider peace proposals on the basis of return to their former allegiance, and by permission sent a letter requesting that a committee be sent to confer with him. This communication was treated with contempt, and Lee's next step was to suggest a plan of campaign by which the British might move on and capture Philadelphia. He declared that the people of Maryland and Pennsylvania were "loyal," and if Howe were once in possession of the rebel capital he could dictate terms to the Americans. To this end he suggested that 14,000 men should be ordered to drive Washington out of New Jersey, and 4,000 should sail for Chesapeake


bay, and capture Annapolis and Alexandria. The plausibility of the schem appealed to the Howes, and had they been able to carry it out with the rapidity that was intended Philadelphia would have fallen in June instead of the latter part of September, and a sufficient force could have been detached up the Hudson to co-operate with Burgoyne. But Washington's admirable tactics defeated their plan, and although Howe entered the "rebel capital" and spent the winter there the victory was in the main a barren one, while the failure to relieve Burgoyne insured his capture which was followed by the French alliance. Of course nothing was known of Lee's treason in the American camp, and the British General Prescott having been captured Lee's jailors, knowing he would be useful to them in the American army while as a prisoner he was simply a nuisance, gladly gave him in exchange for Prescott after having paid him 1,100 guineas for his services. He arrived at Valley Forge in May, and, as we have seen, immediately began putting all sorts of obstacles in the way of Washington's plan for breaking up Clinton's army.

Desiring to get some definite information as to Clinton's movements Washington now detailed Steuben to make a reconnaissance, and the latter on June 25 discovered that the British were moving toward Monmouth Court House (afterwards known as Freehold), and Sandy Hook. A dispatch to Brigadier General Scott intimated that the British were on the direct road to Monmouth Court House, and suggesting that the latter advance his corps to Hightstown a neighboring village, situated as its name indicated on a rising ground, also making the further suggestion that this information be communicated to the other officers. While Clinton had the start of Washington from Philadelphia, yet he had the

longer journey, and was doubtless hindered by the greater quantity of impedimenta, so that he did not reach Monmouth Court House (Freehold) until June 27, with Steuben close on his heels. On the morning of that day the latter encamped a couple of miles to the left of the Court House, and at noon sent the following dispatch to Washington who was pushing forward with the main army three miles in the rear :

We arrived here this morning, and it being the best position we can find to observe the motions of the enemy have remained; we have advanced our parties so near as to fire a pistol at their horsemen while feeding their horses. They now lay encamped, one line on the main road by the court house, and another line extended on their left from the head of the column, which is not advanced 150 paces beyond the court house, having sent a man there to discover; they have some tents pitched, and their horses are at pasture, and have not the least appearance of moving. When we first arrived here, they had a party of infantry posted in a wood on their left and about five hundred paces in our front, from which we could discover several detachments to go to the adjacent houses, two of which they have burnt, viz.: Colonel Henderson's and Mr. Wickoff's. So soon as they move, I shall endeavor to discover their route, and immediately acquaint you.

Steuben was not without adventures while obtaining this information. Once while alone in a field he noticed two horsemen coming from a neighboring wood, which he knew by their uniform to be British soldiers. He at once discharged his pistols, and turning his horse, he leaped a fence, and successfully reached camp, losing his hat, however, by the way, a feat that was afterwards emulated successfully by Sumter in North Carolina. Although the horsemen yelled to him to stop they did not fire at him, for the reason given below. Steuben's two aides had approached the British lines nearer than Steuben, and he supposed they were captured, but while making his report to Washington the aides, one of them, Benjamin Walker, put in an appearance. "How is this?"



MARCH OF WASHINGTON AND CLINTON ACROSS NEW JERSEY.

exclaimed the Baron, "I thought you were taken prisoner?" "O, no," replied Walker, "they were intent on the high prize and overlooked us." "Have you brought my hat?" was next inquiry. "O no, Baron, we had no time." The next evening a prisoner being brought to headquarters saw the Baron, and said, "I believe, General, I had the honor of seeing you yesterday, and thought to get a more splendid prize than your hat." "Why did you not fire?" said the Baron, to which the other replied, "You were recognized by General Knyphausen, and our orders were rather to take you, if we could do it without harming you."

The accompanying diagram shows the movement of the two armies across the state of New Jersey, the southerly line from Gloucester Point through Haddonfield, Mt. Holly, Crosswicks, Allentown, Freehold (Monmouth) and Middletown to Port Monmouth indicating Clinton's march, and the northerly one through Hopewell, Hightstown and Englishtown indicating Washington's. On the night of the 27th General Knyphausen had passed through Monmouth conveying the wagon train. It was the right wing of the British army about 6,000 strong, and encamped on the Middletown road just beyond the Monmouth village as indicated by figure 1 of the diagram. Clinton's left wing numbering some 8,000, stopped before entering the village as indicated by figure 2. Lee with the American advance was five miles northeast of the British line at a point indicated by figure 3, while Washington with the main army was at Englishtown, three miles behind (figure 4). Now was the time to fight, if ever. Clinton's anxiety to avoid a battle was one of the best indications of American success, provided the matter was properly handled. Although Lee was second in command, yet his churlishness, and his refusal to advance

on the ground that he would surely be defeated, had induced Washington to put Lafayette in his place. But on the 27th Lee repented his position, and probably with the view of being better able to carry out his traitorous designs petulantly complained of mistreatment, and asked to be restored to his command. As he had not yet lost his reputation in the country, although Washington had begun to distrust him, it was decided to give him back his place, and the general wrote to Lafayette requesting his withdrawal, adding, "my fortune and my honor are in your hands; you are too generous to ruin one or the other." Lafayette generously acceded, and Lee was placed in charge of the advance. The weather had been very warm for several days, interfering somewhat with energetic operations, but at noon on the 27th, Washington called a general council, with instructions to prepare at once for an engagement the next morning.

We have seen that through Steuben's efforts information was at hand regarding the exact whereabouts of the enemy. Details of the plan of attack were left to Lee, but when Lafayette, Wayne and Maxwell called on him for orders he had none to give, no plan of action was formed, nor did he make any preparations even to the extent of familiarizing himself with the field of action. That night he was ordered by Washington to detach a party of skirmishers to delay the British if they should attempt to retreat, but he lay quietly in camp, doing nothing.

At five o'clock on the morning of the 28th Washington learned that the British army had begun to move from Monmouth towards the coast. He ordered Lee to attack at once, and he would be prompt in sustaining him. Lee hesitated and moved so slowly that Cornwallis with the left wing had passed through Monmouth towards Middle-

town when he found himself flanked by the Americans, with Lee immediately on the north, Wayne close behind, and Lafayette, who had come through Monmouth, threatening him on the south. Menaced on three sides it seemed that Cornwallis was doomed, but Lee would neither make the attack himself nor suffer his subordinates to do so. Lafayette insisted on attacking but to this Lee replied: "You don't know the British soldiers, we cannot stand against them." Whereupon Lafayette sent a dispatch to Washington that his presence was needed on the field at once, and Laurens sent two similar messages. At last securing orders, or rather permission, to attack the enemy's left Lafayette started, but before traversing one-fourth the distance he received counter orders for his return. Wayne also started to make a charge, but received orders to make only a feint. The result of all this an hour or two were spent in marching and counter-marching with finally a complete halt, thus giving the British ample time to reform their columns to either resist a front attack or charge upon the Americans in turn. This naturally caused some indignant comment, and to an officer Lee said: "I have orders from Congress and the commander in chief not to engage." a most palpable falsehood. By this time Clinton had gotten his wagon train well out of the way protected by Knyphausen, who had sent back reinforcements to Cornwallis. It was now about 8 o'clock when Clinton turned a force against Lee consisting of two regiments of cavalry, with grenadiers, guards and Highlanders, a body which should have been repulsed, but to everybody's astonishment Lee directed a retreat. No good reason being apparent this argued some unknown danger which created a panicky feeling among the troops. The order was still good, however, with no serious confusion, thanks to training which had

been given by Baron Steuben, until Lee directed them across a causeway which spanned a marshy ravine. Crowded into a narrow space the ranks were thrown into disorder and men were falling from heat more than from British bullets, until on the westerly side the retreat became a complete rout. Here they met Washington, at the point indicated by figure 7 in the diagram. The latter demanded of Lee, "What is the meaning of this?" The traitor stammered, "Sir—Sir!" The question was repeated when Lee said "You know the attack was contrary to my advice and opinion." Tradition relates that this was one of two occasions when the Father of His Country was known to swear. Certain it is he used very energetic language in telling Lee that he should not have taken the command unless he intended to fight. Lee still protested that he did not think it prudent to bring on a general engagement, but was sharply interrupted by Washington with, "I expect my orders to be obeyed," Lee was ordered to the rear, and Washington set to work at the perilous task of reforming the lines in the face of the advancing enemy.

It was the first time the American troops had to face such a problem, and now was demonstrated the value of the four months' training given by Baron Steuben. Bancroft says that even Laurens hoped for no more than an orderly retreat, and Hamilton's thought was to die on the spot, while Lee sitting idly on his horse in the rear remarked to bystanders that "the attempt was madness, and could not be successful." But, lo and behold, the disorganized mob in response to orders immediately wheeled and formed under fire with as much coolness and precision as they could have shown on parade, and while they stopped the enemy's progress, Washington rode back and brought up the main body of the army.

Steuben commanded the left wing, and in his subsequent deposition before the Lee court martial he relates some of the incidents of that day. "After reconnoitering," he says, "I returned from Monmouth, in order to make my report to the commander in chief, whom I found at Englishtown. Having seen that the enemy was marching and doubting of our being able to overtake them, and having seen nothing in my way but some militia, which followed at some distance, I stopped at a house in Englishtown to take some rest, where I stayed about an hour and a half. I afterwards continued my road to meet the commander in chief. On my way I heard several firings of cannon, and made the greatest haste to arrive near the general, whom I found on the high ground, beginning to form the troops as they arrived. It was there I saw General Lee's division retreating in great disorder, followed by the enemy, whose strength I conceived to be 1,500 men of infantry, and about 150 horse.

"As I was employed in placing a battery, General Lee passed by me, without speaking to one another. About a quarter of an hour after, the commander in chief ordered me to stop the retreating troops and form them toward Englishtown. I sent some officers forward to stop the men, and I went there myself, accompanied by Mr. Ternant and my aides-de-camp to form them. As I passed through Englishtown I found General Lee on horseback before a house. He asked me where I was going. I acquainted him with my orders, upon which he said to me that he was very glad of my having taken that charge upon me for he was tired out. I assembled part of General Maxwell's brigade and part of General Scott's detachment, which I formed behind the creek of Englishtown. General Maxwell was himself there. Scarce had the troops taken their position, when General Patterson

arrived with three brigades of the second line and desired to know where he was to be stationed. I placed his three brigades a little more in the rear on a high ground, and I established a battery on the right wing, in front of the second brigade of General Smallwood. The cannonade continued more or less briskly till past five o'clock. Half an hour after it had cleared, Colonel Gemat arrived and brought me an order from the commander in chief that the enemy was retreating in confusion, and that I should, therefore, bring him a reinforcement. I ordered General Maxwell to take the command of the troops I had placed behind the creek, and to remain there till further orders. I then marched off with the three brigades of the second line. As I passed through Englishtown I again met General Lee, who asked me where I was going. I imparted him the order I had received from the general in chief, which I declared in the very expressions of Colonel Gemat, that the enemy was retreating with confusion. Upon the word 'Confusion,' he took me up and said, 'that they were only resting themselves, but' said he afterward, 'I am sure there is some misunderstanding in your being sent to advance with these troops.' I told him that I had received the order from Mr. Gemat. I ordered, however, General Muhlenberg to halt, and sent for Captain Walker, my aide-de-camp, who repeated, in the presence of General Lee, the order which Colonel Gemat had brought me. 'Then,' said he, 'You are to march,' and I went on with the troops."

The British were now driven back across the ravine over which Lee had retreated, the principal action being at figure 5 indicated in the diagram, with an American battery at figure 6 playing at their right. Darkness checked the pursuit, and the Americans lay on their arms all night, expecting to renew the conflict in the morning. But



MONMOUTH BATTLE GROUND.

View from Wayne's position when Monckton fell. Old parsonage on left occupied during battle by Freeman. Beyond the house right and left was the morass, with elevations in the distance where Washington's army was drawn up. The British grenadiers were on the elevation on the extreme right, and two figures in the open field show where Monckton fell.



STEBUEN'S HEADQUARTERS AT MIDDLEBROOKE.

Wings have since been added.

at midnight Clinton withdrew his troops leaving his dead unburied, his wounded, in the hands of the Americans, and hurriedly retreated to Middletown where his two wings were again united.

On the American side there were 362 killed and wounded, and on the British, over 400, while over 2,000 deserted before and after the battle.

While the treachery of Lee prevented what might have proved the practical annihilation of Clinton's army, yet the fruits of the battle were decidedly with the Americans. It demonstrated their ability to withstand the trained levies of Europe, and once more confined the British to the occupancy of New York and a post on Rhode Island. Had the French fleet come up to expectations Clinton's army might still have been captured and the war ended then and there. But Count d'Estaing did not arrive at the mouth of the Delaware until July 8, too late to intercept Lord Howe's vessels, and two of the largest ships could not get over the bar at New York, so an expedition to Newport was planned, which turned out a failure.

On receiving British reports Frederick the Great exclaimed: "Clinton gained no advantage except to reach New York with the wreck of his army. America is probably lost to England." Alexander Hamilton afterwards remarked that he had never known or conceived the value of military discipline till that day, and this with numerous other expressions which might be quoted, testified to the skill and thoroughness with which the Baron had done his work.

The battle was over, and Lee's traitorous project had signally failed. With characteristic impudence, however, the next day he wrote a letter to Washington demanding an apology for the language used by the general on the

battlefield. Washington replied that what he had said was dictated by duty and warranted by the occasion, and adding that as soon as possible Lee should have the opportunity of justifying himself to the army, to Congress, to America and to the world in general, or of convincing them that he was guilty of a breach of orders and of misbehavior before the enemy, in not attacking them as he had been directed, and in making an unnecessary, disorderly and shameful retreat. To this Lee answered, "You cannot afford me greater pleasure than in giving me the opportunity of showing to America the sufficiency of her respective servants. I trust that temporary power of office and the tinsel dignity attending it will not be able, by all the mists they can raise, to obfuscate the bright rays of truth."

It has long been said that whom the gods would destroy they first made mad, and in Lee's case he had been so flattered and cajoled that he had no doubt brought himself to the belief that in such a controversy with Washington he would come out ahead. Lee was at once placed under arrest and a court martial convened, which, after a month's investigation found him guilty of disobedience of orders in not attacking the enemy, misbehavior on the field in making an unnecessary and shameful retreat, and gross disrespect to the commander in chief. His sentence, which in any European army at that time would have been death, was toned down to the exceedingly mild punishment of suspension for one year. This was no doubt due to the belief that he had simply lost his judgment through excitement. Had the commission known that his pockets were still distended with British gold in payment for his treason he would, of course, have not gotten off so easily.

We have noticed that Steuben was one of the witnesses before the court martial which was the cause of some caustic comments by Lee, that gentleman not having yet learned by experience the art of holding his tongue. This roused Steuben's ire to such an extent that he sent Lee the following note dated Philadelphia, December 2, 1778:

It has been reported to me, sir, that in your defense you have allowed yourself to cast indecent reflections on my account. I made haste to arrive at Philadelphia to inquire into the matter, and I find the report confirmed by the journal of the court martial, of which I got possession an hour ago, and where I read the following paragraph, "Of all the very distant spectators &c." were I now in my own country where my reputation is long established, I should have put myself above your epigrams and would have despised them. But here I am a stranger. You have offended me, I desire you will give me satisfaction. You will chose the place, time and arms, but as I do not like to be a distant or slow spectator, I desire to see you as near and as soon as possible. You will explain to Captain Walker, who will deliver this to you, if your present situation will permit you to bring this affair to as quick a conclusion as I wish it.

Lee evidently did not want a duel for he replied to the Baron's epistle:

I believe you have misunderstood the sense of this article of my defense. Very likely the sentence, "very distant spectators" has appeared to you a reflection cast upon your courage. If such be your opinion, I assure you that I had not the least idea of it. I am ready to acknowledge it to all the gentlemen of your acquaintance, to all the world if you will. It is true that I found fault with your forwardness (as I took it to be) to witness against me. I was piqued and thought myself justified in making use of the phrase which you have seen in print, but I repeat it without the least intention of intimating a reflection on your courage.

Steuben accepted the apology or whatever it might be called, apparently with approval of Hamilton, who, December 19, writes him from Washington's headquarters:

I have read your letter to Lee with pleasure. It was conceived in terms which the offense merited, and if he had any feeling, must have been felt by him. Considering the pointedness and severity of your expressions, his answer was a very modest one, and proved that he had not a violent appetite for so close a tete-a-tete as you seem disposed to insist upon. This evasion, if known to the world, would do him very little honor.

With the closing of this incident Lee and his character might be safely dropped, but a brief reference to his subsequent career may not be without interest. He defended himself very plausibly before Congress, which, after a consideration of three months affirmed on December 5, the decision of the court martial by a vote of 15 to 7, the word "shameful" having been stricken out of the finding. Lee continued to carry on his campaign against Washington through the press, and became so vituperative that Colonel Laurens, one of Washington's aides, challenged him, and in the subsequent duel Lee was wounded in the side. In the spring of 1779 he retired to his Virginia estate as he declared, "to learn to hoe tobacco, which is the best school to consummate a general. This is a discovery I have lately made." Here with his dogs and horse he lived a kind of hermit life, in a shell of a house, the different apartments of which were indicated by chalk lines on the floor. Towards the termination of his suspension he heard that Congress proposed to drop him from the service on the ground of economy, whereupon he wrote an insolent letter to the President of that body which resulted in his summary dismissal. His estate running down through mismanagement he visited Philadelphia while negotiating its sale. There he was taken down with fever, and died in an obscure inn. One clause of his will read: "I desire most earnestly that I may not be buried in any church or churchyard, or within a mile of any Presbyterian or any Baptist meeting house, for, since I have resided in this country, I have kept so

much bad company while living that I do not choose to continue it when I am dead."

Probably because his will was not opened until after the funeral, this injunction was not carried out, and Lee was buried with military honors in the yard of Christ Church, Philadelphia, his funeral being largely attended by citizens and prominent men. He had the faculty of making warm friends who, like those attached to McClellan in the Civil War, held to him through evil as well as good report, and Washington Irving gives him credit for many good traits, but none of these knew of the convincing proof of treason afterwards disclosed in the archives of a British manor house.

CHAPTER VIII.

REMODELING THE ARMY.

Steuben's Dissatisfaction—Desires a Position in the Line—New Code of Army Regulations—Printing Difficulties.

Clinton having reached New York with his beaten army there was nothing further to do in New Jersey, so Washington marched almost directly north along the west bank of the Hudson, which he crossed at King's Ferry, and encamped at White Plains about thirty miles north-east of New York, the relative positions of the two armies being much the same as in the latter part of 1776. Certainly the British had not made much progress, and had Washington been backed by a strong government which could have utilized the resources of the country the end must have come soon, notwithstanding the British still had control of the sea. Newport was abandoned that fall, and Clinton and Washington sat watching each other, neither strong enough to capture or oust the other. In the march from Monmouth to White Plains, where they arrived July 2, owing to the absence of American officers at the Lee court martial elsewhere, Steuben was appointed to command Lee's division, a work which he performed with credit. On the 22nd however, Washington issued a general order incorporating this division in his own command, and directed Steuben to resume his office of inspector general. The latter was not unnaturally dissatisfied with this. He had been performing the office of drillmaster for several months and the value of his work had been conceded. Moreover he had demonstrated his capacity to command, both in battle and on the march. He was deeply interested in the cause of American inde-

pendence, for which he had made serious sacrifices. Besides even the office of inspector, which he was now asked to resume, had only been placed on a temporary basis, and there was considerable doubt as to how far his jurisdiction extended. He went forthwith to Washington, and objected to this arrangement, and intimated a few days later, if not then, that he would feel compelled to resign if not given a command where he would be in active service. Washington regretted this situation, but said if he complied with the Baron's wishes every brigadier in the army would throw up his command, that during the march from Monmouth De Kalb, Lafayette and Steuben, all foreigners had commanded the army and that eight brigadiers had declared that in making Steuben inspector Congress had only intended to give him the nominal rank of major general, and that they did not propose to have him advanced over their heads. There was also another thorn in the Baron's side. One Colonel De la Neuville who had been inspector in Gates's army refused to acknowledge Steuben's authority, and thus the very work which the latter had been appointed to do was thrown into confusion. Even if the Baron should waive his claim to a command, which he appears after consideration to have been willing to do, it was apparent that matters could not continue on their present footing, so he asked leave of absence to present the matter before Congress, which had now resumed its sittings at Philadelphia. This was granted, and the following resume of the situation was sent by Washington to President Laurens :

Baron Steuben will also be in Philadelphia in a day or two. The ostensible cause for his going, is to fix more certainly with Congress his duties as inspector general, which is necessary. However, I am disposed to believe that the real one is to obtain an actual command in the line as a major general, and he may urge a competition set up by Monsieur Neuville for the inspector's place this side of the Hudson, and the denial by him

of the Baron's authority, as an argument to effect it, and for granting him the post as a means of satisfying both. I regard and esteem the Baron as an assiduous, intelligent and experienced officer, but you may rely upon it, if such is his view, and he should accomplish it, we shall have the whole line of brigadiers in confusion. They have said but little about his rank as major general as he has not had an actual command over them; but when we marched from Brunswick, as there were but few major generals, and almost the whole of the brigadiers were engaged at the court martial, either as members or witnesses, I appointed him *pro tempore*, and so expressed it in orders, to conduct a wing to the North river. This measure, though founded in evident necessity and not designated to produce to the brigadiers the least possible injury, excited great uneasiness and has been the source of complaint. The truth is we have been very unhappy in a variety of appointments, and our own officers much injured. Their feelings from this cause have become extremely sensitive, and the most delicate touch gives them pain. I write as a friend, and therefore with freedom. The Baron's services in the line he occupies can be important, and the testimonials he has already received are honorable. It will also be material to have the point of inspector generalship, now in question between him and Monsieur Neuville, adjusted. The appointment of the latter, it is said, calls him inspector general in the army commanded by General Gates, and under this, as I am informed, he denies any subordination to the Baron, and will not know him in his "official capacity." There can be but one head.

On July 26, Washington wrote another letter to the President of Congress to be delivered by the Baron himself, in which, after again rehearsing the facts previously related, he adds:

Justice concurring with inclination constrains me to testify that the Baron has, in every instance, discharged the several trusts reposed in him with great zeal and ability, so as to give him the fullest title to my esteem as a brave, indefatigable, judicious and experienced officer. I regret there should be a necessity that his services should be lost to the army; at the same time I think it my duty explicitly to observe to Congress that his desire of having an actual and permanent command in the line cannot be complied with without wounding the feelings of a number of officers whose rank and merits give them every claim to attention, and that the doing of it would be productive of much dissatisfaction and extensive ill consequences. This does not proceed from any personal objections on the part of those officers against the Baron; on the contrary most of them whom I heard speak of him, express a high sense of his military

worth. It proceeds from motives of another nature, which are too obvious to need particular explanation, or may be summed up in this, that they conceive such a step would be injurious to their essential rights and just expectations. That this would be their way of thinking upon the subject I am fully convinced, from the effect which the temporary command given him, even under circumstances so peculiar as I have mentioned, produced. The strongest symptoms of discontent appeared on that occasion.

The matter was reviewed by Alexander Hamilton in a letter to Elias Boudinot, member of Congress from New Jersey, of the same date as that above, in which he expressed the highest opinion of Steuben's military qualifications, and expressed the hope that some arrangement could be made by which he could be retained in the army. Among other suggestions he says: "Perhaps the principles on which the general's arrangement is formed may be preserved, and at the same time the objects of the inspectorship enlarged so as to render it a more important employment. Perhaps a resolution of Congress giving the Baron a right to be employed on detachments might, for the present, compensate for the want of a permanent command in the line, and might not be disagreeable to the officers. You can sound him on these heads. I need not caution you that this is a matter of great delicacy and importance, and that every step taken in it ought to be well considered."

It will be plainly seen from the above that Washington, Hamilton and all who had control of affairs at the front were anxious to retain Steuben in the army upon such terms as they could grant and he could honorably accept. It is true that Washington in a letter to Gouverneur Morris, discussing this very matter, gives expression to the wish that they had not a single foreigner among them except Lafayette, but this momentary expression of irritation, doubtless excited by the claims and pretensions of

some of the adventurers before mentioned, is not to be weighed against the constant tribute to the Baron's efficiency which he always paid, and the warm friendship which always existed between the two until severed by death. Neither should it be taken as a reflection on De Kalb, Pulaski, Kosciuszko and some others who braved perils even to death in the patriotic cause.

However fervent may have been the desire of Baron Steuben for a major general's command in active service it soon became apparent to him that this was out of the question, at least for the present, so, on his arrival at Philadelphia he accepted the situation, and devoted his energies towards securing the settlement of the inspectorship on a satisfactory basis. Neuville's position was the first obstacle in the way, but on August 2, 1778, Gouverneur Morris wrote to Washington that though the faith of Congress was, in some measure, plighted to Neuville it was not their intention that his brevet should give command, and this he proposed to have expressed by a particular resolution. As to the claims of the Baron for a command in the line he was satisfied that Congress would not grant it.

As predicted by Morris Congress promptly decided in favor of Steuben as ranking officer, at which Neuville resigned and returned to France. Congress then appointed a committee consisting of Messrs. Boudinot and Chase and General Reed to receive proposals from the Baron, who on August 7 presented a memorial covering the whole matter in detail. This with regulations subsequently adopted will be found quite fully reported in Mr. Kapp's work, but an outline is probably as much as will interest our present readers. After referring to the absolute necessity of uniformity in the army and to the acknowledged fact that the commander in chief has it not

in his power to attend in so particular a manner to the details of the different departments he suggests that the office of inspector general should be confided to some intelligent general officer, well versed in the theory and practice of maneuvering troops, the composition and formation of the different corps of an army, the customs of different armies, the necessary equipment of the troops, all which should come under his notice. Uniformity in supplies, discipline and camp duties was especially urged. The inspector should be under the immediate control of the Congressional board of war, also subject to the commander in chief. No foreigner should be intrusted with this charge, but if Congress thought otherwise a Continental brigadier (native) should be associated in the work with the view of himself one day becoming inspector general. Sub-inspectors should be appointed from the army, but no one to inspect his own regiment. The exercise and maneuvering of the troops should always be under the direction of the inspector general, and there are many suggestions under this head. The practice of European armies was cited and comparisons made of the difference in conditions on each side of the Atlantic. The report was most able and exhaustive in every respect, but, like many other public memorials it was destined for some time to get no farther than the hands of the committee.

On the evening of August 28 intelligence of the failure of the French fleet and General Sullivan to capture Newport, reached Philadelphia, and Congress adopted a resolution requesting Steuben to forthwith repair to Rhode Island, and give his advice and assistance to Major General Sullivan and the army under his command. Whether Congress had such a high opinion of Steuben's military abilities that it believed that his presence

at Newport would aid in extricating Sullivan from a precarious situation (provided he arrived in time) or whether it was a polite method of temporarily shelving the inspector problem the result was the same. Steuben left Philadelphia the next morning and reached Washington's camp at White Plains on the 31st, where he learned that Sullivan's retreat to Providence had been safely effected. There then being no object in going to New England Steuben, at Washington's request, remained at White Plains until late in September, when the army moved northward, finally going into winter quarters in the highlands. During this period the Baron continued exercising and drilling the troops as nearly as possible according to the methods prescribed in his memorial, relying on Washington's commands for his authority. On September 17, President Laurens wrote to Steuben expressing his gratification that the latter had not proceeded to Rhode Island, as it would have been a disagreeable embassy, and adding that the committee would soon report on the inspectorship but that Congress was so overcharged with business as to render it impossible to guess when it would be taken under consideration, and concluded.

Richard Peters, of the War Board, also wrote:

I hope to hear of your being more agreeably circumstanced than formerly as to your business at camp. It is an obvious matter that our army are in want of discipline, although their improvements in this respect are amazing, and as our men are docile and caapble, it is a pity that any obstacles should be thrown in the way of their receiving instructions. While you are here, I would wish to make every use of your willingness to serve this country, therefore, I wish to see the inspection in its full vigor, for the greater our discipline, the sooner we shall discomfit our enemies and be at peace, which to me is the most desirable of all objects, except my liberty and the independence of my country. When you have ceased to be serviceable as a soldier, you shall sit down with us and enjoy the pleasing calm

which will succeed the present tempest. Apropos, we will and must take possession of the Bermudas and you shall be governor.

It will be observed that the American cause did not lack optimists even under discouraging circumstances.

Steuben, at this time also received a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Ternant who had been appointer inspector of the Southern troops, and was now in Philadelphia, which encouraged the belief that the plan would soon be adopted. But Congress dallied day after day, and finally recommitted the whole question to a committee. Steuben wrote to Joseph Reed, chairman of the committee, urging action and suggesting that he might hasten matters by appearing before them in person, but "as experience teaches me that offered services do not always prove acceptable, I shall wait with respectful silence for the orders of Congress, which are to regulate all my actions." However, when winter came Steuben went to Philadelphia mainly to arrange and put in order a code of military regulations to introduce a thorough uniformity in the service. He pressed upon Congress the necessity of early action, and in a letter to the President he declares himself ready to make any sacrifice to carry out the wishes of those in control, with a few side remarks concerning his envious critics. He also wrote to Washington on December 6, in a somewhat discouraging mood, saying:

On my arrival in the city I delivered your Excellency's letter to Mr. President Laurens, accompanied by one from, acquainting Congress in what manner I intended to proceed to business. I afterwards, in another letter, requested to know to whom I was to apply for the necessary information on the subject. To these letters I have had no other reply than a resolve, directing the board of war to furnish me with every information I may want on the subject. I have not hitherto been able to get a sight of the plan proposed by a former committee, and to which your excellency subjoined your remarks, nor can I get the least information in whose hands that plan is. All I can

learn from Mr. President Reed, who presided in that committee, is, that that plan, though founded on the one I proposed, differed from it materially, and that the authority of the inspector general was therein much more extended than I proposed, and when I can procure the other I shall see wherein we have differed. However, it may be, I repeat that I shall, without the least deviation, conform to any remarks your Excellency has been pleased to make. I shall endeavor to convince Your Excellency and the whole army, that nothing but the good of the service, and not any personal views, shall direct my actions. The American soldier under my orders is, at the same time, a member of the republic I serve. If every officer and soldier would consider me in the same light, it seems to me many obstacles would be avoided. With respect to your Excellency, I again beg you to consider me as an instrument in your hands for the good of the army which has the honor to serve under your orders.

Washington replied thanking the Baron for his assurances of loyalty, and promising his cordial support towards carrying out any plan that might be agreed upon both out of personal considerations and for the benefit and improvement of the army. Hamilton wrote in the same vein, but the inertia of Congress was too great to be immediately overcome.

It was February 18, 1779 when the report of the committee appointed to confer with Washington was taken up, and a resolution adopted, providing that there should be an inspector general of the armies of the United States with the rank of major general, who in all future appointments should be taken from the line of major generals. The duties of inspector and his assistants were to be as has already been indicated, and he was allowed eighty-four dollars per month for extraordinary expenses in addition to the pay and rations of a major general. On March 29th a letter was read from Steuben accompanied by a system of regulations for the infantry together with a communication from the war board stating that the Baron's plans had been submitted to that body and also

to the commander in chief and had received their approval, and asking the sanction of Congress, which was given, and thus after a loss of much valuable time it looked as though something permanent was to be accomplished.

The arrangement now made by Congress involved the preparation of a complete book of regulations for the army. Steuben did not wait for its authorization before beginning this work, but, anticipating the result, and realizing that it would be a labor of weeks if not of months to prepare this code, began work on it soon after he arrived in Philadelphia, and spent most of his time on it during the winter. He associated with himself in this work Colonel Fleury, Captains Walker and De l'Enfant, and M. Duponceau, his secretary. His original scheme included four divisions; first, the service of infantry in the field; second, in garrison and on parade; third, cavalry; fourth, light troops. The first and third parts were completed during the winter, the others were never finished, and the cavalry division was not printed. The first part consisted of twenty-five chapters, of which a full summary may be found in Mr. Kapp's book, but as the details are of greater interest to military tacticians than to the general reader we give only the headings of the chapters as indicating the scope of the work. The book was entitled, "Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States," divided as follows: Chapter first, arms and accoutrements; second, necessity of officers being acquainted with the manual and answerable for the general instruction of the regiment; third, company formation; fourth, regimental formation; fifth, instruction of recruits; sixth, company exercises; seventh, battalion exercises; eighth, points of view; ninth, formation and display of columns; tenth, march of columns;

eleventh, march in line; twelfth, disposition of field pieces attached to brigades; thirteenth, firings; fourteenth, march of an army or corps; fifteenth, baggage on the march; sixteenth, laying out a camp with order of encampment; seventeenth, manner of entering camp; eighteenth, regulations for preserving order and cleanliness; nineteenth, roll calls; twentieth, general inspection; twenty-first, drum beats; twenty-second, guard service; twenty-third, arms and ammunition and their preservation; twenty-fourth, treatment of the sick; twenty-fifth, reviews.

In addition there were detailed instructions for the general conduct of the officers and privates. The humanitarian spirit of these instructions, which were somewhat advanced for that period, is indicated by the following:

A captain cannot be too careful of the company the State has committed to his charge. He must pay the greatest attention to the health of his men, their discipline, arms, accoutrements, ammunition, clothes and necessities. His first object should be to gain the love of his men by treating them with every possible kindness and humanity, inquiring into their complaints, and, when well founded, seeing them redressed. He should know every man of his company by name and character. He should often visit those who are sick, speak tenderly to them, see that the public provision, whether of medicine or diet, is duly administered, and procure them, besides, such comforts and conveniences as are in his power. The attachment that arises from this kind of attention to the sick and wounded, is almost inconceivable; it will, moreover, be the means of preserving the lives of many valuable men.

There is much more to the same effect, which conclusively proves that though the Baron was a strict disciplinarian, he was not a mere martinet. Concerning the difficulties of the project Kapp says: "Seldom was a work composed in such a manner as this. Every chapter was first roughly written in German, then translated into

bad French, then put in good French by Fleury, translated again into bad English by Duponceau, afterwards written in good English by Captain Walker, and when all this was completed, Steuben did not understand a word of it himself, from his ignorance of the English language." Notwithstanding our respect and admiration for Mr. Kapp's careful researches we are inclined to question the accuracy of this last statement. Baron Steuben had now been in the country about sixteen months. During that period he was constantly in association with men who spoke only English, was compelled to give orders to troops who knew no other language, and in various ways came in close contact with it almost every hour of the twenty-four, except the limited period allotted to sleep. He was well educated and was already proficient in French as well as his native German. It is not possible that he had learned to speak English fluently during the time he had been in America, in fact he never did so, but it is in the highest degree improbable that in all that time he had not learned to understand a word of this language. The truth doubtless lies between these two extremes. The Baron was not able to write out his book in English in the first place, but when translated by his assistants there is no reason to suppose that he was unable to read it, or to understand substantially what it meant.

His labors were greatly increased by the dearth of military publications in America, so he had to depend mostly on his recollections of the Prussian Code, and the lack of familiarity of his translators with the military terms of that code greatly increased the difficulty. On completion of the work it was sent to Washington for examination, who gave it his hearty approval with the comment: "As the fine season is advancing you will, I

flatter myself, shortly have the satisfaction, so rarely enjoyed by authors, of seeing your precepts reduced to practice, and I hope your success will be equal to the merits of your work." Steuben in reply said:

The engraving of the plates and correcting the press, will, I am afraid, detain me till the middle of April, and, as before that time the season will permit the troops to exercise, I think it would be necessary they should be exercised in detail on the principles laid down. If Your Excellency approves it, I will send Colonel Fleury, who has assisted me in composing the regulations to receive your orders on the subject. * * * I shall have the honor to forward to your Excellency a model of the several tools mentioned in the regulations, and which I think are necessary, if circumstances will allow me to procure them.

Congress ordered 3,000 copies of the work printed, but the troubles were not yet over. Mr North says: "To sketch, re-sketch the plates, and fit them for the engraver—the engraver, the paper, the types and printer, with difficulty to be found. None but those who lived in those dark days of poverty and dearth of everything, can think a thousandth part of all the penury with which we were surrounded. The Blue Book has at last appeared and was studied, and, except the Bible, was held in the highest estimation."

In the face of these difficulties the book was not ready for distribution until June, causing the Baron, who never seems to have been celebrated for his patience, to become more than restive. As illustrative of their difficulties Timothy Pickering on June 19, writes to Steuben:

We expected to send you more copies of the regulations, of which the bookbinder gave us encouragement, but his workmen failed him. It is not so easy to get work executed in America as in Europe. Here, under the present scarcity of hands, you can place no dependence on your workmen—to-day they are with you, and to-morrow on board of a privateer, with hopes of making their fortunes. I have, indeed, had much trou-

ble with the Regulations, but I went through it with pleasure, because I judged they would prove highly useful to my country.

* * * Should I again discover marks of extreme impatience, and even asperity, in the inspector general, I will impute them to his anxiety to introduce a perfect order and discipline in the army, and to his zeal in securing the safety and independence of America.

Peters writes to the same effect, and after a somewhat jocular introduction concerning the Baron's impatience, adds seriously:

We should violate our private feelings if we personally disregarded you, and we should, in my opinion, our public trust, did we not by every means in our power, assist you in the important business of your department. Real embarrassments have occasioned our not complying with our, as well as your, wishes, and however trifling the rubs thrown in our way may seem to one used to countries full of needy artificers, and stored with materials for work, yet to us they are not unimportant, or, what is worse, uncommon. These difficulties will continue during our present war, and as we cannot conquer we must endeavor to bear them.

There is considerably more along the same line, mixed with mild reproof, which the Baron doubtless took in good part. As an illustration of the minor difficulties of the occasion it is related that two copies of the Regulations which the Baron had ordered handsomely bound for Washington and the French minister could not be completed, because the bookbinder, (there seems to have been but one in Philadelphia) after searching through the entire city, was not able to procure any gold leaf for gilding.

Congress, on April 5, passed a resolution to the effect that Baron Steuben, inspector general, be informed by the President that Congress entertain a high sense of his merit, displayed in a variety of instances, but especially in the system of military order and discipline formed and presented by him to Congress.

Similar testimonials were offered by officials of the

different states to whom copies of the work were sent, each one testifying that the manual not only filled a want that was severely felt, but was invaluable in the existing condition of affairs. Copies of the work sent to Europe also elicited high praise from competent experts.

Congress, at Steuben's request, appropriated a thousand dollars for Colonel Fleury, eight hundred for Walker, six hundred for De l'Enfant, and four hundred for Duponceau. We may appropriately conclude this branch of our subject by the following account of an occurrence as related by the Baron himself :

"Although the Board of War was only composed of Peters and Pickering, there was always a member of Congress who took part in their deliberations. At this time it was Mr. Root, of Connecticut, who filled this office. I came one day to the war office, probably at the time they were deliberating how they should reimburse me for the expense I had been at while employed preparing my work. Mr. Root asked me how many copies had been printed. I said, three thousand. 'How many,' he replied, 'Shall you require for the officers of the army?' 'About eighteen hundred,' was my answer. 'There will, therefore be about twelve hundred left over,' said Mr. Root, 'the book will sell well.' He then made a calculation in an undertone, and resumed, 'But you could sell the remaining copies, and that would pay your expenses while in town.' If I had not remarked that Mr. Peters bent his head and blushed at hearing this proposal, I should certainly have told them my mind in pretty strong language. For a long time I did not utter a word ; at last I rose and said to Mr. Root that I was the more astounded at his proposition as I had not asked for any reimbursement of my expenses out of the public money."

CHAPTER IX.

CAMPAIGN OF 1779.

Steuben Reviews the Situation—Barbarous Raids—Value of the Bayonet Demonstrated at the Capture of Stony Point—Visit of the French Ambassador—Suggestions For the Future.

Toward the close of 1778 we find Clinton still holding New York and Newport, and although the rest of the county was measurably free yet there were no signs that England intended relaxing her grip. Her command of the sea continued to paralyze foreign trade, which reacted disastrously on domestic interests. Washington with a totally inadequate force was trying to hold the back country, and the prospect, to say the best, was not encouraging. At this time Steuben in a letter to James Lowell, Chairman of the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs, gave the following succinct review of the situation:

We have fortunately escaped a serious danger at Rhode Island. The enemy cannot boast of having gained the least advantage over the allied fleet, or over our army. A change in the wind has favored him and caused the failure of our plan. As it is but fair to render justice even to our enemies, we ought to admit that the English and the wind have made us miss two highly important strokes—that on the Delaware because the French fleet did not arrive a little earlier, and that on Rhode Island. If, when I made war under the King of Prussia, we had escaped two such strokes in one campaign, we should have called that a successful campaign. Here we are now on the defensive, a species of warfare extremely difficult and oftentimes dangerous. We have two objects to attain—equally important—to retain possession of the North river, and to bring our main force close to Boston. In case the enemy should undertake any operation, these two objects are very far distant from one another. Our land force, such as it is, must be ready to resist, at the right or the left, wherever the enemy thinks proper to

attack us. Now what will become of that unhappy province, the Jerseys, which is actually menaced with devastation and fire by the enemy? Lord Cornwallis has entered it with a body of probably six thousand men. Will Lord Stirling be able to oppose such a force with his three brigades, the number of which I will not mention, so as not to annoy you? Perhaps you will say, "The militia of New Jersey." But is the militia still animated by the same spirit as it was when America had no regular army? Now, allowing for the said three brigades, and two more at Providence, look at this side of the river and tell me what other forces have we there? Do not be deluded, sir, by the rolls of our regiments or brigades; deduct therefrom, unhesitatingly, one-third for those who, either for the want of clothing or shoes, are unable to make a single march in the present season of the year, when the nights are already cold and wet. I am not afraid to tell you the truth, disagreeable as it is; no, on the contrary, I consider it my duty to show you the actual situation of our army. I beg you, rather, sir, to examine attentively the land forces which the enemy possesses on this continent; look at their number, their nourishment, clothing, arms, order and discipline; see how much we are inferior, in all respects to them, and then answer me if our game is not a very hazardous one?

How long will our country continue to stake her fortune on the issue of one day? How many more millions has the devastation of the Jerseys devoured than it would have taken for the states to have completed the regiments upon the plan adopted by Congress, in which case we should have had an army of forty thousand men? Had we this force, nay, had we only thirty thousand, would the enemy ever have dared to put a foot out of New York island? Too numerous an army is expensive, but too small an army is dangerous. In 1776 General Washington had the glory to maintain himself at the head of an army of eighteen thousand men. I sincerely hope that he may not have that glory a second time. If too much backwardness had not been exhibited in this matter the war would probably have been already at an end. In order to secure peace on a solid and honorable basis, it is prudent to redouble every preparation for carrying on the war. * * * In consequence of the bad discipline, the service of picket guards or patrols is entirely neglected in our army. Our cavalry is without a leader—not a single officer of that arm understands the duty. They are brave, I have no doubt, but bravery alone does not constitute an officer.

Generals might plead and Congress might request, but states continued indifferent, and matters continued to jog along without any material change.

During his sojourn in Philadelphia, at the request of

General Reed, Baron Steuben spent several days with that gentleman examining the country around the city, especially on the Jersey side, with the view of constructing defenses which, fortunately, were never needed.

Impatient to get back to active service Steuben, without waiting for the final action of Congress, which now seemed assured, on March 26 hastened to rejoin the army in northern New Jersey. He went to work immediately, straightening out matters which needed attention. The nominal strength of the army, according to the resolutions of Congress, was eighty battalions of infantry of 477 privates each, so that the whole should be about 40,000 men, but the real strength was scarcely half this number. The force under Washington's direct command at this time numbered just 11,067 men, and with this little force he was expected to keep Sir Henry Clinton in New York (if not capture him with the city) and prevent sporadic raids along the coast and frontier. Steuben divided the army into six divisions known as the Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts and North Carolina. He drilled them thoroughly in the use of the bayonet, which was soon to figure in the capture of an important stronghold, and his formation of light infantry proved so effective that after the Revolution it was introduced into other European countries in contradistinction to the massing which had proved so fatal to Braddock and others. Reviewing and drilling were the order of the day, even after the army had taken the field. Arms must be polished, officers attentive to the wants of their men, the sick visited and cared for, and the improvement of the army was marked in every direction. A few details given by North indicated the amount and character of the work performed. He says:

I have seen the Baron and his assistants seven long hours inspecting a brigade of three small regiments. Every man not present must be accounted for; if in camp, sick or well, they were produced or visited, every musket handled and searched, cartridge boxes opened, even the flints and cartridges counted; knapsacks unslung, and every article of clothing spread on the soldiers' blanket, and tested by his little book, whether what he received from the United States within the year was there, if not, to be accounted for. Hospitals, stores, laboratories, every place and every thing were opened to inspection, and inspected, and what officer's mind was at ease if losses or expenditures could not, on the day of searching be fully and fairly accounted for? The inspections were every month, and wonderful was the effect, not only with regard to economy, but in creating a spirit of emulation between different corps. I have known the subalterns of a regiment appropriate one of their two rations to the bettering of the appearance of their men, but this was at a later period of the war, when supplies and payments were more regular.

The year 1778 closed and 1779 opened with a series of barbarous raids both on the Northern and Southern coasts, the main object being evidently to induce Washington to send part of his forces to protect these scattered posts. But Washington knew that such a procedure would prove his undoing, for any material weakening of his army along the Hudson would be the signal for an advance by Clinton up that river, and by the occupation of strategic points he would cut the American Confederation in two, and conquer each part in detail. The Americans with their fortifications at West Point held a firm grip on the highlands of the Hudson, with two smaller posts farther down, Stony Point on the west side, and Verplanck's on the east bank of the river. But while the Americans were fortifying Stony Point Clinton captured the place, and with its batteries reduced the works at Verplanck's. It was deemed essential that Stony Point be retaken, and the task was entrusted to General Anthony Wayne, whose "madness" was controlled by method, which brought victory on more than one occa-

sion. There was but one way to retake the fortress and that was by assault. But the usual storming party would be subject not only to the fire of the occupying garrison but to crossfires from Verplanck's and the river, which would make success out of the question. There was but one resource, a bayonet charge under cover of darkness. Every dog within three miles was killed, and at midnight on June 15, 1,200 Americans with unloaded guns and fixed bayonets advanced on the works. They were on top of the breastworks before discovery, and although the British made the best resistance possible the cold steel of the bayonet was too much for them, and after a loss of sixty-three, the remainder of the garrison 553 in number, surrendered. The American loss was fifteen killed and eighty-three wounded. The value of the bayonet as a fighting arm, which Steuben had labored to impress on the army, was now fully demonstrated, and the next day after the battle when he visited Stony Point in company with Washington, he was enthusiastically greeted by the soldiers who declared that in the future they would take care of their bayonets and use them for other purposes than digging trenches or roasting meat. At Steuben's request a general order was issued (which could now be enforced) directing that in the future all bayonets should be continually fixed to the musket, and the men were not to wear any more belts and sheaths for the purpose of carrying them. Bayonets, belts and sheaths were saved by this operation, and the former from this time forth became an integral part of each soldier's equipment. Owing to the great changes in fire arms and infantry tactics there has been some question in late years of the value of the bayonet, but for a century it held its place with no one to doubt its efficiency.

Shortly after this M. Gerard, the French minister to

the United States was superseded by Chevalier De la Luzerne, who arrived in Boston the latter part of August. Steuben was then doing some reviewing at Providence, R. I., and was requested by the minister to accompany him to Washington's headquarters, which he desired to visit. Accordingly he met the minister at Hartford, and the two continued their journey via Wethersfield, New Haven, Fairfield and Danbury to Fishkill on the Hudson, where Washington had already arrived. The pair, although strangers to each other, had the opportunity of becoming pretty well acquainted on their journey through Connecticut, and Steuben remarks of his companion: "Although he received me with the utmost politeness, I saw that he knew nothing of me, and that the French ministry had not informed him how it happened that I had come to this country. This convinced me that they had sent me adrift, and that I was to manage for myself as well as I could. I took good care not to allow M. De la Luzerne to perceive what I thought, and mentioned only incidentally my acquaintance at Versailles and the way I came to America, and determined to play the part of an American officer who had no other protection or support." It was evidently a case of out of sight, out of mind, and it is very probable that the Baron did not occupy the thoughts of the French officials to any great extent after he left that country.

American officers were naturally not thoroughly posted as to the details of etiquette to be observed in receiving foreign ambassadors, while Steuben, from his previous experience was perfectly at home in these matters. Before the party arrived at Fishkill, Hamilton wrote to Steuben asking him "to send on an express to the General (Washington) informing him of the daily stages which it is proposed to make and the time of your

intended arrival at camp. If the General should meet M. De la Luzerne at Fishkill as a private gentleman will he think the compliment amiss? This is *entre nous*. I see no impropriety in it, but shall be obliged to you to favor me with your opinion on this, and on any other point that may occur to you, *avec franchise*. At his Excellency's debarkation at headquarters Major Gibbs has a violent inclination to make a little flourish at the head of his men. Will this be an infringement on your plan?"

This plan seems to have been entirely satisfactory, in fact it was the only appropriate one, the minister not having yet presented his credentials to Congress. The visitor was greeted on his arrival with an artillery salute and a military reception in the fortress, and everything passed off agreeably. As Washington afterwards wrote, "He was polite enough to approve my principle, and condescended to appear pleased with our Spartan living. In a word, he made us all exceedingly happy by his affability and good humor while he remained in camp. After an inspection of the army and fortifications the minister proceeded on his journey to Philadelphia."

Washington at this time requested a written opinion from Steuben as to the military situation, which was given at some length on July 27, from which we take the following extracts:

Our present situation is about the same as it was at the commencement of the campaign. The enemy is still numerically superior. Their troops are better provided than ours. They are better able to carry out their plans, and, on account of their ships, they are masters of the coast and of the mouth of North river.

The taking of Stony Point was a great advantage for our side. It has not only encouraged the army but the people. It has shown the enemy that our generals know how to make a plan, and that our officers and soldiers know how to carry it out with boldness and precision. It has delayed the field oper-

ations of the enemy, but it has not altogether defeated their plans.

Let us examine what those plans probably are: The great preparations which the enemy have made to protect themselves on both sides of the river at King's Ferry, the time, labor and expense they have employed in fortifying this point—can they have any other object than the burning and plundering the coast of Connecticut? Would they have fortified Stony and Verplanck's Points to terminate their conquests there for this campaign? Neither supposition is at all probable. Their plans must be more comprehensive. Having fortified these two points, and leaving a sufficient garrison in them (it will be remembered that the Americans evacuated Stony Point three days after its capture by Wayne) they are at liberty to take the rest of their forces wherever they think proper, and in case of a reverse these two points are a support for their troops and a harbor for their vessels. They will then invade the country with a view to encouraging us to follow them by detachments, or with our full force, while they will be ready at any moment to make an attack on West Point with three or four thousand men and the vessels necessary for their transport. If, on the other hand, we do not allow ourselves to be drawn from our present position by their invasion, it is possible that they may send a corps of five or six thousand men, on either side of the river, to seem to threaten our flanks, and try to maneuver in our rear, so as to attack West Point. This, however, seems to me very difficult, particularly on the side of the fort.

Whatever means they employ, I am positive that their operations are directed exclusively to getting possession of this post, and of the river as far as Albany. If this is not their plan they have not got one worth the expense of a campaign. On their success depends the fate of America. The consequence is, therefore, that there is nothing of greater importance to us than to avert this flow. Let them burn what they have not burned already, and this campaign will add to their shame, but not to their success. Were West Point strongly fortified, supplied with sufficient artillery, ammunition and provisions, and a garrison of two thousand men, we ought not to be induced to take our forces more than a day's march from it. To have the means of relieving it, I go further and say that our army should be destroyed or taken before we allow them to commence an attack on West Point. * * * Were it possible to place a brigade or two somewhere between Sufferns and Fort Montgomery, the enemy would be compelled to keep more men and ships near Stony Point, and although I do not think it advisable to risk a second enterprise against the same point, I should wish the enemy to apprehend it. * * * Let us defend North River and hold West Point, and the end of our campaign will be glorious. The above is my opinion on the present condition of af-

fairs. The arrival of our ally's fleet on the coast would materially change our plan of operations.

No general movement was made by either army, and the summer passed away quietly so far as operations in this section were concerned. The Baron and his assistants were indefatigable in bringing the army up to as high a standard as possible with the facilities at his command. He seems to have largely conquered the prejudices which still existed among the Americans against foreigners, and Duponceau tells us that though he was a strict disciplinarian he was much beloved by the soldiers as well as by civilians. One woman asked permission to name her child after him when he said, "How will you call him?" "Why to be sure," was the reply, "I'll call him Baron." Occasionally he would swear in German, then in French, and then in both languages together, and when these vocabularies were exhausted he would call aides to continue the operation in English until the desired maneuvers were successfully performed. On September 28th he sent some copies of his regulations to Benjamin Franklin at Paris with a short review of his work in the army, which he considers on the whole quite satisfactory. He says if other correspondents "tell you that our order and discipline equal that of the French and Prussian armies, do not believe them; but do not believe them either, if they compare our troops to those of the Pope; and just take a medium between these two extremes. Though we are so young that we scarcely begin to walk we can take already Stony Point and Paulus Hook (near New York) with the point of the bayonet, without firing a single shot. * * * All I can assure you of is that the English will not beat us if we don't beat ourselves."

There was the usual trouble, however, arising from expiring enlistments and scanty supplies which effectually

prevented Washington from making any serious efforts towards the reduction of New York, which was now the only important post held in the North since Rhode Island had been abandoned by the enemy. Clinton finding he could accomplish nothing substantial in his own neighborhood decided to turn his face towards the South, where the British had won several important victories, and it became evident that the principal military operations would soon centre in that section. Leaving Knyphausen with a strong force to guard New York, he and Cornwallis on Christmas Day, 1779, with five men of war and 8,000 troops sailed for Georgia, and afterwards received 3,000 more, bringing the army in that section up to 13,000 men. Savannah had been for sometime in possession of the British, and Charleston was now the objective point. Its capture was not accomplished, however, until May 12th of the following year.

In the meantime, Washington, having sent all the Virginia and North Carolina troops south to aid in repelling the invasion went into winter quarters near Morristown, New Jersey. The winter was exceptionally severe, and it was almost Valley Forge over again. Snow lay two feet deep on the ground, and the troops suffered severely before they could build their log huts to keep from freezing. Continental money was worth about thirty cents on the dollar, and nobody wanted to take it at any price. Sometimes the army would be without bread, sometimes without meat, and sometimes without both, for days at a time. Congress seemed unable to do anything, and the men were kept from starving largely through voluntary contributions of the New Jersey farmers. The Hudson was frozen over, and Knyphausen added to his army considerable loyalist militia to resist

any effort which the Americans might make to cross on the ice and attack the city, but such an effort was beyond Washington's power. Nevertheless nobody thought of giving up the contest. Steuben kept up his drills and exercises, and as he now had the entire confidence and good will of the army his task in this direction was comparatively easy. He had troubles, however, in another way, in that his expenditures necessarily exceeded his income. Out of his small allowance he was obliged to purchase supplies for his servants and horses, and as a result his financial condition soon became a matter of serious concern. Washington on August 17, 1779, called the attention of Congress to this matter with a memorandum of warrants he had given Steuben on his own authority. Strictly speaking this was not legal, and could only be justified by the urgent necessity which existed. He asked that the Board of War be vested with discretionary power to meet this class of emergencies, by granting such amounts from time to time as might be necessary and reasonable. As usual, however, Congress did nothing, and the situation became more strained as Washington did not feel justified in issuing such warrants without specific authority to do so. Some of the American officers were in the same condition as Steuben, but as they received aid from their respective states their situation was more endurable than the Baron's, who had nothing to fall back upon. To tide over the fall and winter at Morristown, Mr. Boudinot made him a loan, and at last Steuben, whose patience was naturally exhausted, asked Congress for an increase of pay or dismissal. It will be remembered that his compensation was nominally \$2,000 per annum, but this was paid in Continental currency, then almost worthless. Finally Congress, on March 7, 1780, voted him an extra allowance of 250 louis d'ors, quoted at \$3.83

each, but which being paid in bills of exchange on Paris, the Baron was compelled to discount them at a loss of 40 per cent. thus realizing the munificent sum of \$580.50. Had it not been for the urgent requests of his associates Steuben would no doubt have resigned his position at this time. Colonel Benjamin Walker, the Baron's aide-de-camp, among others, wrote him, "I cannot but dread the moment when such an event shall take place, for much am I afraid we should again fall into that state of absolute negligence and disorder from which you have in some measure drawn us." But Steuben held on, hoping for better times and better things.

It will be remembered that so far as the sinews of war were concerned Congress was practically reduced to French loans and paper money issues, whereas a strong government possessing adequate powers of taxation would probably not have been obliged to resort to either, at least to more than to a limited extent.

CHAPTER X.

A YEAR OF EVENTS.

The George Rogers Clark Expedition—Victories of Paul Jones and the Navy—Spain Enters the Struggle—Troubles in the South—Paper Reforms—Bad Condition of the Army—Steuben's Continued Efforts—Gloomy Prognostications.

However interesting in themselves it would be foreign to the purpose of this work to follow the numerous forays and expeditions, which, along the coast and back at the frontier, followed each other at frequent intervals. Harrowing as they were to the communities thus afflicted they cannot be said, so far as the British efforts were concerned, to have had much influence on the final result of the war. in fact the outrages thus committed aroused such indignation as to incite the patriots to renewed efforts and counter expeditions. One of these latter, under the command of George Rogers Clark, which penetrated to the Mississippi and gave the whole of the territory northwest of the river Ohio, then a part of the province of Quebec, to the United States, is deserving of larger space than it has yet received in our general histories. A writer has called Clark the Hannibal of the West, but the comparison fails to do justice to the conqueror of the West. Like Hannibal Clark penetrated far into the enemy's country, but, unlike Hannibal, he refused to retreat, and, turning threatened annihilation into victory, gave to his country not only that great empire which now includes the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and part of Minnesota, but indirectly prevented the confinement of the new nation to a narrow strip along

the Atlantic ocean, with the Allegheny mountains practically the western boundary.

During this period our little navy had also been doing excellent work on the ocean, and John Paul Jones was able to strike terror even along the English coast. Early in 1779 Spain by entering into an alliance with France had practically declared war against England with the object of recovering Florida, Minorca and especially Gibraltar, whose continued possession by Great Britain was equal to a running sore in the body politic of the Iberian peninsula. England now had 314,000 soldiers in different parts of the world, but her enemies were giving her so much trouble that she could not reinforce her armies in America to any great extent, in fact Clinton was compelled to send 5,000 men to the West Indies which involved the evacuation of Newport, and from that time until the end of the war, New York was the only place of importance north of the Chesapeake held by the British. It was a golden opportunity for the Americans, but Washington with his inadequate resources could do nothing but watch, while his little army stretching in a thin line from Danbury, Connecticut, to Elizabethtown, New Jersey, maintained a pretty effective blockade so far as the back country was concerned. British ships could ascend the Hudson as far as the highlands, but so long as the Americans held West Point this was of very little use.

In this condition of affairs Clinton not unnaturally turned his thoughts towards the South. He had not forgotten his defeat at Fort Moultrie in 1776, but the situation had changed somewhat since then. Savannah had been captured by the British in the fall of 1778, and they still held that city notwithstanding an effort the next year by the combined Americans and French forces for its re-

capture, in which Count Pulaski was slain. Subsequent battles in Georgia and South Carolina were unfavorable on the whole to the Americans, and with the royalist sentiment known to exist in those two states it was believed that a new base for successful operations could be found.

Washington, ever on the alert, fully appreciated the new danger, especially when he learned that Clinton and Cornwallis on Christmas Day, 1779, had sailed for Savannah with 8,000 men, leaving Knyphausen in command at New York, which had been strengthened by the forces from Rhode Island and posts on the Hudson. But the same situation confronted him, the inadequacy of his army, which alike prevented the sending of large reinforcements south or any successful movement against New York. In fact the expiration of terms of enlistment threatened to reduce the main army, now having only 13,070 men, by at least one-fourth. At this juncture he ordered Steuben, in whom he continued to manifest increased confidence, to go to Philadelphia to confer with Congress in regard to reforming the army and placing it on a more permanent basis. The prejudice against anything looking towards the formation of a standing army had previously considerable influence in preventing the enactment of legislation whose necessity was now so apparent, in fact the very existence of the army was at stake.

Steuben arrived at Philadelphia on the 22d of January, 1780, and the next day delivered Washington's report to Hon. Samuel Huntington, then President of Congress. On the 26th he was informed that the Board of War was ordered to confer with him on the state of the army. There was also talk of a committee to visit the camp in order to give a new formation to the army, and incorporating forty-one regiments. Steuben was also in-

formed by the French minister that the latter was on the point of asking Congress what means it intended to employ for the operations of the next campaign, that he might give notice to his court and to the chiefs of squadrons to make their arrangements. He also gave assurance that they might reckon on the arrival of the French fleet in case the Americans were able to co-operate.

Steuben left very full notes of this period, and letters which have been translated by Mr. Kapp, which give a flood of information obtainable from no other source. The Baron appeared before the Board of War on the 26th, where he found the members well disposed towards his plans and apparently willing to do all in their power to reinforce the army and promote vigorous operations. Several schemes were proposed, and the Baron expressed his willingness to accept any that would bring them an army.

Finally on January 28 he presented to the Board a lengthy memorial reciting what had been done towards reducing the army to a uniform organization in the face of serious obstacles, and even that, incomplete as it was, promised to be totally destroyed by the expiration of terms of enlistments, leaving fragments of battalions and regiments which could not be thrown together without encountering such opposition as threatened to disrupt the whole scheme. Even supposing the army could be recruited by filling each skeleton regiment it would bring the force to 58,000, not only an unnecessary number, but one which would be beyond the ability of the states to support. But in order to oppose the enemies in the North and South it was necessary that the army should be considerably augmented, and sufficiently provided with necessaries for the next campaign. That the Baron did not consider an immense number necessary for this

purpose is evident from the figures given below, which do not include officers, sergeants, drummers, wagoners, artificers, servants or camp followers of any kind, but only actual fighting men. His very conservative estimate of the number of these needed is as follows:

Infantry	23, 616
Cavalry	1,000
Artillery and artificers	2,000
Train of Artillery	400
Train of the army.....	2,952

Total 29,968

Of this he assigned the forces under Washington as follows:

Infantry	16,000
Cavalry	600
Artillery and artificers.....	1,200
Train of Artillery.....	300
Retainers &c.	2,000

Total 20,000


He would allow 1,816 in garrisons, and the balance to General Lincoln in South Carolina. To accomplish this he proposed that—"Each state should only level its regiments—each to consist of three hundred and twenty-four men. They ought then to divide each regiment into eight companies, and one of light infantry. Each company should consist of thirty-six men, out of whom four should be drawn to be put under the quarter-master general's orders, who might employ them as wagoners, etc., and thereby save the enormous expense to which we are subjected by the considerable pay those wagoners receive, which it is known is no less than that of a captain of infantry."

Considerable space is also devoted to measures for subsistence, clothing &c., and above all, 10,000 stand of arms by the beginning of the following May, without reckoning on those which were expected from France. The moments were precious, and the Baron reminded the Board that if the recruits did not join their regiments by the 1st of April the trouble and expense of assembling them would avail nothing. He adds in conclusion:

“Our late disappointment at the southward should strike us; two thousand men more under the orders of General Lincoln would have insured us the defeat of the enemy in Georgia, and we would now have no fatal consequences to apprehend on that side. I cannot forbear observing here that most of the individuals of this continent are tired of the present war. I wish this consideration may induce us to do our utmost to bring it to a happy termination in one glorious campaign.”

While some made objections to certain details of the Baron's plans, on the whole they were well received, of which fact he apprised Washington on January 30, and asked for the Board of War returns of the present condition of the troops, supplies &c. To this on February 8 Washington replied from Morristown to the effect that before arranging details it should be decided whether it would be in their power to make an offensive movement, or must they confine themselves to a defensive campaign, and on this point he says:

It is not possible to decide this question without a more intimate knowledge of our resources of finance than I at present possess, and without ascertaining whether our allies can afford a squadron for an effectual co-operation on this continent. I think, with vigorous exertions, we may raise a sufficient number of men for offensive operations, if we were able to maintain them; but from the view I have of our affairs, I do not believe the state of our treasury will admit this without



WEST POINT IN 1780.

From print in New York Magazine, 1790. On left is portion of old Fort Constitution. Opposite on a high point is Fort Clinton, the two connected by the great chain 450 yards long. In the distance are two mountains crowned with North and Middle redoubts. The view is from Constitution island.



THE VERPLANCK HOUSE.

Steuben's Headquarters near West Point, where the Society of the Cincinnati was formed.

assistance from abroad. Whether this is to be obtained, Congress alone can judge. On the other hand, from the particular situation of the enemy's posts in this quarter, I should not advise you to calculate measures on the principle of expelling them, unless we had certain assurances that an adequate naval force will be ready to co-operate with us through all contingencies. If foreign aid of money and a fleet are to be depended upon, I should then recommend that all our dispositions should have reference to an offensive and decisive campaign, and in this case I should ask at least one-third more men than you estimate, to be immediately raised by a general draft. But as I doubt whether these two preliminaries can be placed upon such a footing of certainty as to justify our acting in consequence, I imagine we must of necessity adopt the principle of a defensive campaign, and pursue a system of the most absolute economy. On this principle, however, if I understand your estimate, I do not think it will be more than sufficient. When the deductions for unavoidable casualties are made this number will give us less than twenty thousand for our efficient operating force. This is as little as we can well have to contain the enemy within bounds, and prevent their making any further progress. Including the detachment which lately sailed from New York they have near twenty thousand men fit for actual service in these states, to say nothing of the recruits they will probably send over to complete their battalions, &c.

While conferences with the War Board were still in progress Steuben busied himself in arranging details for the anticipated recruiting, examination of the recruits and assignment for service. None under eighteen or over fifty years of age should be received, and the regulations could not be improved upon to-day. Special attention was given to the cavalry.

As usual, however, Congress failed to fully comply with the suggestions of Steuben, although they were fully supported by Washington. In lieu thereof on February 5, the following resolutions were adopted:

That, for the ensuing campaign, the states be respectively required to furnish, by draughts or otherwise, on or before the 1st day of April next, their respective deficiency of the number of 35,211 men exclusive of commissioned officers, which Congress deem necessary for the service of the present year.

It was provided that all the men whose service did not expire before the last of the following September should be credited on the quotas of their respective states, and for this purpose the general in chief was directed to make returns to the states of the men so credited. This action led to a lengthy correspondence between Steuben and Washington in regard to carrying out of details. As before intimated the lack of men was not the only difficulty to be encountered. Arms and accoutrements were quite as important, and, according to information furnished by the Board of War there were only about five hundred stand of arms on which they could rely, while nothing could be expected from abroad before the following June or July. There was necessarily considerable delay in making out the returns which fretted the Baron, who declared, "We shall certainly lose two months at a time when we ought not to lose two days."

While this was going on the Baron did a little investigating on his own account, and found in the Philadelphia manufactories and magazines 3,200 stand of arms in good order. A return of 2,000 was made from Albany, and a similar number at Carlisle, Pa., which could be brought together by the beginning of April. He also found 4,000 large muskets without bayonets, which were too heavy for campaign purposes but suitable for use in fortifications. He proposed to have 2,000 cleaned and sent to West Point. In addition 2,000 new cartridge boxes were discovered, which would be useful in the army. At this time a letter was received from Franklin in Paris, in which he expressed no doubt that a request made by Congress of the King for arms, ammunition and clothing for the army, would be granted.

The hopes raised by this condition of affairs were soon succeeded by discouragement. A letter to Wash-

ington, dated March 15, shows that practically nothing had been done to carry out the plans proposed. Congress still dallied with details, and especially neglected to decide whether the number of regiments was to be preserved, or whether a general incorporation was to take place, a matter simple enough in itself, but a necessary preliminary to my effective work in the future. The Baron in despair concluded to quit Philadelphia and return to the army, but Chancellor Livingston requested him to remain and make one more effort towards securing Congressional action through the War Board. As the season was now so far advanced and so much valuable time had been lost it was decided to abandon the reformation idea, and instead recruit the existing skeleton regiments up to their maximum strength. Once more the Baron reformed his plans to meet the new exigency, by which each regiment was to consist of 317 fighting men exclusive of the commissioned officers, drummers, fifers, and be divided into nine companies of thirty-five men each. A brigade of four regiments would have 1,268 fighting men, and fifteen brigades at the grand army would make a body of infantry of 18,703 men under arms. By this time Washington's entire force in New York and the Jerseys had been reduced to 10,400 rank and file, including 2,800 whose terms of enlistment would expire the last of May, which would leave him with less than 7,000 troops, stretched around a crescent of over one hundred miles. With this little army poorly supplied he had to watch the 11,000 well armed and well trained British soldiers strongly fortified and concentrated at New York City, and be ready at any opportune moment to move towards Boston, up the Hudson or back across the Jerseys as circumstances might require. The Virginia and North Carolina brigades had already been sent south, and the

critical situation there would soon make further demands. There were some Canadians serving in the army at this time, but their number was not large.

On the 28th the Baron again wrote to Washington that Congress had done nothing with his memorial, which still lay on the table, and as he says, "every wheel of the machine seemed stopped." He pronounced the situation very critical, and although some attempts had been made to improve the financial situation, no immediate results could be expected in that direction. He concludes this epistle with the following pregnant remarks:

My anxiety for our northern affairs. I cannot help saying, is considerably increased by the last accounts, which seem to announce a determination of General Lincoln to defend Charleston with all his force. This to me appears to be playing a hard game. Another danger which threatens us, and which is much to be dreaded is the declared division between Virginia and Pennsylvania, the latter state having actually passed a law for the raising fifteen hundred men to defend their pretended rights. All these things offer but a dull prospect, rendered still more dull by the cabals and factions which reign among us. The civil departments of the army, at a time when their whole attention should be taken up in providing for the approaching campaign, are in such a state of dissatisfaction and confusion, that I am very apprehensive they will make things still worse than they are.

You will perhaps think, my dear General that I am in anxiety for things which are out of my sphere; but when you consider that all my happiness depends on our success, you will not blame me for the interest I take in the cause. The same motives make me apprehensive that the necessary arrangements will never be firmly established without your personal assistance; and I submit to you, My dear General, whether your presence is not absolutely necessary at Congress in the present critical situation of our affairs. Your right to the confidence both of Congress and the people is too well founded not to command the greatest attention to everything you propose. The time is precious, and the prospect before us is threatening. Your presence will animate our councils as it does our armies. My attachment to the cause, and the respectful confidence I have in your presence, induce me to express in the strongest terms the desire I have to see you here.

Washington's reply to this earnest epistle is dated April 2. After referring to some details of the proposed reforms he says :

Your anxiety on the score of southern affairs cannot exceed mine. The measure of collecting the whole force for the defense of Charleston ought, no doubt, to have been well considered before it was determined. It is putting much to hazard, but at this distance we can form a very imperfect judgment of its propriety or necessity. I have the greatest reliance on General Lincoln's prudence, but I cannot forbear dreading the event. Ill as we can afford a diminution of our force here, and notwithstanding the danger we run from the facility with which the enemy can concentrate their force at our weak points, besides other inconveniences, I have recommended to Congress to detach the Maryland division to reinforce the southern states. Though this determination cannot, in all probability, arrive in season to be any service to Charleston, it may assist to arrest the progress of the enemy, and save the Carolinas.

My sentiments concerning public affairs correspond, too, much with yours. The prospect, my dear Baron, is gloomy, and the storm threatens. Not to have the anxiety you express at the present juncture, would be not to feel that zeal and interest in our cause by which all your conduct shows you to be actuated. But I hope we shall extricate ourselves, and bring everything to a prosperous issue. I have been so inured to difficulties in the course of this contest, that I have learned to look upon them with more tranquility than formerly. Those which now present themselves no doubt require vigorous exertions to overcome them, and I am far from despairing of doing it.

Steuben replied on the 6th with the oft-told tale of procrastination, and embodying the suggestion that he had previously made to Congress, that in view of the delay and lateness of the season a committee be appointed with full power in concert with Washington to make every arrangement necessary for the ensuing campaign. Washington had, in the meantime, written to President Huntington concerning the alarming condition of affairs and before Steuben's letter was dispatched a committee was appointed, consisting of Messrs. Schuyler, Matthews and Peabody to take up the matter. They were

instructed to proceed at once to headquarters to carry out as far as possible the reforms suggested by Steuben, and during the Summer they made reports and continued their labors until August 11, when they were discharged. Congress took up the matter, however, the following Autumn, and adopted the Baron's system when the war was nearly over.

While Steuben was in Philadelphia, details of his work in the army were carried out as far as possible by his aide de camp, Colonel Walker, who, with immense amount of trouble, succeeded in getting returns of more or less completeness. Even with the support of Washington it was very hard to enforce the regulations, and it was no doubt with unfeigned satisfaction that the Baron was welcomed back to his military duties about the middle of April. Steuben was accompanied to headquarters by Chevalier De la Luzerne, the French minister, in whose honor, the army, under Steuben's direction, was put through a series of maneuvers, which elicited the warmest praise from their distinguished visitor.

CHAPTER XI.

A DISASTROUS PERIOD.

Reverses in the South—Loss of Georgia and the Carolinas—The Army Almost Discouraged—Equipoise of Washington and Steuben—Incompetency of Congress—The Baron Outlines Plans for the Future—Treachery of Arnold—An Interesting Incident.

The apprehensions of Washington and Steuben in regard to the army in the South were soon abundantly verified. General Lincoln was a brave and energetic officer, but he made the mistake of allowing his army to be cooped up in Charleston instead of escaping as Washington did from New York in 1776. As a result, the city being invested by a superior force on land and sea, he was compelled on May 12, 1780 to surrender with all his force. The 3,000 Continentals were held as prisoners, and the militia and male citizens were paroled. The loss was most serious as it turned South Carolina as well as Georgia almost completely over to the British, although Marion, Sumter and other partisan rangers kept up a desultory warfare. Sir Henry Clinton returned to New York leaving 5,000 men with Cornwallis to complete the reduction of the South by the invasion of North Carolina and Virginia. A crisis was at hand, and not only were more troops needed south of the Potomac, but a competent general to command them. Washington had unlimited confidence in Greene, notwithstanding the latter had made some mistakes in the early part of the war, and desired that he might be sent to collect the remnants of the southern army. But Gates, who, with the assistance of Arnold, had won his laurels at the expense of Schuyler

at Saratoga, notwithstanding his character had suffered by the disclosures of the Conway cabal, was still regarded as an able general, and on June 13 Congress placed him in command of the Southern army. He left for the field of operations with the best wishes of everybody, although his old-time friend and associate Charles Lee, sent him a warning note to "Take care that your northern laurels do not turn to southern willows." He arrived at Hillsboro, North Carolina, on June 19, and relieved General De Kalb, who had managed to keep together what was left of the army. It was a situation demanding extraordinary care and prudence, but Gates does not seem to have exercised even ordinary faculties. Without going into details, which are related by Fiske and other historians, it is sufficient to say that he was surprised by Cornwallis, near Camden, S. C., and on August 16, suffered a crushing defeat. His army was captured, slaughtered or scattered and De Kalb killed, while Gates only saved himself by a precipitate flight to Hillsboro, nearly two hundred miles distant, which he covered in less than four days. The way to North Carolina and Virginia was now open to the invader, but before following the course of events in that section we will return to the Jerseys.

Steuben was at his old work keeping the army in the best shape possible. The new levies ordered by Congress brought the army down below the danger point, while the lack of supplies and worthlessness of the Continental money embarrassed every step. The latter had fallen to two cents on the dollar, and before the end of 1780 it took ten paper dollars to make a cent. In these days of alleged high prices it may be interesting to observe that corn was then quoted at \$15 per bushel, butter at \$12 a pound, flour \$1,575 a barrel and other things in proportion. Of course these were not specie prices but based

on paper which had already produced the familiar proverb "Not worth a Continental," that has survived to the present day. As the army was paid in currency, when paid at all, the situation was particularly hard on both officers and privates, when it required an officer's salary for the entire year to purchase a suit of clothes. Washington attempted to supply the army with food by requisitions from the surrounding country, a proceeding always objectionable, but which he carried out as lightly and impartially as possible, paying therefor in certificates which were receivable for taxes, not a very good makeshift but one that served its purpose for the time. When the pay of a private of a private soldier for a month would not buy a bushel of wheat for his suffering family, it is not surprising that there were desertions. The people were getting tired of the war, and even among the patriots there was talk as to whether it would not be better to make terms and end the struggle before there should come the inevitable collapse. Desertions at that time averaged over a hundred a month, and Washington in writing to President Huntington calls attention to the fact that with the end of the year the terms of half the army would expire, with the condition that "The shadow of an army that will remain will have every motive except mere patriotism to abandon the service, without the hope which has hitherto supported them, of a change for the better. This is almost extinguished now, and certainly will not outlive the campaign unless it finds something more substantial to rest upon. To me it will appear miraculous if our affairs can maintain themselves much longer in their present train. If either the temper or the resources of the country will not admit of an alteration, we may expect soon to be reduced to the humiliating condition of seeing the cause of America in America upheld by foreign arms."

On June 6 Knyphausen concluded to make a diversion into New Jersey, and for this purpose landed a force at Elizabethtown point. The town itself was guarded by American militia, who, having warning, withdrew in time not only to avoid capture, but with the help of reinforcements and some Continental troops they harassed the British all the way to Connecticut Farms, a distance of about five miles. From there the Americans retreated a few miles farther to Springfield where they took a strong position, which Knyphausen, although his force was greatly superior, did not attempt an attack, and that evening began a retreat back to the point. Steuben, as Washington's chief of staff, seems to have supervised the movements of the Americans, for all reports were sent to his quarters as well as deserters and prisoners. He also drew up a general plan to utilize the New Jersey militia during this invasion which subsequent movements of the enemy rendered unnecessary.

Clinton arrived at New York from the South on June 17, and two days later came across the bay to view the situation in New Jersey. He did not think much of it, but before withdrawing his troops concluded to try the effect of a diversion. Making a feint at threatening Washington's army in the rear, he again advanced to Springfield about thirty miles northwest. Greene had taken up a strong position beyond the town which Clinton concluded not to attack, but that evening ordered a retreat after burning the village. Skirmishers and militia harassed the British along the entire route, repeating the Lexington experience. The British troops reached Staten Island by a bridge of boats which was then removed. Later Clinton embarked 8,000 troops on an expedition to retake Rhode Island, which he had given up the preceding fall, but owing to the inactivity of Arbuthnot, the naval com-

mander, it came to nothing, and Clinton wrote home that it would be impossible to conquer America without reinforcements.

Bancroft states that during the first week in June the troops under Washington's immediate command numbered but 3,760 men fit for duty, and these Congress could neither pay nor supply with food. But dark as was the prospect the commander in chief and the little band which composed his staff did not despair. As he did once before at the request of Washington, Steuben drew up a general review of the situation with suggestions and plans for the future, especially the coming campaign. First as to the existing situation, concerning which he says:

The great preparation made by the belligerent powers in Europe since last December, announced an intention on both sides to render this campaign as decisive as possible. The intentions of the Court of France were made known to the honorable Congress the beginning of January last by the minister, who at the same time exhorted the United States to employ every effort in making the necessary preparations for a vigorous campaign on their part. It is not now necessary to examine into the motives that prevented the different Legislatures from making the necessary arrangements. But it is proper to know that, instead of augmenting our force, it has diminished near five thousand men whose term of service has expired. About this time Charleston was invested, and it did not require any superior knowledge in the art of war to presume the place would fall. This has, in fact, happened; and by the capture of the garrison we have suffered a loss of two thousand five hundred men. These, added to the five thousand above mentioned, make about one-half the force we had last campaign.

On the arrival of Marquis De Lafayette, the latter end of April, we were assured of the intention of the Court of France to send a fleet of ships of the line and seven or eight thousand troops to co-operate with the Americans in such a manner as Congress should judge for the interest of the United States. It was then thought proper to reinforce the army, and accordingly Congress recommended, and the states resolved, to raise troops for that purpose. But the bad state of our finances, with other difficulties which have occurred, has prevented the execution of

these resolves to the present moment. Such is the situation of things at this time.

The enemy having left a garrison of three thousand men at Charleston, are returned with the remainder of their force to New York, where they have about ten thousand regular troops and four thousand new levies, in all about fourteen thousand, together with four ships of the line in the harbor, besides which it is reported that Admiral Graves has arrived at Penobscott with a fleet, the force of which we have not ascertained.

On the other hand we are in expectation of the arrival of promised succor from our allies, and expect to receive from the different states the number of men and every other assistance necessary to co-operate with them, and strike a decisive stroke whenever the commander in chief shall think proper to direct his operations.

From this the Baron proceeds to outline a course of campaign, which, it must be confessed, appears very ambitious considering the resources at hand and what might reasonably be expected. The paper seems almost to combine the present cheerfulness of Mark Tapley with the future visions of Don Quixote. First was the reduction of New York with the capture of the garrison which would terminate the war. Second was the conquest of Canada in order to secure the frontier from savage raids and secure the peace of the continent. Third was the reduction of Halifax and Penobscot. Fourth was the retaking of Charleston, and fifth was the reduction of the Floridas, in which assistance might be expected from the Canadas. New York was of course, regarded as the crucial point, where, as we have seen, the enemy had 14,000 men, well fortified and supplied. According to military authorities to successfully invest and reduce a fortified place requires a force three times as large as the garrison, but the Baron thought it might be done in this case with double, or 28,000 men. Counting the existing American force at 7,000, which we have seen was very liberal, and expecting 6,000 or 7,000 French troops in addition the Americans would then have about 14,000 all told, and

consequently would need at least 14,000 additional recruits. He thought if these recruits were furnished by August 1 and properly supplied with provisions and forage (two very violent assumptions) the enterprise might be inaugurated. Co-operation might also be expected from the French fleet, but there was very little certain information on this point. The process of investment is worked out with very elaborate detail, but as the scheme was based upon resources which were never furnished it is not necessary to follow it here. The same may be said concerning the invasion of Canada and the capture of Quebec, which, under the circumstances was as visionary as a hobo's dream of sumptuous banquets in marble halls. Charleston and Florida were to await the results of operations in the North.

Possibly Washington's features relaxed into a grim smile as he read this memorial, which contained the essence of military strategy had there been the means to carry it out. In the meantime came news of Gates's defeat, and the summer was wearing away without anything being accomplished. On September 10 another paper was submitted by the Baron, which, taking into account their present condition, is quite different in tone from the former. Although disclosing the serious condition of affairs it contains no note of despair, but is filled with valuable suggestions. All idea of present offensive operations is abandoned, the writer pertinently remarking:

What can be undertaken against an enemy placed on three islands, superior in naval force and at least equal in land force, without mentioning the advantages that an army of veterans has over one the half of which is composed of young recruits? We cannot even expect to keep them within their limits. They have it in their power to pass the rivers and make incursions wherever they think proper, and I shall be much astonished if

the enemy do not assemble their whole force, pass the river (the Hudson) and try to engage us in general action. If any consideration prevents them it is that, having so large a proportion of German troops, they are apprehensive of their deserting on such an occasion, while the English fleet blocks the port of New York, and thereby prevents a junction with the French troops.

Some changes are suggested which would give better facilities for resisting the enemy in the event of an attack, and the Baron proceeds to a discussion of affairs in the South, which is of special interest as that section was destined soon to become the principal theatre of war :

Upon a general view of the situation, and especially after the unhappy affair to the southward, I think that our only object should be to stop the progress of the enemy till some more fortunate events permit us to act on our part. To do this I would not only wish the army to be kept together, but I should wish for as speedy a junction as possible with the French troops.

* * * What appears to me most likely is, that the enemy, after the defeat of General Gates, will endeavor to push their conquest to the southwest, and being sure that we are not able to undertake anything against the three islands, they will embark what troops can be spared, and make a descent on Virginia, where there is nothing but militia to oppose their progress. How to stop them in that quarter is the most difficult to answer. The successive detachments we have already sent have lost us the troops of six states. Always inferior to the enemy, and not supported by the provincials or militia, they have been sacrificed as far as they have been sent. Can we risk now to expose the Pennsylvania line to the same fate? At any rate we can not before the junction of the French troops with our army. * * * To attempt to retake by detachments of our army, what we have lost in that quarter, we shall in the end be defeated by detail. I could cite many examples where whole armies have been defeated by detachment. Prince Eugene, against the French, risked his reputation and the loss of the house of Austria for having weakened his army by detachment—he was totally defeated by detail. But our own experience will suffice. The troops of six states have already been lost, and if these states cannot or will not replace their troops the State of New Hampshire would at least be left to defend the whole thirteen states. To detach any part of the army at present seems to me of more dangerous consequences than any progress the enemy can make to the southward. In fact they can only ravage the country, and this we cannot hinder even with

a superior force; and should they take possession of any places on the coast, so soon as the maritime forces of our allies become superior to theirs on the coast they must abandon them.

* * * The greatest danger, in my opinion, that can threaten the country is a defeat of our army. The disaffected would become discouraged, and all our resources become more difficult. We should even in that case lose every advantage that we might reap from the arrival of a fleet of our allies to our assistance. My opinion then is absolutely this, to play a sure game, and rather suffer some little insult than risk the whole; to keep our army together as much as possible, and prepare ourselves to act with vigor when our allies come to our assistance.

This lengthy and pregnant memorial concluded with the suggestion that the only assistance Washington could then give the Southern states would be to send one or two well posted officers to give necessary instructions. A winter campaign against Charleston is suggested in case the expected French fleet arrived with sufficient reinforcements.

The importance of this memorial cannot be overestimated. The pressure upon Washington to send further detachments to check the progress of the enemy in the South was very great, and while he no doubt realized in his own mind the importance of keeping the grand or main army intact as far as possible he was no doubt glad to be sustained in his position by such an unanswerable presentation of the facts and conclusions therefrom.

Mention of expected aid from France has no doubt been noticed in the above memorials. This does not refer to the general assistance which had been received from that country since the outbreak of the war but to a special expedition which was expected that summer. So far the results of the French alliance had been disappointing at least to the general public, who could not realize the value of the assistance which had been given in the form of money and supplies and the indirect help afforded by

keeping busily engaged elsewhere forces that would have otherwise been turned against America. The only two instances where the forces had attempted to co-operate had been disastrous, largely at least through divided counsels. By 1780, however, mainly through the representations of Lafayette, who had returned to France in 1779 and remained several months, there was a change of policy. Lafayette urged Vergennes to dispatch at least 12,000 men to America under a competent general, who, however, would be completely subordinate to Washington, and thus the combined armies would succeed in "dealing England a blow where she would most feel it." Lafayette returned to America in April, 1780, with the information that such an expedition was projected, and on July 10 there arrived at Newport Admiral Ternay with seven ships of the line and three frigates, carrying 6,000 men under command of Count Rochambeau. This was only half the number needed, but the balance was promised as soon as transportation could be procured. Unfortunately the French fleet was blockaded in Narragansett bay by a strong British squadron, and Rochambeau did not care to move his troops while this danger existed. The other 6,000 were blockaded in Brest harbor and never got away from France. Thus all the schemes for that year miscarried, and offensive plans did not get beyond the paper stage. Another year was to elapse before even Rochambeau's force could be utilized.

During this summer General Robert Howe was in command at West Point, against which Washington believed Clinton had designs while making feints in New Jersey. He had seen active service in the South, but had been unfortunate in losing Savannah while trying to defend it against a force three times as great as his own, and at the request of the South Carolina delegates in Con-

gress he was superseded by General Lincoln who was equally unfortunate at Charleston. A fear existed in the army that he might not be able to defend West Point, so Washington, not wishing to remove him, about the middle of June sent Steuben to Howe as a confidential adviser, a commission which he filled with tact and delicacy until the 1st of August, when Benedict Arnold succeeded to the command. While there, as elsewhere, the Baron paid particular attention to the condition of the army, bringing the personnel and equipment up to the highest standard for any emergency that might arise. Referring to the soldiers one of the officers remarked that when they marched from the parade they appeared equal to the storming of another Stony Point. Furloughed men were recalled, and a needed reformation carried out in every department. Expected arms from France failed to arrive, and complaints of insufficient supplies were only relieved from monotony by their justice, but Steuben labored on amid all discouragements, a sample of which is related in a letter to General Knox, dated July 27, which is only one of several to the same effect:

"Among the 3,000 arms arrived from Albany 900 only have bayonets, nor do I know where to procure them. We shall also be very short of cartridge boxes. I have ordered 1,500 to be repaired here. God knows if it will be done. These fifteen days past I have been endeavoring to get arms from Chester to Newburg, where I have prepared a store for their reception, to deliver them to the brigades. I have also been ten days trying to get the arms from Albany from on board the sloops, but neither one nor the other can be done. My orders are less respected than those of a corporal. The army is under marching orders, and nearly 4,000 are unarmed. The arms are here, and cannot be delivered because nobody

will do his duty. There were at Philadelphia, I believe, 5,000 arms with bayonets, and 1,500 new cartridge boxes, with drums, fifes and other articles, and there are, I believe, 1,000 arms at Carlisle. In our present circumstances they should all be collected or we shall lose the campaign."

By this time Washington had removed his headquarters to Tappan, between West Point and New York, in order the better to watch Clinton and form a junction with Rochambeau when opportunity offered. Here he was joined by Steuben, when Arnold took command at West Point, and it was here no doubt that he presented his memorial of September 10 which furnished a basis for future movements.

To follow the marching and counter-marching of armies, to recount the stories of sieges and battles is always more interesting than picturing the details of camp life, the daily drill, looking after supplies, instructing and preparing officers as well as the rank and file to properly perform their duties. But just as the latter is absolutely necessary to any efficient work against the enemy so is it necessary to give some account of it, even at the risk of being tedious, in order that there may be due appreciation of the character and services of him to whom the duty of carrying on this branch of the service is allotted. It was now three years since Steuben had cast his lot with the American insurgents, and during most of that period he had labored in season and out of season in performing the duties assigned him. If he could not get what he thought he should have, he took what he could get, whether it was a question of authority or a matter of supplies. As a member of Washington's official family he had earned the unlimited confidence of the commander in chief and the respect of every

member of his staff. His special work had shown good results, and undoubtedly contributed largely to saving the army at Monmouth, as well as adding to its efficiency on other occasions. While temporarily holding a command in the line, he demonstrated his fitness for the position so clearly that one is forced to the conclusion that had not jealousy of foreigners prevented his assignation to a permanent post the story of some reverses to the patriot army might have been different. He had the confidence of the rank and file as well as that of the inferior officers, which was in itself a marked assistance in carrying on his operations. Yet we have seen from the West Point letter that he was still hampered unreasonably in his work, and this was largely due to the neglect of Congress to provide him with ample powers and assistance in the way of subordinate officers. When that body on February 25, 1779, resolved to establish the office of permanent inspector instead of the temporary arrangement then existing, it seemed to think that the mere creation of the office, with the book of regulations as subsequently adopted would furnish an automatic machine which would perform the work required without further action. Washington, by special orders relating to the duties of inspector, sub-inspectors, brigade majors and others concerned, rendered invaluable aid towards carrying out Steuben's plans, so that by 1780 the discipline and exercises of the troops were as good as the shifting from expiration of enlistment terms and other courses would permit. The next move was to stop abuses of furloughs and discharges as well as the waste which prevailed. To do this it was requisite that there should be a consolidation of the muster master's and inspector's departments. The two heads were in constant conflict until Congress on January 12, 1780 annexed the former to the inspector's department,

so that accounts of men and supplies should be made to the inspector. In pursuance of this action Steuben reorganized his department, creating new offices to which should be attached these additional duties, the department to consist of an inspector general and assistant, one for each division being a Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel, sub inspector for each brigade to be a major or senior captain, an inspector for artillery, and one for cavalry. These officers were to be allowed such assistance in men or animals as they might need, and the commander in chief should make regulations for the whole body.

The matter was taken up by Congress, which body, on September 25 passed a set of resolutions adopting the idea as a whole, but making material changes in detail which were not very satisfactory to the Baron, who was not slow to express his dissent therefrom. None but a military person would care to follow these differences with particularity, but the main objections on the part of the Baron appear to be summed up in a letter from Philadelphia to Washington, dated October 23d, as follows:

The monthly addition of five to eight dollars to the pay of officers of such merit as those whom your Excellency has chosen for the inspectorship, appears to me so very mean that I will not take upon myself to make them such a proposition. When the ancient majors of brigade, who, in the first institution, were taken from the line of lieutenants or ensigns, had an addition to their pay of twenty-four dollars per month, how can nine dollars now be proposed to a colonel for discharging so important and painful function? I am now endeavoring to find how much the muster master's department has cost the states. I am sure that the addition I ask for the officers of inspectorship will not amount to an eighth-part of it. Several resolutions in this arrangement are contradictory to one another, and others are not sufficiently clear. I am therefore determined to present a memorial to Congress in order to have the inspector's department established on the footing proposed by your Excellency, without any alteration. If Congress desire that I should continue in this office, I flatter myself that they will have a regard to my representation.

As usual, however, the Baron had been going ahead attending to his duties both as inspector and as a member of Washington's staff. Among other things he drew up a plan for the daily assembling of the general officers with the commander in chief by which the different branches were kept in close touch with each other, also for punishing officers absenting themselves without leave, with other matters of like nature. Scarcely half the recruits requisitioned so bravely by Congress had put in an appearance, but these had to be trained and absorbed by the rest of the army. Congress again attempted to provide a regular army, at least on paper, by providing that from and after January 1, 1781, said army should consist of four regiments of cavalry, four of artillery, forty-nine of infantry exclusive of Colonel Hazen's regiment of foreigners, and one regiment of artificers. The cavalry was to consist of six troops, each of 64 non commissioned officers and privates; artillery regiments to consist of nine companies of 65 each, the infantry of nine companies of 64 each, and the artificers of eight companies of 60 each, making a total of 1576 cavalry, 2,340 artillery, 28,124 infantry, and 480 artificers, or 32,520 in all besides commissioned officers and the various non combatants such as musicians, teamsters &c. These were apportioned among the states with an urgent request to fill up their quotas not later than January 1, enlistment to be made for the war if possible, but if these could not be obtained then recruits to be taken for not less than one year unless sooner relieved. The sum of fifty dollars was allowed as bounty, and each recruiting officer was granted \$2 premium for every soldier obtained. Some changes were made in this plan, but as a whole it was retained until the end of the war.

Steuben now had a new job on hand, namely the for-

mation of the fresh army which Congress proposed to create. This he outlined in a lengthy memorial in which great stress was laid on retaining as many of the old officers as possible. As finally arranged the infantry, cavalry and trains of the army should amount to 32,058 men, with 3,153 in the artillery, sappers and miners. His views were adopted by Washington and subsequently by Congress, and it looked as though he would now have a chance to work out his ideas under more favorable circumstances than ever before. Unfortunately for this object the condition of affairs in the South called him away from the main army, and the reforms which he had so carefully planned were practically shelved for a year.

There was soon to be a shifting of the active theatre of war, but before giving it attention, it may be well to recall the celebrated plot of Arnold and Clinton, which, had it been carried out to a successful consummation would have furnished a most tragic climax to what has been not inappropriately called the year of disasters. The character of Benedict Arnold certainly was a mixed one, and in his earlier days he possessed traits that cannot but excite one's admiration, although even then he had his critics who had at least some foundation for their detractions. Running away from his home at Norwich, Connecticut at the age of fifteen he joined an expedition against the French, but not enjoying military restraint he deserted and came back home. At the outbreak of the Revolution he was in the mercantile business at New Haven, and immediately after the battle at Lexington went to Cambridge at the head of the militia company of which he was captain. He proposed an expedition against Crown Point and Ticonderoga, but Ethan Allen having organized a similar expedition under authority of the State of Connecticut, he served under him as a volun-

teer. Becoming angry at an investigation ordered by the Massachusetts authorities he left the expedition and returned to Cambridge. His expedition to Quebec that fall through the Maine woods furnished an episode of suffering and endurance seldom equalled. Severely wounded in the futile attack on Quebec, he succeeded to the command of the combined forces on the death of Montgomery who had joined him by way of Montreal, which point he held until the following April, when he was compelled to retreat. Charges were made against him of having misappropriated goods belonging to Montreal merchants, but an investigating committee pronounced these charges utterly baseless. Later he made a brilliant fight against odds on Lake Champlain, and when Congress in 1777 created five new major generalships it was thought Arnold would be given one of them. But although ranking brigadier he was passed over entirely on the ground that Connecticut already had two major generals. He was so indignant at this injustice that he wanted to resign from the army, but Washington persuaded him to remain, and he afterwards did some brilliant work in defeating a band of British raiders at Ridgefield, Conn. He was now commissioned major general, but without the ranking to which he was naturally entitled, and he was sent to join the army of the North against Burgoyne. Gates had succeeded Schuyler in time to reap the fruits of victory due to Schuyler's arrangements, very much as credit was largely given to another who had the advantage of Admiral Sampson's work at Santiago over a hundred years later. Being jealous of Arnold's military reputation which had been won during the Canadian expedition Gates provoked a quarrel with him which led to Arnold being relieved of his command, but when the second battle of Saratoga began and the situation appeared serious,

at the request of his brother officers Arnold dashed into the affray and rendered brilliant service, contributing materially to that day's victory. During this fight the bone of his left leg was fractured above the knee by a shot from a German wounded soldier who was lying on the ground, and as Arnold fell from his horse one of his men rushed to bayonet the German. Arnold cried out, "For God's sake, don't hurt him he's a fine fellow." The soldier was saved, and so, unfortunately, was Arnold. Had he died on that field, his name would have been enrolled among those of American heroes. Admiral Mahan in the introduction to his "Life of Nelson," remarks: "It is the appointed lot of some of History's chosen few to come upon the scene at the moment when a great tendency is nearing its crisis and culmination. Fewer still, but happiest of all, viewed from the standpoint of fame, are those whose departure is as well timed as their appearance, who do not survive the instant of perfected success, to linger on subjected to the searching tests of common life, but pass from our ken in a blaze of glory which thenceforth forever encircles their names." The application of this truth to many instances both in public and private life will recall itself to the mind of the reader, but none is more striking than in the case of Arnold.

For his actions at Saratoga Congress gave Arnold a vote of thanks and advanced him to his proper rank. But his evil genius still pursued him. When Clinton evacuated Philadelphia, and Washington was endeavoring to head him off while crossing the Jerseys, he placed Arnold in command of the troops in the city. During the winter the Tories had had a joyous time with balls and banquets, and now the other side had its inning. Arnold took the lead in lavish entertainments and entered on a course of extravagance which soon led him into pecuniary embar-

assments, out of which he tried to extricate himself by speculations which only involved him more deeply. Perhaps this might have been overlooked, but among his particular friends was a Miss Shippen, a member of one of the old Tory families, to whom he was betrothed and who afterwards became his wife. As a result Tories more than patriots figured at his entertainments, a state of things not conducive to harmony. While Arnold was absent on a visit to Washington at Morristown, President Reed and the Pennsylvania Executive Council preferred a series of charges against him, which were not only laid before Congress, but scattered broadcast over the country. They accused him of having allowed a ship to improperly come into port, using public wagons for transporting private property, allowing people to enter the enemy's lines, illegally buying a prize vessel lawsuit, imposing menial offices on certain persons, and making private purchases while the shops were closed by his orders. At this distance these charges on their face look rather frivolous, and the committee of investigation evidently thought so too for about the middle of March, 1779, it reported that the complaints were groundless except as to the use of the wagons and irregular granting of a pass, and as there was no evidence of wrong intent even here a verdict of acquittal was recommended. Instead of granting this Congress listened to the representations of Reed that more testimony was forthcoming, and the matter was finally referred to a court martial which held the matter up until January 26 following, when a verdict was rendered acquitting Arnold of all intentional wrong, but directing that he be reprimanded for his "imprudence." Washington was compelled to issue the reprimand which he made as delicate as possible. But Arnold, with his feelings outraged, and per-

haps influenced more than he himself suspected by his Tony associates, had already made a secret crossing of the Rubicon. He is said to have written a letter to Sir Henry Clinton the previous April intimating that he might go over to the British if he were indemnified for what loss he might incur, and a correspondence ensued through the medium of Clinton's Adjutant Major John Andre, using the signature of John Anderson. Possibly profiting by their experience with Lee the British authorities were evidently not willing to pay a very large amount for Arnold's adhesion unless it brought with it something of more substantial value than simply his own person. During the progress of the court martial he was not in a position to deliver anything of value, but in July, 1780, he requested Washington, who still had full confidence in him, to give him command of West Point, the key to the highlands, which Clinton coveted more than any other post in America. Burgoyne had tried in vain to reach it, and its loss would sever the northern portion of the Confederacy into two disconnected parts. Arnold took command there on August 3, with the full confidence that when he should openly desert to the British he would not go empty handed. We have outlined Arnold's career up to this time for the reason that it has not been so generally published as the later transactions leading to the arrest of Andre, the discovery of the plot and the escape of the chief offender. These are familiar to every schoolboy. Washington had gone to Hartford to hold a conference with Count Rochambeau, and had he returned by the regular route his capture would probably have been one of the results of the successful fruition of Arnold's scheme. He, however, took a more northerly route, and arriving at Fishkill, eighteen miles north of West Point two or three days earlier than was expected he sent word

to Arnold that he would meet him at breakfast the next morning. Instead of doing so, however, he spent the time examining some fortifications with Knox and Lafayette. It was while Arnold was breakfasting that he learned of the discovery of his treason, and fled while Washington was still on the opposite side of the river.

The traitor was beyond reach of punishment, but the unfortunate Andre was in the toils. A court martial of fourteen officers was called to pass on his case, of which Steuben was a member, General Greene presiding. The conclusion was inevitable, and on September 29 Andre was unanimously condemned to death, the sentence being carried out on October 2. His fate, although in accordance with all the rules of war, excited the sympathy even of his judges, but their duty was clear. Steuben was especially sympathetic, and in referring to the case said, "It is not possible to save him. He put us to no proof, but in an open, manly manner, confessed everything but a premeditated design to deceive. Would to God the wretch who drew him to death could have suffered in his place."

Sympathy for Andre only intensified the feeling against Arnold, and in Steuben's mind especially this feeling was one of horror and detestation as is forcibly illustrated by the following incident related by Pomeroy Jones in his history of Oneida County, New York:

"On one occasion after the treason the Baron was on parade at roll call when the detested name, Arnold, was heard in one of the infantry companies of the Connecticut line. The Baron immediately called the unfortunate possessor to the front of the company. He was a perfect model for his profession; clothes, arms and equipments in the most perfect order. The practiced eye of the Baron soon scanned the soldier, and, 'Call at my mar-

queen, after you are dismissed, brother soldier,' was his only remark. After Arnold was dismissed from parade, he called at the Baron's quarters as directed. The Baron said to him, 'You are too fine a soldier to bear the name of a traitor—change it at once, change it at once.' 'But what name shall I take?' replied Arnold. 'Any that you please, take mine, if you cannot suit yourself better, mine is at your service.' Arnold at once agreed to the proposition, and immediately repaired to his orderly, and Jonathan Steuben forthwith graced the company roll, in lieu of the disgraced name of him who had plotted treason to his country. After the United States had conquered their independence our hero returned to Connecticut, and on his petition the General Court legalized the change of name. [The records show that this was done not by the court but by legislative enactment in January 1783.] A few years after, he wrote the Baron, who had now settled on his lands in northern New York, that he had married and had a fine son born, and that he had named him Frederick William. The Baron replied that when the son should arrive at the age of twenty-one he would give him a farm. The Baron soon after paid the debt of nature, but his letter was carefully preserved. A few years after its settlement Jonathan Steuben moved to the town of Steuben (N. Y.) with his family. When Frederick William arrived at his majority, the letter was presented to Colonel Walker, one of the Baron's executors, who at once executed to him a deed in fee of fifty acres of land, but which had been previously leased to Samuel Sizer, and as the recipient preferred the enjoyment of the land to the receipt of the rents, he purchased the lease, and at once went into possession.

"Jonathan lived to become a pensioner and died some fifteen or sixteen years since (about 1836). His widow

survived him; she also drew a pension. In the war of 1812 Frederick William went with the militia to Sackett's Harbor, where he was taken sick and died. For his services his widow also received a pension. He was orderly sergeant of his company, and with the name of the Baron he seems to have inherited at least a portion of his distinguished qualifications, for he was considered one of the best disciplinarians in his regiment."

At the risk of some repetition it may be of some interest to note a sequel to the above account. When the present writer was collecting data for this memoir of Steuben he happened to observe in the monthly bulletin of the Sons of the American Revolution a note stating that Dr. R. M. Griswold, of Kensington, Connecticut, a collateral descendant of Jonathan Steuben, the latter being his great uncle, had made an address on this subject before the Colonel Jeremiah Wadsworth Branch, S. A. R. On communicating with Dr. Griswold he courteously furnished an abstract of his reminiscences from which we take the following:

"More than fifty years ago when a small boy I spent much of my time with my paternal grandmother, who, before she was married, was Ann Arnold, daughter of Samuel Arnold, of the southeast or so-called Hockanum district of East Hartford. In a closet of the old farmhouse where she lived and which was her father's I found an old flintlock musket which I persuaded my grandmother to allow me to rest upon the backs of two kitchen chairs, while I took imaginary shots at bears and Indians and red coats, for she told me that this old gun was the one with which "Uncle Jonathan Steuben used to shoot the red coats." To what species of animal the red coats belonged my boyish imagination did not extend, but it is certain that I classed them as some kind of wild

animals. There was something about the history of this gun and of Uncle Jonathan to whom it formerly belonged, of which my grandmother and the rest of the family were very proud, the reason for which will be found below. Jonathan Steuben was born Jonathan Arnold. His father, Ensign John Arnold and his grandfather, Sergeant John Arnold, lived and died in the family homestead in East Hartford or Hockanum, which burned more than sixty years ago. Ensign John married Lucy, daughter of Thomas Wadsworth, who lived adjoining his father's house on the north, and here Jonathan was born February 27, 1757. This house is still standing in an excellent state of preservation (as will be seen by the illustration).

"When a little over eighteen years of age he enlisted, and served until the end of the war, most of the time in Col. Huntington's regiment of infantry. Later he served in Colonel Sheldon's regiment of light horse, and still later on detached duty in various places under command of Baron Steuben as instructor of new troops. Immediately after the attempted delivery of West Point to the British by Arnold, when the army was stationed at Verplanck's Point under command of Baron Steuben, at roll call one morning the name of Jonathan Arnold was heard and responded to. The Baron said, "Let the man by the the name of Arnold step three paces to the front." Jonathan Arnold stood six feet two inches in his stocking feet, and when Steuben saw him he said, "You are too fine a looking soldier to bear the name of Arnold, change it!" To Arnold's inquiry as to what name he should take the Baron said, 'If you have none better, take mine, and I will be your godfather.' His name was at once changed on the company's roll to Jonathan Steuben, and as such he remained until the rest of his life, the

General Assembly legalizing the change in 1783.

“Jonathan Steuben became a warm friend and bosom companion of William North, the Baron’s aide de camp, and the Baron himself kept very close watch on his young namesake. After the latter’s discharge at the close of the war he returned to his old home in East Hartford, and married Lucy Porter, of Hockanum, said to have been the handsomest girl in Hartford County. By her he had eleven children, six of whom are of record as having been born in East Hartford; two daughters dying young, were buried in East Hartford cemetery.

“In 1790 the State of New York granted Baron Steuben a large tract of land near the present city of Utica, parcels of which were given by the Baron to his friends, among whom Jonathan Steuben was remembered, and in 1805 he with Colonel North and others removed to this section and settled what was afterwards known as the village of Steuben. Not long before his death Baron Steuben, accompanied by William North and Jonathan Steuben visited the latter’s relatives in East Hartford, and this visit my grandmother seemed to remember with peculiar pride and pleasure.

“In February, 1890, 115 years after Jonathan Arnold entered the Colonial service, I had a letter from the only surviving member of his eleven children, William North Steuben, of Gilroy, Santa Clara County, California. He wrote that he was the youngest of the children, having been born on August 7, 1808; that he removed from York State to California in 1849, and that he was named after Colonel North. An older brother, Frederick William, named after the Baron, died at Sackett’s Harbor on November 1, 1814, while in the service of his country during the second war with England. Another brother, Benjamin Walker, died in Illinois, December 25,

1888. The latter left four sons, and William North Steuben left two sons. He was delegate from the California Society of Sons of Revolutionary Sires to the Centennial celebration of the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1883. Although 82 years old at the time of writing the letter above referred to he was in good physical and mental health. He died in 1904."

CHAPTER XII.

SHIFTING OF THE CONFLICT.

Seat of War in the South—England Adds Holland to Her Enemies—At War Against the World—Greene and Steuben Sent to Virginia—Former Assumes Command of the Southern Armies—Appeals to Steuben for Help—Desperate Condition of Affairs.

British victories in the South, and the practical reduction of Georgia and South Carolina made it apparent that the main seat of war must soon be transferred to that quarter. Gates, by his mismanagement more than by his actual defeat at Camden, had so thoroughly discredited himself that everybody recognized the necessity for an immediate change of commanders. Mindful of its previous experience Congress this time concluded to leave the selection to Washington, who promptly appointed General Nathaniel Greene to the command of all the Southern armies.

It may be remarked here that in December, 1780, England, as if she had not her hands full already, declared war against Holland. The alleged cause was the capture of some papers from an American packet containing a proposed treaty of commerce between the United States and Holland, but the real cause was the fact that the Dutch drove a profitable trade with France and America during the conflict. Russia, Denmark and Sweden had also become unfriendly to England on account of her arbitrary searching of neutral ships and the confiscation of goods found therein, and had united in what was known as the armed neutrality. It almost seemed as though the contest was developing into a struggle of

England against the world, and while American prospects looked desperate it was also a most critical period for the British empire. In May, 1781, the armed neutrality league was joined by Prussia, the following October by the German (Holy Roman) Empire, in July, 1782, by Portugal, in September, 1782, by Turkey, and the following February by Naples. Thus by the close of the Revolution the doctrine that "free ships make free goods" became a firmly established principle of international law, to which England, however, did not give a formal assent until 1856.

Sensible of the demoralization that now prevailed throughout the South, and convinced that Greene would need all the assistance possible in restoring order out of chaos, Washington proposed sending Steuben with him as assistant. He was not only expected to be useful in the formation and regulation of raw troops, as he had been in the northern army, but besides performing the duties of inspector general it was expected that he should be given a command suitable to his rank. In his letter of notification to Steuben, dated October 22, Washington dwells on his services as being most essential to the southern army and adding: "I wish you may have been able previously to obtain a satisfactory establishment of your department, which, in your absence, will become more necessary than it has been heretofore. But if it is not done, I would not have it detain you. Assure yourself that, wherever you are, my best wishes for your success and happiness attend you."

The appointments of Greene and Steuben were confirmed by Congress on October 30, with a flattering testimonial to the value of the Baron's services, with the belief that both generals would be very useful in their new field. There was also encouragement in the types of both

men. They were above petty jealousies, and placed their cause high above all other considerations. They had been intimate friends at Valley Forge, and had worked in harmony in their efforts to improve the condition of the army. In fact the whole situation now was better in one respect at least. The traitors, the factionists, the mutinists and incompetents who held high official positions had been gradually weeded out, and as towards the close of the late Civil war, there was more working together instead of the pulling apart, which had characterized earlier stages of the conflict. Alexander Hamilton wanted to go south with Greene and Steuben, but Washington did not feel that he could yet spare him from his immediate official family. During the whole southern campaign there never was a disagreement between Greene and Steuben.

The two generals left Philadelphia for their new field early in November. With the former were his two aides, Major Burnett and Colonel Morris, and with Steuben were Major Walker and his Secretary Duponceau. After a short stop at Chester the party separated, General Greene tarrying to make some arrangements with the governors of Delaware and Maryland, and the others proceeding directly to Virginia, stopping to pay a brief visit to Mrs. Washington at Mount Vernon, where they were cordially received and invited to remain to dinner. Duponceau says, "The external appearance of the mansion did not strike the Baron favorably. 'If', said he, 'Washington were not a better general than he was an architect, the affairs of America would be in very bad condition.' The house at that time might be considered handsome, and perhaps elegant; but at present, the most that can be said of it is, that it was a modest habitation, quite in keeping with the idea that we have of Cincinna-

tus, and of those of the other great commanders of the Roman republic. In the interior we saw only two rooms, separated by an entry, one of which was a parlor, the other the dining room. They were respectably but not luxuriously furnished. The Baron having accepted the invitation we sat down to dinner. Mrs. Washington was accompanied by a young lady, a relative, whose name, I think, was Miss Custis. The table was abundantly served but without profusion."


From Mount Vernon the party went to Richmond, where they met Greene about the middle of November. Matters were in about as bad shape as possible, very much like the condition of the northern army when Steuben first entered upon his duties. Everybody was a law unto himself. The fragments of the army were scattered over a large extent of country, largely disorganized and practically without supplies of either food, clothing or ammunition. The victory at King's Mountain on October 7, another by Sumter over Tarleton on November 20, and a few small engagements had revived the hopes of the patriots and warned Cornwallis that his march northward would not be altogether a holiday affair. But marching north he was, and with reinforcements en route and no considerable organized force to oppose him he was reasonably sure of success.

While the war centre was now principally along the boundary line between North and South Carolina, yet it was evident that Virginia must be principally depended upon both for men and supplies. The Old Dominion had heretofore fought the battles of the patriots at a distance, and only a few months before her hardy sons under Clark had conquered an empire, but so far her own settlements had escaped the worst ravages of war. Self-interest as well as patriotism dictated that the enemy

should be kept at arms' length as long as possible, so previous to his departure for the Carolinas, Greene placed Steuben in command in Virginia. The latter's task was sufficiently arduous. He was expected to organize the raw recruits into serviceable volunteers and have them sent forward with adequate supplies, as well as to take care of any invasion which might occur from the coast. Greene left Richmond on November 20, and took command at Charlotte, N. C., on December 2. His parting word to Steuben was to keep a lookout for the enemy who were hovering around Chesapeake bay, but left him with full liberty to govern himself as circumstances might require. He suggested, however, that the Baron secure as soon as possible accurate reports of the military resources of the state to be forwarded to him, acting as far as possible in concert with the state authorities. Recruiting was to be carried on as vigorously as possible, and any troops which might arrive from Washington's army were to be sent south without delay. It is scarcely necessary to state that Steuben's position was a most difficult one. Expecting an invasion the state authorities were naturally more anxious concerning the direct defense of their own firesides than supplying the army in the distant Carolinas. Here as elsewhere the National idea was as yet imperfectly realized, and they could not grasp the fact that permanent relief could only be obtained through the destruction of Cornwallis's army. The Baron on the other hand had an eye single to the general welfare, without special consideration for local interests. Jefferson, who was governor at this time, seems to have seconded Steuben's efforts as far as practicable, although, according to Prof. G. W. Greene, he was "governing in a way which has afforded his adversaries an ample field of crimination, and cost his eulo-

gistic biographers much labor to defend." Whatever may be the justice of this stricture it is very certain that the inertia of the state machinery and the indifference of the people were not easily overcome. This had been more or less the condition in every state since the beginning of the war. Whenever a section was invaded the yeomanry, from Lexington to Savannah, would flock to repel the invader, but when the crisis was past the undisciplined force would melt away like snow in summer time, leaving the commander with but a handful of soldiers who could be depended upon for regular military service. With a change of form it was mediaeval practice transferred to America long after it had been abandoned in the old world. There were plenty of men in Virginia but everything was disorder, abundant resources (except possibly arms and ammunition) but reckless extravagance and want of system, personal bravery but an almost supine indifference. This all reacted on the people, who began to doubt whether they could ever achieve independence under such a state of affairs.

With his usual energy Steuben went to work to improve the condition of affairs. His demands were sufficiently comprehensive. First he asked that the state furnish its quota of troops, under the new plan, thoroughly equipped for the field for a winter campaign; that a magazine of 10,000 barrels of flour, 5,000 barrels of pork and beef, and two hundred hogsheads of rum be established at Taylor's ferry on the Roanoke river; near the present town of Boydton in Mecklenburg County, near the North Carolina line; 3,000 head of cattle be driven at once to camp; 100 good road wagons to be furnished, with driver, four horses and harness complete to each wagon; forty artificers for the army; provisions at different points of rendezvous; a military chest with



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5,000 pounds (\$25,000) specie or the value thereof, and sufficient advances be made to the officers as would enable them to properly equip themselves. These requisitions doubtless made the local authorities open their eyes, but, as we shall see, did not have an equal effect upon their hands.

There was a corps of regular soldiers in the state under command of General Lawson, and Greene, whose necessities in this respect were very urgent, desired that it be sent at once to the front. Lawson arrived in Richmond on November 26, but did not report to Steuben until two days later. His force consisted of 378 men, and Steuben proposed to review them on the 30th, and send them the next day to join Greene, at once informing Greene of his action. When the men appeared for review at Petersburg, forty-one were missing. The remainder were ordered to march the following morning, but instead of starting General Lawson told Steuben that the Legislature had ordered the men discharged at Petersburg, which was verified by a copy of the order received by Steuben from Jefferson the next day. Efforts to induce the men to enlist for a longer period were fruitless, and the corps was allowed to disperse. In writing to Greene on this matter Steuben told him that he need not regret their absence as from the poor condition of the corps in respect to discipline, arms &c. with the short period of enlistment it would have given very little service. General Greene responded that he did not regret the failure of the corps to join him as on account of its short time of service it would have been of little use. Neither was he surprised at the condition of affairs in Virginia, especially as to the troops. They had been at home and so long neglected that all sense of duty and discipline was lost. He urged the Baron, however, to press the state

for supplies and the officers to obey. He also urged that reinforcements be sent forward as rapidly as possible, as the enemy had been strengthened and their own forces divided.

Steuben, of course did his best, but the results were not commensurate with his efforts. On November 27 he wrote a vigorous letter to Jefferson in which he pointedly declared that "Instead of forwarding to General Greene the reinforcements he expects, we are keeping a number of corps dispersed about the state, where no enemy has been these eight days, thereby exposing General Greene with an inferior force to the enemy, and exhausting what little provision was collected in the state."

General Greene confirmed the Baron's statements, and warned the authorities that this course persisted in must exhaust their resources, and recommended that they should not keep in the field a man more of the militia than was absolutely necessary for covering the country from the enemy's ravages. But it seemed as though little or nothing could be accomplished, nor could data be secured showing the actual number of the militia or the terms of enlistment. In a letter to Washington of December 18, Steuben thus reviews the situation:

"This state, having only a handful of regulars in the field, is continually ransacked by bands of officers and soldiers, who have always a pretext for not joining their regiments, and who are drawing pay and rations for doing no service at all, while they are committing excesses everywhere. Since the Virginia line was detailed to the southern army, it was never regularly formed; nay since I have been in the United States it has not had a regular organization. Your Excellency will recollect that in Valley Forge the brigades of Woodford and Scott consisted only of a few soldiers and officers, confusedly mixed together without any distinction of companies or regiments. In such a condition every corps must be ruined. The officers do not care for their soldiers, and they scarcely know the officers who have to command them."

At this time Generals Muhlenberg, Wilson and Nelson had three separate corps in Virginia, the first named having about 900 men. Steuben proceeded to select 400 from this corps and send them at once to Greene. On December 3d, however, a delegation came to his headquarters in Petersburg and presented a paper, signed by the officers, complaining of ill usage from the state and refusing to march until affairs were placed on a more satisfactory basis. Steuben represented to General John P. Muhlenberg and Colonels Greene and Harrison the serious consequences of this proceeding, and by their influence the complaint was withdrawn. Proper equipment was provided, and on December 14 the detachment, consisting of 456 men, started to reinforce Greene.

Steuben endeavored to continue the policy previously indicated of sending forth regular troops to Greene as fast as their places could be filled with new recruits. But the matter of equipment as well as discipline was ever pressing. The remainder of Muhlenberg's corps was ordered to Petersburg, and Colonel William Davies sent to Chesterfield, a few miles distant, to establish recruiting headquarters. As soon as two hundred were collected they were formed in companies of fifty to be sent to the army.

General Greene had already complained of the condition of the Virginia troops under his command, which, according to his statement, were literally naked, dirty and deficient in discipline, and gave notice that no more would be received in that condition. He also urged, what Steuben had before suggested, the formation of provision magazines upon the Roanoke. He tells Steuben to "Use every argument you can to convince the Assembly of the necessity of clothing their troops. If they mean they shall render any service, or do not wish

[them] to fall a sacrifice to death, desertion and disease, I beg them to give their men good covering, for without it this will be their portion."

On December 8 Steuben wrote to Washington detailing the difficulties with which he had to contend, but a repetition would be monotonously uninteresting. As a simple illustration the Lawson Corps, previously mentioned, had been created at great expense. But the enlistment was only for six months, and by the time the men were brought together their terms were so nearly expired that it was not worth while to send them to the front. Consequently they disbanded without having rendered any service whatever.

The year was now closing, and little had been accomplished, but late in December the Assembly directed the enlistment of 3,000 men for the war or a draft for eighteen months. Steuben considered this force too small, but, according to his usual custom, concluded to make the best of it, and at once prepared plans for a general rendezvous at Chesterfield, with sub-stations at other points.

The number of recruits assembled at Chesterfield does not seem to have exceeded six hundred, and, even for this small number, it was difficult to get supplies. While the winter climate was materially milder here than in the northern states, it was sufficiently severe to cause considerable suffering among the poorly-clad troops, who were without blankets or sufficient clothing to cover their nakedness. A letter from Colonel Davies to Steuben, dated December 31, says: "Shoes and blankets, and, indeed, almost every kind of clothing, are universally wanting. I think not more than one hundred and fifty can take the field as at present clad, but with clothing I think four hundred might march. Indians are not more

naked, nor half so miserable. We have seventy good tents, but we have not, nor have I have been able to get, notwithstanding my frequent applications, any cords to make loops with."

Some blankets had, indeed, been collected, but they were monopolized by Lawson's Corps, which did not need them, as it was dissolved, and it is presumed that his men carried the blankets home. There was also woeful lack of discipline, officers without men, and men without officers. Those in charge of the sub-stations told the same story, and we seem to approach the grotesque when Colonel Davies asks for a couple of whips and hand saws to replace some borrowed ones which they had been compelled to return.. The little hospital was overcrowded, and three men died in their tents for lack of proper care and surroundings. This condition led to thievery, and, in one instance, at least a store was broken open and valuable articles taken.

Steuben was unwell at this time, but worked without ceasing to remedy the situation, intending as soon as he had matters in proper shape to join Greene in the Carolinas. Greene himself was anxious for this, and, on December 28, wrote to Steuben that he was "without a single general officer with me in this camp, except General Huger, who is a brigadier for this state, and not desirous of commanding other troops; it is my wish you should come forward as soon as you have made the necessary arrangements on the Virginia line. We are now in a camp of repose, and, could we get clothing, we might improve our discipline. Your aid in this and many other matters will be essential, both to me and the service."

This desire on the part of both generals was never carried out. A new condition of affairs soon arose in Virginia, which, as well as Greene's movements in the

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South, permanantenly separated the two commanders.

Steuben was now to have his hands more than full in the direction of events that finally led to the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown and the ending of the war.

CHAPTER XIII.

ARNOLD'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.

Invasion of the State Via James River—Capture of Richmond—
Steuben's Efforts to Save the Dominion Without Men or
Supplies—Arnold Retreats and is Besieged at Portsmouth—
Virginia's Loyalty to the Patriot Cause—Still Aiding Greene

During previous years of the war Virginia, especially along the coast, had not escaped the raids which had harrowed the people of the South. The brutal destruction by Matthews, in May, 1779, and the attempt by Leslie, in 1780, when Portsmouth was the principal sufferer, were still fresh in the memories of the people. Now there was a more serious danger at hand. Benedict Arnold, zealous to justify himself in the minds of his new allies, and glut his revenge on those with whom he had been formerly associated, was placed at the head of an expedition to Virginia. Clinton, no doubt, despairing of dividing the northern section of the Confederacy by capturing the posts on the Hudson, naturally turned his eyes southward, where events had provided an active theatre of operations. Virginia was the oldest and richest and most populous of the provinces. Destroy her resources, and the Southern patriots would be paralyzed and the Northerners discouraged. With all the territory south of the Potomac reduced to subjection it would be impossible for Washington and his army to carry on the war much longer. In fact, the year had scarcely closed when a mutiny of Pennsylvania troops, on account of their miserable condition, threatened the most serious consequences, and the outbreak was only suppressed by the exercise of the most tactful conduct, mingled with firmness.

Moved by these considerations, Clinton, in December, 1780, dispatched Arnold to Virginia with a company of ships carrying 1,600 men. The fleet was discovered off Willoughby Point, the site of the Jamestown Exhibition of 1907, on December 31, and two days later it was in the James River. The wretched condition of affairs at that time can scarcely be imagined. Every available recruit had been sent southward to Greene, and the few companies of militia which had been organized were worse than useless. It appeared as though all the invader had to do was to march through the country, at wil, burning, destroying and killing as he went. Steuben was the only regular army general in the state, and to him the panic-stricken people unconsciously turned.

The campaign which followed was remarkable in more ways than one. That Steuben, by his Herculean efforts, saved the state from destruction there is little doubt; that with an inferior force he impeded the operations of the enemy to such an extent as to nullify largely the object of the expedition, and was on the point of complete victory, when superseded by Lafayette, is made very clear by Mr. Kapp, whose collection and presentation of official papers bearing on this part of the war make a valuable contribution to American history. Here was a campaign of two months' duration, which, in interest, at least, was equal to several others of the war, although not so dramatic in the way of battles, which seems to have largely escaped the attention of other historians. Bancroft devotes twelve lines to it, and Fiske an equal number, most of which are taken up by an anecdote concerning Arnold's conversation with a prisoner. Of course, this field was quite a distance from New England, but a powerful glass, if not inverted, might have shown that considerable action was going on down there.

Irving, in his "Life of Washington," gives a satisfactory, though brief outline, of this campaign, and in the official reports of Steuben and other papers already referred to, we have a pretty full account of this crucial period of the war.

The Baron's first report was made to Greene on January 8, in which he says:

"On the 31st of December the Governor informed me of a fleet of twenty-seven sail having arrived at Wiltoughby point, in consequence of which I immediately dispatched Colonel Senf and Captain Fairlie down to the south side to procure intelligence of their strength and destination, and General Nelson was sent the same day—down the north side—to act as circumstances might require. Notwithstanding these precautions, we did not receive the least intelligence till the 2d of January, when the Governor informed me that nineteen ships, two brigs and ten sloops and schooners were in Warrasquiack Bay, and were getting under way to proceed up the (James) river, and that their destination was Petersburg. I directly waited on the Governor and Council, and requested four thousand militia might be called out, estimating the enemy's force at two thousand five hundred.

"The distressed situation of the Continental troops at Chesterfield Court House would only permit one hundred and fifty of them to be ordered out. These I formed into a battalion and sent to Petersburg to cover the public stores, and at the same time sent Colonel Carrington there to remove them. I also took proper measures for the removal of the stores and hospital from Chesterfield in case the enemy should move that way.

"The next day, on the 3d of January, we were advised of the enemy's arrival at Williamsburg, where General Nelson had collected about one hundred and fifty

militia. Here a flag was sent, to which General Nelson returned a verbal answer—that he would defend the town. They landed a few troops at Jamestown, but re-embarked them immediately up the river. At midnight their foremost vessel passed Hood's, where we had a battery of two iron ten-pounders and a brass howitzer. Three shots were fired, two of which struck the vessel, on which the rest of the fleet brought to. A party landing below, the militia, about ninety, evacuated the battery, and the cannon and howitzer fell into their hands. They burnt the carriages of the guns and carried off the howitzer.

“The 4th, in the morning, we received intelligence that the fleet lay at Westover (twenty-five miles below Richmond), and were preparing to disembark. It was then evident their object was Richmond, and orders were immediately given for the removal of the public stores. As the enemy had twenty-five miles to march before they reached the town, I was in hopes a force would collect sufficient at least to check their progress, but, to my surprise, about one hundred men were all that could be assembled. These I sent down under command of Major Dick, a state officer, to whom I gave orders to harass the enemy by firing at them from every favorable piece of ground. These orders were, however, badly executed. The enemy moved that evening to Four Mile Creek, where they encamped about eleven o'clock.

“What few Continental stores were in town I sent to Westham (six miles up the river), having previously ordered Major Claiborne up the river to collect boats there to transport them across. I also ordered the one hundred and fifty Continental troops to march from Petersburg and take a position opposite Westham, and, Colonel Davies, having sent all the stores and the hos-

pital from Chesterfield, was ordered to the same place with the remainder of his naked troops. The state stores, of which there were great quantities in town, were under the direction of Colonel M., by whose inactivity and downright negligence a great part was lost. Of their artillery I secured, myself, five pieces which were mounted, the rest, consisting of three brass and a great number of iron pieces, fell into the enemy's hands. Not a single man, except those I sent out, undertook to oppose the approach of the enemy. I thought it prudent to cross the river in the evening and took my quarters in Manchester (opposite Richmond), and the next day, about twelve o'clock, the enemy took possession of the town, having marched twenty-five miles with eight hundred and fifty men and about thirty horses, without receiving a single shot. They left about half their force in town and proceeded immediately with the rest to Westham, where they burnt all the public buildings, consisting of a foundry, with a boring mill, powder magazine and some small shops, and returned to Richmond the same evening. The Continental stores had all been sent across the river, and some of the state stores. What part was left I have not yet learned. About three hundred militia had arrived at Westham on their way down, and arms were actually recrossing for them, but hearing of the enemy's approach, and, being unarmed, they dispersed.

"The next morning I ordered the battalion of Continental troops, to which I had attached two of the state pieces of artillery, to Manchester (opposite Richmond), where there were about two hundred militia collected. With these I intended to oppose any attempts they might make to cross. They, however, did not attempt it, but about eleven o'clock began to set fire to the public build-

ings, and before one o'clock had entirely gutted the town (Richmond). They burnt a rope walk, the public work shops and two or three public stores. Two of the inhabitants came out with propositions from Arnold to pay for half of the tobacco on their giving hostage for the delivery of the whole to vessels he should send for it. The Governor refused to agree to it, and as they did not come out as a flag, I refused their return. The tobacco, however, was left unhurt."

One of Arnold's objects was to capture Governor Jefferson at Richmond, but Jefferson left the city the preceding night on horseback for Tuckahoe, a village some fifteen miles northwest of the capital, where his family was staying, desiring to remove them to a point more distant from the marauders. This having been accomplished he came down to Manchester the next day in time to witness the entry of Arnold's troops into Richmond. The town had been abandoned by most of the citizens, who, from the surrounding hilltops, witnessed the devastation of their homes. There seem to have been a couple of hundred militia in the place, who also retreated to the hills after firing a few volleys. The detachment which committed the destruction at Westham was under command of Colonel Simcoe, after whom one of the Canadian lakes, now a summer resort, was named. Steuben thus proceeds with his account:

"The enemy marched that night to their former position at Four Mile Creek, where they encamped, and yesterday got to Westover. On their return great excesses were committed by straggling parties. As there were great quantities of grain and flour at the mills near Warwick, I marched my little force on the 6th in the evening to that place. Yesterday I advanced to Osborn's, and this day I arrived here at Petersburg. I find about four

hundred and fifty militia here under Colonel Gibson, whom I had ordered to take the command in the absence of Generals Muhlenberg and Weedon. On the first intimation of the enemy's approach I wrote these gentlemen, but have heard nothing from them. The public stores, of which great quantities were in this town, were all removed by the great exertions of Colonel Carrington and Colonel Gibson. Yesterday General Smallwood arrived here, and has been so obliging as to stop and afford us his assistance. Some vessels of the enemy were sent up this river (the Appomattox) to take or destroy some merchant vessels lying there, but by the disposition General Smallwood made with some ships, guns and the militia, they were obliged to abandon the enterprise. General Nelson, during all this time, was on the other side of the river. On the 3d he was twelve miles above Williamsburg with one hundred and seventy-five men; the next day he moved four miles higher, and wrote me from Long Bridge, on Chickahominy, that the enemy were moving down to their shipping, and that the rain the preceding night had incapacitated his men for immediate service. In fact, the enemy returned as they went, without a single shot, and have lain quietly at Westover in a scattered manner all this day.

"As the stores were all removed hence and a considerable force of militia collected, I do not imagine the enemy will attack this place. I have some hopes of being able to annoy them from Hood's on their return. The river there is very narrow, but we have yet no guns. I have sent to have those we have there remounted and shall march there myself with all the militia I can arm, so soon as I hear the enemy are moving down. The greatest distress we now feel is want of arms; the great part of those belonging to the state were damaged by

the militia during the late invasion, or were scattered at different places and never collected or repaired. Those at Richmond were, on the enemy's approach, sent off in such disorder that part of them are not yet found. The militia are coming in, and no arms to put in their hands, while, on the other side, General Nelson has one thousand five hundred stand and only five hundred men."

By the 11th Steuben had moved his headquarters to near Hood's, on the James river, from where he continues his report of operations, as follows:

"The enemy lying still at Westover on the 9th, and some vessels which had lain at the mouth of the Appomattox, dropping down that day to their fleet, I thought it evident they had no design against Petersburg, and therefore ordered the few militia who were assembled there to march to Prince George Court House, and went there myself, that I might be more at hand to prepare against any movement of the enemy. The 10th, in the morning, I was informed they were embarking their troops, and on reconnoitering them myself from Coggin's Point, I found their embarkation completed, and the vessels preparing to sail.

"It had been found impracticable to remount the canon at Hood's, or to prepare any obstruction to their passing that place. Of this, however, the enemy were ignorant, and, thinking it very probable they would land a party to examine these works before they attempted to pass, I ordered three hundred infantry and about thirty horse, under Colonel Clark (George Rogers) to lie in ambush to receive them. About twelve o'clock the fleet got under way, and at four o'clock I saw them, from Hood's, come to within cannon shot. At dark they landed troops for eighteen boats—deserters, say five hundred—who immediately attacked a small picket we had

the militia during the day, however, at different places and never collected at points at Richmond were, on the enemy's side, such disorder that part of them are still absent. The militia are coming in, and to arms to get ready. While, on the other side, General Jackson began with five hundred stand and only five hundred left.

By the 11th Stedden had moved his headquarters near Hood's, on the James river, from which he transmits his report of operations, as follows:

"The enemy lying still at Williamsburg, and having some vessels which had been at the mouth of the York river, dropping down that day to meet us. I thought it evident they had no design against Richmond, and therefore ordered the few militia who had remained there to march to Prince George Court House, and from there myself, that I might be more at hand to oppose against any movement of the enemy. The 11th, at 10 o'clock morning, I was informed they were attacking our troops, and on reconnoitering them myself from Coggins Point, I found their embarkation completed and the vessels preparing to sail.

"It had been found impracticable to ground the cannon at Hood's, or to prepare any obstruction to their passing that place. Of this, however, the enemy were ignorant, and, thinking it very probable they would send a party to examine these works before they attempted to pass, I ordered three hundred infantry and some horse, under Colonel Clark (George Rogers) to lie in ambush to receive them. About twelve o'clock the boats got under way, and at four o'clock I saw them near Hood's, come to within cannon shot. About the landed troops for eighteen boats—deserters to the number of one hundred—who immediately attacked a small party of the



HANOVER COURT HOUSE, VA., ERECTED 1710.



BLANDEFORD CHURCH, VA.



HANOVER COURT HOUSE, VA., ERECTED 1740.



BLANDFORD CHURCH, VA.

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and pursued them to within forty paces of the ambuscade, when our troops gave them a fire, but on returning it and charging bayonets, the militia immediately fled." After throwing the cannon into the river the enemy returned to their ships, which at daylight were five miles below. I ordered three hundred infantry and two troops of horse down to Cabin Point, and encamped with the remainder—about five hundred men at this place. As an attempt might be made at Williamsburg, and as General Nelson had only four hundred men, I ordered five hundred and sixty militia, who were on their way to join me, to cross the river and reinforce him.

"The next great object for the enemy being Hunter's works and the stores at Fredericksburg, I wrote the Governor to countermand the militia from that quarter. General Weedon had already advanced with about three hundred and fifty as far as Hanover Court House before he received the Governor's letter. It is left with him to return or not, according as he, from the knowledge of the force that can be collected, may think necessary. I cannot yet form any judgment of the future operations of the enemy. Should they mean to pillage Williamsburg, Nelson's corps may harass, but cannot prevent them. If they take possession of Norfolk I shall collect what force is necessary and endeavor to keep them in check, or if they should go into the Potomac, I shall immediately march to form a junction with the militia under General Weedon and cover Fredericksburg.

"The militia are coming in from all quarters, but without arms, for which they apply to me. I have delivered about five hundred we had belonging to the Continentals. Those of the state were so scattered in removing them on the alarm that their officers cannot collect them again. The troops have neither tents nor camp kettles. It is im-

possible to describe the situation I am in—in want of everything, and nothing can be got from the state—rather from want of arrangement than anything else.”

In a few days Steuben made another report to the Board of War, and we cannot do better than to follow his detail of succeeding operations :

“The enemy having passed Hood’s on the 13th, I **marched with seven hundred militia to Cabin Point.** The Continental troops, being too naked to keep the field, **were sent back to Chesterfield Court House.** On the 14th the enemy landed at Hardy’s Ferry, twenty-two miles below Cabin Point, and began their march towards Smithfield. Supposing Colonel Parker, with the militia of the lower counties, would oppose them in front, I detailed Major Willis with three hundred infantry and fifty horses to harass their rear. My orders were badly executed, and the enemy entered Smithfield on the 15th without opposition. Having that day received a reinforcement of four hundred men, I immediately detached them, under General Lawson, with orders to march towards Smithfield, and act in conjunction with Colonel Parker, who, I supposed, had retired towards Suffolk. On General Lawson’s approach the enemy crossed Nansimond river at Sleepy Hole and encamped on the opposite bank, and General Lawson, being joined by the troops under Colonel Parker, occupied Smithfield. The 19th the enemy marched to Portsmouth, where Arnold established himself, and their vessels fell down to Hampton Roads.”

Arnold had made his raid, and while the history of the preceding three weeks had not made a pleasant chapter for the patriots, it was scarcely more so to the British. Considerable property had been destroyed, the forces opposed had not been effective in repelling them, and along the river from its mouth to the head of navigation at

Richmond they had operated pretty much as they pleased. But in one important respect the expedition was a lamentable failure. In New England, the Middle States and in the farther South, wherever the British arms advanced they found a strong Tory sentiment which was of great aid in facilitating the work of the regular troops, but in Virginia it was either non-existent or so small as to be of little or no practical significance. The Virginians may have displayed mismanagement in defending their own firesides, but they had no intention of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Colonel Meade, writing to Alexander Hamilton, begs leave to "Observe in justice to the people at large, that there are fewer disaffected by far in his state than any other in the Union, and that the people turn out with the utmost cheerfulness. The misfortune on the present invasion was, that in the confusion, arms were sent everywhere, and no timely plans laid to put them into the hands of the men who were assembling. The Baron has no doubt given the General the particulars of the whole affair. He can hardly be himself and say anything on the subject that ought not to be credited."

Of course, the greater part of the state was left untouched by Arnold. He never trusted his troops at any great distance from his ships, and Steuben's manoeuvring, for, like Washington in 1778-9, he could do but little more, confined the raided territory within very narrow limits. As an illustration of the deficiencies, even in minor details, General Nelson, having a message to send from Williamsburg, apologized for transmitting it verbally, as he had no pen or ink. Governor Jefferson co-operated with Steuben to the extent of his power, and bore willing testimony to the General's merits. In a letter to Washington he declared that the Baron's vigilance had in a great measure supplied the want of force in prevent-

ing the enemy from crossing the river, which might have been very fatal, and that he had been assiduously employed in preparing for the militia, as they should assemble, pointing them to a proper object, and other offices of a good commander. James Lovell also wrote to Steuben on the 22d, saying: "I am still unable to promise you a supply of arms and clothing. But I cannot refrain from expressing to you by this opportunity how much I am affected with pleasure by any occurrence which redounds to your glory. The Governor of Virginia mentions very honorably your conduct with a small body of militia, of which you have condescended to take the command, while a traitorous villain was striving to make extensive ravage on James river. I would to God you were at the head of a body suitably equipped to execute the directions which your great military knowledge enables you to give whenever you are in a field of action. I regret much the mortification which I know your warm zeal in our cause must have met with from your inequality of men, artillery, and, in short, every means of giving a final blow to Arnold's schemes. I regret more that you have no prospect but the continuance of such disadvantages."

So long as Arnold's ships had command of the sea it was impossible to capture or starve him out. He might be forced to disembark, but to do this would require a stronger and better trained army than was at hand. He might be shut off on the land side from making further raids, and this Steuben proposed to do. He established his headquarters at Smithfield, about twenty-five miles northwest of Portsmouth, while Colonel Parker, General Lawson and General Muhlenberg had detachments at various points, making a semi-circle a few miles outside of Portsmouth. General Nelson was stationed at Wil-

liamsburg with a thousand infantry and some cavalry to watch that section.

With all this on his hands, Steuben did not forget Greene, and as soon as he had Arnold safely cooped up in Portsmouth, he again turned his attention to raising troops for the Southern general. But if the process was slow when the people were not excited over invasion, it can be imagined what the situation was with the enemy within their gates. It was natural that there should be objection to raising and equipping troops to be sent perhaps hundreds of miles away when they could not rid themselves of the invader who had harassed their own territory, and was liable to repeat the operation. They were unable to see that the whole was greater than any one of the parts, and indifference developed into a hostility which threatened to bring Steuben into conflict not only with the people but with the state authorities. Just when a soldier ceased to be a militiaman and became a Continental was not always clearly defined, and controversies arose as to liability for expenditures. The Baron naturally looked at everything from a national standpoint, and could not understand why the interests or desires of a state should interfere with those of the country at large, while among the people the national idea had scarcely gained a foothold. Neither Jefferson nor his followers had yet realized that there cannot be two heads to military movements, and the following from the Governor to Steuben undoubtedly voiced the sentiment of the former's partisans:

"We did not think proper to resign ourselves and our country too implicitly to your demands, and thought we had some right of judgment left to ourselves. We can only be answerable for the orders we give, and not for their execution. If they are disobeyed from obstinacy

of spirit or want of coercion in the laws it is not our fault. We can only endeavor to engage the willing. The Executive has not by the laws of this state any power to call a freeman to labor even for the public good without his consent, nor a slave without that of his master." This epistle was in answer to a criticism by Steuben upon the lack of support given by the state authorities during the late invasion.

Efforts to raise the three thousand militia provided by law continued during February, but recruits came very slowly. By the 12th four hundred men had been collected at Chesterfield, which was doing comparatively well under the circumstances. In one instance, where a man brought his son, a mere boy, to take his father's place, the Baron promptly sent the youth home and placed the father in the ranks. The troops started south, but had only gone a short distance when the father was tacitly allowed to desert. Wholesale desertions of militia were not uncommon; in fact, their enlistment frequently seemed like pouring water into a sieve. Even the state authorities did not always keep faith with the men. For instance, they would bargain with a man for 6,000 or 7,000 pounds (Continental money), pay him 1,000 or 1,500, and promise the remainder in two or three months. They fail to pay, and the soldier deserts, thus relieving the community from payment of the balance; at the same time it received credit for a recruit furnished. In short, the state had no money, provisions or credit.

During the late civil war there was considerable talk concerning shoddy contractors who furnished inferior materials to the army. They had their prototypes in the Revolution. To cite a few instances, 1,495 yards of cloth which the Governor estimated would make 400 suits made only 350 coats, as the cloth was only half the guar-

anteed widths. One day's use wore out the shoes. That the petty officers were dishonest under such circumstances and took advantage of the general demoralization to enrich themselves is not surprising.

To prevent the enormous waste which was going on Steuben, on April 10, filed an order prohibiting the issue of more than a three days' supply of provisions at one time without a special order from the commanding general or field officers.

That Greene appreciated Steuben's difficulties as well as the help afforded in spite of them is shown by a letter of February 3, in which he says:

To your address and industry, I feel myself principally indebted for what is coming. Whatever misfortune may happen for want of force it is no fault of ours. The Southern States are in such a defenceless condition that they must fall under the dominion of the enemy unless reinforcements are immediately sent from the northward. Such destruction of public stores is enough to ruin a nation. These are some of the happy effects of defending the country with militia, from which "Good Lord deliver us!" O, that we had in the field, as Henry V. said, some few of the many thousands that are idle at home.

Probably in reply to this letter, Steuben wrote to Greene, on February 17, that a thousand militia had been ordered to join him immediately from five counties named, and that he was trying to dispatch four or five hundred men from Chesterfield. In order to meet Greene's needs the Baron arranged with Jefferson to send militia from Augusta, Rockingham and Shenandoah counties, but none could be found to take their places and they refused to leave their homes, so the project was abandoned. Augusta was the frontier county, and included what is now Western Pennsylvania. Efforts were also made to secure recruits from Delaware and Maryland, but nothing was accomplished. Campbell's detachment got away on February 25, and four hundred under Colonel Greene from Chesterfield. Third, fourth and

fifth detachments were promised on April 1, April 15 and May 1, but they were not sent. Virginia appeared to be a squeezed lemon so far as sending more troops southward was concerned, and, besides, there was soon to be another shifting of action in respect to the war that was to make a most radical change in every direction, both in the personnel of the actors in Virginia and in their operations.

CHAPTER XIV.

GREENE AND STEUBEN.

Their Operations in the Carolinas and Virginia—Victories and Good Generalship Recover the Carolinas—Arnold Bottled Up in Portsmouth and Cornwallis in Wilmington—Arnold Save Through Refusal of the French Commander to Co-operated—Arrival of Lafayette—Steuben Still Has the Burden—Second Foray Up the James—Capture of Petersburg and Richmond.

It may help us to a better understanding of subsequent events in Virginia if we leave that state for a short time and follow Greene in his operations. The Southern Army, notwithstanding some small victories by independent partisan bands, had not recovered from the demoralization caused by the defeat of Gates. Greene's entire force, about two thousand strong, was less than two-thirds that of Cornwallis, while its efficiency, through lack of supplies and discipline, had been reduced almost to the vanishing point. But in addition to his own ability Greene had with him subordinate officers of exceptional bravery and genius. Sumter, Marion and Morgan, with their little bands, had prevented the fire of patriotism from being utterly extinguished and now, in addition, were Kosciusko, the Hungarian patriot; Henry Lee, the famous lighthouse cavalryman, and Lieutenant-Colonel Washington, a distant relative of the commander-in-chief. There was here an assemblage of brains and bravery which went far to offset the disparity of strength between the two armies. It was, of course, Greene's policy to avoid a general engagement until he could put his army in better condition and receive the expected reinforcements from Virginia. In the meantime he divided

his force into two sections, taking the larger part, about one thousand one hundred strong, to Cheraw Hill, South Carolina, from which point Lee and Marion threatened to cut off the communications of Cornwallis with the coast, while to the west were Morgan and Washington, with the aid of the militia, threatening the inland posts held by the British. Cornwallis now had a hostile army on both flanks. If he moved on Greene the interior posts were in danger, while if he went the other way Greene would go to Charleston and effectually cut him off from the sea. His only other course was to move northward into North Carolina, which he did with two thousand men, leaving one thousand one hundred under Tarleton to look after Morgan. In these movements both parties seemed to defy the elementary rules of modern warfare. Keep your own force together and beat the enemy in detail was a military axiom never violated without peril, but here both sides were doing this to the fullest extent.

On January 7 Tarleton and Morgan met at the Cowpens (a name given to a general cattle coral in the grazing district), and Tarleton was completely routed. The British lost two hundred and thirty killed and wounded and six hundred prisoners, while the remaining two hundred and seventy were so scattered and demoralized as to be utterly useless as an army. Morgan, by a forced march, now rejoined Greene, and the whole army moved northward, with Cornwallis following. It was Greene's plan to draw his opponent as far as possible from his base, and the plan succeeded admirably. On February 9 he reached Guilford Court House, North Carolina, about thirty miles south of the Virginia border, and there he determined to await Cornwallis, in the meantime urging Steuben to hurry forward the promised reinforcements. But, as we have seen, although Steuben

now had Arnold practically shut up in Portsmouth, yet it was impossible to fulfill Greene's expectations. Nevertheless the latter, by good generalship, managed to keep Cornwallis at bay until March 15. By that time all the troops which Steuben could send from Virginia had arrived, and these, with accessions from other quarters, brought the army up to four thousand four hundred and four men, while Cornwallis had been reduced to two thousand two hundred and thirteen; all, however, hardened veterans, while fully half of Greene's was made up of raw recruits. A battle opened here in the morning and continued all day with varying fortune, but in the evening Cornwallis secured possession of a hill from which it was impossible to dislodge him. He held the hill for a couple of days, and then retreated to Wilmington, the nearest seaport, having lost over one-fourth of his army and throwing open the southern provinces to Greene, who did not hesitate to take advantage of the situation. Leaving Cornwallis to figure out what he should do next he returned directly south on April 6, and within three months had reduced nearly every British post in South Carolina, and the victory at Eutaw Springs on September 8 shut the remnant of the British army up in Charleston, while the state government resumed its usual functions. This ended the war in the far South so far as large military operations were concerned. The British still held Charleston and Savannah, but the three states of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia were now practically under American control and remained so until the close of the war.

We can now return to Virginia, where events had been moving so rapidly that the Old Dominion by this time occupied the centre of the stage. During the month of February Muhlenberg, under Steuben's direction, con-

tinued to watch Arnold in Portsmouth much as a cat does a mouse which it cannot reach, but which it is ready to pounce upon should it attempt to come out of its shelter. Unfortunately the shelter in this case had a back door, namely the water, over which the mouse could escape if the situation should become desperate. On the 16th, however, three French war vessels were discerned at the mouth of James river, supposed to be the advance guard of a large fleet. Surely the mouse was now trapped, and Nelson wrote at once to Steuben, "What you expected has taken place. I give you joy with all my soul. Now is our time; not a moment ought to be lost!"

The rejoicing, however, was premature. The three vessels had left the main fleet off Rhode Island and were making a cruise from New York to Charleston. But it was hoped by Steuben that there was sufficient force to accomplish his purpose, and he sent Captain Duponceau to arrange with the French commander, De Tilly, for the movement on Portsmouth. At first it seemed as though the project would be carried out. General Gregory was ordered to collect a force along Dismal Swamp, which began at Portsmouth, and be in readiness to move at Steuben's direction, and an express service was established between his camp and Suffolk, county seat of Isle of Wight County, by means of which orders could be transmitted in a few hours. General Muhlenberg advanced from Suffolk to within sixteen miles of Portsmouth, and General Nelson, at Williamsburg, was ordered to hold himself in readiness to march as soon as needed. Williamsburg was to be covered by General Weedon's corps, which would come from Fredericksburg, and guard a battery at Newport News, which was erected to protect the French fleet should it be compelled

to retire to York river. There were six or seven armed merchant vessels in the James river which were expected to be used as auxiliaries to the fleet. Boats were collected to transport troops and munitions across the river, among the latter there being eight eighteen-pound cannon and two mortars. The militia were so encouraged by the situation that General Muhlenberg advanced towards Portsmouth and surprised a picket guard, and, after a skirmish, in which two men were killed, captured a sergeant, twelve privates, a wagon and two horses. He was now within a mile and a-half of the town, and everything promised a speedy capture. But the best laid plan of men, if not mice, gang aft a glee, as was now discovered. The French commander refused to go up the Elizabeth river, which was virtually a part of the bay, where Arnold had anchored his vessels, on the plea that it was unsafe, and stated that he proposed to leave as soon as the wind permitted. The golden opportunity of capturing Arnold, something specially desired by Washington, was needlessly thrown away. The disappointment of officers and men who were thus balked of their prey was very keen, and it was not surprising that many denounced the French alliance which so far had not exhibited a single tangible result, although, as we have shown, the indirect benefit was very great.

In the meantime Washington, no doubt without detailed knowledge of the fact that Steuben had Arnold practically in his power, and could beyond doubt have captured him with his entire force had there been proper co-operation on the part of the French commander, decided to make a move which would relieve Virginia of this invasion, and for that purpose proposed to utilize the main body of the French fleet and a portion of the land forces which were still lying idle at Newport. Ad-

miral Destouches agreed to sail for the Chesapeake to blockade Arnold, and carried with him a corps of one thousand one hundred and twenty French infantry detached from Rochambeau's force. At the same time a corps of twelve hundred light infantry with some artillery was detached from the American force around New York and sent over land in charge of General Lafayette, who was expected to reach Virginia in time to co-operate with the French fleet in the capture of Portsmouth. Washington on February 20 notified Steuben of the proposed expedition, urging him to make such arrangements with respect to the militia and supplies and take such position as he judged would be most conducive to the success of the enterprise. Lafayette was instructed to open a correspondence with Steuben, informing the latter of his approach, and requesting him to have a sufficient body of militia ready to act in conjunction with the new arrivals. Washington's parting injunction was that should Arnold be captured he was not to be treated as an ordinary prisoner of war, but summarily executed. Lafayette on February 24 wrote to Steuben from Morristown, declaring that "nothing will be wanting to hurry the detachment, which you will find to be an excellent body of troops. I hope the French ships will strictly blockade Mr. Arnold, and as your position will no doubt exclude the possibility of his taking any advantage by land, I hope we may, before long, give a good account of him. Should he by chance make any proposition, no communication ought to be held with him that might countenance any pretension to his being a prisoner of war."

Lafayette and his force marched south, and on his arriving at the Head of Elk, which is about forty miles northeast of Baltimore, at the upper end of Chesapeake

Bay, on March 3d, he wrote to General Muhlenberg: "In all cases I am to request you that no communication be held with Arnold that may in any way give him the least claim to the advantages of a prisoner of war." From all of which it appears that the capture of Arnold was looked upon as the principal object of the expedition.

As may be supposed, Steuben did not look on this new movement with any great degree of satisfaction. In the face of tremendous difficulties and mainly with the help of untrained militia, he had forced Arnold into Portsmouth, which with the co-operation of a suitable naval force he felt sure of capturing. The mouse had been almost within his grasp, and had it not been for the refusal of the French naval commander to blockade the mouth of the river the British must surely have surrendered. Now when he had matters in better shape than ever, with the French fleet almost in sight, he could bring the campaign to an end with advantage to the country and credit to himself. In a letter to Greene, dated March 3, he thus expresses himself:

Tomorrow I set out for Williamsburg to finish my preparations for the arrival of the marquis and fleet. I have communicated to him the plan of operation I should have followed had the fleet been here to assist me. I think the same plan, with very little alterations should now be adopted. I flatter myself that a marquis and minus six hundred troops that are coming, it would have been in my power to have delivered to you Mr. Arnold, but this honor is reserved for another. But do not think, my dear general, that this idea, however mortifying, will in the least relax my zeal in the affair; on the contrary, I hope the marquis will find everything prepared for his arrival.

The Baron was not one to sulk in his tent when there was a duty to be performed, and he went vigorously to work collecting supplies for the coming of Lafayette, boats, horses and provisions, with the usual scarcity of

everything that was needed. Muhlenberg had only eight rounds of ammunition and provisions for four days, so that had the promised reinforcement from the state arrived, it would doubtless have been of little use. Steuben had declared that the fortifications of Portsmouth could be taken sword in hand, but this idea was based on the expectation of having the "swords" to do it with, which in this case meant ammunition, etc.

As stated, Lafayette arrived with his troops at Elk Head on March 3, from which point they were transferred to Annapolis by water. As it would be useless to move the troops to Portsmouth until the arrival of the fleet, Lafayette took an open boat down the Chesapeake bay to arrange with Steuben for a convoy and other necessities. He found the latter at Yorktown on the 14th, full of business and expecting the co-operation of five thousand militia. Lafayette wrote to Washington the next day, giving a summary of the situation, concluding, "In your first letter to the Baron, I wish, my dear General, you would write to him that I have been much satisfied with his preparations. I want to please him, and harmony shall be my first object."

We have already seen, however, that the expected resources were largely on paper, although the ultimate failure of the expedition cannot be charged to this cause. The French fleet was already due, but there was no sign of it. While waiting Lafayette went down to Muhlenberg's camp at Suffolk on the 19th, and while there had a light skirmish with the enemy. But Steuben never relaxed his operations; Arnold's outposts were attacked and all communication with the country was cut off. His capture was regarded as a certainty, and when, on the 20th, a large fleet was seen entering the bay there was jubilation among the Americans. The fleet came in

slowly, and it was not until the 23d that the colors on the vessels were discovered to be British and not French. Admiral Arbuthnot had followed D'Estouches down the coast, and had engaged the latter sixty miles off the entrance of Chesapeake bay. The result appeared to be a drawn battle, but the French admiral turned back to Newport to repair damages, a most fatal procedure for the Americans, while the British proceeded to Portsmouth for the same purpose, a situation which could not have been more favorable to Arnold.

Lafayette, who seems to have construed his orders to limit his Southern operations simply to the capture of Arnold, as soon as he learned the new situation of affairs, returned to Annapolis, from where he transported his army back to Elk Head, with the intention of again joining Washington in the North.

By this time the British force in Virginia was greatly augmented, and Clinton had sent General Phillips with two thousand men to relieve Arnold. The latter was subsequently sent back to New York, and Phillips was now in command at Portsmouth with about three thousand five hundred troops. Steuben's force was not able to confine this army inside of Portsmouth, and it was evident that Virginia was to suffer yet more largely from the ravages of war. But notwithstanding Steuben went to work with the object of at least saving the stores and supplies which had been collected at various points if he could not check the enemy. The next day after the arrival of Phillips he ordered Muhlenberg to concentrate all his troops at one point, which it would be impossible to do after Phillips had begun to move. Colonel Parker, who had a difficult journey across Dismal Swamp, succeeded in uniting with the main force, so that by April 3 he was able to report to Steuben that in his judgment

his division, located near Suffolk, was in the best position either to prevent the enemy from making hostile excursions into the country or to keep pace with them should they move up James river, which was anticipated. But desertions soon crippled his force to such an extent as to endanger the safety of his command, and he was forced to retire farther back into the country.

It may be remarked here that while Lafayette was in camp Steuben had formulated a plan for driving the British not only out of Virginia but freeing the entire South. It was to take the whole body of militia and march to Greene's assistance in North Carolina, and then move directly on Cornwallis, who would be forced to call on Phillips to save him. He had four thousand men assembled, and with an additional two thousand for thirty days it looked as though the operation would be successful. But the state government, which claimed to control the militia, was incapable of taking such a broad view of operations.

Its reply was that although the proposition seemed to be founded on very probable principles, yet as the number of arms that such a detachment would carry with them was greater than the number which would remain in the state, it would be a measure unjustifiable in the present circumstances of affairs, the enemy having lately received a great reinforcement; that although the militia at present in service would be unable to resist the whole force of the enemy in any quarter, yet, being strangers to their certain intentions, the militia would be able to repel the incursions of detachments, which otherwise would be rendered impracticable for want of arms.

While the reasoning which lead to this conclusion was clearly faulty, yet as it emanated from the powers that be there was nothing to do but submit, and Steuben

turned once more to the task of trying to make bricks without straw. His report to Washington on April 15 gives a graphic picture of his unsatisfactory situation. Writing from Chesterfield Court House, he says:

My situation is not the most agreeable, as I am obliged to undertake the defense against three thousand regular troops, with nothing to oppose them but militia, whose numbers decrease every day. Those who have served since the beginning of the invasion have discharged themselves and are not replaced by others, in consequence of which General Muhlenberg is left on the south side of the river (James) with only seven hundred men; and General Weedon on the north side with about six hundred men. If the enemy have any intention to penetrate the country, the opposition we can make will avail little.

A very great evil resulting from the invasion is, that it stops recruiting for the army. So long as a county has any militia in the field, so long that county is prevented from drafting; and as most of the counties have had part of their militia either here or with General Greene, little or nothing has been done in the business. Only fifty-two have yet come in, and of these some have already deserted. Some who came as substitutes have received twenty-five and thirty thousand pounds (paper) for eighteen months.

Then follows the usual report as to lack of arms, horses for cavalry and pretty much everything else needed for an army. He concludes by stating that he had asked Greene to call him to the front, which would be infinitely preferable to the Sisyphean task in which he was now engaged. In fact, he had written to Greene on April 2, saying: "If I preferred my own inclinations to the public interest I should immediately set out to join you; my desire to act under your immediate directions, and the disgust I have from my situation here are motives equally forcible to urge my departure hence. I, however, think it is my duty to remain here till I am to bring my first detachment with me, which I intend shall amount to five hundred infantry and sixty to eighty cavalry, and for this I am now exerting my very utmost."

That Greene appreciated the Baron's work, and

deeply sympathized with him in his discouragements, is evident from a letter which he wrote on April 3, probably before the epistle quoted above had reached him, in which he says:

I see and feel for your disagreeable situation, and anything that is in my power you may command. But if you leave Virginia all things will run into confusion, and I am so far from thinking that you are disgraced by your command in Virginia, that everybody allows you have acquired great credit, and though it is not of that splendid kind, it is nevertheless very honorable, and is founded upon the same line of conduct from which General Washington has justly acquired so much honor—I mean that of guarding against misfortune. My greatest expectations of support are from Virginia, drawn forth under your regulations and arrangements. If you leave them, state policy and partial views will counteract all the support we may expect from that quarter, and we shall all fall together to the southward. Nothing in my power shall be wanting to do justice to your reputation, and I feel my obligations to you for your exertions. Should you wish to join the army, you shall most readily have my consent, for I am greatly in want of your aid here as well as there, but it is my opinion that you can be more extensively useful there than here.

On April 6, Greene having no doubt in the meantime received Steuben's letter of the 3d, replied, again giving his consent for the latter to come to the front, but adding, "However, my dear Baron, when you consider the critical and disagreeable situation I am in, the little prospect I have of acquiring glory, and the almost certain disgrace that will accompany my manœuvres, from the nature and constitution of our army, and from the many difficulties I have to combat, and compare your situation with mine, you may think yourself happy that you are not in as perplexing a state as I am. I wish both our prospects were better, but mine, of all men, is the most disagreeable. Let us labor and faint not; haply we may get through the thorny path in due time, and by ways and means not very clear to either at present."

With this kind of patriot's faith, although the clouds were very dark and lowering the final outcome, under the protection of a favoring Providence was certain, and deliverance was already nearer than the leaders in this great drama supposed. For six weary years had the war dragged along, more wearing even on the moral and mental faculties of those who were conducting it than on the material interests of the country. After all, one great goal had been reached. The traitors, the sycophants and incompetents in the higher branches of the service had been weeded out by the progress of events, and the military machine, although in many, and, in fact, most places, was badly out of shape, yet was operated for the most part in harmony. Washington in the North, Steuben in the Centre and Greene in the South, understood each other thoroughly, and had bent all their ability and energy solely to the advancement of the cause, without selfish ambition, but only considering the interests of their common country. The Civil War furnishes a parallel to this in the closing work of Grant, Sherman and Sheridan, although the surroundings were very different.

That the enemy had the intention of penetrating the country soon became evident, and Steuben set himself to work to hinder his progress as much as possible. He gave directions for the entire militia to turn out in whatever section the British might appear. If Muhlenberg was attacked he was to retire to Petersburg to protect the upper country as far as possible, but should they turn south towards North Carolina, then the flank was to be harassed continuously in order to delay their junction with Cornwallis by which that General might be able to overwhelm Greene. Muhlenberg was to remain at Petersburg in case the enemy should come up James

river. Nelson was ordered to follow Phillips, and the battery at Hood's, not being considered defensible, stores in the neighborhood were ordered carried to Petersburg.

They had not long to wait until Phillips manifested by his movements which route he intended taking. Leaving a garrison at Portsmouth, whose fortifications had been strengthened, he started on April 16 for the James with twenty-five flat boats, each carrying a hundred men. According to Steuben's orders Muhlenberg had removed all stores on the right or south bank of the river from the lower counties to Prince George Court House, about sixty miles northwest of Suffolk, and six miles from Petersburg. Steuben, not deeming them safe even here, had them moved into the country above Richmond. It must be remembered that Richmond was at the head of navigation on the James, and unless he considered his force strong enough to overcome all obstacles Phillips was not likely to leave his boats so far away that they would not be a refuge in case of retreat. While Muhlenberg was gathering stores on the south side of the river Colonel Innes was doing the same on the north side, and preparing for any emergency. On the 18th the enemy reached Pagaa's Creek, below Jamestown Island, and on the next day Muhlenberg, keeping ahead of Phillips, marched to Cabin Point, a short distance above. On the 20th the enemy reached Jamestown and landed at Sandy Point the next day. We do not hear of them accomplishing anything special at this place, but they no doubt committed depredations wherever they stopped. Steuben was at Chesterfield Court House, about half way between Richmond and Petersburg, where he was organizing a cavalry corps, and, as usual, looking after stores. On the 23 Phillips landed at Westover, on the left side of the river, and easily dispersed the five hun-

dred militia there, only two hundred of whom were armed. As Arnold had plundered this place a little over two months before the British probably did not find much to destroy, although it is said they committed some depredations. The militia were ordered in all cases to avoid a general engagement, which could only lead to a disastrous defeat with useless sacrifice of life, but to harass the enemy and impede his operations as much as possible. Matters certainly looked bad, and Steuben writes to Washington that there was not a single company of regular troops in the state, and the militia were too inexperienced to hope for the least resistance from them. This time the British did not stay long at Westover, but crossing the river on the 24th, landed at City Point, at the mouth of the Appomattox river, twelve miles from Petersburg. Steuben had gone over to the latter place from Chesterfield the same day and taken charge of affairs there. We will let him tell the story of subsequent operations:

“I reconnoitred the enemy’s fleet, then lying off Westover, and consisting of thirteen topsail vessels and twenty-three flat-bottomed boats full of men. The whole number of troops on board I judged to be about two thousand five hundred, a Hessian sergeant who deserted to us made them three thousand. The fleet of the enemy soon came to sail, and stood up the river toward City Point, which continued to keep me in doubt on which side they would debark. I therefore ordered the militia under command of General Muhlenberg to retire to the vicinity of Blandford, a short distance from Petersburg. The same evening the enemy landed all their force at City Point, which fully evinced that their first object was Petersburg. Being obliged to send large detachments to the neck of land between Appomattox and James rivers,

I had not more than one thousand men left to oppose the enemy's advance. In this critical situation there were many reasons against risking a total defeat—the loss of arms was a principal one, and, on the other hand, to retire without some show of resistance, would have intimidated the inhabitants and encouraged the enemy to further incursions. This last consideration determined me to defend the place as far as our inferiority in numbers would permit. I made choice of Blandford as the place of defense, and the bridge of Pocahontas as our retreat; the troops were disposed accordingly, and passed the night under arms.

“The morning of the 25th I was informed that the enemy was within three miles of our advanced posts, and that eleven flat-bottomed boats, with troops, were at the same time moving up Appomattox river. Towards noon the enemy came in sight, formed themselves and deployed to their left, but it was near three o'clock before the firing commenced, which continued from post to post till past five o'clock, when the superior number of the enemy and a want of ammunition obliged me to order the retreat and the bridge to be taken up, which was executed in the greatest order, notwithstanding the fire of the enemy's cannon and muketry. The troops, with the same good order, retreated to this place (Chesterfield), where they are just encamped. I am not yet able to ascertain our loss, but believe it not great. I do not think the enemy took a single prisoner. The enemy's loss I am also unable to form any judgment of. General Muhlenberg merits my particular acknowledgements for the good disposition which he made, and the great gallantry with which he executed it. Indeed, the gallant conduct of all the officers and the particular good behavior of the men, must, I am persuaded, have attracted the admiration of

the enemy. I have the pleasure to say that our troops disputed the ground with the enemy inch by inch, and the manœuvres were executed with the greatest exactness."

"Governor Jefferson congratulated Steuben on the resistance which the raw militia under him gave to the trained troops, and later wrote to Washington that "The enemy was received by Steuben with a body of militia somewhat under one thousand, who, though the enemy were two thousand three hundred strong, disputed the ground very handsomely for two hours, during which time the enemy gained one mile only, and that by inches."

Greene wrote to the same effect, and, and although Irving mentions Muhlenberg alone in connection with this action, it is clear that he acted in a subordinate capacity under Steuben's direct supervision.

Phillips burned the tobacco warehouses in Petersburg and destroyed all the vessels lying in the river, repeating the destruction at Chesterfield, which was also abandoned.

While this was going on a detachment under Arnold burned the tobacco magazines at Warwick, a little town in the neighborhood, and opened fire on some small armed vessels in the James, the fleet which had been collected when the first effort was made to blockade Arnold at Portsmouth, but which was defeated through the refusal of the French naval commander to co-operate. The crews sunk or burned the ships and escaped to the upper side of the James.

Phillips and Arnold pursued their course up the James, burning and plundering, until they reached Manchester, opposite Richmond, from whence they could view the capital by the light of blazing warehouses.

During this expedition some smaller detachments practically unopposed carried on similar exploits on some

of the other rivers in the Virginia tidewater region. One of these going up the Potomac stopped at Mount Vernon, where Lund Washington, a relative of the General, had charge. By furnishing the British with provisions he prevented the ravaging of the estate, for which he was severely reprimanded by the owner. But the country has looked very leniently on this action, which saved the historic estate from destruction.

CHAPTER XV.

THE WAR IN VIRGINIA.

Lafayette Ordered to Steuben's Assistance—Cornwallis Moves Northward—Steuben Prepares to Oppose Him—Magazines of Supplies Formed and Recruits Gathered—Lafayette Retreats to Fredericksburg—Steuben Extricates Himself From Point of Fork—Important Stores Saved—Brilliant Tactics—Cornwallis Outwitted—Steuben Gives Up Going South, and Requested to Join Lafayette.

While Virginia was being ravaged by this desultory warfare, what had become of Lafayette and the one thousand two hundred Continental troops which Washington had sent to aid in capturing Arnold or driving him out of the state? They were still at the head of Chesapeake bay preparing to march back to the northern army. But the arrival of General Phillips made it apparent to Washington that Steuben with his handfull of militia would be unable to cope with this increased force, to say nothing of Cornwallis in North Carolina, whose movements were yet uncertain, whether he would follow Greene to southward or turn northward and join the enemy in Virginia. Accordingly the Commander-in-chief sent a courier with all haste to Lafayette, directing him to proceed at once to the help of Steuben. The messenger arrived at Elk Head on April 8, and, as the British fleet controlled the lower bay, an overland march was determined upon. A new difficulty here arose. Most of Lafayette's troops were New Englanders, who feared the Southern climate, although it could hardly be considered dangerous in April, and the difference had not been sufficiently marked to prevent Virginia troops from serving in Massachusetts, so they refused to move. Desertions

followed, but Lafayette made an appeal to their patriotic pride by announcing that he was about to start on a dangerous enterprise, and hoped that none of his comrades would leave him, but if any were deterred by the prospect he would issue permits for them to return North. That was the end of the disaffection, and it is said that a lame sergeant, afraid of being left behind, hired a place in a cart in order to go with the others. The army was so poorly equipped that it was hardly fit to proceed into an enemy's country, for such in a certain sense Virginia had now become, and to remedy this Lafayette pledged his own credit with Baltimore merchants for goods which the patriotic women made into summer clothing, also hats, shoes, etc.

It was about two hundred miles to Richmond, but by a forced march Lafayette arrived there on April 29, the evening before Phillips and Arnold appeared at Manchester, on the other side of the river, and was joined by Steuben with his militia the same night. The two little armies together numbered about four thousand men, and the British general concluded not to attempt the crossing of the river in the face of that obstacle, so Richmond was, for the present, saved from a second visitation.

Lafayette, being the ranking commander, took charge of the movements and collected the small boats and stores above the falls out of reach of the enemy, who being unable to accomplish anything more in that neighborhood, dropped down the river to a point opposite Cobham. Lafayette in a letter to Washington at that time expresses the belief that Phillips's intention was to go on to Williamsburg and gather up the stores which had been collected there. This induced him to take an inland position between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey rivers, where he could protect other sections of the

state while still covering Richmond, and send a detachment of militia under General Nelson towards Williamsburg. If this was Phillips's intention he changed his mind on hearing that Cornwallis was en route to Virginia, and concluded to join him at or near Petersburg. On the 5th of May Phillips started up the Appomattox river, and four days later entered Petersburg without opposition. There he died of fever, leaving Arnold once more in command.

Our last view of Cornwallis was his arrival at Wilmington, North Carolina, to which point he had been forced by Greene's superior generalship like debris cast on shore by an incoming wave. He was in a quandary. To attempt a pursuit of Greene, who had already turned south with a good start, would be most hazardous. To return by water to Charleston or Savannah, after having been manœuvred out of the country, would simply expose himself to ridicule, and he could not stay where he was if he expected to take any further part in the war. He was, of course, informed of the operations in Virginia, and it occurred to him that if he could unite his force with Phillips, and perhaps get further aid from Clinton, the richest and strongest state in the Confederation might be completely subdued, the North and South separated and beaten in detail, and the war brought to a speedy conclusion. With this scheme in view, and without the sanction of Clinton, Cornwallis left Wilmington on April 25, and on May 20 reached Petersburg, where he took command of the combined forces, Arnold being ordered back to New York. Cornwallis now had a force of nearly five thousand men besides the Portsmouth garrison, with only three thousand opposed to him, and with the further expectation of Tory help. In the latter he was grievously disappointed, as had been Arnold and

Phillips. Virginia, though overrun by the enemy, remained solidly loyal to the patriot cause, and had it not been for the smoking ruins of homes and the devastation of the farms, the course of the invader through the country would have been as the passage of a ship through the waters; when the agitation stirred up by the keel has subsided, the waters close up and leave no trace. Nevertheless there was great alarm. It was proposed to call for Washington and make him dictator. Cooler heads discouraged the latter proposition; nevertheless it was apparent that matters were converging to a focus. Lafayette made a stand at Wilton, about twenty miles below Richmond, but Cornwallis crossed the river at Westover, and, being further reinforced, drove him back into the country.

The arrival of Lafayette relieved Steuben from direct responsibility, but he continued to render every aid in his power, not forgetting Greene in the general turmoil. With the approval of Lafayette he established a rendezvous at Albemarle barracks, northwest of Richmond, in a comparatively safe locality. But recruiting was slower than ever, and he again expressed the desire to join Greene as soon as he should complete his present work. Greene had anticipated his desire, and in a letter dated May 1 asks the Baron to join him as soon as possible, for he was badly needed, and bring with him such troops as he could get together. Steuben presented this letter to Jefferson and Lafayette, and it was thought that about one thousand five hundred men could be gathered at Albemarle barracks, and when put in condition could be ordered to reinforce Greene or Lafayette as the occasion might demand. It was subsequently decided, however, that Albemarle was too remote for convenience, and the Point of Fork, on James River, about sixty miles

northwest of Richmond, was substituted. The Marquis desired Steuben to hasten there and prepare for the expected one thousand five hundred recruits, but the highest number received was five hundred and fifty, and even these were poorly equipped.

The principal depot for state supplies was now at Point of Fork, and from the movements of the enemy Steuben was satisfied that they could not remain there with safety. So he ordered all boats possible up from Richmond to assist in their removal, and on May 29th took up his position there for that purpose. Four days later he wrote to Lafayette stating that he had "Five hundred and fifty men in a desert without shoes, shirts, and, what is still worse, without cartridge boxes. I write everywhere; send expresses to all parts of the world, but I receive no answer. If I did not expect Lawson with reinforcement I would go to Charlottesville to sing a jeremiad to my sovereign masters. Please let me have news from you. I am here as I would be in Kamschatka; I do not know where you are nor what has become of Cornwallis."

Lafayette was at no trouble to ascertain what had become of Cornwallis, as he was busily engaged in keeping out of the way of that general, who with his greatly superior force was able to crush the smaller patriot army could he bring on a general action. This Lafayette endeavored to prevent, and pursuing the Fabian policy learned by both Greene and himself from Washington, he retreated northward towards Fredericksburg and crossed the Rapidan west of that town, about sixty miles from Richmond. Cornwallis promptly entered the capital, the state government having been moved to Charlottesville, in Albemarle county. The British general did not care to follow Lafayette so far north, but de-

tached Tarleton to Charlottesville to capture the members of the government if possible. Seven members of the Legislature were apprehended, but the Governor, with the others, having been warned in time, got away, Jefferson leaving on horseback just twenty minutes before the British arrived at his home at Monticello. The troopers spared his homestead, as they had done with Washington's home at Mount Vernon, but ravaged the farms (including Jefferson's) in the vicinity, and Virginia was now experiencing the horrors of war such as had been suffered by no state north of the Potomac, with the possible exception of Northern New Jersey.

Lafayette was now comparatively safe, and the expedition was a failure so far as the capture of his army was concerned, but how about Steuben, with his band of five hundred militia, at Point of Fork? If the reader will take the trouble to lay down a ruler on the map of Virginia he will find a base line of about sixty miles running north from Richmond to Fredericksburg, another of seventy-five miles northwest to Charlottesville, and a third seventy-five miles northeast from Charlottesville to Fredericksburg, thus giving him a triangle of which Charlottesville is the apex. Now, Point of Fork is located directly on the line between Richmond and Charlottesville, somewhat nearer the latter. Steuben was thus directly between Tarleton and Cornwallis's main army with apparently not a possibility of escaping. Cornwallis advanced northward as far as Hanover Court House, when he turned squarely to the west, striking the James river at Elk Hill, the property of Thomas Jefferson, where he made his headquarters for ten days. He had already detached General Simcoe with five hundred men against Steuben in advance of the main army, and Tarleton was approaching in the other direction from Charlottesville.



CHARLES P. FILSON.



ELIPHALET F. ANDREWS



While Steuben no doubt had an idea that something was wrong, and had taken the precaution to move the most valuable stores out of the way, yet the British managed to keep their main operations pretty well concealed. On June 2 Steuben heard of Simcoe at Goochland Court House, about twenty-five miles distant, and supposed it to be Cornwallis's main army, which, in fact, was not very far behind. He at once issued orders for removing the remainder of the stores, and had the boats which he had collected made ready for crossing the river should the occasion demand it. Early on June 4 Major Call arrived and stated that the enemy were approaching in two columns, one via Goochland and the other (evidently Tarleton's) via Louisa Court House, and that he had narrowly escaped capture. There now seemed no doubt that the enemy in force were close at hand, and Steuben forthwith gave orders to move all baggage across the river, and placed a picket of eighty men opposite to where he expected Cornwallis to approach. Having guarded the baggage across he left another picket of fifty men on the road where Tarleton was expected. General Lawson arrived the same day with two hundred and fifty militia, of whom fifteen were mounted, on the opposite side of the river. Steuben's force at this time had been reduced to four hundred and twenty men, so that the addition, though small, was very welcome. Colonel Davies, representing the state authorities, arrived that evening to remove their stores, in which work Steuben gave all possible assistance, as Davies was poorly supplied with means of transportation.

That same morning Steuben had sent four dragoons up the road to observe and inform him of the British approach, but the entire party was captured. At ten o'clock word was received that Tarleton was within four

miles of Point of Fork, and Steuben sent one of his aides, Mr. Farile, to call in the pickets, which was done, although the messenger was captured. About noon General Simcoe came in sight with about five hundred men, partly mounted. Tarleton was close by on the other side, and, according to the best information then obtainable, Cornwallis was on the other side of the branch river, six or seven miles below, although, as it afterwards turned out, Cornwallis was not that close. There was no possibility of successful resistance, and the only possible object that could be obtained was to detain the enemy by a show of force until the balance of the stores could be removed. But the unreliability of the recruits completely baffled that design. A picket of fifty men deserted the post on first sight of the enemy, and could only be brought back by threats and persuasion. A single shot from a three-pounder seems to have been the extent of the resistance, and the enemy captured a number of canoes which had been left in North Fork contrary to Steuben's orders, although they were not absolutely essential to the attacking party, as the river was fordable. Notwithstanding these drawbacks Steuben held the place until dark, when he crossed to the south side of the main branch of the James, securing, with the bulk of the stores, his entire force, with the exception of about thirty men who were captured while awaiting the return of the canoes. Although, as we shall see, Steuben was criticised for his action here, yet it was a most skillful manœuvre in the face of a superior force, and, in a small way, resembles Washington's strategy after the battle of Long Island. The fact that the main body of Cornwallis's body had not arrived, as Steuben had supposed, does not materially alter the situation, as had he remained he would undoubtedly have been captured with his entire

force and equipage. In order to confirm Steuben in his opinion that he was now confronted by Cornwallis and his whole army on the opposite side of the river, Simcoe lighted fires on the hillsides, giving the appearance of an extended camp. .

Steuben the next day retreated southward, which fact is attributed by some historians solely to Simcoe's stratagem. This no doubt accelerated his movements, but we have seen that there was nothing else for him to do, as he could with his little squad of raw material accomplish nothing against the formidable foe. He writes to Lafayette from the south side of the James on June 5, saying that he himself had seen "a party of cavalry at Goochland Court House in the morning, and another large party at Louisa Court House in the afternoon; the latter, of at least one thousand men; that both parties seem to direct their march this way. The northern branch being fordable in several places, my position became critical and I therefore changed my situation. This I executed immediately and came here, first crossing the baggage and a quantity of state stores which were at Fork Point. I have since heard nothing of the party which were at Louisa, those at Goochland remaining there yesterday. General Lawson has joined me with three hundred militia, and we expect about four hundred more to-day or to-morrow. I had ordered all the boats below this place to be brought up, but the current was too strong to permit it. I intend to move from here as soon as the weather clears up, and take a position at the mouth of Willis Creek, where I shall collect every boat on the river, and from there I have communication everywhere."

This does not read as though coming from a panic-stricken general, but one who knowing that he was con-

fronted by a superior force takes every precaution to conserve his men and supplies. As to the latter there was great exaggeration concerning the loss. The Baron's enemies made the most of the affair, and the usually careful Irving says, "In his alarm he made a night retreat of thirty miles, leaving the greater part of the stores scattered along the river bank, which were destroyed by the next morning by a small detachment of the enemy sent across in canoes." But we find the Baron the next day within a mile of the Fork calmly writing to Lafayette his reasons for retreating, which were based on sound military grounds. That same day he wrote to the Governor of North Carolina that he proposed marching towards that state.

As to the abandoned stores there is considerable conflict of testimony as to their value. General Simcoe, who was naturally disposed to make the most of his exploit, says there were destroyed at the Point of Fork two thousand five hundred stand of arms, a large quantity of gunpowder, case shot, etc., several casks of saltpetre, sulphur and brimstone, sixty hogsheads of rum and brandy, several chests of carpenters' tools, four hundred interchanging tools, casks of flint, etc., six mortars and four long brass nine-pounders. Lafayette, however, declared that the loss was unimportant, and Henry Lee, in his memoirs, says that most of the arms were muskets out of repair. Steuben reported to Greene that only a few articles were lost, and these through the negligence of the commissaries and storekeepers, and Colonel William Langborn reported that the enemy secured only twenty barrels of powder and a few canoes, as the boats had all been sunk by the Baron's orders. The bulk of clothing and manufactured goods had been removed to Staunton, where it was safe for the present. Colonel Davies

writes from there on June 23 that "The Assembly were at first much mortified at the losses we had sustained by the rapid incursions of the enemy, and in their discontent were really clamorous; they moderate in their vexation, as they have since found that the mischief done by the enemy was inconsiderable compared with the plunder of the inhabitants, of whom we expect to recover a great deal."

As we have seen Steuben was still within a mile of the James on June 5, watching the movements of the enemy, but by the morning of the 6th his little army was collected in comparatively safe quarters at Willis Creek, about thirty miles below. From here he sent an officer back to observe the movements of Simcoe and Tarleton, no doubt still supposing that Cornwallis had joined them. Intelligence was received that the enemy had constructed a couple of rafts, each with a carrying capacity of eighty to one hundred men, and had thrown a bridge across North Fork, connecting with their force opposite Elk Island. This, if it meant anything, indicated a movement southward, and as Steuben himself says, "I could not see what could hinder the enemy from detaching a sufficient party to disperse my force and render themselves masters of the stores at Prince Edward, Charlotte and Halifax (Houston) Court Houses. I thought it absurd making a bravado with a small number of bad troops against such a force, while the Marquis, being nearly one hundred miles off, could make no diversion on that side. I therefore gave orders for dispersing the stores in such manner that only part could fall into the enemy's hands on any route they could take, and sent off three officers successively to acquaint the Marquis of my situation. I wrote circular letters to the county lieutenants to call out their militia, and, leaving General Law-

son at Charlotte Court House, I marched the recruits to Cole's Ferry on the Staunton."

On June 9th Steuben reached Charlotte Court House (now Smithville), and Cole's Ferry the next day, where he halted in order to await instructions to join Greene or Lafayette, as circumstances might dictate. He had never given up the original project of joining Greene, from whom he had heard nothing since May 1, the latter's orders for him to proceed south having been intercepted by the enemy. His force was now fifty to seventy-five miles south of Simcoe, who manifested no disposition to follow him, and a march into North Carolina seemed feasible, both as a method of aiding Greene and indirectly Lafayette by inducing Cornwallis to follow him, although he appears still to have been in doubt as to the exact whereabouts of the latter. He gave directions for a new distribution of stores to prevent them falling into the hands of an enemy marching southward, and issued a circular appointing Prince Edward, Cumberland and Amelia Court House as suitable points for concentrating the militia, making most earnest appeals to the patriotism of the people, and declaring that "If we succeed in collecting such a body of militia as can offer resistance to the enemy, I have not the least doubt that we shall not only preserve this part of the state from their depredation, but that in a short time they will be driven back to their shipping, and probably convinced of the impossibility of conquering a country defended by freemen."

At this time Steuben requested Governor Nash, of North Carolina, to send him all the armed militia possible, especially horses, he being now only thirty or forty miles from the North Carolina line.

Greene, as we have seen, was getting the advantage of the British in North Carolina, and Augusta had sur-

rendered on the 5th, but the latest information led Steuben to believe that he was still needed in that direction, as, indeed he was, for the battle of Eutaw Springs, which broke the British power in the South, was not fought until the following September 8. Hence he resolved to join Greene without delay, taking with him about five hundred and fifty recruits, leaving General Lawson with six hundred militia, with which it was believed he could take care of any raiding parties which might put in an appearance. On the 12th of June, however, according to Kapp, Steuben heard that General Sumner had been ordered to march with the North Carolina line to Virginia and form a junction with him. If this were the case the orders were certainly countermanded, for General Sumner remained with Greene and took an active part in the battle of Eutaw Springs. However that may be, Steuben evidently concluded that Greene was now getting the Southern situation well in hand, and that he could do more good by marching northward and co-operating with Lafayette. He gives his reasons, however, why he at first proposed going South in a letter addressed to one Captain Kirkpatrick, of North Carolina, in which he says: "I have halted here two days waiting for General Greene's orders, in the meantime endeavoring to collect a sufficient body of militia to cover this side of the James river, and promising if they turned out with spirit I would venture to remain in the state and join my small force to theirs. My reasons for marching southward (as I find a general must give reasons to every citizen for his conduct) were positive orders from General Greene, and my own hopes that my moving this way would alarm Cornwallis and induce him to detach a part of his army in my pursuit, which would be of more essential advan-

tage to the Marquis than if five times the number of my recruits would join him."

June 13th found Steuben at Prince Edward Court House on his northward march, where he collected all the militia possible, whether armed or not. From here he sent a militia detachment to Carter's Ferry, while with his main force he started for a point opposite Seven Islands, on the James river, a few miles above the now celebrated Point of Fork. This he regarded as a favorable rendezous for the militia and also an excellent point for observing the enemy's movements. While on this march he received an urgent letter from Lafayette requesting him to join the latter as quickly as possible.

CHAPTER XVI.

APPROACHING THE CLIMAX.

Steuben Joins Lafayette and Forces Cornwallis to Leave Richmond—Retreat to Williamsburg—Steuben's Illness—Arrival of Washington and Siege of Yorktown—Steuben Assigned a Command—Closing up the Trenches—Receives a Deputation from Cornwallis—The Surrender.

We left Cornwallis with his main force at Elk Hill, and Tarleton and Simcoe within supporting distance, so that his army was now practically concentrated into one body. Lafayette was in the neighborhood of Fredericksburg, about sixty miles northeast, well out of harm's reach, while Steuben, as we have seen, was well south of the James. On June 7th, however, Lafayette was reinforced by General Wayne with eight hundred to one thousand Pennsylvania troops, which gave him a force, if not strong enough to cope directly with Cornwallis, at least to protect stores at Albemarle and other points. Reinforcements from other sources had now brought his army up to four thousand men, and Cornwallis, seeing that he could not now safely divide his force into marauding parties, gathered it together and retired to Richmond. It was at this juncture that Lafayette, on June 13th, sent the following message to Steuben:

I request, my dear sir, that you will immediately return this way, and with the Continentals and militia under your command, hasten to form a junction with us. I am afraid General Greene's letter requesting you to remain with us has not yet got to hand, but unless you have received orders subsequent to General Greene's march against Ninety-six and Augusta, I can assure you his desire was then to form a junction. Should the enemy cross the James River, which I do not believe they will do, and which none of them have yet attempted, it must be with a view to reconquer Carolina. In this case you would be in

their way, and I should request every obstruction to be put in their way, as I shall myself follow them as expeditiously as possible. But, on the contrary, should they make the conquest of this state their main object, our united force is not too much to resist them. No news from the northward; it is reported General Washington is coming to Virginia with French and American troops, but I had no letter from him.

There being no evidence that Cornwallis meditated a southward movement Steuben at once put himself in the way to form the junction with Lafayette as requested. By rapid marching he crossed the James at Carter's Ferry on June 16 into Goochland county, and three days later joined Lafayette in Hanover county, twenty-five miles north of Richmond. Lafayette now had a force of five thousand men, so Cornwallis, to prevent himself from being besieged in Richmond, evacuated that city on the 20th, and retreated down the river, plundering and devastating the country as he went. He arrived at Williamsburg on June 25 and pillaged every dwelling within reach. The American army, although close on his heels, could not prevent the destruction of property, and it is estimated that the losses suffered by the state and people of Virginia to this time aggregated not less than \$15,000,000.

Scarcely had Cornwallis arrived at Williamsburg than he received an order from Sir Henry Clinton at New York to send three thousand men back to that city, as Washington was threatening the place. The American general had by numerous feints succeeded in convincing his foe that was about to attack him with over twenty thousand men, when, as a matter of fact, he did not have more than one-half that number. Besides, it seemed clear to Clinton that there was no prospect of subjugating Virginia with Cornwallis's present force, owing to the solid loyalty of that state to the American cause, and

hence he thought it would be advisable to merely hold a defensive position on the coast and send the surplus men where they could be used to better advantage. Sullenly Cornwallis prepared to submit, and considering Portsmouth the most available point for a defensive post he began his march thither on July 4. During the crossing of the river, about eight miles above Jamestown Island, on the 6th Wayne, with the Pennsylvania men, engaged the British, and after a sharp contest the Americans were repulsed with a loss of one hundred and forty-five men. Kapp in his account of this affair condemns Lafayette for having been lured into an action "which, only for the bravery of Wayne and the inability of Cornwallis to pursue his advantage, on account of the night, would have resulted in the annihilation of the whole army." It is only just, however, to say that none of the other historians takes this view, although Irving says "That retreat, if followed close, might have been converted into a disastrous flight."

While proceeding to carry out Clinton's orders in a half-hearted way, Cornwallis did not fail to protest against them, pronouncing a defensive post on the Chesapeake as of no value, only giving access to an unhealthy swamp and liable to become a prey to a foreign enemy with a temporary superiority at sea. In fact, he was so disgusted that he wanted to transfer his command to General Leslie and return to Charleston. In the meantime transports had arrived to carry the troops to New York, with instructions to hasten their embarkation, for Clinton was hourly expecting an attack. But troops had scarcely boarded the ships when counter orders were received. Cornwallis's rapid movements in the South, and the apparent conquest of that section had strongly commended themselves to Lord Germain and the British min-

istry, who did not realize how completely Greene was undoing the work of his late opponent, who had been really driven from the field. To reduce Virginia as he had apparently reduced Georgia and the Carolinas, would go far towards ending the war, and there seemed no reason apparent to the gentlemen in London why this should not be done if Cornwallis were suffered to retain his troops. This was made known to Clinton, who already regarded Cornwallis as his rival and possible successor; hence the rescinding the order, and the troops disembarked..

Cornwallis had his way, but if Virginia were to be conquered it could not be by sporadic raids, but by a regular campaign with a suitable base on the coast. Portsmouth was not adapted for this purpose, as the harbor could easily be blockaded, and it would be impossible for works erected there to protect a fleet in Hampton Roads. Accordingly, Yorktown, a small village on the right bank of York river, was selected, and the army moved thither. A glance at the map will show that the four principal rivers which drain the Virginia tidewater region, namely the Potomac, Rappahannock, York and James, enter the Chesapeake bay on nearly parallel lines, forming comparatively narrow peninsulas. Where stood the town of York the width of the peninsula was only about eight miles, while in front vessels could safely ride on the broad, deep river. Across the river, on the north side, and only a mile distant, was Gloucester Point, which was also occupied by Cornwallis. It will readily be seen that though the town might be captured by a superior force, yet so long as a garrison had command of the sea there was a sure means of escape provided. When Cornwallis occupied Yorktown he had with him seven thousand and trained veterans, the flower of the British army, most of whom had become inured to fatigue and danger dur-

ing their recent campaigns. The combined forces of Lafayette and Steuben numbered something over five thousand, too weak, of course, to capture or rout Cornwallis, but strong enough to give him occupation until a new situation should develop. At this time Cornwallis was so confident of the security of his position that he professed a willingness to send one thousand or twelve hundred men north if they were needed.

It was August 22d before Cornwallis had concentrated his entire force at Yorktown, and meanwhile a change was impending from another quarter.

It is scarcely necessary to say that Washington, while keeping one eye on New York, had the other constantly turned on the Southern campaign. News traveled slowly in those days, and, like the light from the so-called fixed stars which gives not their position at the time they are viewed by the eye, but sometimes long years before, so it was in a minor sense with reports from the theatre of war. Ten days were required to transmit dispatches from Virginia, and three times that long from Greene, even when they were not intercepted by the enemy, so that when Washington learned of a certain state of affairs, the situation had usually entirely changed before the information reached him. Nevertheless he kept in touch with the situation as closely as possible, as was manifested by his instructions to Lafayette, and, although utterly unable to make an attack on New York with any prospect of success, yet by his feints and manœuvres, he kept Clinton in such a state of alarm that not only was the latter anticipating an assault at any time, but was led to believe that he could not safely send further aid to Cornwallis.

The time was now at hand, however, when some decisive action was needed. The French troops could not

be detained indefinitely at Newport, both the country and the army were certainly getting tired of watching New York, and the commander-in-chief was now satisfied that with a combined movement by the two armies in conjunction with the fleet something decisive might be accomplished. As has already been indicated the command of the sea was necessary for the capture of Cornwallis's army, without which a march to Virginia would be comparatively barren of results, and so far the French fleet had not rendered much service. Washington seems to have grasped the idea of a final Virginia campaign as soon as he learned of Cornwallis's entry into that state, but England, still having command of the sea, it was realized that any effort in that line would be abortive. But a strong French squadron was expected during the spring of 1781, and on May 22 Washington went to Wethersfield, Conn., where he held a conference with Count Rochambeau in regard to a projected attack on New York. In that conference he broached the subject of the Virginia campaign to Rochambeau, but the matter was kept a close secret, as it was still uncertain what part of the coast the fleet under Count de Grasse would strike. So Washington waited and watched the course of events, in readiness to strike at New York or march four hundred miles south and end the campaign there. On August 14 word was received from Grasse that he was en route from the West Indies to Chesapeake bay. That settled the question. Rochambeau's army had joined the American forces on the Hudson, ready for any service which might be demanded. Feints were made against New York which completely deceived Clinton, and, on August 19, Washington, leaving a sufficient force to hold West Point and other strategic centres, crossed the Hudson, at King's Ferry, with two thousand Continentals

and four thousand Frenchmen. Nobody but Washington and Rochambeau knew where they were going, and it was not until they reached Philadelphia that even the American officers guessed the secret. The country had already been cheered by intelligence of Greene's success, and now the military and civilians vied with each other in their enthusiasm. The march through the city was a festal one, and when Washington, who had galloped ahead to Chester, sent back word that Grasse had arrived in Chesapeake bay, the joy was unrestrained. The 2d and 3d days of September were occupied by the troops in marching through Philadelphia, the Americans in their tattered garments and the French in their gorgeous uniforms. Washington arrived at the Head of Elk on September 6, followed as rapidly as possible by the army. Part of the force embarked at once, going down the Chesapeake, but there being not sufficient vessels for all, Washington with the rest of the army marched overland through Baltimore. On the 9th he left that city for a short visit to Mount Vernon, which he not seen for six years. Here he entertained Count Rochambeau and other distinguished guests with true Virginia hospitality, and on the 12th left to join Lafayette at Williamsburg.

Count de Grasse had reached the Chesapeake on September 5, and was conveying French troops up James river when the British Admiral Graves appeared with twenty ships. Grasse put to sea with twenty-four vessels, and on the 7th engaged the British with such effect that after four days' manœuvring Graves bore away to New York, and De Barras, another French admiral, having arrived with transports carrying troops and stores, the allies were now in full control of both land and water.

Washington took personal charge of affairs and was urging matters forward with the greatest celerity until

the 22d, when an incident occurred which threatened to derange everything. Word was received that the British Admiral Digby had arrived at New York with six additional ships and troops. This alarmed De Grasse, lest the reinforced British fleet should return and attack him at disadvantage, and he proposed starting for the open sea, where he could either fight to advantage or blockade the British in New York. This was enacting the Portsmouth fiasco over again, and Washington, fearing the complete failure of his plans, sent Lafayette to the Admiral with a courteous but urgent letter, asking him to at least delay his departure for a short time, which he finally consented to do. By the 25th the American and French troops had encamped between Williamsburg and Yorktown, effectually preventing any retreat by land, while the fleet guarded the river. The combined forces of the besiegers now numbered about sixteen thousand troops, of which nine thousand were American and seven thousand French.

In order to give a connected resume of events leading up to the investment of Yorktown special reference to Steuben's movements during this period has been omitted. As previously stated, on June 19 he with his forces effected a junction with Lafayette in Hanover county, and a few days after he received orders from Greene to remain with the Marquis in connection with the Virginia recruits. Shortly after joining Lafayette's army Steuben, who had been broken down by anxiety and exposure, fell ill and retired to a country place near Charlottesville to recuperate. Here about the end of July he received a delayed order from Greene to join him, with or without recruits, the latter having all been turned over to Lafayette. To this the Baron responded on August 13:

I have received your favor of the 19th of July, in which I am ordered to join you. If it had pleased God, my dear General, that this order had reached me a few months sooner, I should have escaped a great deal of pain and chagrin, but what I have to say on that subject shall rest till I have the pleasure to see you. My duty and inclination would have engaged me to set out immediately on receipt of your letter had not my ill state of health prevented me. An eruption of blood, which has covered my whole body, obliged me to retire to a country house. It is near Mr. Walker's, whom you saw at Philadelphia, a member of Congress, and his father, who is my physician. The heat of the season, uneasiness of my mind, and a thousand other things have so used me up that I cannot yet sustain the fatigues of a journey. I shall, however, prepare to take up my line of march the last of this month, and hope to join you before your operations begin. I can say nothing to you on our affairs either political or military; a sick man, you know, looks on things worse than they really are. I have the consolation to hope I shall soon be with the general I esteem and the friend for whom I have the strongest affection.

The Baron's health having improved considerably towards the latter part of August, he made preparations for going to Greene, and was about starting on his journey, when he received an urgent letter from Lafayette asking him to join the latter at once. We have seen that affairs on the York peninsula had assumed a critical aspect. Although Cornwallis was in a measure on the defensive, yet his army was really stronger than Lafayette's, and another affair like that at Green Spring, Jamestown, might cause matters to become very serious at least. So Steuben went down to King William County, near the head of York river, where he occupied himself with his old work of putting things in order and aiding in strengthening the army that was now closing in about Yorktown. While here he learned of Washington's southward march and the arrival of the French fleet. Old soldier that he was, he sniffed the smoke of battle from

afar, and for the time being he is willing if not anxious to remain in Virginia. On September 9th he writes to Greene:

In the moment of my departure to join you I received the glorious news of the arrival of the French fleet. The whole country is flying to arms. I had reason to apprehend that my departure at such a time as this would have been made to operate against me by persons who seek to destroy the reputation of every honest man. You are, without doubt, informed, my dear General, of the trouble and vexation to which I have been exposed in this state. The greatest sacrifice I can make to the public interest, is to suspend my endeavors for redress until the present scene is finished. To have quitted the state before that period would have armed my enemies against me. Two days before the arrival of the fleet, the marquis wrote me to hasten to his assistance, but your orders and my wishes to join you, made me decide for the southward. I beg you, my dear General, to permit my assisting this expedition which is preparing. Considering how small the number of your troops is, I think my presence may be dispensed with for some time, nevertheless if you judge it necessary, and should you think the motives which induce me to stay insufficient, the moment I receive your commands I shall begin my journey. To-morrow I shall join the marquis. I shall give him every assistance in my power.

Of course, Steuben, when he wrote the above, had not learned of the battle of Eutaw Springs, which, with other events that quickly followed, removed the necessity for him going South, and the promised union with Greene never took place.

According to his intention Steuben started to join Lafayette in Williamsburg the next day, and arrived there at least by the 12th, where he met General Washington and Count Rochambeau when they arrived there on the 14th. On the 19th he writes to Greene: "Our troops and those of our allies from the North are expected every hour. They embarked at Baltimore on the 14th instant. As soon as they arrive our operations will commence. This, my dear General, is the decisive moment—the happiest time I have spent in America. Every

advantage appears to declare in favor of the righteous cause. Young Colonel Laurens called to see me yesterday; he is just back from France, and brings with him everything which will be necessary to finish the war. The court of France has answered the Emperor (of Germany or the Holy Roman Empire) on his proposition of a mediation, that they can enter into no negotiations without the consent of their allies, and as the haughty Briton will not consider this ally as an independent state, the negotiation is broken off. I trust the success of this campaign will render our enemies more tractable."

In response to Steuben's request for a regular command Washington promptly assigned him a division, composed of Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania troops, numbering two thousand three hundred and nine men, of whom one thousand three hundred and forty-six belonged to Wayne's brigade and nine hundred and fifty-three to Gist's. According to a report, dated October 3, there were only seven hundred and thirty men of Wayne's men fit for service, and four hundred and forty-five of Gist's, the sick numbering six hundred and seventeen. It is presumed, however, that under Steuben's careful management the effective strength of the division was brought up more nearly to the proper record. Steuben was in his old place as member of Washington's staff, and as none of the Americans had participated in regular siege operations his experience as aid to Frederick the Great at the investment of Schweidnitz proved of great value. The first trenches in front of Yorktown were begun by General Lincoln on the night of the 5th of October, the American and French working together in friendly rivalry, so that by the 8th the first parallel was completed, and batteries began playing upon the enemy's works. This was at a distance of six hundred yards, but on the

night of the 11th Steuben with his division began a second parallel within three hundred and sixty yards of Cornwallis's lines, and worked with such success that the enemy did not discover his position until daylight, when the Americans were too strongly entrenched to be dislodged. General Wayne was with Steuben, and when the British opened fire in the morning a shell fell close by them. The Baron threw himself into the trench to avoid the effect of the explosion, and Wayne in trying to get out of the way fell on top of him. The Baron perceiving his comrade in that position jocularly remarked, "I always knew you were a brave general, but I did not know that you were so perfect in every point of duty; you cover your general's retreat in the best manner possible." Fortunately neither of the officers was hurt.

Another incident of the siege recorded by Steuben himself is worth relating. Baron De Viomenil commanded the trenches on the 10th of October, and at four o'clock in the evening he sent Count Deuxponts to tell Steuben that he had observed, while visiting the trenches, that his division was extremely weak, and as it was probable the enemy might make a sortie that night he wished to reinforce his (Steuben's) left wing from five to eight hundred men if the latter should think it necessary. In the presence of General Wayne Steuben replied that he did not think he wanted any reinforcements, and that if the enemy were to attack him he should answer for being able to hold the battery until the Baron De Viomenil could arrive to support him, and further, in case Viomenil was attacked, he might rely upon Steuben to support him with eight hundred men in two columns. When Count Deuxpontz had gone away Wayne remarked to Steuben that he had only one thousand men in his entire division. "No doubt of it," Steuben replied, "that is my calculation

too, but if it should so happen, I should, on my own responsibility, leave two hundred men to defend the battery, and with the remaining eight hundred men attack forthwith in two columns," adding that if he was guilty of a certain amount of gasconade with regard to the number of men it was for the honor of his (Wayne's) country, whereupon Wayne took the Baron by the hand and addressing himself to the officers present said: "Now, gentlemen, it is our duty to make good the exaggeration of Baron Steuben, and support him just as if he had double the number of men that he has."

It would not be profitable here to follow the siege operations in detail, they can be found in any reliable history. Cornwallis made a desperate effort to escape from the trap in which he had taken refuge. On the night of October 15 he started to convey his troops across the river to Gloucester Point, hoping to force his way northward and join Clinton in New York. The plan could hardly have succeeded under any circumstances, but after part of the troops had crossed the river a storm arose which scattered the boats, and daylight put an end to the project, those who had reached the Point being compelled to recross under the fire of American batteries. Further resistance was impossible, and on the morning of the 17th Cornwallis dispatched a flag of truce with a letter to Washington proposing a cessation of hostilities for twenty-four hours to arrange terms of surrender. Baron Steuben in command of the trenches received the letter, and forwarded it to the commanding general. Later Lafayette came with his division, it being the relieving hour, but, according to North, Steuben declined to be relieved, assigning as a reason the etiquette in Europe; that the offer to capitulate had been made during his guard, and

that it was a point of honor, of which he would not deprive his troops, to remain in the trenches until the capitulation was signed, or hostilities recommenced. The matter was referred by Lafayette to the commander-in-chief, with the result that Steuben remained in the trenches until the British flag was struck.

Washington was not disposed to grant very much delay in view of the expected arrival of Clinton with reinforcements and the anxiety of De Grasse to get away, but negotiations dragged along until the 19th, when the posts of Yorktown and Gloucester were surrendered to General Washington as commander-in-chief of the allied army, and the vessels and seamen to Count de Grasse. The troops surrendered numbered seven thousand two hundred and forty-seven and eight hundred and forty sailors, or over eight thousand in all, besides an immense quantity of military stores. The garrison lost five hundred and fifty-two during the siege, and the besiegers about three hundred, killed. These figures are small compared with those of later contests on Virginia battlefields, but in its ultimate results the siege of Yorktown stands as one of the decisive conflicts of the world.

Little detail is given of Baron Steuben's part in this memorable contest other than the incidents related above, but Washington in his congratulatory order issued the day after the capitulation specially mentions Steuben along with Lincoln, Knox, Lafayette and Duportail. Lincoln was deputed to receive the sword which Cornwallis sent by a deputy, giving illness, real or feigned, as his excuse for not being present in person.

As a rule not much detail has been given concerning the Yorktown surrender, the participants having been more deeply interested in the general result which not



SURRENDER OF CORNWALLIS AT YORKTOWN.

Steuken is Third in the Row of American Generals With Washington Directly in Front.

only freed Virginia from further invasion, but was practically the end of the war, although over a year was yet to elapse before a formal treaty of peace was concluded. But there was with Cornwallis one sergeant, John Conrad Doehla, belonging to a regiment from Anspach, Germany, who kept quite a full diary of those eventful days, and for a translation of which we are indebted to Mr. Kapp. Among other things Sergeant Doehla says:

We were left in full possession of all our equipage and apparel—nothing belonging to us was taken, or even touched; we were treated with fairness and respect, as prescribed by the usages of war. To speak out plainly we were rather satisfied that the end of this siege had come at last, escaping therefrom on unexpectedly favorable terms, while we had been always of opinion that we should be taken by assault. Had it lasted a few days longer, a general storm was unavoidable—the French grenadiers (?) were already preparing for it.

It was on the afternoon of the 19th of October, between the hours of four and five o'clock, that all our troops, with arms and baggage, standards covered but drums beating, marched out of the lines of, and the whole camp. * * * The French, who formed the right wing, had sometimes richly dressed "hieducks" (fancy servants) in their suite, who being very tall and handsome men, presented quite a dazzling appearance in their gold and silver laced liveries. All the French generals, Count De Rochambeau, Marquis De Lafayette, Count De Deux-ponts, and Prince De Lucerne, wore glittering stars and badges of military orders.

On the right wing of each French regiment was gorgeously paraded a rich standard of white silk with three golden fleur de lis embroidered upon it. Beyond these standards stood the drummers and fifers, and in front of them the band which played delightfully. It must be confessed that the French troops, altogether, looked very well; they were all tall, handsome men. They all wore white gaiters, a part of them were clad in red, some also in green, most of them, however, were in white regimentals. The German, or Alsacian regiments had blue regimentals.

The left wing of the line through which we had to march was formed of the Americans; in front of them their generals, Washington, Gates, Steuben and Wayne. They were paraded in three lines, the first composed of the regulars, who had also

a band; playing moderately well. They looked passable, but the militia from Virginia and Maryland, forming the second and third lines, were both a ragged set of fellows and very ill looking.

We, now prisoners of war, stared with amazement at all these troops, parading there in lines three ranks deep. We were quite astonished at the immense number of our besiegers, perceiving well that, compared with such a formidable army, we were little more than a mere guard, and that they were strong enough to have eaten us up to the last man. The lines of both armies extended nearly two miles in length. Think, only of an army of forty thousand men, altogether drawn up in lines three ranks deep, what a space it must cover. Our small number quite puzzled the enemy; they had believed we were much stronger.

When all was over, we had to march again through the two lines of the allied armies to return to our camp, but this was done in utter silence without further incumbrance, as the poor equipage which we carried in our knapsacks was all we possessed. All the courage and spirit which at other times animate a corps of soldiers were extinguished, the more so as on this, our return march, the American part of our conquerors jeered at us very insultingly. We were again quartered in our lines and tents, enjoying, however, full liberty to walk anywhere in the lines as well as in the city. And I must say the French behaved very well towards us. They were altogether kind and obliging. But the Americans with the exception of their officers, were strictly forbidden to come within our lines, or even to enter the city. The French grenadiers, who occupied all our lines, did not allow any of the American militia to approach us, fearing, as they were at all times addicted to plunder, they might not forget to rob us also, or to make mischief, as was their custom.

Our worthy sergeant has evidently allowed his imagination free play to some extent, especially as to the forty thousand troops whom he saw in the allied armies. The records show five thousand Continentals, seven thousand French and three thousand five hundred militia, sixteen thousand in all. As the force surrendered by Cornwallis numbered about eight thousand, it is apparent that the investing army instead of the three to one standard considered by military authorities as necessary to success in siege operations the ratio was not over two to one.

There had also been gallant assaults wherein Hamilton and others had won laurels, and it seems fortunate for Cornwallis that he did not wait to risk a general one. It must also be remembered that in the surrender the army was turned over to the Americans and the naval forces to the French officers, and whatever protection the prisoners had was due to Washington's orders and not to any special chivalry on the part of the French. A special order by Washington guaranteed fair treatment to all. It is very probable that the militia were restrained from mingling with the prisoners, for most of them were Virginians who for months past had been indignant witnesses of the unrestrained license of a brutal soldiery, whose paths up and down the state had been marked by plundered plantations, burning homes and even violated women. No doubt the robbers even at this time had some of the plundered property in their possession, and the temptation to "get even" would certainly have been very strong had opportunity offered.

It may be added that on the day that Cornwallis surrendered Sir Henry Clinton sailed from New York to his relief with thirty-five ships and seven thousand picked troops. What might have happened had this force reached Yorktown before the surrender it is idle to speculate. Clinton arrived off Capes Charles and Henry on October 24, and after hovering about the entrance to Chesapeake Bay for five days, he learned of Cornwallis's surrender and forthwith returned to New York.

Washington desired to move south with the allied forces, and by investing Charleston and Savannah drive the British at once from that section, but the French refused to co-operate, so he reluctantly gave up the plan, and proceeded to follow Clinton to New York with the

American army except Wayne's division which marched south to join Greene.

Rochambeau remained with the French forces in Virginia, and De Grasse left with his fleet for the West Indies, where in the following April he was defeated and taken prisoner by the British Admiral Rodney. This action maintained the Anglo-Saxon supremacy on the ocean which has been preserved to the present day.

CHAPTER XVII.

YORKTOWN AND AFTER.

Review of the Political Situation—Strength in Weakness—Adoption of the Articles of Confederation—A Rope of Sand—Controversies With the Virginia Authorities—Vindication of Steuben—Financial Difficulties—Attack on New York Discussed—Peace Negotiations—France and Spain Suggest the Alleghenies for the Western Boundary—Steuben Appeals to the King of France.

The surrender of Cornwallis produced such a radical change in the condition of affairs that it may be profitable at this juncture to glance at the political events with which Baron Steuben afterwards became more closely connected. The lack of real authority on the part of the Continental Congress, which the British scornfully denominated a vagrant horde, and which was in fact only a large committee representing the different colonies, impressed on the minds of the Colonists at a very early date the desirability of some more definite form of government, whose powers, even if restricted, should at least possess a tangible reality. It must be remembered that the term "United States," although in common use at that time, implied no feeling of nationality outside of a comparatively few individuals, but was simply what its name indicated—a league of sovereign Commonwealths bound together for mutual interest and protection, in which league each and all stood on an equality, and from which any or all could withdraw at pleasure. Hence it was not surprising that one of the first actions of the Congress was the preparation of the instrument known as the Articles of Confederation for the purpose of securing a "perpetual union" of the Colonies, now called

"States." It was not, however, until November 15, 1777, that the final draft of this document was prepared for submission to the "States," not the people. The germ of nationality was planted in the provision which provided that citizens of any State were entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in every other State, so that Pennsylvania for instance could not enact a law favoring her own people at the expense of a New Yorker residing within her borders. Each State could have not less than two nor more than seven delegates in Congress, to be paid by the State, and when it came to balloting each State was to have one vote, and nine such votes were necessary to enact a law. There was no President in the present sense of that term, but during the recess of Congress the Government was administered by an executive committee of one from each State. The right to declare war or make peace was placed in Congress, but it could only get troops by requisitions on the States. Postoffice, coinage and like matters were entrusted to Congress, in connection with States, but that body had not the power to levy taxes or of enforcing its own decrees. There was no Supreme Court, some the duties later conferred on that body being lodged with Congress. Without going further into details, it is sufficient to say that the instrument above named was no sooner put into operation than it was found to be unworkable. A body that had neither the power of the purse nor of the sword, but must depend upon another sovereignty to enforce its decrees could hardly be called a government whatever else it might be. Hence the correct conclusion of Von Holst that the new arrangement was worse than the old. The very strength of the Continental Government lay in its weakness. Not possessing any real power or claiming the right to

“coerce” a recalcitrant State, but, as has been said, being a general committee for the common defense, the States could obey its requests as coming from their own representatives, without jealousy or the fear of usurpation. And so the central body ventured on measures which under other circumstances would have been deemed a most unwarrantable stretch of power. But when this idea was **crystalized into a written instrument** the feeling became different, and stolid apathy or active opposition created obstacles that were insurmountable. The “Articles” were not to take effect until ratified by all the States, and fortunately this did not take place until March 1, 1781, when Maryland gave her consent, so the war was practically over before the full operation of the instrument revealed its glaring defects.

Baron Steuben did not immediately accompany Washington to New York. There were several reasons for this. Considerable work was yet to be done in Virginia, and he did not know but that Greene might still need him in the South. But what probably influenced him more than anything else was the desire to vindicate himself from the charges and innuendos which certain enemies had made, especially in regard to the loss of stores at Point of Fork. His strict military methods and exposure of fraud and incompetency naturally drew upon him the hostility of all whose desire for gain or ease was stronger than their patriotism, and while they could do the Baron no permanent damage yet for the time being they were able to cause him considerable annoyance. This was one reason which made him anxious to join Greene, until affairs reached a point when he felt that he must remain until the matter was settled. The grievances of the Virginia officials seemed to be princi-

pally because he insisted on the organization of troops according to the instructions of Congress, and hostility was excited by his remonstrances, sometimes pretty vigorous, against the loose habits of the militia as manifested on one occasion by insubordination and indiscriminate plundering of an English ship, and his criticism of the waste in several departments. He made other charges of a more serious nature, which, whether correct or not, brought upon him the enmity of those whom he thus verbally castigated. There does not seem to have been any formal attack upon him, however, on the part of the State authorities until after the affair at Point of Fork, and although this was fully explained, showing the loss was inconsiderable and the Baron was not to blame, yet the animosity continued. On October 6 Washington wrote to Greene that "Baron Steuben, from the warmth of his temper, has got disagreeably involved with the State, and an inquiry into part of his conduct must one day take place, both for his own honor and their satisfaction." Of course, Washington never doubted for a moment that such an inquiry would fully vindicate the Baron, and the latter was more than anxious for an investigation. Both Greene and Lafayette expressed their approbation of his course, and the former on September 17 wrote as follows:

Your letter of the 13th of August gives me most sensible pain. I am sorry that a mind so zealous and intent in promoting the public good should be subject to chagrin and mortification for its well meant endeavors. But let me beg of you, my dear Baron, not to feel too sensibly the illiberal attack of a misguided populace. Merit is too often veiled for a time, and the best intentions subject to partial censure, and this more frequently in republican governments than any others. But it rarely happens that a man of worth is long without his reward, for although society may mistake for a time, men are generally willing to retract and approve when properly informed. And

I am so confident of the propriety of your conduct and the justice of the people, that I have not the least doubt you will see this verified in your case.

Lafayette, on reading this letter the day after Cornwallis's surrender, referred to it as follows:

The high terms in which he (Greene) speaks, particularly on the subject you allude to, are certainly sufficient for your satisfaction, so that I would think it needless for me to add anything to an opinion for which I have the highest veneration. I will therefore only speak of what can be supposed to have come under my immediate cognizance. In the beginning of the campaign I considered you and the new levies as belonging to the Carolina army. The letters in which General Greene and myself were positive for your joining me have been intercepted by the enemy. Lord Cornwallis's intention (as I have still more particularly ascertained) was to maneuver me from a junction with Wayne. His endeavors were vain, but his movements towards our stores threw me, for a little time, at a pretty great distance from the enemy. The account you received was given by Major Call, whom I requested to watch in that quarter the motions of Lord Cornwallis. Your movements at that moment must have been directed by the intelligence you received, and what you conceived to be General Greene's intentions. I was happy in your re-union with me, and I think it determined Lord Cornwallis to a speedy evacuation of Richmond. Let me add that during all the time we served together I have been so well satisfied with your assistance, that I was only sorry your health forced you to leave the army, where your experience and exertions were so useful. Should I have forgotten anything that might add to your satisfaction I will spare no pains to convince you of the sentiments I possess for you.

The above would seem to have been sufficient indorsement of Steuben's actions by the men most competent to judge, and the matter could well have been allowed to drop right there had it not been for a resolution passed by the Virginia legislature shortly after the retreat from Point of Fork requesting Lafayette to require an explanation from the officers under his command in regard to the loss of stores at that place. Of course, the Baron was the only one who could give that explanation, and he was ready at any time to do so, either

to Lafayette or to the legislature itself. We have seen that Lafayette did not regard the matter as worthy of any attention, and in the letter just quoted practically declared that Steuben had acted on intelligence furnished by his (Lafayette's) officer specially detailed for that purpose, which was, of course, conclusive, and there was nothing left to investigate or explain. But the original resolution was a matter of record in the legislative journal, and Steuben was unwilling to depart until the matter was officially cleared up. Accordingly, on November 1, while still at Williamsburg, he wrote to Governor Nelson, saying: "As my duty at present calls me northward, I cannot quit your state without asking your Excellency to inform me by an official letter if government have any complaint against me since I have had the honor of serving in Virginia; that if there should be any I may justify myself before my departure. A reputation acquired during twenty-seven years' service authorizes me in this point of delicacy."

No reply was received to this letter, and, accordingly, on December 13, Steuben addressed a communication to General Harrison, President of the Assembly, stating: "I could be but exceedingly hurt by the implied censure passed on me by the resolve of the Assembly. The State of Virginia had before honored me with a particular mark of esteem, and conscious that I had exerted my utmost to deserve it, I was unwilling to leave the state before I had fully justified my conduct. I accordingly wrote to Governor Nelson, desiring him to acquaint me with the nature of any complaint the state may have against me, but never received an answer. I must, therefore, repeat the same request to you, sir. Col-

onel Davies, General Lawson and Colonel Meade will be my witnesses as to the propriety of my conduct at Point of Fork."

To this Harrison replied on the 28th: "The resolutions of the last Assembly respecting the loss of the stores at the Point of Fork were sent to the Marquis De Lafayette, who informed the present Assembly by letter that he had been too much engaged to enter on the inquiry, for which he begged their excuse. There the matter rests, and I dare say will not be again taken up."

It was evident by this time that those who had favored the resolution were heartily ashamed of their action, and were very glad of an excuse to drop the whole affair. It was never heard of again.

Mr. Kapp severely criticizes Lafayette, both from a military standpoint, and because he considers him as detracting from the honor due Steuben on account of his work in Virginia. It is no doubt true that Lafayette was treated with great favor on political grounds, and to him was ascribed much of the influence in securing the French alliance which, as we have seen in the early part of this work, was really due to Beaumarchais. Nevertheless Lafayette undoubtedly rendered most important aid to the American cause, both politically and otherwise, and although it has never been claimed that he was a great general, his youth alone was against him in that respect, yet his career was most creditable and deserving of commendation. And it is not necessary to draw comparison between him and Steuben. The latter sacrificed all his patrimony in coming to America, where he devoted his life to the patriot cause. His military experience was invaluable, and more than once turned defeat into victory. His labors were untiring, in season and out of season, amid the utmost discouragement and even

hostility from those he was benefitting. But posterity is beginning to recognize his merit, and Greene's prediction has been more than verified.

Many believed that the surrender of Cornwallis presaged the immediate termination of the war, and had the Americans been in condition to utilize at once the army set free by the end of the Virginia campaign, this might have been the case. But of the nine thousand Americans present at the surrender, three thousand five hundred were militia, and the four thousand five hundred Continentals were as usual poorly equipped. With this force added to the northern army they might continue to watch Clinton in New York, but as the French fleet had gone to the West Indies, leaving the English again in command of the sea, the capture of that city was out of the question.. Then, as before intimated, the country was becoming weary of the war, and the Articles of Confederation which had now taken effect, instead of providing a stronger government only emphasized its weakness. True the last extensive campaign had ended, and the last large battle fought, but a single serious mistake might easily undo all that had been accomplished, and it would not do to trust too implicitly the indications that the British ministry were ready to treat for peace.

Steuben's plans for the reorganization of the army had been interrupted by the Virginia campaign, and for a year or more nothing had been done in that direction. It was imperatively necessary that this work be taken up at once, consequently at the beginning of 1782 we again find him with Washington's army about New York preparing to resume his former duties. In one respect there had been an improvement. The officers having been furnished with printed copies of Steuben's instructions, had had the opportunity of becoming familiar with the same,

so the principal object was now to see that they were carried out. In this connection and in order to simplify the system Steuben proposed that in the future the officers of the department be limited to an inspector general and two inspectors, one for the northern and one for the southern army. This met with the approval of Washington, and Congress adopted the plan on January 10, thus completing the arrangement inaugurated by Steuben at Valley Forge four years before, which had been hampered and rendered largely nugatory by negligence and petty jealousies. The good that would have accrued from the early adoption of this plan may be set down as incalculable, and would have averted much of the trouble caused by loose organization, ill-defined authority, poor drilling and insubordination. Steuben was now Inspector General of all the armies, with Colonel Stewart as deputy for the northern army, and Lieutenant Colonel Ternant for the southern. While this reform was late it was better than not coming at all. The Inspector General was allowed a secretary in addition to his aides, and was required whenever the commander-in-chief saw fit to visit every part of the army to see that uniformity prevailed; also inspect the military hospitals. The Baron took great pride in displaying his manœuvres in the presence of the French officers, when their precision and quiet attracted special attention in view of the rather boisterous evolutions of their Gallic brothers. Once in discussing some evolutions with a French general the latter mentioned one of considerable difficulty which he had witnessed in Silesia by the Prussian army, adding, "But we do not expect you to equal the veterans of the King of Prussia. All in good time." When the general had left Steuben remarked, "The time shall be next week. I will save the gentlemen who have not been in Silesia the

trouble of going any further than Verplanck's Point for instructions." The affair came off as the Baron anticipated with great eclat and edification for the visitors. The Baron gave a dinner in his tent to his French associates, saying, "I am glad to pay some part of the dinner debt we owe our allies." In fact, Steuben was always a great stickler for fulfilling the duties of hospitality in a manner which he conceived befitting his position, notwithstanding his financial condition, owing to the irregular receipt of his pay, was not always equal to the demands imposed upon it. This was forcibly illustrated just after the siege of Yorktown, when the major generals took turns in entertaining the British officers. At this time the Baron called on Colonel Walter Stewart and desired to sell him his favorite charger in order to secure funds with which to entertain his late foes. "'Tis a good beast," said he, "and has proved a faithful servant through all the dangers of the war, but though painful to my heart we must part." Colonel Stewart refused to accept the horse, but offered his purse freely, with the suggestion that if this were not sufficient the Baron might sell or pledge his watch. "My dear friend," was the reply, "'tis already sold. Poor North was sick and wanted necessities. He is a brave fellow and possesses the best of hearts. The trifle it brought is set apart for his use. My horse must go—so no more, I beseech you, to turn me from my purpose. I am a major general in the service of the United States, and my private convenience must not be put in the scale with the duty which my rank calls upon me imperiously to perform." Another account says he sold such part of his camp equipage, brought from Europe, as was of silver, that he might entertain, saying, "I can stand it no longer; we are continually dining with these people and cannot give

a piece of bratwurst in return; they shall have one grand dinner if I eat my soup with a wooden spoon hereafter." Let us trust, although the Baron was compelled to sacrifice his silver, yet he was enabled to retain his fourfooted companion..

There is usually a reaction after a spurt of any kind, and the condition of affairs in 1782 was no exception to the rule. Officially the war was in progress as much as ever, but there was talk of peace on both sides, causing a relaxation of efforts to keep up and provide for the army, which were just as necessary as ever. There were small skirmishes and much brutal outrage by companies of British partisans which scoured the country, but Wayne and Greene succeeded in largely suppressing this kind of work in the South, and on July 11 Savannah was evacuated, the regulars going to Charleston, the only city south of the Potomac now left to them, and the Tories to Florida. Clinton was guilty of acts in New York which will forever render his memory infamous, but on May 5 he was superseded by Sir Guy Carleton, a humane and generous commander, who treated the peace negotiations as practically in force. Towards the close of the year Wilmot was killed in an enterprise against James Island, the last man to fall in the war.

Under the Articles of Confederation Congress could requisition the States for money, but the States could suit themselves about complying, which in most cases was not at all. As a single example of the state of affairs, on March 1, 1782, the country owed Steuben \$6,850 in specie (figures would hardly be sufficient to state this in Continental currency), and being unable to draw bills of exchange even at heavy discount or to borrow any money he addressed the following personal letter to Washington:

Without troubling your Excellency with a tedious detail of the hardships attending my situation, I pray you to consider the peculiarity of my employment compared with that of other officers. The arrangements which are going to take place for furnishing the army with provisions, forage, etc., will not be of advantage to me, and I am bound to travel from one part of the country to the other, to live at double expenses in taverns, in which I have to pay ready money not only for my personal expenses, but also for the entertainment of my aides de camp and horses necessary to perform our journeys. I would be happy if the pay allowed by Congress were equal to such expenses. I do not want to lay up any part of my pay, I ask no addition to it, but I declare it to be totally out of my power if my appointments, as well those of January and February, as those occurring in the future, are not regularly paid me. With regard to the arrearages, I shall be satisfied to leave in the public funds \$6,000 provided I am paid the remaining \$850, which are indispensably necessary to enable me to discharge my expenses here and provide myself with the necessary equipage for the ensuing campaign.

Washington took up the matter, and by special exertions obtained the \$850 asked for and also \$500 on account of pay due for January and February, which was all he received since entering the service up to this time.

The troubles in regard to arrears of pay and lack of supplies were not confined to Steuben, but were general throughout the army, Washington and some of the other officers had independent resources, but the destitution was general. The army was not in condition to make a day's march, and had the British in New York not become apathetic they might at least have caused considerable trouble. There was mutiny among the Connecticut soldiers arising from these causes, and it was deemed necessary to shoot the ringleaders. Officers sent in their resignations, and there appeared great danger of a general collapse.

Amid all these troubles Washington did not lose sight of the fact that a direct movement against New York would be most desirable if there was the slightest

chance of success, and that in any event it was better to keep the army employed in active work than permit it to disintegrate through inanition. So, as in a similar condition, two years before, he called on Steuben for a review of the situation, a plan of attack, should one be attempted, and the chances of success or of failure. Steuben's report gives a valuable resume of the state of affairs at that time. Leaving out Canada he sums up the forces then in America as follows:

	British Army.
Regulars at New York	9,000
Militia	3,000
Garrison at Charleston	3,000
Garrison at Savannah	700
Total	15,700
	Allied Army.
Northern Cont. Army	10,000
French Troops	4,000
Southern Army	2,000
Total	16,000

American militia do not seem to be included in the above, which number was constantly fluctuating from practically nothing to four or five thousand. Taking the above figures as a basis the Baron proceeds to discuss the chances of an attack on New York, as follows:

The position of the enemy is on three islands. Whenever we attack one the other two must be kept in check. If, then, the besieged should consist of 12,000 men, and the besiegers of 24,000, the latter must be divided into three parts, each consisting of 8,000 men. The points of attack are the passage at Kingsbridge, the Heights of Brooklyn, and the works on Staten Island. The shortest line of communication between them is from twenty to twenty-four miles with a river between each. How, then, is the one to support the other in case of a superior attack, which the enemy may easily make, as they possess every possible advantage by water? And, even supposing we should obtain possession of either island, what position should we take to cover our flanks from the enemy's force by water? But if

we should be unfortunate enough to have any one division defeated, what retreat is left while the enemy keep possession of the water?

These reasons alone prove to me sufficiently the impropriety of such an undertaking as long as the enemy keep possession of the port and the river by which the islands are surrounded.

As soon as a superior fleet shall have blocked up the harbor without, our principal object, I conceive, will be Long Island, in which case the greater part of our strength will be necessarily employed in carrying the works at Brooklyn, either by storm or regular approaches, and to erect batteries to bombard the city and the fleet in the bay. But even then it will be necessary that our frigates should be in possession of the Sound, and that batteries should be erected on our flanks commanding the river.

The last proposition supposes that we were in possession of the harbor and had the superiority at sea. In this case we should be highly reprehensible if we did not make the attempt; yet even then I would propose that we should have the most pointed assurances that the fleet destined for this service should remain long enough to effect a co-operation on the occasion. It would also be necessary to make an exact estimate of the number of troops and the means which we possess to make the attempt. If the enemy should abandon the southern States and collect their whole force at New York, it would amount to 16,000 men, and by recalling our troops thence we should amount to the same number. If they retain possession of Charleston and Savannah General Greene must also remain there, and then we shall be in the same proportion of 14,000 to 14,000.

It would be no less difficult than hazardous to attack the enemy in their present position with less than double this number, or 28,000 men. If the States of Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York and Jersey could send 4,000 men as rank and file into the regular army, it would amount to 14,000 men (Continental troops); 4,000 French and 10,000 militia; with this and no less than this, I conceive we might attempt the enterprise.

As a conclusion to the above resume of the whole situation the Baron expresses the fear that the suppositions on which the questions depend will never be realized. "The late unfortunate defeat of the French fleet in the West Indies, the improbability of collecting a force sufficient to carry on the siege, and the difficulty, I had almost said the impossibility, of supporting them, afford

but too just grounds for this suggestion." He goes farther, however, and although the proposition to attack New York is shown to be chimerical, he concludes as follows :

However, though our particular situation makes it hazardous to undertake an operation which calls for more force and greater resources than we at present possess, yet I am not of opinion that we should permit the campaign to waste away without improving those advantages which are within our reach. The army should move down and take some advantageous position at or near the White Plains, and if our force will admit that the two York regiments, with Hazen's, should be added to the two Hampshire regiments who are now stationed on the northern frontier, and march under the command of Hazen, towards St. John's in Canada, by the road lately laid out or which other way may appear most proper; if this diversion should be attended with no other advantages it would at least prevent the incursions of the savages, a circumstance of the greatest importance. Should it, therefore, be advisable to recall the French troops from Virginia I should conceive the army would be formidable enough to move down and take an advantageous post at or near White Plains; and if by the addition of recruits or militia our situation would admit of a diversion with the two York regiments under Hazen, added to those of Hampshire, toward the garrison of St. John's in Canada, I am persuaded it would be attended with the most salutary consequences.

But peace talk and other causes had produced so much apathy that the inertia could not be overcome, and so none of these suggestions was adopted. Neither New England nor the Middle States possessed a George Rogers Clark to invade Canada and at least make the St. Lawrence the northeastern boundary from Lake Ontario to the sea.

During this period Washington received a letter from one Colonel Lewis Nicola, who had obtained some prominence in the army, who attributed the existing distress to the form of government, and suggesting a constitutional monarchy like that of England. It was delicately hinted that Washington would be the proper per-

son to head a movement in that direction. Had Washington been either a Cæsar or Napoleon the suggestion in the then desperate state of affairs might have carried some weight. Being neither, but an American patriot, he wrote a most stinging reply, concluding with the words, "I am much at a loss to conceive what part of my conduct could have given encouragement to an address, which to me seems big with the greatest mischiefs that can befall my country. If I am not deceived in the knowledge of myself you could not have found a person to whom your schemes are more disagreeable. At the same time, in justice to my own feelings, I must add that no man possesses a more sincere wish to see ample justice done to the army than I do, and as far as my powers and influence, in a constitutional way, extend, they shall be employed to the utmost of my abilities to that effect should there be any occasion. Let me conjure you, then, if you have any regard for your country, concern for yourself or posterity, respect for me, to banish these thoughts from your mind, and never communicate, as from yourself or any one else, a sentiment of the like nature."

The muster roll of the northern army at the June inspection, 1782, disclosed seven thousand nine hundred and thirty-seven infantry and seven hundred and ninety-eight artillery, a total of eight thousand seven hundred and thirty-five, with two hundred and thirty-four sick and absent, leaving eight thousand four hundred and ninety-four fit for duty, this, of course, not including the sporadic militia. The universal poverty was displayed to an almost ludicrous extent by the fact that blanks and muster rolls were allowed to lie in the post offices for want of cash to pay for the cost of postage, Congress not having allowed them the franking privilege unless the

words "public business" were written upon them, a duty which some of the officers neglected to perform. In spite of all these drawbacks drilling and inspection were carried on with such efficiency that on June 18 Washington issued a general order from his headquarters in Newburg expressing satisfaction with the appearance and manœuvres of the troops and returning thanks to Major General Baron De Steuben for the indefatigable assiduity and singular attention exhibited in the late inspection and review, and for his eminent service in promoting the discipline of the army on all occasions.

In accordance with his policy of keeping up the inspection and drill at all hazards Steuben paid the expenses of two officers sent to Saratoga out of his own pocket. On another occasion when Colonel Hazen's regiment was to be reviewed at Lancaster, Pa., the Minister of War said it was not worth while to go to that out-of-the-way place, to which Steuben replied, "It is my opinion that omitting the inspection of only one regiment for one month can cause more expense to the United States than the inspection of the whole army for a year can cost."

Matters were going from bad to worse. Steuben writes: "If my life depended on it I would not be able to raise ten dollars on credit. The certificate for \$6,000 which I held from the United States I offered in vain for one-tenth of its nominal value. There is no resource whatever left in me. I have already lost six horses since I am in the service chiefly for want of forage, the two best were stolen, as, while in West Point, I had to send them twenty miles from that place to find pasturage for them; besides that for want of bolts and bars for my house, my silver and linen were stolen, so that I am reduced in everything."

Of course the \$850 pittance which Steuben had received from Congress in the spring was a mere bagatelle and was speedily dissipated. In June he wrote to the Secretaries of War and Finance that the defrayment of at least his ordinary expenses was an absolute necessity, pointedly stating that, "While other officers were stationed within their respective divisions, brigades and corps, and could avail themselves of their ordinary supplies, the nature of my duty kept me in constant motion from one division of the army, and even from one army to another, necessarily subjecting me to all the expenses incident to traveling. I ever have been, and ever will be, disposed to draw an equal lot with those truly brave men whose sufferings have long since called aloud for speedy redress; with them I have frequently wanted not only the conveniences but even the necessities of life, and if my duty confined me to my camp and quarters, I would not conceive myself entitled to any extraordinary privilege. Hitherto I have never made a requisition of any kind to Congress, and entreat your Excellency to be persuaded that it is with singular pain I am compelled to make one at this time; but the duty I owe to my own feelings, as well as the respect I entertain to that august body, required that I should thus be explicit with them."

This communication, not appearing to have any effect, Steuben concluded to go in person to Philadelphia, and during the journey he inspected and reviewed the troops stationed along the line of his route. In order to better sustain his claims he propounded certain questions to Washington as to the necessity of his department in the army, and whether it had been conducted during the previous five years in accordance with the wishes of the commander-in-chief, and whether it had come up to expectations. To both these questions Washington responded

decidedly in the affirmative, adding that the department had been of the utmost utility and continued to be of the greatest importance for reasons too obvious to need enumeration, but more especially for having established one uniform system of manœuvres and regulation in an army composed of thirteen states (each having its local prejudices), and subject to interruptions and deviations from the frequent changes and dissolutions it had undergone. The intelligence, activity and zeal of the Baron were highly commended as not less beneficial to the public than honorable to himself, and the general expressed himself as having abundant reason to be satisfied with the inspector's abilities and attention to the duties of his office..

But Congress dallied along and did nothing, and although Steuben was in receipt of unsolicited testimonials as to the justice of his cause and the condition of the army, they did not relieve the tension. Walker wrote from Newburg on November 20 that the discontent was general, and a memorial to Congress was under consideration. North wrote him on October 29: "Your services to my ungrateful country have been treated with a neglect shocking to every man of sensibility. * * * The army of the United States know what you have done; your intimate friends only know what you have suffered, since you took upon you the Herculean task of forming the American armies. It is now five years since you undertook this last work. How well you have succeeded the present state of the army will declare; but unfortunately for our honor your reward only consists in the consciousness of having acted a great and good part. The war, my dear general, is, perhaps, drawing towards a close. It has happily been successful, and you doubtless have acquired a lasting honor by the part you

had in it. But honor alone will never compensate for your sacrifices in Europe, nor your sacrifices in America; a reward of another kind is due. Justice to yourself and to your friends points out the necessity of your endeavouring to procure it."

General Otho Williams, coming north at this time, was especially struck with the change in the condition of the troops, and volunteered the following: "How much our troops are indebted to you, sir, for that military ability and appearance in which they now both so advantageously compare with the best disciplined troops in Europe, Congress, his Excellency General Washington and other eminent characters, bear honorable testimony. The personal knowledge I have, as an officer of the American army, acquired from your general instructions, influences my gratitude to add my private thanks to the more important acknowledgements you have already and repeatedly received."

General Gates visited the army during the fall of 1782 while it was building huts to go into winter quarters at New Windsor. He had been absent three years, and writes to the Baron his astonishment with which he beheld the order, regularity and attention which he had taught the American army, and that the obedience, exactness and true spirit of military discipline which he had infused into them did him the highest honor. He hopes that the generosity of the governing powers will proclaim to the world his merits and their obligation, and thus convince mankind that the Republics of America have at least the virtue to be grateful."

General Robert Howe wrote to the same effect, and these epistles might be considerably multiplied if necessary, but the evidence would only be cumulative.

But still there was nothing doing, and at last, tired

out with waiting, Steuben on December 4 addressed a letter to Hon. Elias Bondinot, President of Congress, calling attention to the fact that he had now given five years' service to the American army after renouncing respectable commands and affluent circumstances in Europe, and it was mortifying to appeal to Congress in reference to his private affairs. His private resources being exhausted, he entreated Boudinot to appoint a committee to examine into his situation and report the reasonableness of his demands. He was ready to demonstrate wherein his administration had resulted in immense saving to the country, and refers to the remarkable order and discipline which now prevailed in the army, winning the approbation of its allies. He concluded as follows: "When I drew my sword in defense of these states I did it with a determination that death only should force me to lay it down before Great Britain had acknowledged the independence of America, and I still persist in the same resolution. Your own feelings, sir, and those of Congress may enable you to judge of those of an old soldier who finds himself obligated to mention facts of such a nature as those I have been laying before you. Congress will do me the justice to believe that, in doing justice to the zeal and capacity of the officers, and the docility of the soldiers of the Federal army, to speak of myself is a task highly painful and disagreeable to me."

Congress seemed moved at last to take the matter up, and appointed a committee, consisting of Messrs. Hamilton, Clarke and Carroll, to investigate and report. It did not take the committee long to verify each and every statement made by the Baron, his relinquishment of substantial benefits in Europe, his coming to America at a critical period, his disinterested work in the army

without the compensation similar to those made to other foreign officers; his establishment of discipline, order and economy in the army and his conduct as a brave and experienced officer, all of which entitled him to the distinguished consideration of Congress and to a generous compensation whenever the situation of public affairs would admit. It was also found that the Baron had considerable arrearages of pay due him, and that having exhausted his own resources it was indispensable that a sum of money be paid him for his present support, and to enable him to take the field for another campaign. It was proposed that \$2,400 be paid him to be charged to his account, and that he be allowed \$300 per month in lieu of extra pay on account of traveling expenses, forage, etc. Congress on December 30 adopted these suggestions, and thus the matter closed for the present.

Holland recognized the independence of the United States on March 29, 1782, and on August 2 Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby sent a joint letter to Washington, informing him that general peace negotiations had been opened at Paris. Washington, however, relaxed none of his vigilance on that account, rightly judging that the surest way to expedite the progress of the negotiations was to keep the army up to a state of efficiency as far as possible. Disintegration or disaster would certainly cause the British ministry to call a halt in the negotiations, which were in fact not concluded until the following spring. In September the northern army was strengthened by the addition of the French from Virginia, which added much to the gayety of the force as well as its strength.

But notwithstanding the evidence that war was officially in progress the belief was general that the end was near. Outside the fact that negotiations were ac-

tually in progress was the further fact that the British now held but two cities on the Atlantic coast—New York and Charleston—and the tenure of the latter was very insecure. No invasion of the country could be safely attempted without reinforcements, which the ministry were not able to send, however much they might desire it. Besides the United States England was at war with France, Spain and Holland, and there were plenty spectators in Continental Europe watching for her downfall. The conviction had become general that the American Colonies were lost beyond recovery, and the only object now was to get out of a bad situation with as little loss of material and prestige as possible. Peace negotiations had been delayed by previous instructions of Congress to the American Commissioners to do nothing without the co-operation of France, and that nation with Spain was not anxious that America should have the great territory northwest of the Ohio river. In fact, a map of the country as proposed by these two powers made the Allegheny mountains the western boundary of the United States, taking in only the original thirteen colonies along the Atlantic coast. All west of the present states of Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina and the greater part of Virginia to the Mississippi and south of the Ohio river was to be a neutral zone under the name of Indian Territory, and all northwest of the Ohio to the Mississippi was to remain a part of the Province of Quebec, to which it had been annexed in 1774. Spain was to retain the Floridas and the Louisiana territory. This delectable programme, however, received its quietus by the statement that George Rogers Clark and his hardy band of Virginia troops had settled that question by the conquest of the disputed territory which was now in possession of the United States, and there it would remain. The

logic of events was too strong for the schemes of intriguing European diplomats, and the Mississippi and the great lakes became the western and northern boundary.

It was natural under such condition of affairs that many of the officers should be taking thought of the future when the army should be disbanded and they were retired to civil life. Of course, so far as the French officers were concerned, they had their permanent positions in the army, and in a few years were destined to have more occupation than they anticipated. The Americans were at home, and could look forward either to political preferment or engaging in business and professional life. To Baron Steuben there was no such opening. His profession had been solely military, and the chances of taking up another pursuit in a foreign country at his age were not encouraging. He had cut loose entirely from Germany, and it was not unnatural that he should turn to those who had first suggested that he go to America and furnished the means to do so. Hence it is not surprising that during the latter part of 1782, when peace was clearly in sight, we find him writing to various French officials concerning his future prospects. The first of these letters is to Luzerne, the French minister, wherein he recites his work of the preceding five years, and suggests that Luzerne having personal knowledge of the facts, forward an enclosed letter to Count Vergennes. The latter was asked to authorize Luzerne to state to Congress that it was with the acquiescence of France that the Baron had come to America, and interest himself in having his claims adjusted. He follows this with two other letters sent directly to Vergennes through Chevalier De Chattelux, along the same line, but with the second one was enclosed a memorial to the French Court,

in which he anticipated a favorable report of his operations by Chattellux, and adds these significant words :

The zeal and perseverance with which for a period of nearly six years he has surmounted every obstacle, the difficulty of conducting his operations without any support, and almost without means, and lastly the system which he has established, and the success which has followed it, are the titles on which he presumes to rest his claims to the favors and munificence of His Most Christian Majesty. He binds himself to bring the work he has commenced to a termination. It is only when the war shall have ceased, and the independence of America shall have been recognized by England, that he wishes to finish his days in the dominion of His Majesty. He hopes to obtain from the United States of America an indemnity for the sacrifices he has made to enable him to enter into their service. This sum would nearly reinstate him in the same situation he was in previous to leaving Europe. Whom can he look to for the reward of such a hazardous enterprize if it is not to the generosity of that prince who has rewarded the smallest services rendered in this revolution? Encouraged by these examples of generosity he presumes to take the liberty of asking for the favors mentioned in the following: that His Majesty will condescend, after this war, to grant him the same rank in his armies which he may then hold in the American service. As his age will hardly allow him to be actively employed, the rank which he asks will not cause any jealousy in the army. That will be a title wished for by an old soldier which would confer upon him the sole object of his ambition. That His Majesty will add to the pension which Mr. De Steuben hopes to obtain from Congress, such sum as will yield him a life interest of 20,000 livres (about \$4,000) per annum, to enable him to end his days at ease in the States of the King.

Mr. De Steuben is emboldened to beseech the Count De Vergennes to grant him his influence for obtaining the favor which he asks. It is worthy of the munificence of the King. It will be the reward of an old soldier who has sacrificed all to attain so interesting an object as the independence of America.

By the same post Steuben sent a letter to Prince De Montbarey recalling the latter's former friendship, and asking an expression of approval from him.

Vergennes did not reply to these communications until July 21 following, acknowledging their receipt, and concluding with the following rather non-committal

language: "I have taken great interest in your success. You have rendered valuable service to the United States, and I do not doubt you will harvest the fruit which you have the right to expect. I have the honor of being your obedient servant.

DE VERGENNES."

What would have been the final result to Steuben had he entered the French service it is idle to speculate. Before Congress had settled his claims France was in the throes of revolution, to be followed by the Reign of Terror and the beheading of that sovereign to whom Steuben was now appealing, while the latter had appropriately assumed the duties and privileges of citizenship in the country to which he had rendered these years of efficient service..

CHAPTER XVIII.

DISBANDING THE ARMY.

Difficulties of the Officers—Peace Officially Announced—Parting Scenes—Testimonials to Steuben—Plans a Military Academy—Visit to Frontier Posts—Washington's Farewell Letter—A Belated Tribute.

Notwithstanding the prospect of peace the year 1783 cannot be said to have opened very encouragingly. The main army was in winter quarters in the huts the troops had built about Newburg. Affairs were not as bad as at Valley Forge five years earlier, but they were bad enough, and the months of inaction gave the men plenty of time to brood over their wrongs. While facing the enemy, whether in camp, on the march, or in battle, their patriotism was proof for years against every strain, but now that this tension was relaxed the feeling that they were treated unjustly by the country they had saved bid fair to overcome every other sentiment. A committee was sent to Philadelphia to present their case before Congress, which, among other things, reported:

We, the officers of the army of the United States, in behalf of ourselves and our brethren the soldiers, beg leave freely to state to the supreme power, our head and sovereign, the great distress under which we labor. Our embarrassments thicken so fast that many of us are unable to go farther. Shadows have been offered to us, while the substance has been gleaned by others. The citizens murmur at the greatness of their taxes, and no part reaches the army. We have borne all that men can bear. Our property is expended; our private resources are at an end. We therefore beg that a supply of money may be forwarded to the army as soon as possible. The uneasiness of the soldiers for want of pay is great and dangerous, further experiments on their patience may have fatal effects. There is a balance due for retained rations, forage, and arrearages on the score of clothing. Whenever there has been a real want of

means, defect in system or in execution we have invariably been the sufferers by hunger and nakedness, and by languishing in a hospital, etc.

The Superintendent of Finance, Robert Morris, informed Congress that not only was the treasury empty, but that he had overdrawn his European account by \$700,000. Congress authorized a further loan, as nothing could be raised by taxes. It was a great source of irritation that the state legislatures never adjourned without paying themselves in full, and those on the United States civil list received their salaries regularly. Congress hesitated to take radical measures for fear of offending the states, when Morris threatened to resign unless something was done, so on February 5 he was enabled to issue a warrant, by which the officers received one month's pay in notes and the privates a month's pay in installments of fifty cents each.

On April 21, 1778, Congress had agreed that the officers of the army should receive a life pension beginning at the close of the war, equal to one-half their existing pay. Later this was altered to half pay for seven years. It was now attempted to repudiate this contract, although the Articles of Confederation provided that all debts contracted by the Continental Congress should be held valid. Some of the longer heads were beginning to realize that the Confederation was a sham, and unless strengthened must soon fall to pieces of its own weight, but that did not help the immediate situation. .

Finally, on March 10, an anonymous circular was sent through the camp, calling a meeting of officers to consider a letter from Philadelphia. It was an insidious appeal to force in case Congress failed to accede to the demands of the army. As soon as Washington heard of it he called a meeting of officers on the 15th, ostensibly

to receive the report of the committee which had been sent to Philadelphia. To the surprise of Gates and other malcontents who had engineered the scheme Washington himself was present. Gates was in the chair, when the commander-in-chief arose, and in a neloquent address beseeched his comrades not to sully their patriotism which had been so sorely tried through previous years by any grievous error now. He concluded by saying that his utmost endeavors would be to see that justice was done. The address had its effect, and a resolution was promptly adopted concurring with him, and declaring that nothing should be done calculated to sully the glory and reputation acquired at the price of their blood and eight years' faithful service. Washington at once wrote a strong appeal to Congress, which again took up the matter, and the vote of nine States, necessary under the Articles, passed a resolution commuting the half-pay proposition into a sum equal to five years' whole pay, and the matter was settled.

Washington received on April 17 the proclamation of Congress officially announcing that a treaty of peace had been concluded on January 20 preceding. This was given to the army two days later, just eight years after the battle of Lexington, and it is not necessary to descant on the joy that prevailed. Many of the soldiers desired to go home at once, and Congress authorized Washington to grant furloughs at discretion, which power was exercised liberally, and the danger of disbanding large companies of unpaid troops at one time was thus avoided.

Steuben, seeing that nothing was to be accomplished for the present by remaining in Philadelphia, returned to Washington's headquarter's, on the Hudson, in March, and was immediately called to active duty in connection with the disbandment of the army, the difficulties con-

nected with which we have already discussed to a limited extent. As Richard Peters wrote to Steuben on April 23, "Our means are small though our wishes are favorable and sincere. Our circumstances afford an odd contrast to those we have heretofore experienced. The difficulty which heretofore oppressed us was how to raise an army; the one which now embarrasses us is how to dissolve it. Everything that Congress can do for our deserving soldiers will be done, but an empty purse is a bar to the execution of the best plans."

The Baron's decidedly humorous reply to this communication is worthy of reproduction, notwithstanding its length:

This glorious peace has caused a great change in my way of thinking. You know, my dear friend, that I have often lamented, like Heraclitus, the follies of the human race. But I now laugh, like Democritus, particularly at our extravagance. A money without gold or silver, military schools where they teach the Presbyterian catechism, arsenals filled with the Word of God, and even the hereditary sin of Congress, an empty purse, are things to make the gloomiest pedagogue laugh. But what will the world say if this great independent empire, which has supported a war for eight years against Great Britain, cannot support itself during one year of peace? O, Fathers of Areopagus, spare the poor Americans this ridicule. Do not make money without metal, or arsenals without arms. "Has not this old German Baron plenty of reason to laugh his own folly?" You will say, as a member of Congress, "Must he always amuse himself at the expense of his sovereign?" Stop, member of Congress! I am Baron of the Holy Roman Empire, consequently a sovereign myself. Quite as poor, but quite as proud as any American Senator, I retain the privilege of laughing at your folly as I laugh at those of the sovereign pontiff or of Kings. Will they believe in Europe, that after seven years of war this country is quite as thickly populated, if not more so, as it was when the war began; that at this moment the country is quite as widely cultivated, has as much merchandise and far more coin than it had before the war; that its commerce is more extended than ever, and its ports the market of the world; that everybody has more of everything than he needs; that among three million of men thirteen (certainly the most enlightened) have been chosen to govern this vast empire; and that this same

vast empire has no more credit than the smallest village in the Canton of Grison? O, Fathers of the Areopagus, suffer not the Grisons and the grizettes to laugh at us! Go on, gentlemen, when Providence gives you wisdom, I shall lose the greatest object of my mirth.

But, gentlemen laughers, what would you do if you were Congress, without money, without credit, without authority, and the people unwilling to pay taxes? The case is certainly a difficult one. As a Prussian officer I shall reply—but that wont do. I should resort to common sense. I should beg Common Sense to speak to the people in its own language (the most unintelligible to the people); to explain first the advantages that result from the independence obtained by peace; then the debt they have contracted to obtain these advantages; the necessity to pay these debt to maintain the national credit; the decline of a nation and of each individual inhabitant when the national credit declines; the advantages of a solid confederation to secure the property of every citizen; and finally, I would beg Common Sense to show the people a bill, as simple as that of the butcher, of the general debt, the annual interest, the division of this interest among the inhabitants, and the sum required to pay it off, and provide for the wants and security of the empire, also divided among the people. The people seeing that this sum will be very small (which it ought to be) will not hesitate to adopt the proposed measures.

I think that a pamphlet written by Common Sense on this subject would produce a better effect than all the recommendations of Congress in prose and verse. "But if the people will not listen to Common Sense?" In that case I should say to such a people, "Go to the devil with your independence." Adieu, my dear friend.

As already intimated the suspension of hostilities having been announced on April 19, the manner of disbanding the army was the first and foremost question, as well as its peace footing if any was to be maintained. At Washington's request Steuben on April 26 submitted a plan at once efficient and dignified. He proposed that every man before dismissal should receive a printed discharge signed by the commander-in-chief, which would be a testimonial of the recipient's patriotism and valor and also legal evidence of his services should any be needed. Of course a record was to be kept of all discharges, and the troops to be dismissed in line begin-

ning with New Hampshire. The troops were to be assembled in regiments or battalions, and after inspection were to march to a rendezvous in their respective states, where they were to be finally dismissed. Those who remained to be formed in battalions and companies until other arrangements were made. Washington approved of the plan, but, as we have seen, financial embarrassments made it impossible to carry it out. In a subsequent letter to North the Baron gives some details concerning the manner in which the army was finally dispersed, in which he once more displays his wit and sarcasm. Among other things, he says:

This disbandment of the army, for instance, was so thoroughly comic that you would have laughed yourself sick had you seen it. I drew the most amusing picture of it for your special entertainment, but all of a sudden I thought, "The lazy fellow does not deserve it," and I tore up the work. * * * Every man played his part in the melancholy scene according to his character. As I could not trust my temper, I shut myself up in my rooms and pleaded illness. Each corps was disbanded by separate orders to the commander of each regiment, with the exception of the general order announcing the resolution of Congress. Each corps dispersed without leave-taking on either side. As Congress said nothing to either officers or soldiers, the commander in chief did not see fit to say anything, although everyone considered this an absolute dismissal. I was the only person who had to bear the sad farewells of the officers and soldiers. They came to visit me in my retreat, and nearly all of them in heart-broken accents began the conversation by asking me what I thought of the way they had been dismissed. Not venturing to say what I thought I had nothing left to do but assure them of my friendship, and console them as well as I could. The New York regiments which were a model of discipline and order for the entire army, were disbanded the same day. The officers did me the honor to present me an address, of which I enclose you a copy. As they only addressed the Governor and myself, how do you think the proceedings will be regarded? However that may be, I feel infinitely flattered, and their kindly sentiments towards me will be the consolation of my old days.

What a contrast does all this present to the grand review in Washington at the close of the Civil War, and

how the Baron would have delighted in such a pageant as the latter, even though on a much smaller scale!

Concerning the peace establishment Steuben had already furnished a simple plan to Washington, suggesting that the troops retained be entirely Continental as distinct from the militia, thus planting the germ of what has since become the regular army of the United States in which state distinctions are entirely ignored. The pay was to be less than in actual war, and disbursed weekly. Money was to be given in lieu of rations, and the Baron suggested the need of a regular force for the protection of the frontier, that the militia be on the regular establishment (a plan which is now after more than a hundred years being carried out) and that the establishment of military schools and manufactories would be the best means of providing for security in the future.

At this time, at the special request of the Secretary of War, General Benjamin Lincoln, Steuben presented detailed plans for a military academy which afterwards developed into the West Point establishment. They were modeled on the Prussian cadet plan, with a director general at the head and inferior officers to be appointed by Congress. The foundation was to consist of 120 young men over the age of fourteen years, eighty of whom should be destined for infantry officers, twenty for cavalry, and twenty for engineers and artillery. Each cadet was to pay \$300 per year for board, clothing and instruction, all of which is now allowed by the Government, and if any cadet left before the expiration of his three years' term, he was not to be given a certificate. There was to be a general education by five professors with other instructors along special lines. No person was to be employed as an officer in the army unless he had

served as such during the Revolution or had a certificate from the director general as to his capacity.

Connected with this school was to be a manufactory with six hundred employees, who were to make everything necessary for the use of the army. It was figured out that the cost of operating both of these establishments would be \$142,636 per year. The manufactured articles would be worth \$95,950, and the tuition from students would be \$36,000, leaving a balance of \$10,686 to be made up, a very modest estimate. The director general was to receive a salary of \$2,832, and each assistant \$1,488, a total of \$8,784; the five professors, \$6,721; five masters of arts and tutors, \$3,264; and hospital department, \$4,212. It may be of interest to add that at present the maximum number of cadets allowed at the West Point academy is 533, and each is allowed \$500 per annum and one ration per diem or commutation thereof at the rate of thirty cents each. Within the last ten years Congress has appropriated about \$8,000,000 for the reconstruction of the academy, placing it among the first military schools of the world, but after all it is only an enlargement of Steuben's plan with changes to meet modern conditions. The manufacture of military supplies proposed by the Baron is carried on elsewhere, although there is a machine department at the academy for repairs and local needs.

Reference has already been made to an address presented to Steuben by the officers of the two New York regiments. This address was offered on June 9, before the departure of the men for their homes, and reads as follows:

The objects for which we took upon us the profession of arms being accomplished, we are now about to retire from the field, and return to the class of private citizens. But before we

separate forever, permit us, the officers of the two New York regiments, to express our feelings toward you on this occasion. The essential and distinguished services you have rendered this country must inspire the breast of every citizen of America with sentiments of gratitude and esteem. But we, sir, feel sentiments of another nature. Your unremitted exertions on all occasions to alleviate the distress of the army, and the manner in which you have shared them with us, have given you more than a common title to the character of our friend—as our military parent we have long considered you. Ignorant as we were of the profession we had undertaken, it is to your abilities and unwearied assiduity we are indebted for that military reputation we finally attained. We therefore feel ourselves bound to you by the strongest ties of affection, and we now take leave of you with that regret which such sentiments must occasion. Wishing you long to enjoy in health and happiness those rewards which your services have merited, and which a grateful people cannot fail to bestow, we have the honor to remain, Yours &c.

The terms of peace establishing our northern boundary having been received Washington appointed General Steuben a special commissioner on the part of the United States to proceed to Canada and claim from General Haldimand, Governor of that province, the surrender of certain frontier posts whose locations were within the territory of the United States according to the boundary line upon which both countries had agreed. Detailed instructions were issued to the Baron on July 12, which, after outlining the course of his journey, directed him, in case the Governor refused to surrender the posts at once, to ascertain what date should be fixed for their evacuation in order that they might be occupied by American troops without delay. He was also to arrange for the exchange of artillery and other stores. This being accomplished he was to visit at his discretion the several posts and fortresses on the frontier as far as Detroit, view their situation, strength and circumstances, and forming a judgment of their relative position and probable advantages the same were to be reported to Washington. In passing Lake Champlain he was to critically observe its width

at the northern extremity and the nature of the ground adjoining, with a view to determine whether there was any spot south of the 45th degree of north latitude on which it would be convenient, should Congress judge it expedient, to erect fortifications which would command the entrance from Canada into that lake. To the French settlers at Detroit he was to intimate the good disposition of Congress and the inhabitants of the United States for their welfare and protection, expressing at the same time our expectation of finding the like disposition in them towards us and the post proposed to be established there, or any other settlement which might be formed in their neighborhood by citizens of the United States. It was suggested that as the advanced season or some other obstacle might prevent the arrival of the American troops before the withdrawal of the British garrison the inhabitants might provide a company of militia to be paid by the United States, to take charge of the works, and also to learn upon what terms the farmers or merchants of Detroit would supply the American garrison with provisions. At this time Washington himself made a trip to northwestern New York and along the Susquehanna to facilitate the operation of changing the occupants of the posts.

As soon as possible Steuben left for Canada, and arrived at Chamblee on the Sorel river about twenty miles southeast of Montreal on August 2. From here he sent Major North to General Haldimand to announce his arrival, and by arrangement they met at Sorel about forty-five miles below Montreal on the St. Lawrence river on the 8th. What happened there we will let Steuben tell in his own words :

“To the first proposition which I had in charge to make, General Haldimand replied that he had not received

any orders for making the least arrangement for the evacuation of a single post; that he had only received orders to cease hostilities; those he had strictly complied with, not only by restraining the British troops, but also the savages, from committing the least hostile act; but that, until he should receive positive orders for that purpose, he would not evacuate an inch of ground. I informed him that I was not instructed to insist on an immediate evacuation of the posts in question, but that I was ordered to demand a safe conduct to and a liberty of visiting the posts on our frontiers and now occupied by the British, that I might judge of the arrangements necessary to be made for securing the interests of the United States. To this he answered that the precaution was premature, that the peace was not yet signed [this was not correct], that he was only authorized to cease hostilities, and that, in this point of view, he could not permit that I should visit a single post occupied by the British. Neither would he agree that any kind of negotiation should take place between the United States and the Indians, if in his power to prevent it, and that the door of communication should, on his part, be shut until he received positive orders from his court to open it. My last proposal was that he should enter into an agreement to advise Congress of the evacuation of the posts three months previous to their abandonment. This, for the reason before mentioned he refused, declaring that until the definite treaty should be signed he would not enter into any kind of agreement or negotiation whatever."

Although wrong in his assertion that the treaty of peace had not been signed yet General Haldimand was no doubt technically correct in his decision. Whatever might be the terms of the treaty he was subject to the orders of his government, and could not withdraw or

make any arrangements in that direction until instructed to do so. In fact the posts in the northwest remained a thorn in the side of the American government for thirteen years. Under the claim that the Americans did not live up to the provisions of the treaty, especially in regard to those who had remained loyal to the British government, the latter continued to hold Detroit, Mackinac and other points until 1796, when they were evacuated in pursuance of the Jay treaty which was negotiated in 1794.

As no arrangement could be made in regard to the forts Steuben returned to the States, and halted at Saratoga on August 21, to recruit his health, which had again become poor. Having shortly recovered he resumed his routine duties, the army being still in process of disbandment, and by instructions from Washington proceeded to Philadelphia where he dissolved the existing posts, looked after invalid soldiers and finished up the business of the military hospitals.

General Lincoln having at this time resigned the office of Secretary of War, there was a strong feeling that Steuben was not only his logical successor, but by far the most capable man for the place. He had an opponent, however, in the person of General Henry Knox, whose name stood high in Revolutionary annals. Instead of deciding the case, however, on its merits the objection was made that Steuben was a foreigner. This was certainly puerile in view of services during the past six years, and in one sense at least was baseless, for the State of Pennsylvania in March 1783, had by special act of the Legislature made him a citizen of that commonwealth. Perhaps they wanted to give the office to Knox anyway, at all events he was chosen. Steuben did not appreciate this action, and expressed himself in the following characteristic manner :

The man who had abandoned all his appointments and the brightest prospects in Europe, to devote his services to the United States, who had served them with zeal and fidelity during a war of seven years as critical as trying; the man who had got possessions in Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey—with what effrontery could he be called a foreigner! As to the importance of this ministerial office, the man who organized the whole American army in the midst of the war; the man who solely had established and put in execution the principles of strict military rules; this man cannot be intrusted with the administration of a corps of four hundred men in time of peace! What fine reasoning! But, in fact, Mr. Knox had engaged the delegates of Massachusetts to secure to him this place. His own State could not provide him with a post worthy of his ambition, and therefore the Confederacy had to give him a suitable appointment. Without disputing his knowledge in the use of artillery, I dare assert that on my arrival at the army, it had no idea of maneuvering with a single field piece, and that I was the first who taught them to make use of their cannon in the attack and retreat.

Although there had been a general exodus from New York during the late summer and early autumn of 1783, chiefly of British loyalists, the formal evacuation of that city did not take place until November 25, and on that day General Washington took possession accompanied by his staff including Baron Steuben who had lately returned from Philadelphia. Thus the Baron was a central figure both at Yorktown which was the end of the effort to coerce the colonies by military force, and the last act of the drama when the departure of the soldiery from the metropolis gave visible assurance that the independence of the country was recognized in the most tangible and striking manner.

Festivities and fetes were the order of the day, in all of which Steuben took an active part, but a solemn if not sad separation was soon to take place. On December 4 Washington left for Annapolis, Md. where Congress was in session, to resign his commission, and while a barge was waiting to convey him across the Hudson to Paulus

Hook, he took leave of his staff and principal army officers at France's tavern near the ferry. Filling a wine glass he turned to them saying, "With a heart full of love and gratitude I now take leave of you, most devoutly wishing that your latter days may be as prosperous and happy as your former ones have been glorious and honorable." The toast was drunk, and each one at his request took the General by the hand, and then accompanied him to the barge which, with waving of hands, they watched until it disappeared from sight, when they returned in solemn silence to the tavern and quietly dispersed.

Washington stopped in Philadelphia to adjust his expense account with the Comptroller of the Treasury. It will be remembered that he never asked or received any salary for his services during the Revolution, but only his actual expense and not all of that. On his arrival at Annapolis arrangements were made with the President of Congress to tender his resignation at noon on December 23. There, in the presence of the chief dignitaries of the country and of all the spectators who could crowd into the little hall, the greatest man of this or any other age with a few well chosen words retired from the post he had so ably and patriotically filled. That little hall has become a shrine, and when a few years ago the state of Maryland decided to erect a new capitol building it was placed immediately in the rear of the old structure, which was left intact and served as a vestibule to the new structure, so that all who entered the latter should pass through this historic apartment with its lessons of patriotism and self-sacrifice.

One thing Washington did, however, in the closing hours of his official life which is worthy of special record as being his last act as General of the army. Notwithstanding the details which must have crowded upon

him on that eventful morning he found time to sit down and write the following to his faithful Co-adjutor Baron Steuben:

Annapolis, December 23, 1783.

MY DEAR BARON:

Although I have taken frequent opportunities both in public and in private of acknowledging your great zeal, attention and abilities in performing the duties of your office, yet I wish to make use of this my last moment of my public life to signify in the strongest terms my entire approbation of your conduct and to express my sense of the obligations the public is under to you for your faithful and meritorious services. I beg you will be convinced, my dear sir, that I should rejoice if it could ever be in my power to serve you more essentially than by expressions of regard and affection; but in the meantime I am persuaded you will not be displeased with this farewell token of my sincere friendship and esteem for you. This is the last letter I shall write while I continue in the service of my country. The hour of my resignation is fixed at twelve today, after which I shall become a private citizen on the banks of the Potomac, where I shall be glad to embrace you, and testify to the great esteem and consideration with which I am, my dear Baron, &c.

To this letter Steuben gratefully replied:

The letter of the 23d of December which I have had the honor of receiving from your Excellency, is the most honorable testimony which my serving could have received. My first wish was to approve myself to your Excellency, and in having obtained your esteem my happiness was complete. The confidence your Excellency was pleased to place in my integrity and abilities gained me that of the army of the United States. Your approbation will secure it. A stranger to the language and customs of the country, I had nothing to offer in my favor but a little experience and a great good will to serve the United States. If my endeavors have succeeded I owe it to your Excellency's protection, and it is a sufficient reward for me to know that I have been useful in your Excellency's operations, which always tended to the good of our country. After having studied the principles of the military art under Frederick the Great, and put them in practice under Washington, after having deposited my sword under the same trophies of victory with you, and finally after having received this last public testimony of your esteem, there remains nothing for me to desire.

Accept my sincere thanks, my dear General, for the unequivocal proofs of your friendship which I have received since I

first had the honor to be under your orders, and believe that I join my prayers to those of America for the preservation of your life and for the increase of your felicity.

On March 24, 1784, Steuben, now a resident of New York City, presented his resignation to Congress, and once more asked for a settlement of his accounts. The resignation was accepted on April 15 following, at which time Congress promised to take up the matter of settlement, and resolved, "That the thanks of the United States in Congress assembled be given to Baron Steuben for the great zeal and abilities he has displayed in the discharge of the several duties of his office; that a gold hilted sword be presented to him as a mark of the high sense Congress entertain of his character and services; and that the superintendent of finance take order for procuring the same."

For some reason the completion of the sword was delayed nearly three years, and it was not until January 4, 1787, that General Knox forwarded the testimonial to the Baron with a letter stating the action of Congress and his own satisfaction he had "of presenting you with the invaluable memorial of their sentiments and your eminent merits. Were it possible to enhance the honor conferred by the sovereign authorities it would be derived from the consideration that their applause was reciprocated by the late illustrious commander in chief and the whole army."

To a soldier a sword as a testimonial for services rendered is always a gratifying gift, even though the recipient may never expect to use it in active service. But when the aforesaid recipient is straitened for the necessities of life through the neglect to provide compensation justly due, it is a little like offering a stone in place of bread. Steuben, however, replied, politely acknowledg-



WASHINGTON MEMORIAL CHAPEL, VALLEY FORGE.

Cloister of the Colonies. Chapel. Porch of the Allies with Steuben Bay. Hall and Library.



FORT STEUBEN—FROM THE RIVER.



ing the receipt of the sword as a mark of their regard, and adding, "To a soldier such sentiments are ever dear, and that this is accompanied with the approbation of our late commander in chief, of yourself and the army in general will always be my greatest glory. Accept, sir, my sincere thanks for the very flattering manner in which you have communicated this present &c."

The following description of the sword, from the New York Advertiser of January 11, 1787, will be of interest:

It was made in London under the direction of Colonel Smith, and executed by the first workmen in that kingdom. The small medallions on each side of the top of the hilt present an eagle perched on a bunch of arrows, with a wreath of laurel in her bill, and wings extended ready to rise. The modest genius of America fills the front medallion on the hilt, dressed in a flaring robe, ornamented with the new constellation, holding an olive branch in her right arm and a dagger in her left hand, and the fair field of liberty flourishing in the background. It is answered on the opposite side with the full figure of Minerva in martial dress, robed and ornamented with the same stars; the bird of wisdom is seated near; her left hand being extended presents the olive branch, while the right is properly supported by the spear. This figure is martial and gay—the other is mild and modestly embraces the olive branch, but holds the dagger with firmness. The bow of the hilt presents drums, colors, halberds, &c. The sword and Blue Book, the Baron's excellent regulations for our army, fill the the two lower ones. Two eagles, seated on knots of colors, surrounded with stars and holding a sprig of an olive branch in the bill, with extended wings, are emblems of protection, under the sword and Blue Book (which our country cannot too strictly attend to). The two opposite medallions are filled with trophies of war, and the following inscription modestly placed out of view under the shield: "The United States to Major General Baron Steuben, 15th April, 1784, for military merit."

At the Baron's death this sword was left by devise to Benjamin Walker.

CHAPTER XIX.

SOCIETY OF THE CINCINNATI.

Organized by Baron Steuben—A Storm of Opposition—Presenting Claims to Congress—A Wearisome Task—Adoption of the New Constitution—Tardy Justice.

In order to give a connected history of the different events connected with the closing year of the Revolution and Steuben's part therein one important episode in his life has been omitted, namely, his founding of the Society of the Cincinnati. We use the term, "founding" advisedly, for although both Irving and Fiske give credit to Knox for the first suggestion of the society it is clear from Knox's own statements hereinafter produced that Steuben, if he did not originate the idea, was the main-spring of the organization, both in its incipency and afterwards when it was so bitterly assailed. During the early part of 1783 the American officers began to realize that the period of their close association had nearly terminated and that the day of separation was not far distant. In addition to the feeling naturally engendered by the prospect that their ties of friendship must soon be broken, with gloomy prospects ahead, at least for many of them, a sentiment grew up in favor of a permanent organization which should keep alive the feeling of brotherhood, as well as affording mutual help and consideration. Accordingly on the 10th of May there was a gathering of the officers who were with the army on the Hudson to discuss this matter, at which General Steuben presided, he being the senior officer present. At this meeting Generals Knox and Hand and Captain Shaw were appointed a committee to prepare a plan for a so-

ciety such as had been indicated. Knox seems to have had a rough draft of such a plan in his possession as early as April 15, and it was doubtless from this that the committee worked. A report was made at a subsequent meeting held on May 13, 1783 at General Steuben's headquarters at Verplanck's house which was unanimously adopted. The preamble to the constitution recites that

"It having pleased the Supreme Governor of the universe in the disposition of human affairs to cause the separation of the Colonies of North America from the dominion of Great Britain and after a bloody conflict of eight years to establish them free, independent and sovereign States, cemented by alliances founded on reciprocal advantages with some of the greatest princes and powers of the earth ;

"To perpetuate, therefore, as well the remembrance of this vast event as well as the mutual friendships which have been formed under the pressure of common danger, and in many instances cemented by the blood of the parties, the officers of the American army do hereby, in the most solemn manner, associate, constitute and combine themselves into one society of friends, to endure so long as they shall endure, or any of their eldest male posterity, and in failure thereof, the collateral branches, who may be judged worthy of becoming its supporters and members.

"The officers of the American army having generally been taken from the citizens of America, possess high veneration for the character of that illustrious Roman, *Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus*, and being resolved to follow his example by returning to their citizenship, they think they may, with propriety, denominate themselves 'The Society of the Cincinnati.'

"The following principles shall be immutable, and form the basis of the Society of the Cincinnati."

"An incessant attention to preserve inviolate those exalted rights and liberties of human nature for which they have fought and bled, and without which the high rank of a rational being is a curse instead of a blessing. An unalterable determination to promote and cherish between the respective States that union and national honor so essentially necessary to their happiness and the future dignity of the American empire. To render permanent the cordial affection existing among the officers; this spirit will dictate brotherly kindness in all things, and particularly extend to the most substantial acts of beneficence, according to the ability of the society towards those officials and their families who, unfortunately, may be under the necessity of receiving it."

Provision was made for the usual officers, the association to be divided into State societies with a triennial delegate meeting representing the whole body. Besides the American officers and their eldest male representatives French officers of the rank of Colonel who had served in the Revolution were also eligible. A fund was formed by the contribution of one month's pay to aid such as were or should become destitute.

The emblem of the Order was a bald eagle made of gold, attached to a blue and white ribbon emblematic of the united efforts of America and France in the war. The eagle held in its talons golden olive branches with leaves in green enamel which are continued around the bird, forming a wreath above its head to which is attached the clasp. An oval medallion on the breast of the eagle represents Cincinnatus accepting a sword from three Roman Senators with appropriate surroundings, while around the oval are the words, "*Omnia Reliquit*

Servare Rempublicam (He left all things to serve the Commonwealth). In the background his wife stands at the door of their cottage, with the plow and other agricultural implements close by. On the reverse side of the emblem Fame is represented as crowning Cincinnatus with a wreath inscribed, "*Virtutis Praemium*." (The Reward of Virtue). In the background is a maritime city with its gates opened, and vessels entering the harbor. Below this are clasped hands supporting a heart inscribed, "*Esto Perpetua*" (Be thou Forever).

Generals Heath, Steuben and Knox were appointed a committee at the above meeting to call on Washington with a copy of the constitution and request him to head the membership list. The General, heartily approving the objects of the Society, acceded to the request, and became the association's first president with Knox as secretary and General McDougall, treasurer.

Four days later Steuben wrote to Luzerne, the French minister, acquainting him with the organization of the association, "Which is founded on principles of patriotism and gratitude, is to perpetuate the memory of an epoch so glorious to America as the present, and the effectual assistance this country has received from her generous ally."

The society met with instantaneous favor in France, those entitled to do so considered themselves honored in wearing its badge, and the King issued an order relaxing in its favor the rule which prevented army officers from wearing foreign decorations. Major De l'Enfant wrote to Washington that it was more in demand than the order of St. Louis, and applications for it were made daily. Count Rochambeau, D'Estaing, De Grasse, Lafayette, and all who had served in the American war vied with each other in their interest in the institution which they

considered as a monument erected to republican virtues as the fundamental basis of a cordial union between the different States, and as a new tie which assured the duration of that reciprocal friendship which France had devoted to America, could not be looked upon in too advantageous a light.

But while this hearty reception was given to the society in France a storm was brewing in America. The reader has probably not discovered any hidden menace to the liberties of America in either the constitution of the society or its personnel, any more than was found in later years in the Loyal Legion, an organization of officers formed after the Civil War, or in the larger society of the Grand Army of the Republic. So far as these organizations have had any influence on public affairs it has been in favor of patriotism and good government. But in 1783-4 people were sensitive. It had begun to be apparent that Articles of Confederation were an unworkable proposition, and that a stronger form of government must be provided or the country would drift into anarchy. Practically the only successful governments in existence at that time were monarchies in which there was a hereditary nobility. Probably not a single member of the Cincinnati had the slightest idea of anything of the kind, in fact their constitution was directly contrary to such a proposition. But as a little spark is sometimes sufficient to kindle a great fire so the idea of hereditary succession was caught up by many as fraught with danger to the new republic. A bitter pamphlet was written by Judge Aedamus Burke, of South Carolina, charging in its title that the society, "creates a race of hereditary Patricians or Nobility." This pamphlet was translated into French by Mirabeau with additions of his own, in which he as well as Burke charges Steuben with trying to introduce

foreign titles and offices of nobility into America which, while they "may do well under the petty princes of Germany, yet in America" are "incompatible with our freedom." The most dire predictions were made that this patriciate and military nobility would soon "become a civil nobility, and an aristocracy the more dangerous because, being hereditary, it will perpetually increase in the course of time and will gather strength from the very prejudices which it will engender, * * * it will at length have incorporated itself into the Constitution; or when, after having for a long time sapped its foundations, it will in the end overturn and destroy it."

In France little or no effect was produced by these attacks, probably because the people at large were not much interested in them one way or the other, but in America it was different. John Adams poured out the vials of his wrath, and for once Massachusetts was in accord with South Carolina. There was talk of suppressing the society by an act of the Legislature, and a member who was a candidate for Senator, concluded to resign in order to save himself from defeat. In Rhode Island it was proposed to disfranchise any person who belonged to the organization, but that did not frighten Nathaniel Greene, one of her leading citizens, who took up the cudgels vigorously in its behalf. Knox seemed inclined to bend to the storm, and on February 21, 1784 wrote to Steuben:

We had a meeting of the society in this town on the 10th instant, at which General Lincoln presided. A committee was chosen to attend a meeting of the Society in May next, at Philadelphia, which appears the place most proper for the occasion. R. Putnam, Colonel Hall, Major Sargent and myself, are of the committee; probably only two will attend. Your society, Mr. Baron, has occasioned a great deal of jealousy among the good people of New England, who say it is altogether an outlandish creation formed by foreign in-

fluence. It is still heightened, by one of our ministers abroad, who intimates that it was formed in Europe to overthrow our happy institutions. Burke's pamphlet has also had its full operation. You see how much you have to answer for by the introduction of your European institutions. I contend to the utmost of my power that you only had your share in the matter, and no more, but it will have no effect. Burke's allusion has fixed it, and you must support the credit of having created a race of hereditary nobility. Our friend Heath says: "I forewarned you of all that will happen." He did not attend the meeting. The Legislature of this State are, however, decided that the scheme shall not be carried into execution in this commonwealth, and in order to frustrate the measure, the Assembly have chosen a joint committee of both houses to "inquire into any association or combination to introduce undue distinctions into the community which may have a tendency to create a race of hereditary nobility contrary to the Confederation of the United States, and to the spirit of the constitution of this commonwealth." The committee have not yet reported the results of their inquiries; when they do this I will inform you. You must observe, my dear friend, how possible it is for the best institutions to be misunderstood and misrepresented. Let me know how it is relished in Pennsylvania and to the southward."

Shortly after William North wrote to Steuben that "Knox and Jackson avoid the badge of the Cincinnati as they would the devil."

The meeting of the general society occurred on the 4th day of May at the City Tavern in Philadelphia. Washington presided, and in order to allay the storm which had been raised, suggested that the hereditary feature of the society be abolished. Other changes were suggested such as collecting funds, honorary memberships, attention to the general union of the States and holding general meetings, until it looked as though there would be nothing left of the society but the charitable feature and the badge. After considerable debate it was proposed to alter the constitution, abolishing hereditary succession and honorary memberships, the funds to be put in the hands of the Government, and there was to be no general treasurer. Although these amendments passed the general meeting they could not be operative

until approved by the State chapters which were, as a rule in no hurry to respond, so that at the meeting on May 7, 1800, the subject was still pending. By that time the country was under the new Constitution, and the spectre of a military or hereditary despotism had vanished. A committee appointed to look into the matter reported in favor of leaving the constitution as originally framed, which report was unanimously adopted.

Washington remained President of the general society until his death, when he was succeeded by Hamilton and Pinckney. Robert Burnett, who died November 29, 1854, at Newburg, N. Y., near where the society was first organized, was the last of the original members. Steuben was Vice President of the New York Society in 1785, and President from 1786 to 1790. Mainly under his encouragement the New York branch was the most vigorous of the State associations. They had an elaborate ceremony of initiation, and Steuben himself with his facile pen vigorously defended the men who had fought the battles of their country from the stay at home critics. At the initiations General Steuben brought up the rear of a formal procession; at his entrance the standard saluted, and the kettle drums and trumpets gave a flourish, which continued until passing through the avenue now formed by the members opening to the right and left, he mounted the steps and took his seat upon the chair of state.

For a number of years the institution flourished, and then interest relaxed. The visit of Lafayette in 1824 created a revival, but after that states dropped out until only six continued their organizations, viz.: Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and South Carolina. In 1893, doubtless inspired by the success of the society of the Sons of the American

Revolution, an effort was made to revive the association, with such success that the original thirteen states again had working chapters which have been kept up ever since. The presidents after Hamilton have included Charles C. Pinckney, Aaron Ogden, Morgan Lewis, Wm. Popham, H. A. S. Dearborn, Hamilton Fish, William Wayne, Winslow Warren. The present city of Cincinnati owes its name to General St. Clair and Colonel Sargent, who gave the hamlet of Losanteville in 1789 the title of their society.

From the time that Baron Steuben entered the American service in the winter of 1777-78, he may almost be said to have had two histories, running along parallel lines. One was the performance of military and civic duties, and the other was in the first place to have the status arising from those duties clearly defined by Congress, and trying to induce that body to grant him the proper support and compensation due him for his work and the financial obligations he had incurred, as well as sacrifices he had made in order to come to this country. While at the outset he trusted to the generosity of Congress to make good his losses and pay him for his services, yet it was clearly understood that both were to be provided for with a suitable honorarium in the event of the success of the efforts for independence. Steuben had faithfully fulfilled his part of the contract, and independence had been assured, but with the exception of a few dribblets reluctantly doled out Congress seemed determined to ignore his righteous claims for compensation just as it was doing in the case of Beaumarchais, but with a much clearer knowledge of their merits. When the Baron's resignation as Major General was accepted on April 15, 1784, it was promised that the matter of recompense should be promptly taken up and pushed for-

ward to a conclusion, and in the meantime that \$10,000 should be paid him on account. His total claims at this time amounted to \$50,000. The \$10,000 was gradually paid in installments, with which performance Congress seemed to think it had done its whole duty, and began to manifest the usual impatience of an unwilling debtor towards an importunate creditor. In November, 1784, Congress moved from Annapolis, where it had sat from November 26, 1783, to Trenton, N. J., where Steuben again preferred his claims. Here a new obstacle arose. The present body was composed of different men from those who had assembled at York in the dark winter of 1777-78, and as the records did not show the making of any contract or arrangement with the Baron it began to be questioned whether any such existed. To this was added the usual charges as to him being an adventurer who had come over here to seek his fortune, that he had received pay from France, and that his sacrifice of property in Europe was purely mythical. It was rather late to spring all these things after an interval of seven years, and there appeared to be enough conscience left in Congress to admit that something was due him. Accordingly soon after the removal of that body to New York in January, 1785, a resolution was passed, "That in full consideration of the Baron De Steuben having relinquished different posts of honor and emoluments in Europe, and rendered the most essential services to the United States, he be allowed and paid out of the Treasury of the United States the sum of seven thousand dollars in addition to former grants."

The matter of contract being thus ignored it became incumbent upon the Baron to prove its existence. In response to the letters written to Dr. Witherspoon, Messrs. Peters, Gerry and Duer who had been given authority

to make arrangements with him at York, he received from those gentlemen certificates to the effect that the facts were just as he stated, and flatly contradicting the insinuations that had been thrown out against him. These papers were submitted to John Jay, Chancellor Livingston, Alexander Hamilton, James Duane and Mr. Duer, the leading jurists of their time as well as patriotic citizens. They unanimously declared that they sustained the position that there existed a valid and binding contract between the United States and the Baron. These letters with a full statement of his case were printed in a small pamphlet for circulation among members of Congress and others. A copy of this pamphlet, at Steuben's request, was sent by Hamilton, to Washington. He had previously written on the subject of the Baron's claims, and now adds on October 30, 1787:

There are public considerations that induce me to be somewhat anxious for his success. He is fortified with materials which, in Europe could not fail to establish the belief of the contract he alleges. The documents of service he possesses are of a nature to convey an exalted idea of them. The compensations he has received, though considerable, if compared with those which have been received by American officers, will, according to European ideas, be very scanty in application to a stranger who is acknowledged to have rendered essential services. Our reputation abroad is not, at present too high. To dismiss an old soldier, empty and hungry, to seek the bounty of those on whom he has no claims, and to complain of unkind returns and violated engagements, will certainly not tend to raise it. I confess, too, there is something in my feelings which would incline me, in this case, to go further than might be strictly necessary, rather than drive a man at the Baron's time of life, who has been a faithful servant, to extremities. And this is unavoidable if he does not succeed in his present attempt. What he asks, would, all calculations made, terminate in this—an allowance of his five hundred and fifty guineas a year. He only wishes a recognition of the contract. He knows that until affairs mend, no money can be produced. I do not know how far it may be in your power to do him any good; but I shall be mistaken if the considerations I have mentioned do not appear to your Excellency to have some weight.

To this Washington replied on the following November 10:

Application has been made to me by Mr. Secretary Thompson (by order of Congress) for a copy of a report of a committee which was appointed to confer with Baron Steuben on his first arrival in this country, forwarded to me by Mr. President Laurens. This I have accordingly sent. It throws no other light on the subject than such as is derived from the disinterested conduct of the Baron. No terms are made by him, nor will he accept of anything but with general approbation. I have however, in my letters inclosing the report to the Secretary, taken occasion to express an unequivocal wish that Congress would reward the Baron for services, sacrifices and merits, to his entire satisfaction. It is the only way in which I could bring my sentiments before that honorable body as it has been an established rule with me to ask nothing from it.

A new committee was appointed which had before it a detailed report of the Baron's claims, divided as follows:

Reimbursement of expenses in coming to

America	\$ 2,815.80
Interest for ten years at 7 per cent.....	1,971.08
Payment of Loan made in 1778 of Gerard and Beaumarchais's Agent	6,358.32
Interest at 7 per cent.....	4,005.72
Indemnification for loss of yearly revenue...	52,683.32
Interest at 4½ years.....	11,853.72
Total	\$79,687.86

Received on account:

Traveling expenses	\$681.24
Interest thereon	381.48
Commutation	9,090.00
A gratification	7,000.00— 17,152.72
Balance due	\$62,535.14

The old story was rehearsed, the genuineness of the certificates was doubted, and when again questioned as to his revenue in Europe, the Baron declined on account of the dignity of the United States to produce further proof. One committee after another took the matter up but nothing was accomplished. Steuben offered to submit the whole subject to three judges, but this was not accepted, and so the matter stood for a couple of years longer. During this period a political revolution of greater magnitude than any since the Declaration of Independence was in progress. Pretty much everybody, at least of those in official positions, was convinced that the Government could not longer be carried on under the Articles of Confederation, and a new Constitution had been launched, which was to convert the League of Friendship between Sovereign States into a NATION of which each individual was to be the unit instead of the State (which was no longer to be spelled with a capital initial letter). On June 21, 1788 New Hampshire had put the new Constitution into force, being the ninth State to ratify it, and by Autumn all the others had followed except North Carolina and Rhode Island. The old Congress of the Confederation dissolved in November, 1788, leaving the Steuben claims still undecided. His situation at this time is fairly described in a letter from General J. Armstrong, on May 30, 1788, to General Gates. "The Baron passed the winter at the same lodging house with me. Louvre (boarding house) is dismantled and deserted, and he is once more upon the justice and generosity of the public. But the public has neither, and he has only to chose between starving here and begging in Europe. This is calamitous to him and disgraceful to us. He is now with North."

The Government under the new Constitution went into effect at New York City on March 4, 1789, and Steuben lost no time in presenting his memorial to Congress. Owing to press of other business it was not taken up until September 25, when it was referred to Alexander Hamilton, the newly appointed Secretary of the Treasury, for investigation and report. On April 6, 1790, he made a report to Congress showing that he had sifted the whole matter most thoroughly, the document being one of the ablest that ever issued from the pen of that accomplished jurist. He completely sustained Steuben on every point. It would be tedious to quote the paper in full, but its drift will be indicated by a few excerpts. Taking up first the question of contract he concludes that "The statement made by the memorialist of what passed in the conference at York is authenticated by such strong, direct and collateral evidence as ought, in the opinion of the Secretary, to secure full credit to the existence of the fact." After discussing this proposition at some length with the conclusion that it will be most consistent with the dignity and equity of the United States to admit it as the basis of a final adjustment of his claims, he proceeds to examine into the merits of the claims themselves. According to the principle prevailing in the American army the Secretary caused an account to be made up in which Steuben was credited with his emoluments as major general and inspector general, exclusive of future half pay or commutation, and with an annuity of 580 guineas, being the amount of the income stated to have been relinquished by him from the time he left Europe to the last of September, 1789, with interest at six per cent. per annum, and was charged with all moneys received by him from the United States with interest at the like rate. This statement showed a balance

in his favor of \$7,396.74. In addition to this he would be entitled for the remainder of his life to the yearly sum of 580 guineas as a continuation of the indemnity for the income relinquished, and to such reward as the Government in its discretion should think fit to allow, for which purpose a moderate grant of land, if deemed expedient, would suffice. Even this, Hamilton declared, would not fully reimburse the Baron for the sacrifices he had made, or pay him the full value of the services he had rendered to the United States, which were peculiarly weighty and valuable, especially as he was less likely to share in the collateral which might accrue to the native Americans who had been in the army. He concludes, however, that a settlement on the principles suggested in his report would terminate all the claims of General Steuben on the United States in a manner equally satisfactory to him and honorable to them.

The House of Representatives on April 19 took up Hamilton's report and appointed a committee consisting of Messrs. Gerry, Wadsworth, Vining, Lawrence and Smith to present a bill covering this subject. Eleven days later they offered a resolution providing that Steuben should be allowed "the pay and other emoluments of major general and inspector general specified in several acts of Congress relating to him, from the 10th of March, 1778, to the 15th of April, 1784; an annuity for life of \$2,706, to commence on the 1st day of October, 1787, and ——— thousand acres of land in the western territory of the United States, to be located in such manner as shall be hereafter prescribed by law, provided that the foregoing allowances shall not be construed to include either half pay or the commutation for half pay."

A motion was made to substitute an annuity of \$1,500 instead of the \$2,706, provided in the bill, and on

this Mr. Page, of Virginia, made an extended speech in opposition as being derogatory to the honor and veracity of the members of the committee of Congress, on whose testimony the Baron's claim was founded.' He declared that the value of the Baron's services was far beyond what was now proposed to give him, he had saved many times that amount in money to the army, and the value of his discipline was shown when on one occasion Lafayette and a detachment were in great danger of being cut off (at Monmouth) the whole army was under arms and ready to march in fifteen minutes. The army passed rivers in less time than could the best troops in Europe. The excellent French troops which served with it in the campaign of 1781 were inferior in this respect. The superiority of our troops as to rapidity of movement was seen in the attack on the two redoubts of Yorktown. The army officers were declared to favor the bill, and its adoption would give them satisfaction as they fully acknowledged their obligations to the Baron.

Discussion of the matter continued at intervals until May 10 when the House struck out the provision for land and reduced the yearly annuity to \$2,000. The Senate on the 27th increased this to \$2,500 which was agreed to and the act became a law in the following form:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled: That in order to make full and adequate compensation to Frederick William De Steuben for the sacrifices and eminent services made and rendered to the United States during the late war, there be paid to the said Frederick William De Steuben an annuity of \$2,500 during life, to commence on the 1st day of January last, to be paid in quarterly payments at the Treasury of the United States, which said annuity shall be considered in

full discharge of all claims and demands whatever of the said Frederick William De Steuben, against the United States.

“Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg,

“Speaker of the House of Representatives.

“John Adams,

“Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.

“Approved, June 4, 1790.

“GEORGE WASHINGTON,

“President of the United States.”

Thus justice was in a measure satisfied after long years of waiting, and Steuben was assured of a competence that would support him without anxiety in his declining days. He could not foresee that he would enjoy this annuity for a much shorter period than he had spent in trying to procure it.

While the Baron was knocking at the doors of Congress, asking for justice, some of the State legislatures felt like making him some compensation for services within their boundaries, and being poorly supplied with cash and plentifully supplied with land or claims thereto discharged their obligations so far as they were concerned in that manner. Virginia, “as a high sense they had of the merit and services of Steuben” made him a grant of fifteen thousand acres in the territory northwest of the Ohio, located between the Muskingum and Great Miami rivers, and Pennsylvania in March, 1783, when it conferred on him the privilege of citizenship, added to it a gift of 2,000 acres in the County of Westmoreland, some forty or fifty miles east of the present city of Pittsburgh. On its face this transaction showed up pretty well, and if the Baron or anybody holding through him possessed those 17,000 acres to-day he probably would

not feel the need of other support unless he desired to own a few shares of Standard Oil stock, but that was not the situation in 1783. Although George Rogers Clark had secured the Ohio Country for Virginia and the League of States the Indian titles had not been extinguished, at least in the minds of the Indians, and while the granted lands were admirably located for the raising of scalps their value at that time for any other purpose, was practically nothing. The Westmoreland land was a little nearer civilization, but heavily timbered, cut through by deep ravines, and scarcely more valuable than the other. It is doubtful if the Baron could have sold his lands for the price of a week's board, and we have no record that he ever attempted to enforce his claims to them.

New Jersey was more practical. That State "deeply impressed with a sense of the many and signal services by him rendered to the United States of America during the continuance of the late war, and desirous to testify to the world the grateful sense they entertain of said services" granted Steuben the life lease of an estate belonging to John Zabriskie in Bergen County, not far from New York City, which had been confiscated because of Zabriskie's position during the war. The Baron on hearing that this would impoverish Zabriskie, refused the gift and interceded for the alleged Tory. The Baron by this time may well have begged to be spared from his friends, but on May 5, 1786, the State of New York having recently extinguished the title of the Oneida Indians granted him a quarter of a township, near Lake Ontario, containing 16,000 acres which was afterwards to become his home.

CHAPTER XX.

LIFE IN NEW YORK.

Activity in Public Affairs—Plans for a Regular Army—Popularity With the People—His Memorial on the Banks of the Ohio—A Western Land Project—Suggestion Concerning Prince Henry—Washington's Inauguration—Social Distinction—Wit and Generosity.

When General Steuben resigned his commission in the early part of 1784 he did not cease to take an interest in public affairs, in fact having been relieved of routine duties which in an army in time of peace are likely to become monotonous, there was better opportunity for a more varied exercise of his talents, notwithstanding his financial embarrassments. The city of Albany had already on July 23 complimented him with its freedom, and this example was followed by New York City on the 11th of October following. He now determined to make the latter place his home, and rented what was then a suburban house fronting on what is now Fifty-Seventh Street. It belonged to David Provost, and was called the "Louvre" probably from the French, and the predilection of its owner for names connected with the country of his ancestors. The proprietor was commonly known as "Ready Money Provost." Here Steuben associated himself with his old companions, North, Walker, Smith, Fairlie and others. One by one, however, they departed to homes of their own, leaving him practically alone. His brain was busy, however, and between his correspondence, writing political pamphlets &c., his time was pretty well occupied. Among other things he had previously worked out a plan for a regular army on a

peace footing, to consist of one Continental legion of 3,000 men, artillerists &c., 1,000, and seven legions of established militia of 3,000 men each, or 25,000 in all. This plan was communicated to Washington, who heartily approved of the scheme, but of course nothing could be done with the existing government. It is worthy of note, however, that after the adoption of the Constitution the size of the regular army was fixed at 25,000 men as suggested by Steuben, at which figure it remained until the outbreak of the Civil War.

On August 23, 1784, a society was organized in New York City for the purpose of assisting poor Germans and their descendants, of which Steuben became an active member, and on October 3, 1785, he was unanimously chosen president, a position which he held during the remainder of his life. The society still exists, and numbers among its members many distinguished persons both of German descent and otherwise. Among other objects the society took under its care were German immigrants "bound to labor" who had been induced to enter into contracts which practically reduced them to a state of peonage. This action was the forerunner of the laws afterwards enacted, first to regulate, and afterwards prohibit the importation of laborers under such contracts.

Steuben's prominence and standing were forcibly voiced by Edward Livingston, the English orator, at the annual meeting of the society in 1789, who said: "When German worth is the theme, can we omit the name of Steuben? Or when we speak of services like his, will admiration bind itself to forms? No! regardless of the feelings it may excite, the voice of truth proclaims him the creator of our force, who, from a chaos of disorder raised our military fame. Unhappily the voice of gratitude has not been heard; our country yet, my friends, is

not unjust. It was but lost amid the din of acclamation; and that voice, though small and still, shall soon be heard, and teach our country to reward its merit."

But Steuben was not able to entertain his friends in his own house very long, probably not over three years, and perhaps less, for by that time the pittance he had received from the Government was exhausted. In fact economy was not a strong point with him, as illustrated by an anecdote concerning him soon after his arrival at the Louvre. In one corner of the grounds had been erected a family monument, and a visitor observing that in case of death Steuben would have a snug place of interment, Colonel North replied, "Then, sir, his disposition must alter with his state, for in life he will never tolerate the idea of laying by ready money."

Mr. Walker having married and occupied a house in Maiden Lane, near Liberty street, he invited Steuben to make his home with him. This he did for a short time, when Walker moved to Courtlandt street, and Steuben went to the house of Dr. Vache in Fulton street, and took his meals with Misses Dabeny who kept a popular boarding house in Wall street. He was no doubt here when, under date of May 30, 1788, General J. Armstrong wrote to General Gates: "The Baron passed the winter at the same lodging house with me. To this he has come at last. The Louvre is dismantled and deserted, and he is once more upon the justice and generosity of the public. But the public has neither, and he has only to choose between starving here and begging in Europe. This is calamitous to him and disgraceful to us. He is now with North."

From the Dabeny house after probably a short stay with North he went to Dr. Tillory's house at the southeast corner of Broadway and Wall street, which he con-

tinued to hold as a winter residence until 1791 when he moved to what was afterwards 216 Broadway opposite St. Paul's Chapel, attending services at Old Trinity, which he continued to hold until his last trip to his farm in 1794.


It must not be imagined that Steuben was a recluse all these years. Notwithstanding his straitened circumstances, he was a favorite in society and much sought after, especially by the ladies, to whom military men are usually acceptable. The families with whom he was socially intimate included the Jays, Duers, Duanes, Livingstons, Varicks, Hamiltons, Fishes and others that might be named. A prominent visitor in New York at that time, says that when "the Baron" was spoken of everybody understood that Steuben was meant.

An incident occurred, about this time showing the Baron's popularity with the masses as well as with the "classes." The careless exposure of a body from the dissecting department of a hospital was the subject of such general indignation that a riot ensued, and Steuben being with Governor Clinton, as the latter was trying to quiet the outbreak, was struck on the forehead with a stone, knocking him down and inflicting a flesh wound. This so touched the feelings of the rioters that they made room for the Baron to pass through their ranks, and then renewed their destructive work in spite of the militia which had been called out. Mr. Jay was wounded in the same way. Governor Clinton in relating these occurrences afterward declared that at the time he was struck the Baron was protesting to the Governor against any order to fire, but as he fell he cried out, "Fire, Governor, fire," thus creating a laugh at the Baron's expense. The affair occurred near Mr. Duer's house, and his daughter dressed the injury.

We will have something to say later concerning the measures taken to perpetuate Steuben's memory or otherwise, but it will be of interest to note here the first step taken by the Government towards honoring his name in ment of what is now the State of Ohio. A small white settlement had grown up on the site of the old Mingo town in the present Jefferson County, as well as isolated cabins a few miles farther down the river. Although the Confederacy had by concessions from the States interested secured a clear title to the territory which Clark and his Virginia troops had wrested from Great Britain yet it was not ready to encourage permanent settlement, and early in April, 1785, a company of soldiers was sent out to remove the settlers. During that same year, however, Congress determined to have the lands adjacent to the Ohio river surveyed and thrown open to purchasers, and to protect the surveyors engaged in this work a company of soldiers was sent out under command of Captain Hamtramck which arrived at Mingo on August 12, 1786, and was inspected by Major North, the well-known friend of Steuben, who was now an inspector in the army. On an examination of the country, North or Captain Hamtramck, probably both, evidently concluded that a plateau located on the river three miles above was a better place for a fort than the Mingo bottoms, so the post was moved up there, and they began the building of a block house 28 feet square. This was completed early in September following, and during the fall and winter this block house was added to by three other similar structures which, being connected at their corners by a palisade of logs 150 feet in length, made a substantial fortification equal to all the needs of that section and an efficient protection to both settlers and surveyors. This frontier fort was equipped in the usual manner, provided



STEUBENVILLE, O., BUSINESS SECTION.



FORT STEUBEN, GROUND PLAN.

No. 1, Blockhouses 28 feet square divided into two rooms for fourteen men each. No. 2—Officer's barracks; a, a parlors; b, bedroom; d, kitchen. No. 3—Commissary store. No. 4—Quartermaster's store. No. 5—Magazine. No. 6—Artificers' shop. No. 7—Guard house, built on two piers, a b, with piazza looking inwards and a sally port between the piers, the pier a the common store, and b the black hole, a place of confinement. No. 8—Flagstaff. No. 9—Main gate looking towards the river. The small squares in the sides and corners of rooms represent chimneys. The width of the blockhouses diagonally was 39 feet in inch nearly, and the distance between the points 150 feet.

with quarters for the men, magazines &c., and was named after Baron Steuben. The winter of 1786-7 was a busy one in this locality. Soldiers, surveyors, settlers and visitors, made a lively community well worthy of being the first settlement of the great State of Ohio, and the beginning of the land system of the United States. During the latter part of 1787 the garrison was moved farther west to keep close to the surveyors, but the fort remained a refuge for the settlers until 1790, when it caught fire, and being constructed entirely of wood, was destroyed. As there was no further danger of Indian raids in this section the fort was not rebuilt, but on its site arose the town of Seubenville, since developing into one of the most flourishing cities of the country, a center of commerce and manufacturing. It is the only city in the United States named after the Baron, and in it he has a monument more enduring than could be made in any other form. It must be remembered that the settlement here is older than that of Marietta, and for many years this was the gateway to what was described in the famous ordinance of 1787 as the Territory Northwest of the Ohio.

The legislature of the State of New York on April 13, 1787, appointed Steuben one of the twenty-two regents of the State University, his duties being to inspect all colleges within the state, their condition, system of education and discipline.

During the following year Steuben was busily engaged in evolving a scheme, which, had it been carried out, would have made a radical change in his own condition, and might have had some effect on our western borders. It will be remembered that Spain still possessed the Louisiana territory which lay between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains. On this territory Steuben

proposed to plant a colony of farmers and artificers not exceeding 4,200 in number, and for this purpose suggested a concession of 200,000 acres of land, and a bounty of \$100 to each settler, who was also to receive 240 acres of good soil. The settlers were to be both Americans and foreigners, and there was to be freedom of religion, and their own system of land tenure to be modeled after that of the United States. There was to be a semi-independent military corps, subject to the approval of the King. The plan was submitted to the Spanish minister, who sent it to his government, and that was the last heard of it. The Spanish government of that day was evidently not ready to experiment with colonists who were inclined to want their own way, and it has not advanced very much in that direction since.

It is perhaps needless to state that General Steuben took an active interest in the politics of his day, especially in the proceedings leading up to the adoption of the Federal Constitution. He was now an American citizen, and by natural bent as well as associations was a pronounced Federalist. No person more than he had experienced the evils of the loose disjointed scheme which under the name of government assumed to control the affairs of the Confederacy. It was also natural that he should favor the party of Washington and Hamilton on personal grounds, for his years of intimate association with those great men had created in his mind a feeling of respect and esteem for their intellectual abilities with a strong affection due to their disinterested patriotism and high moral qualities. In his pamphlets he discussed the National debt, Presidential prerogatives and other burning questions of the day. During this period one of his friends jokingly asked him whether his friend, Prince Henry, of Prussia, would not make a good President, to

which he replied, "As far as I know the Prince he would never think of crossing the ocean to be your master. I wrote him a good while ago what kind of fellows you are; he would not have the patience to stay three days among you."

Fortunately, whatever differences might exist among them, nobody among the Americans had any idea of calling anyone from abroad to rule over them, and certainly no person in the land was more rejoiced than Steuben when Washington was chosen to be the first President of the new republic. However, could the Baron have projected his vision forward into the future a little over a century he would have found a Prince Henry in America, not as a ruler, but as a welcome guest for a much longer period than three days, visiting cities that were not even contemplated during the Baron's career, feted and honored not only as the representative of a great nation beyond the seas, but the warmth of whose reception was augmented by the fact that the country from which he came gave Baron Steuben to the cause of the American Revolution. On the evening of February 26, 1902, in in the large ball room of the Waldorf-Astoria hotel in New York there was a dinner at which, on the invitation of Herman Ridder, editor of the *Staats-Zeitung*, over a thousand representative journalists from all parts of the United States were gathered. Prince Henry was the honor guest, and the address of welcome was made by Whitelaw Reid, whose remains after being honored by a state funeral at Westminster Abbey, have been lately laid to rest from New York's great Cathedral. The response by Mr. Ridder among other eloquent passages contained the following:

It will be recalled that Frederick the Great was a friend of Washington, and that from his staff there came to us in the

hour of stress one whose name will ever be held in grateful remembrance by the people of the country. He it was, Baron von Steuben, who drilled the raw recruits and farmer lads of the Continental army, made soldiers of them, and made possible Washington's great victory. He was beside Washington in the closing days of that great struggle at Yorktown, and shared with the great commander the glory of that hour. Returning from the army, he came to this city of New York, and enjoyed the plaudits of those who owed him so much. Thus early he was the first President of a German-American society in New York.

And from that day, sir, to the present time Germany has ever been the steadfast friend of the United States. The blood bond still survives. And it is but natural, therefore that we should welcome your royal highness to-night with special affection. We greet you, not alone as a German prince, but also as one bound to us by the ties of kinship. The Saxon spirit has played its part in American national life, as it has done with you, in giving renewed vigor to the great empire from which you come. And that strain in the American people, let us hope, will bring our two great nations closer together in the bonds of friendship in the future.

When Washington arrived at New York to assume the duties of his office, Steuben with Governor Clinton and other civic and military dignitaries met him at Murray's wharf and escorted him to his residence, he preferring to walk. The inauguration occurred on April 30, which was perhaps fortunate, as March winds are no pleasanter in New York than Washington, and it is to be wished that future inaugurations might occur at this time rather than on March 4. When the new President took the oath there were gathered with him on the balcony fronting Wall street, the most distinguished men of the new republic, including John Adams, the Vice President, State Chancellor Robert L. Livingston, Roger Sherman, Alexander Hamilton, Generals Steuben, Knox, St. Clair and Livingston. After the inaugural address the party repaired to St. Paul's Chapel on Broadway, where services were conducted by Rt. Rev. Samuel Provost, Bishop of New York and chaplain of Congress.

The day closed amid general rejoicings with fire works and illuminations at night. A large ball was given at the City Assembly rooms a few evenings later, which originated the custom of an affair of this character at each subsequent inauguration. Steuben was a prominent guest at this ball, and on the succeeding July 4, as the chosen representative of the Cincinnati Society he presented to the President a complimentary address in the name of that association.

The President and Mrs. Washington, attentive to the social side of affairs, gave a public levee from three to four o'clock on each Tuesday afternoon, with smaller social receptions on Friday, and a dinner to friends and dignitaries once a week. The Baron's wit and general good nature made him a favorite at these affairs, aside from his more solid qualities. It is related that at one of these dinner parties Mrs. Washington asking him what amusements he had, he replied, "I read and play chess, my lady, and yesterday I was invited to go a fishing. It was understood to be a very fine amusement. I sat in the boat two hours, though it was very warm, and caught two fish." "Of what kind, Baron?" asked his questioner. "Indeed I do not recollect perfectly, but one of them was a whale!" "A whale, Baron, in the North river!" "Yes, on my word, a very fine whale, as that gentleman informed me. Did you not tell me it was a whale, Major?" "An eel, Baron," responded the gentleman appealed to. "I beg your pardon, my lady," said Steuben, "but the gentleman certainly called it a whale. But it is of little consequence. I shall abandon the trade, notwithstanding the fine amusement it affords."

Another out the many anecdotes concerning the Baron's wit may be worth repeating. One day while at the house of Chancellor Livingston's mother, he was in-

troduced to a handsome and brilliant young lady named Miss Sheaf. The Baron's English was equal to the occasion, and he at once responded, "I am very happy in the honor of being presented to you, Mademoiselle, though I see it is at an infinite risk; I have from my youth been cautioned to guard myself against mis-chief but I had no idea that her attractions were so powerful."

As to the Baron's generosity Washington summed up the whole story when, after Congress had settled the Baron's claims he remarked: "I rejoice that Congress has given to so excellent a patriot an independence by an annuity, for had they bestowed a specific sum, were it ten times the amount, the generous heart of Steuben would keep him poor, and he would, in all probability, die a beggar."

CHAPTER XXI.

THE NEW CINCINNATUS.

Character of the Baron's Grant—Liberality to Settlers—Visit From Relatives—Politics and Literature—Preparing For War—Important Commission—Farm Life and Future Projects.

Steuben had paid one or two visits to his land in the Oneida country, which, gauged by the transportation methods of that day, was far in the wilderness, but having no money to improve it his stay each time was brief. The grant of his pension in 1790 put a different face on matters, and we find him on June 10 en route to his northern estate with the view of a more permanent settlement, or at least spending his summers there while he proposed keeping his winter home in New York. The journey required about twelve days. He doubtless went by water to Albany where he visited Philip Schuyler and other old friends, going from there to Colonel North's home at Duanesburg in what is now Schenectady county, and from thence to old Fort Schuyler, the site of the present city of Utica. Here he rested at the house of John Post, an old German and a former army comrade. From there he proceeded to his patrimony which is thus described by Pomeroy Jones, a local historian, in 1851:

"The township in which it was situated is in an elevated position, and its soil better adapted to grazing than the raising of grain. A high ridge of land runs east and west through it. Steuben hill and Star hill are the most elevated points in this ridge, the highest land in the county. Their altitude is so great that Indian corn entirely fails to mature there. The visitor is at once im-

pressed with the vastness of the landscape. No land within many miles is so high as where he stands. West-erly and northwesterly the view is almost unbounded. A large section of the Oneida lake is to be seen, and a person well acquainted in central New York, in viewing the location of the different highlands, soon becomes satisfied that portions of seven different counties are distinctly seen. In general the surface of the township may be termed stony. Boulders of every size and shape, some of which are of immense proportions, thickly dot the fields."

Steuben made it his practice whenever he found a Revolutionary soldier who desired to settle in that part of the country to make him a present of a tract covering forty to one hundred acres. He also succeeded in disposing of some of his surplus land on long leases at \$10 to \$20 per hundred acres, certainly a trifling figure, but probably as much as it was worth in those days, and besides he no doubt rightfully concluded that if he could bring settlers into that section by gift or nominal charge for land he would thereby enhance the value of the remainder to a point that would make it profitable.

From Steuben's diary it appears that by July 4, 1790, there was quite a little colony on the place to which he gave a dinner. Samuel Sizer was his superintendent, and preparations, which were made for clearing and cultivating the property, were characterized by the same accurate methods that had been so marked in his military career. He received numerous visits from his former associates and neighboring settlers, and altogether was doubtless more happy and contented than he had been for many years.

Prosperity not only tends to bring new friends but sometimes restores the affections of old ones, especially

if they be far away relatives as the Baron soon discovered. Two nephews visited him in 1786, sons of the Baroness De Canitz, but their conduct was such that he sent them home the following year. Both were army officers, but one soon after deserted and the other resigned on account of an objectionable marriage. Other relatives, with exaggerated notions of the Baron's wealth, continuously made applications for pecuniary assistance until Steuben declined to favor them in this way any longer. On July 27, 1790, he writes on this matter: "I am a self-made man; my personal position is the work of my own hands; but I never forgot to help and afford relief to my poorer relatives whenever I could. They, however, took me for a richer man than I am. The reputation of my having acquired immense possessions and a large fortune spread to the extreme ends of Germany, therefore I could not satisfy all demands on the part of my family. The little I could do was partially compared with what I could not do for them, and rather put to my debit than to my credit. They considered themselves entitled to get all and everything from me, while I expected nothing from them."

Steuben returned to New York for the winter, as he did the three subsequent years, spending the summer on his farm, and early in 1791 he met John W. Mulligan, whose father had been one of the local leaders in the Revolution. Young Mulligan had just finished his course at Columbia College, when he was offered and accepted the position of private secretary to the Baron. A strong friendship grew up between the two, and it is to Mulligan that we owe most of the details of Steuben's death.

The Baron continued an active member of the Federal party, and when John Jay, at that time holding the office of Chief Justice of the United States, was nomi-

nated by the Federals for Governor of New York, Steuben was prominent in a meeting called to ratify the nomination, his name being placed first on the list of those issuing an address to the public on that occasion. Chancellor Livingston, who, as an anti-Federalist, was supporting the candidacy of Governor George Clinton, in replying to this address, referred somewhat sneeringly to Steuben as a government "pensioner." The pamphlet was published anonymously, but at the request of Steuben his friend General Armstrong, answered it over the title of "Timothy Tickler," addressing Livingston by his official title. Livingston replied over the name of "Aristides," addressing Mr. Jay as the supposed author of the Tickler letter. Mr. Jay promptly denied the authorship which ended this battle of the pamphlets.

In the latter part of 1793 the feeling between the United States and Great Britain was so intense that many feared a renewal of the war. The latter power still held the military posts in the northwest including the one at Oswego, on lake Ontario, on the ground that the Americans refused to fulfill their treaty obligations in regard to British loyalists who had remained in the country, resisted the collection of just debts, etc. Recriminations were mutual, and the situation was such that plans were made for fortifying New York harbor. In company with Nicholas Fish, Steuben made a survey between Hell Gate at the upper end of East River, and of the Narrows at the lower end of the bay, with the object of erecting forts and batteries at suitable points. The outcome of this survey was that the New York legislature (which then met on Manhattan Island, Albany not having been made the capital until 1797) on March 26, 1794, ordered the existing fortifications repaired and new ones erected that would afford adequate defense for the port and city.

At the same time the legislature appointed a commission for the purpose of building fortifications, floating batteries and such other vessels as might be necessary for the security of the western and northern frontiers of the state. Steuben was placed at the head of this commission, the other members being Peter Gansevort, Jr., William North, Stephen Van Rensselaer, John Taylor, John Verner and Daniel Hale.

At this time the excitement was so great in the city that volunteers were called on to labor at the fortifications, and among other incidents the German society previously mentioned, of which Steuben was president, on May 21, adopted a resolution calling on all its members and other German residents of New York to assist in building a fortification on Governor's island, now familiar to all visitors as the headquarters of the Eastern military department. Early on the morning of June 5th there was a gathering at the Lutheran school-house on Nasau street, and with their president at the head of the procession, the members marched with flags and music along Broadway to the Battery, from whence they embarked for Governor's island. Duties were assigned by the mayor of the city, and a good day's work performed.

Shortly after Steuben left for the north for his usual summer sojourn on his farm in Oneida county, where, however, he was destined to spend but very little time. Arriving at Albany he met the other members of the defense commission, and the board organized by electing him president, and Mr. Mulligan, secretary. After a discussion of plans and measures Steuben proceeded to his farm to make preparations for an inspection tour. It must be remembered that Steuben's home was practically on the frontier, and that a short journey from thence would bring him into what was practically a hostile

country, although within the state of New York. Steuben, North and Van Rensselaer seem to have met at the farm and started on their journey, having with them one L. Hough, in charge of the baggage, and a small guard. According to the chronicle they went from old Fort Stanwix down Wood Creek to Oneida lake, which they crossed, and proceeded along Seneca river to Salt Point at the foot of Onondago Lake where now stands the city of Syracuse. Indians to the number of several hundred were holding a council there, and the disposition seems to have been about equally divided between friendship and hostility. The commissioners were suspicious, and during their stay there they were protected by a guard. While there it was learned that there was a gathering of Canadian Indians at the mouth of the Oswego river, which flows from Lake Onondaga to Ontario, with the intention of capturing Steuben and turning him over to the British commander at Fort Oswego. Such a proceeding could hardly fail to prove a *casus belli*, and to avoid the very serious complication which must have arisen from such an outrage on American soil. Steuben left the party and went northeastwardly through the wilderness to Fort Stanwix, now the city of Rome. No sooner had Hough with the boat containing the baggage, started up Onondago Lake than it was surrounded by Indians in their batteaux, who demanded the whereabouts of Steuben. At first they would not believe Hough's story that he was not with the party, and acted in a threatening manner, but as Steuben seemed to be the sole object of their desire, Hough was suffered to proceed without further molestation.

On its return the party stopped over night at the little village of Manlius, which had been settled by one John A. Shaeffer two years before, and, like many of the

first settlers he kept the one tavern of which the hamlet boasted. Steuben and his friends put up with Shaeffer, and being much fatigued retired early, but not to slumber as they had intended. During the night there seemed to be an unusual stir about the house, and as the hour of midnight approached it increased, and before morning there happened one of those unpostponable events incident to all growing families. The Baron was so greatly annoyed during the night that he got scarcely any sleep. The frequent opening and closing of doors, continual tramping of busy feet, and the hushed sound of female voices which were greatly magnified by the Baron's nervousness, and the importance of progressing events kept his mind in a continual tumult. . The house was built of logs, only one story high, with two rooms below, the bed chamber occupied by the guests in the roof above being the size of the house, with only loose boards for a floor, and accessible by no other means than a ladder. The companions of the Baron slept soundly, but he tossed constantly on his bed of straw, seeking rest and finding none. He wondered what could excite such wonderful commotion, and finally worked himself into an uncontrollable passion. At earliest dawn he arose, vowing vengeance on all below. Approaching the landlord he burst out, "Your house is full of gossips and goblins, it isn't fit to stable swine. Give us breakfast and let us be off, and we'll not trouble you again." The landlord, dumbfounded, dared not raise his head to hint the cause of the trouble; but a woman approached, bearing in her arms an infant, saying, "Here, sir Baron, is the cause of all the noise and trouble last night." There was an immediate reaction. The Baron apologized forthwith, and tendered his most hearty congratulations. He bestowed his name on the new arrival, and drew a deed of gift for


250 acres of land. Breakfast was served, and the party went on its way rejoicing.

It was near the first of September when Steuben got back to his farm, and Autumnal foliage was already beginning to bedeck the country. The Jay treaty which was signed on November 19, following, settled the disputed questions, and averted war, at least for nearly twenty years, but the Baron did not live to see the forts evacuated.

This fall seems to have been an enjoyable one. The new Cincinnatus had cleared some sixty acres of land, on which he proposed building a comfortable mansion. About sixteen families were living on his place, he had numerous visitors, and money matters were comparatively easy. He occupied a temporary log building consisting of two apartments, a kitchen and bedroom, with a garret above where the servants slept. During this summer he had built a frame addition to the east end of the log house consisting of a sitting room and bed room, from which it was necessary to go out of doors to reach the other apartments. Steuben slept in the new house, and Mulligan in the other. He took great pride in every department of his estate, and was fond of riding over the place on his mare Molly, watching the improvements and giving orders. Among his projects was an artificial lake to be fed from a couple of streams that meandered through the farm. On one occasion when some New York friends were inclined to make light of his patrimony away up among the Mohawk mountains he declared it to be the best land in the world, and offered to prove it. When challenged to do so he declared, "There is Captain Simeon Woodruff who has sailed around the world with Captain Cook. He has bought a farm on my patent and settled on it, and sure, if in all his voyages a



STEUBEN'S WOODLAND HOME.



OSWEGO AND THE FORT IN 1794.



better location had been found he would not have done so." The skeptics were silenced if not convinced.

The Baron was a good chess player and fond of engaging in this game with an evening companion, but political subjects furnished lively themes for discussion. The latest publications from both sides of the ocean were found on the table of the living room, and the French Revolution with its accompanying military movements received considerable attention, especially the latter, the Baron watching the Prussian maneuvers especially with a critical eye. On one occasion when the abolition of French titles of nobility was a subject of conversation somebody suggested that Steuben renounce his title and call himself Citizen Steuben, to which he laughingly replied, that even were he to do so the title would never die, as all the children who had been or would be christened "Baron Steuben," would perpetuate it. He had the good sense to recognize the fact that titles in America were mere complimentary expressions whether of old world importation or the newer forms of "Colonels," "Judges," "'Squire," or "Doctor."

On another occasion the comparative merits of racial military ability were under discussion when the Baron remarked: "Of all the Americans, the Yankees are in my opinion, the best soldiers; they are the most intelligent, and in some respects the best troops in the world. But they always want to know the reasons for the orders given them by their superiors, and are too fond of improving upon the plans of the latter."

During this period a neighbor named Mappa was a favorite guest of the Baron. He had left Holland during some revolutionary movements, and coming to northern New York was made president of the Holland-Genessee Land Company, through whose means a considerable

number of Dutch and German immigrants were induced to settle in that locality.

Steuben was fond of having selections from Gibbon, Voltaire and other standard works read aloud to him in the evenings, and thus the early fall passed away while the Baron began preparations to return to New York for the winter. A heavy snow fell in November as was liable to happen in that latitude, and towards the latter part of the month all farm work was suspended, as was thought, for the winter, but it was a permanent suspension so far as Steuben was concerned.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE LAST ACT.

Unexpected Death of Steuben—Stricken by Paralysis—A Melancholy Funeral—The Baron's Will—Desecration of His Grave And Final Resting Place.

All accounts agree that Steuben's health was excellent during the summer and fall of 1794. As we have seen he not only made an important expedition into the Indian country, but was especially busy about his farm, putting things in order and with broad projects for the future, not the least of which was a dwelling commensurate with his dignity and position. No doubt he expected to prepare plans for his mansion during his sojourn in New York the coming winter. But while man may propose, God disposes.

On the evening of November 25th, the Baron passed the time in his customary manner, and at about eleven o'clock he retired with no indication of anything being the matter with him. As stated Steuben's bedroom was in the new house, while Mulligan's was in the old log house adjoining. No other persons were in the building except the two servants. Colonel North had been there but had gone back a few weeks before to his home at Duanesburg. On the morning of the 26th at 4 o'clock, Mulligan was awakened by Steuben's German servant named William, who told him the Baron was dying. Mulligan sprang from his bed and rushed through the snow to the Baron's apartments, where he found him suffering intensely and apparently almost dead. Steuben exclaimed, "Don't be alarmed, my son," but was unable to keep up any connected conversation. Mulligan sent for Mr.

White, Steuben's overseer, who lived half a mile off, and dispatched him for a physician and also to notify Colonel (or Major) North. Word was also sent to Mr. Mappa at Boonesville, but he was away from home. The nearest physician was at Whitestown, eighteen miles distant, and could not get to the farm in time to be of any assistance. Mulligan, at his request, lifted Steuben from his bed to a chair, and gave him an emetic, after which he placed him back on the couch. The Baron talked a little until about six A. M., when he became speechless, although apparently sensible during the greater part of the day. He had frequent convulsions, which abated somewhat during the night. The physician arrived at 2 P. M., on Thursday, the 27th, and administered some sedatives which eased the suffering, but Steuben was now beyond all human aid, and was doubtless so from the beginning. He remained unconscious, and at 12:30 noon on Friday, the 28th, passed quietly away. A letter from Mulligan to Benjamin Walker, written on the 29th, gives his account of the Baron's last hours:

"I am sufficiently composed to begin, O my dear sir, a sad tale. On Tuesday morning last our friend, my father, was struck with a palsy which deprived his left side of motion. The evening before we parted at eleven; he was well, perfectly well. At four o'clock I was alarmed with the cry that he was dying, and when I entered his chamber he was in extreme agony, and appeared to have suffered long. I sent for immediate assistance, and dispatched White for Major North. He was sensible and could speak, retched violently, asked for an emetic, which I gave him—it operated well. I then put him to bed from which I had taken him by his desire. He continued to speak at intervals till about six o'clock and from thence was speech-

less. He remained apparently sensible during the greater part of Tuesday, notwithstanding he was often in convulsions. That night he was pretty quiet, though the fits sometimes returned. He did not show any signs of sense afterwards. Every measure which the situation afforded was pursued to relieve him until the arrival of the doctor on Thursday. He administered medicines which gave some relief, but it was not long. The stroke was too violent, and yesterday at half past twelve o'clock, oh my good God, my parent died! O, Colonel Walker, our friend, my all; I can write no more. Come, if you can, I am lonely. Oh, good God, what solitude is in my bosom. Oh, if you were here to mingle your tears with mine, there would be some consolation for the distressed."

Colonel North did not arrive at the Steuben homestead until Saturday, November 29th, the day after the Baron's death, the distance of his home and the condition of the roads having detained him. Mulligan had already made arrangements for the funeral, which he approved and carried out. In fact very little preparation was required. During his life Steuben had expressed the desire that there be no parade over his remains, but that he be wrapped in his military cloak and buried in a retired spot on his estate. He seems to have intimated that under a certain hemlock would be a good location for this purpose, and accordingly it was selected. It was in a wood about two hundred and fifty yards north of the house. Melting snow and bad weather made the digging of the grave a matter of some difficulty, but it was accomplished, and at noon on Sunday the funeral cortege left the house on its sad errand. About thirty neighbors and the Baron's household, including North, made up the procession. No military fan fare, no priest or chant-

ing choir, no funeral orator was there, but in silence the last sad offices were performed. A few handfuls of earth, tears from the little band gathered there, were the only human tributes, while the wintry wind moaned its solemn requiem through the forest, now all bare and leafless save where the dark green of the pines made a deep contrast to earth's white winding sheet.

Perhaps after all it was a burial worthy of a hero. No funeral pomp or pageantry could have added to Steuben's reputation, nor could its absence take anything away. Like Hamilton in the Revolution and Stanton in the Civil War, his character seems to expand as men begin more and more to appreciate the quality of the man, the work he was called upon to perform, and the difficulties he encountered in performing it. Posterity is beginning to realize what his contemporaries could not fully comprehend, and while many a prominent character of that day has been forgotten or only mentioned as a sort of connecting link in the endless chain of events, Steuben looms up more and more as the perspective lengthens. As the disinterested patriot, as the skillful disciplinarian, as the able general, as the confidant, the adviser and the friend of Washington, as the honest and thorough gentleman, he proved himself a worthy compeer of those great characters who laid the foundations of this republic so deep and strong that it has successfully withstood the whirlwinds of a century and a quarter, the strain of war and the laxity of peace, the struggle with adversity and the more insidious enervation as the result of prosperity. *

* Mrs. Cora B. Foster, of Washington, D. C., relates a family tradition that prayer was offered at Steuben's grave by a Welsh Baptist minister named Jones, to whose society the Baron in his lifetime deeded a tract of land, and that after the burial all traces of the grave were carefully obliterated, though

As has probably been inferred by the reader, Steuben remained single all his life. There is a story that when packing his goods preparatory to removal to his farm he let fall a portrait of a young lady, which was picked up by a friend with an inquiry as to the identity of the original. He displayed considerable emotion, and remarked, "O she was a matchless woman," which closed the incident. It is very probable that the Baron's life had at least one romantic episode, few there are that have not.

In his will Steuben expressly excluded his relatives from participation in his estate, which was mainly divided between North and Walker, whom he considered his adopted sons. To the former he specifically bequeathed the silver hilted sword and gold box given him by the City of New York, and to Walker \$3,000 and the gold-hilted sword given him by Congress. To Mulligan he gave his library, maps, and charts with \$2,500, and to

for what reason is not stated. None of the Baron's biographers, however, relates any of these facts, and Pomeroy Jones, the early historian of Oneida County, who was able to converse with living residents of pioneer days, refers to the arrival of the Welsh in 1808 as the beginning of a new era. At the request of the present writer Wm. M. Storrs, of Utica, N. Y., corresponding secretary of the Oneida Historical Society, kindly furnishes the following statement as the result of a thorough investigation, which seems conclusive on this point: "On the 12th of September, 1801, there gathered at the residence of John Williams, Utica, N. Y., twenty-two persons and organized a Baptist Church. These Welsh Baptists organized the first church in Utica. In 1806, Rev. Richard Jones came from Philadelphia to Steuben and organized the First Baptist Society there. He remained pastor many years. Rev. Erasmus W. Jones delivered an address before this Society, Dec. 3, 1888, his topic being, 'The Early Welsh Settlers of Oneida county.' In this address he mentions a Deacon Wm. C. Jones, coming to Oneida County, in 1798. I find no mention of any religious services at the funeral of Baron Steuben, and am unable to locate the Deacon Jones you speak of. The first Deacon Jones I find in the county is the above Wm. C. Jones, who came here in 1798."

each of his servants a year's wages, in addition to his wearing apparel to his valet de chambre. Everything else was to go to North and Walker as above stated, and to the servants' legacies was attached this condition:

That on my decease they do not permit any person to touch my body, nor even to change the shirt in which I shall die, but that they wrap me up in my old military cloak, and in twenty-four hours after my decease bury me in such a spot as I shall before my decease point out to them, and that they never acquaint any person with the place wherein I shall be buried.

It is perhaps needless to say that the last clause of the will was not carried out, in fact the Baron had not definitely selected his place of burial, although he seems to have intimated that beneath the hemlock mentioned above would be an appropriate spot for his grave.

We now come to the most unpleasant incident of all in connection with Steuben's grave, which was not, after all, destined to be his last resting place. Near the beginning of the last century it was desired to locate a wagon road through this estate, and the line as laid out by the surveyors ran directly over the grave. A little variation to the right or left would have answered every purpose, but nobody paid any attention to the matter, and the highway was graded as surveyed, cutting off about one-third of the grave, and exposing the coffin to view. It is even said that the rough, wooden box which enclosed his remains was opened by some of the neighbors who wanted to secure a piece of the Baron's military cloak as a souvenir. Benjamin Walker finally heard of the desecration, and had the body taken up and removed farther into the woods. In order to insure the care of the grounds and prevent further desecration he set aside a tract of fifty acres which he transferred to a Baptist Society in perpetuity on condition that five acres of wood-

land surrounding the grave be kept substantially fenced and forever uncleared, and no cattle or other animals were to be allowed within the enclosure. Any failure to comply with these stipulations was to work a forfeiture of the trust, which has been carefully observed, and beech, maple, evergreens and other denizens of the forest now thickly stand as sentinels over the spot.

Mr. Kapp who visited the grave in June, 1857, in company with the Baron's sole surviving servant, Lemuel Hough, thus describes the spot: "The tall beech trees, under whose shade he loved to sit in the evening of his life, extend their widespread arms over the grave, and keep watch over the old hero. Fragrant flowers, with double vigor rising from the mouldering vegetation, form a lonely wreath around the tomb. All dispute and trouble, all hatred and envy of daily life, are shut out from this hallowed spot, which, in its simplicity and seclusion, presents a strong contrast with the stirring and prominent career of him whose ashes it contains." So we leave him.

CHAPTER XXIII.

STEUBEN'S MILITARY FAMILY.

North, the Founder and Namer of Fort Steuben—Walker—Dupon-
ceau—Fish—Ternant—Davies—Fleury—Fairlie—Smith
and Others.

It would be ungracious to close this work without at least a brief reference to the men who were closely associated with General Von Steuben during his American career, whose biographies, even independent of their connection with the Baron, are of more than ordinary interest.

First in prominence if not in time was William North, who was born of a military family at Fort Frederick, Maine, in 1755. Twenty years later he entered the Revolutionary army and served under Arnold in the ill fated Canadian expedition. In May, 1777, he was appointed a captain of infantry in Colonel Henry Jackson's Massachusetts regiment, and acquitted himself with credit at the battle of Monmouth Court House. Two years later he was appointed aide-de-camp to General Steuben, and served upon the latter's staff, as well as that of General Washington's, until the end of the war. The closest possible friendship ensued between him and Steuben, as each learned to appreciate the valuable qualities of the other, and when Steuben was ordered to Virginia North accompanied him, taking an active part in the campaigns there, which ended in the capture of Yorktown. The war being over North returned to private life, and lived for awhile with Steuben in his bachelor quarters at the "Louvre" in New York City. He was too valuable, however, to be left in retirement, and was con-

stantly called on to take part in public affairs, having been elected several times to the legislature, which then sat in New York City, and was chosen Speaker of the Assembly.

When troops were ordered to the Ohio country in the summer and fall of 1786 an encampment was first made at Mingo on the Ohio river, two miles below the present city of Steubenville. From there they were brought to a point within the present limits of the city, where was begun the erection of Fort Steuben. While here the troops were inspected by Major North, and as previously stated it was no doubt by his command that the fort was located here, and the first permanent settlement in Ohio named after his friend and chief. In recognition of this and other services, Congress in October of that year passed a special act creating North a Major in the Second regiment United States Infantry, a part of the regular army.

Major North was elected to the United States Senate and served in that body from May 21, 1789, to March 3, 1799. When the difficulties with France began in the latter part of the eighteenth century, President Adams appointed him Adjutant General of the army with the rank of brigadier, which position he held until June 10, 1800. In March, 1812, when the second war with great Britain was impending he was again appointed Adjutant General, but declined. He was one of the state canal commissioners in the incipency of the New York and Erie canal project where he rendered valuable service.

It is perhaps, needless to state that, whatever his residence or occupation, his interest in his old friend, the Baron, did not flag. In the fall of 1782 he writes from Fishkill Landing on the Hudson in reference to Steuben's

claims then pending before Congress, strongly censuring that body for its neglect, and expressing the hope that "The department of which you are the head is so essential to the well being of the army, that I hope you will not be permitted to resign it. It is so conspicuous a post that I never wish to see it filled by another, while there is an American army, to profit by your instructions."

North's antipathy to Lafayette was at least as strong as the Baron's. Writing to the latter (who was probably then in Philadelphia) he gives the following account of the arrival of the marquis in New York, in October, 1784:

What, with a villainous wind, and the foolish parade which has been made with the Don Quixote Lafayette, I have not had a moment's peace. He arrived here on Friday, amidst the acclamations of foolish disbanded officers and the town rabble; seated on a little horse (for the sake of Christ I am sorry it was not an ass) he made his public entry. Yesterday they gave him a dinner, and at night Madame Hayley, and an old—— gave him some of the most infamous fireworks I ever saw; but he, like a true Frenchman, told her they were superb. He has done me the honor to notice me. While we were looking at the exhibition, he observed, putting his arm around my neck and whispering how pleased he was that this attention was paid him by an English woman. But d—n the subject. I have kept too long on it already. Monsieur le Marquis goes to Rhode Island to receive the honor due him from that state.

Soon after the Revolution Major North married Mary, daughter of James Duane, one of the most eminent citizens of New York. The latter was born in that city in February, 1733, and in 1759 married a daughter of Robert Livingston. He became prominent as a lawyer and jurist, and at the beginning of the troubles with the mother country was inclined to sympathize with the latter, and exerted every effort towards a peaceful reconciliation. When that was found impossible he cast his lot with the patriots, and was a member of the Continen-



GEN. WM. NORTH'S HOUSE, DUANESEBURG, N. Y.
Built 1784.



FEATHERSTONAUGH MANSION, DUANESBURG, N. Y.
Built 1812.

tal Congress. Having inherited a tract of land in what is now Schenectady County, New York, he founded the village of Duanesburg about seventy-five miles southeast from the subsequent grant to Steuben and a dozen miles southwest of the city of Schenectady. Here North built a spacious home. An idea of his life here may be gathered from the following characteristic letter to Steuben, dated Duanesburg, January 8, 1789:

I received your letter, my dear Baron, of the 12th of December, this morning, and have attempted three times to answer, and therefore tore the sheet in pieces. To what it was owing I know not; but I have had the blue devils all this morning. We have just dined on soup and beef-steaks, and I have drawn two glasses of your sherry. Would to God you were here to drink with me! Whether this wish will banish my ill humor, my letter will show, provided I do not tear it in pieces also. I am up by daylight, and set my man and boy to work this morning; they were sent at a distance from hence, and I was obliged to drudge a mile and a half, with a load on my shoulders, through their carelessness. It is not very pleasant to walk through the snow with a load; I did sweat most confoundingly; this made me a little angry. But this was not all. Your letter told me everybody was going to be a great man. I hate everybody greater than myself except you. I see no chance I have of getting anything in this scramble. This, perhaps, made me mad. Knox will remain Secretary of War or have an equivalent. His smiles and bows have secured him a place of consequence in the new government. If you come in, you must resolve to see him your equal. Except a very few I despise and detest the whole human species; would to God I had been an Indian! I should either have been a warrior or a Sachem. My wife is the best woman possible; my boy is good, but I am not happy. My father-in-law tells me I am independent. So I am, and so is every fellow with a woolen shirt, who owns a hundred acres of land. I go to Albany with Polly and the boy to-morrow, for the first time since we have lived here. It is business more than pleasure that takes me there. I shall get no office under the new government because I shall ask for none. I am proud and honest. I know what I am worth, and if other people do not know it without my telling them, they may remain ignorant. Hamilton, Jay and several others who will have the chief management in this business, know me, but they have their friends and dependents. I shall go to Boston, comfort my old mother, and return here to drudge on in getting my living.

No doubt North's election to the Senate a few months later convinced him that he had not been forgotten in the "scramble," and served as an antidote for the somewhat pessimistic feeling manifested at this time. He died in New York City on January, 1836, at the age of 81 years.

It will be remembered that when Steuben first undertook to drill the troops at Valley Forge, the ranks were thrown into confusion from the inability of the soldiers to understand the Baron's orders. There was prospect of a sudden termination of the whole business in a ludicrous fiasco, when a young man stepped from the ranks and offered to translate the orders into English. That young man was Benjamin Walker, who was born in England in 1753. He came to America, and on the outbreak of the war enlisted in the second New York regiment which, at the time of the incident just mentioned, was at Valley Forge. He had received a liberal education, and spoke and wrote French fluently. He does not appear to have been specially versed in German, but as the Baron was an excellent French scholar it was an easy matter for him to dictate his orders and documents to Walker in French to be rendered by the latter into English. The two men became very closely attached to each other, and from 1778 to 1782, as an aide to the Baron and member of his official family, he necessarily had charge of his correspondence and other documents. He also served about a year on Washington's staff, and was highly respected by all his military associates. During the latter period he taught Mrs. Washington the game of chess, of which the lady seems to have tired, and backgammon was adopted as a substitute, not to Walker's pleasure. At the close of the war Walker was made private secretary to the Governor of New

York, and also became chief naval officer under Washington. He was with Steuben awhile at the "Louvre," but having married he took a house in Maiden Lane opposite Liberty street, where, as we have already seen, Steuben on his invitation went to live with him on the breaking up of the "Louvre." He removed to Courtlandt street shortly after, but Steuben does not seem to have resided with him there. In response to a request from the Baron for his picture he replied: "If it was a miniature you meant, we have a miniature painter here in New York, as superior to Peale as light to darkness." We do not learn who the painter was, possibly it was Earle, or whether he ever received the commission. On leaving the office of secretary, Walker became a broker, and Steuben was a frequent and always a welcome guest at his house. In 1798 he was appointed by the Earl of Bute in charge of the latter's extensive estate in northern New York, which caused his removal to Utica, where he resided until his death on January 13, 1818, at the age of sixty-five years. He took an active part in public affairs, and represented his district in Congress in 1801-3. His rescue of Steuben's remains from desecration and provision for their last resting place have already been related.

Pierre Etienne Duponceau was born at St. Martin, Re, an island, off the western coast of France, on June 3, 1760. He seems to have had a natural taste for linguistic study, and learned to speak English from some persons of that nationality who resided on the island. While at college he pursued his English studies with such interest that he was called L'Anglais. He afterwards became abbe of the monastery, but remained only a short time, and in December, 1775, he walked to Paris, his worldly possessions at that time, in addition to the clothes on his

back, consisting of an extra shirt and a copy of "Paradise Lost." English was then the popular language in the French salons notwithstanding the feeling against that country, and Duponceau prepared an English-French vocabulary of chase and racing terms for the Duke of Orleans, but when he asked for compensation received the reply, "*Le princes ne donent rien*," (princes give nothing). Disgusted with court circles he cultivated association with literary characters, among them Beaumarchais, at whose house he met Baron Steuben in 1777. As it was absolutely necessary that the latter should have some associate in his projected journey to America who understood English he engaged Duponceau as private secretary, and the pair sailed for their new field the following September.

As illustrating the character of the lively young Frenchman it is said that shortly before the party reached Portsmouth, Duponceau wagered that he would kiss the first girl they met after landing. The proposal was received with incredulous laughter, but nothing daunted Duponceau approached the first young lady he met on shore, and told her of his vow, adding that having come over to fight for American liberty he asked a kiss as a blessing on his undertaking. Moved by his pleading or appearance, or perhaps both, the kiss was granted, and Duponceau had the laugh on his companions. His vivacity and gallantry made him a favorite in Boston society, where his knowledge of English gave him an enormous advantage over his foreign associates, who, as he said, "Stood and sat like Indians, and could talk only by signs." He condescended, however, to do some interpreting between the Baron and some of the older ladies, while carrying on a tender flirtation with Miss Sally Doan, daughter of their hostess.

As already related Dupleateau accompanied Steuben to York and Valley Forge, sharing the vicissitudes and honors of his chief. He was quite near-sighted, which defect sometimes led him into ludicrous situations as once when he mistook some red petticoats hanging on a fence for a body of British soldiery. He was kept busy in the transcribing and translation of Steuben's army regulations, correspondence &c., until the winter of 1779-80 when he fell ill, and retired to the country for a short time. He was able, however, to go with Steuben to Virginia in the Autumn of 1780, but the following June was again prostrated and returned to Philadelphia. Fortified with a strong letter of introduction from Steuben, explaining that his health did not permit him to remain in the military service, he was made an American citizen and appointed an assistant secretary in the office of foreign affairs under Robert Livingston. Correspondence kept up his friendship with Steuben, and after the Revolution he entered upon the practice of law. He became a leading citizen of Philadelphia, and was recognized as authority on scientific and literary matters. His publications of legal essays, translations, ethnological and other works, procured for him what was known as the Volney prize of \$2,000 for original research, and for a number of years he was President of the American Philosophical Society. He died on April 1, 1844.

Nicholas Fish was born in New York City on August 28, 1758. He was educated at the College of New Jersey and studied law, which he left to join the Revolutionary forces. In the spring of 1776 he became aide to General Scott, and on June 21 of that year was made brigade major. On November 21 he became major of the Second New York regiment, and soon after Lieutenant Colonel. He attracted attention by his work at both

battles of Saratoga, and the following year was appointed division inspector under Steuben. The latter is quoted as saying that he would have made an excellent officer in the best European army, and the two soon became firm friends. He was soon assigned to more active work, and had an infantry command at the battle of Monmouth. In 1779 he was in Sullivan's expedition against the Indians, and afterwards took an active part in the Virginia campaigns and the siege of Yorktown, where, with Hamilton, he aided in storming and capturing one of the redoubts. In 1786 he was made Adjutant General of New York State, and with Steuben prepared plans for harbor defenses for the city in 1793. He married a member of the Stuyvesant family, and died on June 20, 1833. His descendants have been unusually eminent in public affairs.

Among those who accompanied Steuben to America was Jean Baptiste Ternant, a French lieutenant, who was born in Normandy in 1730. He resigned his position in the army, and offered his services to Congress by which body he was commissioned major and appointed sub-inspector under the Baron. On September 25, 1778, he was commissioned lieutenant colonel and directed to inspect the troops in Georgia and South Carolina. His letters to Steuben describing the condition of affairs there are very interesting, but they were terminated by his capture with Lincoln's army at Charleston in 1786. He was soon afterwards exchanged and continued in the service until the close of the war, having been assigned to the charge of Armand de Roarie's regiment, during the absence of its colonel in France soliciting supplies. On the latter's return Ternant was again sent south where he remained until the close of the war when he spent two years in travel and then went back to France, re-entering

his old army in 1786, receiving a colonel's commission. He was in the battle of Volney, and seems to have been a short time with the German army. On the outbreak of the French revolution he was sent as ambassador to the United States, holding that position until superseded by Genet in 1793. He took an active part in the negotiations of 1798 in regard to the differences between America and France, and at first followed Napoleon, but was disgusted at the latter's coup de'tat on 18 Brumaire (November 9), 1799, and declined the newly made dictator's offer of a commission. His death occurred at Couches, in 1816.

William Davies, who graduated at Princeton College in 1765, later joined the Revolutionary forces and was made inspector under Steuben in 1778. He was a favorite, not only of Steuben but of Washington, on account of his zeal and efficiency. After the war he held a position in the Virginia State Auditor's office at Richmond.

Louis de Fleury was one of the advance guard of those adventurous young Frenchmen whose ardor led them to America. He received a captain's commission from Congress early in 1777, and attracted attention by his services at the head of a volunteer corps of riflemen. He attained further reputation as brigade major during the campaign of that year, and was sent to Fort Mifflin, near Philadelphia, where the services of an engineer were needed. He was now promoted to the office of lieutenant colonel, and had a horse shot under him at the battle of Brandywine, and, as he had filled the position of aide major in France, at Steuben's suggestion and with Washington's approval he was appointed a sub-inspector. The office of inspector having been greatly crippled by the jealousy of other officers, Fleury in July, 1778, was given

second command in a corps of light infantry operating against Rhode Island, and subsequently command of a new battalion of light infantry organized by Steuben. He was the first to enter the main works at the storming of Stony Point, and with his own hands pulled down the British flag. He joined Rochambeau's forces when that general arrived, serving until the close of the war, and keeping up a constant correspondence with Steuben.

James Fairlie, son of a sea captain in the West India trade, was born in New York City about 1757, and entered the Revolutionary army early in the war as ensign Colonel Macdougall's New York regiment. Subsequently he was transferred to Philip Van Courtlandt's regiment, and assisted in the capture of Burgoyne's army. The next year he was appointed aide de camp to Steuben, serving at the battle of Monmouth and accompanying the general to Virginia. There he was captured by the enemy but having been exchanged he came north to Newburg, where he served until the war was over. We have already seen that he was a part of Steuben's family in New York City, when he became claim agent for the state. Subsequently he was clerk of the New York Supreme Court, a member of the General Assembly and of the convention that framed the Constitution of 1823. He was appointed commissioner of bankruptcy by Jefferson, and in 1812 Madison offered him the position of Adjutant General of the United States, which he did not accept. His liberality and brilliancy added to a generous disposition made him a great favorite in society, and he married a daughter of Chief Justice Yates, of Albany. When Steuben took charge of his land in the Oneida Country he presented certain tracts to some of his former aides, Fairlie being one of the beneficiaries. Later, while visiting North he noticed a set of Sevres china, which at-

tracted his attention. The result was that the Fairlie land and North's china exchanged owners. When Steuben heard of the transaction he manifested his disapproval by doubling the shares given to the other aides and turning what would have been Fairlie's over to North. Mr. Kapp also gives this affair as the cause of Steuben omitting to mention Fairlie in his will, although there does not seem to have been anything very reprehensible in the transaction. Fairlie died in New York City on October 11, 1830, and was buried with military honors.

Colonel William S. Smith was another of Steuben's aides who lived with him for awhile after the war. He also served as an aide to Washington, and early in 1785 went with John Adams to England as secretary, from which country he wrote a series of interesting letters to Steuben. He afterward married the daughter of Mr. Adams, and was president of the Cincinnati until his death on June 10, 1816.

Among others whom Steuben mentions with special friendliness as his assistants were: Major de Romanai, who accompanied him to America; Major De l'Enfant; Major De Epinier, nephew of Beaumarchais, who had changed his name from Lepine as sounding more courtly; Captain De Pontiere, who became captain of horse under Pulaski; Captain Duval; Colonel Meade; Messrs. Peyton Randolph and Moore who served him well in Virginia; Majors Galvan and Villefranche, and Lieutenant Colonel De La Lanyante, who were Steuben's engineers at Yorktown, and Major Popham. There are twenty-one in all, and probably not even the commander in chief had a more intimate band of devoted followers

who loved and respected their superior officer, and, as we have seen, maintained the closest friendship and, in some instances, family life with him after the conflict was over.


CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ARTISTS' FAVORITE.

Original Portraits of Steuben by Peale, Earle, Simitiere, Trum-
and Pine—Copies and Reproductions.

Not even the father of his country seems to have been a greater favorite with the artists of his day than was Baron Steuben. For a new country America was peculiarly favored in this respect. During the Revolutionary period there were here at least five painters of international reputation, of whom four were natives of this country, and one an adopted citizen. The oldest of them, Benjamin West, was born at Springfield, Pa., October 17, 1738, and at the age of eighteen began portrait painting in Philadelphia, going to New York two years later. In 1760 he visited Italy, where he remained three years, and was elected member of the principal academies. Settling in London his work attracted the attention both of court circles and the public to such an extent that he was elected to succeed Sir Joshua Reynolds as President of the Royal Academy, which position he held for twenty-eight years. His leading work, "Christ Healing the Sick," was purchased by the British government for 3,000 guineas, and hangs in the National Gallery in London. He died on March 11, 1820, and was buried in St. Paul's cathedral, the only American who lies beneath that historic fane. He is mentioned here, not because he is known to have painted any portrait of Steuben, but because he was a contemporary and instructor of those who did, and was the leading American representative of the pictorial art of his time.


Charles Willson Peale was born at Chesterfield, Md., on April 6, 1741. He followed the saddler trade at Annapolis, but having his attention attracted by a portrait while on a visit to Norfolk, on his return he attempted to paint one of himself, with such success, that he decided to improve his talents in that direction. Living at Boston in 1768-9 he received instruction from John S. Copley, and in 1710 went to London where he studied under West, also practicing modeling in wax, casting and moulding in plaster, engraving in mezzotint and miniature painting. He returned to Annapolis in 1774 and followed his profession for two years, then removing to Philadelphia, and became captain of volunteers. He took part in the battles of Trenton and Germantown, was with Washington and Steuben at Valley Forge and was elected member of the Pennsylvania legislature in 1779. After the war he collected quite a museum of natural curiosities, portraits and other art objects, and was one of the founders of the Philadelphia Academy of Fine Arts, contributing to seventeen annual exhibitions. An idea of his versatility may be formed from the fact that he practiced dentistry, made coaches, harness, clocks, watches and silverware, besides being a soldier, politician, naturalist, taxidermist etc. But his favorite occupation was portrait painting, for which Washington alone is said to have given him fourteen sittings, his first portrait of that gentleman being in the uniform of a Virginia colonel. He painted portraits of most of the eminent men of his day, including the presidents down to 1819. Peale was not regarded as a first class artist, and the value of his portraits is chiefly historical. It was Peale's custom while in the army to carry with him stretchers 6x8 inches in size on which he made sketches of those whose portraits he intended painting, and it was probably at Valley Forge



STEUBEN, BY PEALE, 1778.



STEUBEN, BY SIMITIÈRE, 1783.



Le Baron de Steuben

STEUBEN, BY PINE, ABOUT 1785.



SOLDIERS' MONUMENT, STEUBENVILLE.

in the spring of 1778 that he made the outlines of his picture of Baron Steuben reproduced in this book. This portrait was on exhibition in his Philadelphia museum, and at his death, February 22, 1827, it with other relics and pictures of the Revolutionary and Colonial periods remained in possession of his family. They were offered for sale in 1854 and being purchased by the city of Philadelphia were placed in Independence Hall, where they now remain.

Massachusetts furnished the third of our artistic quintette in the person of Ralph Earle, who was born at Leiceister on May 11, 1751. He moved to Connecticut while quite young, and painted portraits there in 1775. On the restoration of peace he went to England and studied under West, and was regarded as sufficiently meritorious to insure his election as a member of the Royal Academy. He returned in 1786 and painted four historical pictures, the first of the kind executed by an American, viz.: "The Battle of Lexington," "A View of Concord," "The Battle of North Bridge, Concord," "View of the South Part of Lexington." These were followed by portraits and landscapes, "Niagara Falls" among the latter, which created quite a furore when placed on exhibition in London. About this time he painted at least two portraits of Baron Steuben, one of which was given to Major William North. From Major North the portrait has descended to his great granddaughter, Mrs. F. B. Austin, of New York City, who is also the possessor of the Baron's gold-headed cane, the gold box presented to him by the city of New York, and his gold watch. The other painting, which by the courtesy of its present owner is reproduced in this book, was made for James Duane, and, at his death passed to his daughter, Sarah Featherstonaugh, from whom it

descended to her grandson, G. W. Featherstonaugh, of Schenectady, N. Y., the present owner. The portrait, considerably dimmed by age, is three-quarter size, and shows the face nearly full. It exhibits the Baron in full regimentals, his right hand extended and resting on the hilt of his sword. The Order of Fidelity is suspended around his neck, and the "Cincinnati" on his left breast. The Hudson river and West Point hills are seen in the background. In the left hand corner of the painting under the guard of the sword, in red letters appear the words: "Ralph Earle, Pinx., 1786."

Pierre Eugene du Simitiere was a native of Geneva, Switzerland, and emigrated to the West Indies about 1751. In 1776 he went to Philadelphia, and became noted as a collector of curios. Two years later he was elected a member of the American Philosophical Society, and in 1782 he opened his collection to the public under the title of American museum. He was a very popular portrait painter, and among his sitters were Washington, Steuben, Jay and nearly all the noted men of that period. These were engraved by Benjamin Reading and published in London in 1783. He also painted miniatures in water colors, and was commissioned by Congress to design a seal for the new American republic, but of the two designs submitted neither found acceptance. Recently Dr. R. M. Griswold, of Kensington, Conn., became the possessor of a rare copper print of du Simitiere's portrait of the Baron reproduced elsewhere. Simitiere died in Philadelphia, in 1784.

Prominent in this company of Revolutionary artists was John Trumbull, son of the Governor of Connecticut, born at Lebanon on June 6, 1756. He was a graduate of Harvard College, in 1773, and was specially useful to Washington as an aide in sketching the British works

about Boston. Afterwards he was appointed adjutant under Gates, but resigned the next year, and in 1780 went to London and began studying under West. During the Arnold-Andre imbroglio he was arrested as a sort of hostage for the latter, but released after eight months confinement on condition that he return home. He did so, but went back to London and re-entered West's studio, where he painted a number of historical pictures. In 1789 he came back to America to secure portraits of prominent Revolutionary generals for a series of historical paintings. Among them was that of Steuben, which appears in his great painting, "The Surrender of Cornwallis." For this with three other paintings, "Declaration of Independence," "Surrender of Burgoyne," and "Resignation of Washington at Annapolis," each 18x12 feet, ordered by Congress to be placed in the rotunda of the capitol at Washington, he received \$32,000. The figure of Steuben on horseback in the Cornwallis picture has been made a favorite subject for engravings. Trumbull died in New York on November 10, 1843.

Robert E. Pine also appears to have painted a portrait of Steuben which became the property of the United States Government, and was destroyed when the British burned the capitol on August 24, 1814. Pine was born in England about 1730, and came to America after the war for independence with the special object of securing the portraits of leaders in that conflict. He died in Philadelphia in 1788. A copy of his Steuben portrait which appears elsewhere, bears a close resemblance to Peale's work.

In the Governor's room of old City Hall, New York, hangs a portrait of Steuben the frame of which contains the inscription, "After Stuart by Marsiglia." Gilbert Stuart, who is doubtless the artist referred to, was born

at North Kingston, R. I., on December 3, 1755, and died in Boston on July 27, 1828. Following the example of his predecessors he went to London in 1775 and studied under West. Returning to America in 1793 he attained distinction as a painter of eminent men, his Washington portraits having been generally accepted as the standard presentation of the Father of His Country. It is not impossible that he might have painted Steuben during the winter of 1793-4, but we have no direct evidence of that fact, and if there was any such portrait it has disappeared. An exhibition of 754 of Stuart's pictures was given in Boston in 1880, in which there was none of Steuben. In fact the official report of the exhibits in connection with the centennial celebration of Washington's inauguration in 1789, refers to this portrait as a reproduction of Earle's, the copyist having omitted certain details in the dress including the watch chain and also the scenery in the background, which is a characteristic of Earle's portraits. It may be added that the New York branch of the Cincinnati has a copy painted by John Schuyler, and the Oneida Historical Society one by M. B. Ray.

CHAPTER XXV.

POSTHUMUS HONORS.

Eulogies and Memorials—Monuments at Grave and Washington—Andrews's Portrait of Steuben—Portraits of George Rogers Clark and James Wilson by Filson.


Mr. Kapp in drawing a comparison between the simplicity, and we might almost say the poverty of the proceedings at Steuben's grave, and those of his European companions who were buried with all the splendor and brilliancy that royalty and military pomp could afford, concludes that after all Steuben was more fortunate than they. With the last salute that roared over their graves, they are forgotten; the glory and enjoyment of their deeds belonged to the crown under which they served; their names are merely mentioned in the works of some local historian. But Steuben, in spite of hardships and neglect, by drawing his sword in behalf of American liberty connected himself with the greatest event of modern history. His name is as lasting as that of the American Revolution, and only glows the brighter as his old world contemporaries sink into everlasting obscurity.

There were those, however, who did not delay to render their tribute of honor to the distinguished dead. The German society of New York, already referred to, adopted a eulogy to his memory, and as a mark of respect resolved to wear mourning insignia for six weeks, and attend an address to be delivered by Rev. De Gross in the Reformed German Church in Nassau street on the following Sunday afternoon. There were numerous private testimonials from distinguished men, as the fact of Steuben's death became generally known, for news

traveled slowly in those days. Colonel William North at his own expense, placed a mural tablet in the church above mentioned, and when this property was sold to the Baptists it was taken to the new building in Forsythe street. It lay there for awhile unmounted until the termination of a lawsuit which the congregation was having in regard to its property. When the matter was settled Abraham Berky had the monument restored and placed in proper position. It consists of an obelisk slab and square frame of blueish clouded marble. The urn at the base bears a representation of the Order De Fidelite, with an inscription by Col. North.

At last the people of Oneida County, or at least a portion of them, seemed to realize that some little respect was due the remains of the hero who had died and was buried in their midst. Largely through the influence of two women, Miss Sophia Mappa and Bertha Der Kemp, assisted by descendants of other old friends funds were raised sufficient to procure a modest cenotaph, and when Lafayette visited the United States in 1824 he was invited to deliver an oration at its dedication. For some unexplained reason he declined, and the humble monument was dedicated without his assistance. It was a simple tablet eight feet long by four feet wide, and a foot in thickness, resting on four stone walls with pilasters. It bore the words, "Major General Frederick William Augustus Baron de Steuben." An address was made by Rev. Mr. Pierce, a Unitarian pastor in Olden Barneveldt.

As a modest tribute from friends and neighbors no fault could be found with this memorial, but as the years rolled on the foundation began to crumble, and it became apparent that unless some measures were taken for its preservation the structure would soon be a ruin. When public attention was called to the matter it was felt that



STEUBEN'S FIRST MONUMENT.
Over Grave, Oneida County, N. Y., 1824.



STEUBEN'S SECOND MONUMENT
Over Grave, 1872.



MONUMENT AT WASHINGTON, 1910

while Steuben was not a seeker after post mortem honors a testimonial should be placed over his grave which might in some measure at least be expressive of the feelings of subsequent generations towards the man who had contributed so largely towards securing their independence. The first formal suggestion in that direction came in the shape of an appeal to the Germans of the United States for funds to erect a monument to Steuben. This appeal was published in December, 1856, in the *St. Charles Democrat*, a Missouri country paper. The suggestion was favorably received, especially by German societies throughout the country, and by means of entertainments and other sources between five and six thousand dollars was collected. There the matter rested, and the outbreak of the Civil War soon after occupied men's minds to the exclusion of all other objects. In the later sixties the project was again revived. Additional funds were secured, and aided by an appropriation from the state of New York, the monument was begun in earnest. On June 1, 1870, the cornerstone was laid by Governor Seymour in the presence of a large assembly.

The organizations present included the Citizens' Corps of Utica, with band, and the New York Liederkrantz, thirty-five in number. After prayer in Welsh by Rev. Robert Everett, S. Karl Kapff, representing the Schutzen Society of New York, gave a brief sketch of the movement. An address of welcome on behalf of the people of the hamlets of Remsen and Steuben was delivered by D. M. Crowell, followed by the ode "*Der Tagdes Henen*," by the Liederkrantz. The Prussian national hymn preceded the placing of the cornerstone, after which, on the suggestion of Governor Seymour a vote of thanks was tendered the Welsh society for the manner in which it had carried out the directions of Mr. Walker for

the care of the grave and its surroundings. General Franz Sigel closed the exercises with an address in German.

The monument, which was unveiled by the representatives of the Steuben Monument Association in the summer of 1872, was designed and built by Henry Reck, of New York. It is a square massive structure with a base of Trenton limestone, upon which rests a block of dressed granite. On the front of the granite block a laurel wreath is cut in relief having in its centre the single word "Steuben." The base is fourteen feet square, and the total height is fifteen feet. Four parrot guns are placed en reverse at the angles of the base, with a pile of cannon balls between. Fragments of the original monument were left at the base of its successor, and the primeval forest stands closely around. Two handsome pillars, however, indicate the entrance to the burial place, and a well defined trail through the woods leads to the monument.

Congress having appropriated \$50,000 for that purpose a large monument crowned by a bronze statue of Steuben was erected in Lafayette park in Washington, which was dedicated with imposing ceremonies on December 7, 1910. A replica of this statue was erected at Potsdam, Prussia, which was unveiled on September 2 of the following year.

In the cloister, or "Porch of the Allies," connecting the Washington Memorial Church at Valley Forge with the Museum of American history, one of the bays has been erected by the National German Alliance to the memory of Steuben.

On October 2, 1911, Eliphalet F. Andrews, the celebrated artist who had previously donated large portraits of President James A. Garfield, Hon. Edwin M. Stanton

and Hon. Benjamin Tappan to his native city and county, wrote from London, where he was temporarily sojourning, to Hon. F. H. Kerr and J. B. Doyle, offering to add to the already valuable collection in Steubenville a life-size portrait of General Von Steuben. The Stanton Monument Association, of Steubenville, had just completed a series of the most interesting and successful demonstrations in the history of the upper Ohio valley in connection with the dedication of the bronze statue erected to the memory of the great War Secretary in his native city, and it was deemed the most appropriate organization to take charge of the picture and unveil the same with suitable ceremonies. The portrait was finished early in 1913, the Earle-Featherstonaugh painting being taken as the basis. It is not, however, a copy, but the product of the artist's own ideas, aided by other portraits and such historical information as was available. The figure is a standing one, three-quarter length, with the right hand resting on the sword hilt, and the left gloved and holding a glove. The rich Continental uniform in blue and buff makes a pleasing combination, showing to advantage the society decorations already described. Lace cuffs indicate a contrast to the fashions of to-day. The Baron is apparently standing in front of a balustrade partly covered with heavy foliage, with the Hudson and West Point back. It is the most brilliant of Mr. Andrews's portraits.

About this time Charles P. Filson, of Steubenville, offered to paint a companion picture, being a portrait of Gen. George Rogers Clark, the conqueror of the Northwest territory, and for several years a resident of the upper Ohio valley. Arrangements were made with the same artist for a portrait of James Wilson, grandfather of the President of the United States, who resided in

Steubenville for thirty-five years, was editor of the Herald newspaper, member of the Legislature and Common Pleas Court. Here was born Joseph Wilson, father of the President, on February 28, 1822, and here James Wilson died on October 17, 1850. With his wife, who died on September 25, 1863, he is buried in Union Cemetery.

The basis for the Clark portrait is a miniature by John W. Jarvis, who was born in England in 1780, and was brought to America five years later. Although somewhat eccentric he enjoyed considerable popularity, but finally died in poverty at New York in 1840. The Clark portrait was painted early in the nineteenth century when he (Clark) was pretty well up in years. Relying on Jarvis for features Mr. Filson's portrait is an original which is sure to attract favorable comment. Although not possessing the brilliant society decorations of Steuben, yet Clark's Continental uniform and other accessories have given Mr. Filson an opportunity of displaying his skill in the way of coloring, of which he has taken full advantage. The picture represents Clark seated in the woods, figuring out his great campaign. On his right is a stand (possibly the stump of a tree) covered with the Continental flag of thirteen stars and stripes, and spread out above it is a map of the territory northwest of the Ohio from an old plate made in 1764 on which Mingo town is conspicuous. The forest foliage overshadows the warrior and statesman, while in the background flows the Ohio river, with two peaks beyond, as they appear on the seal of the state of Ohio.

The Wilson picture is the only oil portrait of that gentleman in existence, being based on an old daguerreotype. It depicts the strong rugged but not disagreeable features of its subject, indicating force and decision of



GEN. GEORGE ROGERS CLARK.



HON. JAMES WILSON.

character. The judge is seated at a table holding an open law book in his lap, with two others on the stand, the books used for this purpose being contemporary reprints of Bacon's Abridgment of the Laws of England and Vattel's Law of Nations. A copy of the Western Herald indicates the blending of the judicial and editorial mind. Mr. Filson has reason to congratulate himself on this his latest work. *

* Sketches of Messrs. Andrews and Filson will be found in the Author's Memorial Life of Edwin M. Stanton, pp. 390-391.

NOTE—The word "liberal" on page 1 should read "literal." "Lowell" on page 139 should read "Lovell," "northern" on page 160 should read "southern."

APPENDIX

THREE WARS CELEBRATION

Semi-Centennial of Most Northern Invasion During the Civil War—Unveiling of Portraits—Dedication of Monuments and Cannon—Unveiling Maine Tablet.

It happened that the completion of the portraits described on the preceding pages was contemporaneous with the semi-centennial of probably the most stirring and interesting historical event in the history of Eastern Ohio. Popularly known as "Morgan's Raid," it was the farthest point north reached by any invading force during the Civil War. On the morning of Saturday, July 25, 1863, the Confederate general John H. Morgan entered Jefferson County from the town of Harrisville into Mount Pleasant township with a force of 600 men pursued by the Union general James M. Shackelford with an equal force of Federal troops including cavalry, mounted infantry and a battery of artillery.

The invaders followed the wagon road down Long run to Short Creek, and thence down the creek to the present town of Dillonvale, evidently making for the Ohio river, but learning that there was a trainload of troops at Portland (now Rayland) turned northward up "Dry Fork" to Smithfield. From there they went eastwardly to New Alexandria, reaching it about noon, and then went northwardly down McIntire to Cross Creek, and up the creek a couple of miles where they burned a Steubenville & Indiana railroad bridge, cutting the city's westward communications. They then moved northeasterly to Wintersville where they encountered a force of Steubenville militia, and in the firing that ensued one of the latter, Henry Parks was fatally wounded. A short distance beyond Margaret Daugherty (now Mrs. Davis of Steubenville) was wounded by a stray bullet. Shackel-

ford's force had come up by this time, and a skirmish ensued at Two Ridge meeting house three miles beyond in which a Michigan soldier, Martin Keane, was fatally wounded, and several others seriously. Morgan's men passed through Richmond and East Springfield during the evening, closely followed by Shackelford and the Steubenville militia. A division, however, was made at Richmond. Leaving Major Way with a portion of the Ninth Michigan cavalry and Eleventh Michigan battery, in all 250 men, to follow Morgan, Shackelford with his main body including the Steubenville militia turned northward toward Hammondsville intending to flank Morgan. The latter went northwest from East Springfield, and camped that night on the Herdman Taylor farm on Elkhorn branch of Yellow Creek with Way on the hills above. Before daylight on Sunday morning he slipped away, burning the county bridge, and the chase was renewed. Way overtook him at Monroeville on the extreme northern limit of the county, where a battle ensued, the raiders being routed with a loss of several killed, forty-five wounded, 239 prisoners, horses &c. The race was nearly ended, and Morgan being now over the Columbiana county line, surrendered to Shackelford at 2 o'clock on Sunday afternoon, the force of 2,246 with which he had crossed the Ohio river at Brandenburg being now reduced to 336. The prisoners were taken to Steubenville by rail the next morning, and thence to different points. Morgan with his officers were confined in the Ohio penitentiary, in retaliation for similar treatment of Union raiders in the South, from which institution he escaped, apparently through a tunnel, but the manner has been the subject of considerable controversy. To commemorate these events and to indicate Morgan's and Shackelford's zig-

zag course of fifty miles through Jefferson county it was resolved to place fourteen granite monuments at as many different salient points which should mark the course for all time. Each monument weighs about 1,800 pounds, being twenty inches square, resting on a concrete foundation, and four feet high, with a front bevel to receive a suitable bronze tablet 16x24 inches. Monument No. 1, located at Harrisville, bears the following inscription:

"General John H. Morgan in command of Confederate troops entered Jefferson County here July 25, 1863; proceeded northward via Short Creek Valley, Smithfield, and other villages, pursued under orders of Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, by Gen. James M. Shackelford commanding 14th Ill. Cav., First Ky., Cav., 9th Mich. Cav., 11th Mich. Bat'y, 86th Ohio Mounted Inf., 2d Tenn. Mounted Inf., Tablet No. 1. Erected July, 1913."

The others have the same general statement changed to suit each particular location, No. 2 being located on Short Creek bridge above Dillonvale; No. 3 in Dillonvale; No. 4 at Smithfield; No. 5 at New Alexandria; No. 6, mouth of McIntyre; No. 7, Cross Creek at burned bridge; No. 8, Wintersville; No. 9, Two Ridges; No. 10, Richmond; No. 11, East Springfield, No. 12, Morgan bridge; No. 13, old Nebo, near Bergholz; No. 14, Monroeville. The Steubenville militia appear on the tablets beginning at Wintersville.

Four similar monuments were placed at the corners of Fort Steuben in the city of Steubenville, bearing the following inscription: "Corner of Fort Steuben, erected 1786, named in honor of Major General Frederick William Augustus Baron von Steuben, who rendered distinguished service to the United States army in the War of the Revolution with General George Washington, February 7, 1778 to April 15, 1784."



GEN. JAMES M. SHACKELFORD.



GEN. JOHN H. MORGAN.

At this time two bronze cannon which had been used during the Civil War were donated by the National Government as addenda to the bronze statue of Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, which had been erected in front of the Jefferson County Court House two years before. These cannon were made at the celebrated Revere foundry at Canton, Mass., where Paul Revere, of Revolutionary fame, worked from 1801 to 1818. They were selected by Captain J. C. Ault from the Chattanooga battlefield, and, mounted on cast iron carriages make a marked addition to the Court House lawn.

In addition to all this a handsome tablet 13x18 inches made of bronze and brass cannon recovered from the battleship Maine sunk in Havana harbor, was secured, together with an electric helm indicator, bronze port covers and ornamental tripod which had lain in the water about fifteen years. The tablet is a work of art designed by Charles Keck and cast by the Williams Bronze foundry, N. Y. It represents the Goddess of Liberty holding a shield on her left arm while the right hand is stretched towards a palm branch. In the distance is the wrecked vessel slowly sinking in the waters of the Atlantic ocean. The tablet was placed on the front of the Court House, and the relics in the City Museum.

To have these as well as some minor objects placed without due recognition seemed so inappropriate that it was decided to hold proper dedicatory ceremonies under the name of Three Wars Celebration, to include the Revolutionary, Spanish and Civil Wars. It being practically impossible to crowd all the ceremonies into a single day it was decided to extend them over three days beginning with July 23, 1913.

As a matter of fact the celebrations began before that, the fireworks combination exhibiting the Fall of

Pompeii and other spectacular effects playing nightly during the week beginning Monday, July 21, 1913, together with the camp of the 17th United States Infantry and other gatherings.

The first official act in connection with the celebration may be said to be the visit of Col. R. C. Morgan, brother of the general, and Col. Cicero Coleman, both of Lexington, Ky., to some of the markers indicating the course taken by the raiders and their pursuers. Both of these gentlemen had been captured at Buffington, and consequently knew nothing personally of the termination of the raid. The monuments visited were those commemorating the shooting of Henry Parks at Wintersville, Martin Keane and others at Two Ridges, and the movements through Richmond and East Springfield.

Thursday, July 24, was appropriately denominated Revolution Day, as then the four monuments marking the site of Fort Steuben were dedicated, and the portraits of Generals Steuben and Clark unveiled, together with that of Hon. James Wilson. The exercises were held in Court Room No. 1, Hon. Carl H. Smith presiding and delivering the opening address. The monuments and two first named portraits were presented to the city of Steubenville on behalf of the donors and the Stanton Monument Association by its President, Hon. F. H. Kerr, and the Wilson portrait to the County of Jefferson. They were accepted on behalf of the municipality by Roy N. Merryman, City Solicitor, with an appropriate address.

The Steuben portrait was unveiled by Miss Clara Francis, of Martins Ferry, followed by an address by Dr. Roger M. Griswold, representing the Putnam Phalanx, of Hartford, Conn. The speaker wore the old Continental uniform, and his address was an able review of Steuben's life and achievements, concluding as follows:

The matchless courage and patience of Washington, supplemented by the great skill and energy of Steuben, worked out the reward of our country's freedom, and we to-day enjoy the results of their labors.

When we think of what Steuben was in his native land, of his rank and distinction, of the sacrifices he made, of what he did so thoroughly and patiently for us, of the results he accomplished in spite of the inadequate material at his command, the jealousy of his brother officers and the refusal of an incompetent and unpatriotic Congress to recognize his worth and assist his efforts, content to act in an humble and inconspicuous capacity, if thereby he could contribute to a just and righteous cause, when we consider all these things, then his name grows luminous and resplendent, and stands as the beautiful symbol of humble and dutiful service heroically performed.

And so to-day in your beautiful city, enjoying the fruits of the land which he did so much to help our ancestors acquire, we unveil a portrait of that great man, who, having affluence and honor in his own country, standing high in the esteem of his great sovereign, with the kings of Europe bidding for services, left behind him friends and fatherland, and came to the land of the stranger, that he might have a part in the birth of a new nation, and lay his bones in a soil he helped to dedicate to liberty and the rights of man.

Miss May Crumley, of Steubenville, gracefully unveiled the Clark portrait, and an eloquent address was delivered by Hon. W. B. Francis, Representative in Congress. He referred to the magnificent collection of portraits which the city and county were acquiring, and among other things, said:

The teacher and scholar who may gaze upon these excellent portraits will inquire in his own mind who they are, whence they came, when they lived and what patriotic service each of them has rendered. Lessons of patriotism are the lessons we wish our children to learn, for we are now in an age where fads and isms have been fostered to such an extent that representative government is being challenged and the cornerstone which our fathers were instrumental in laying is being torn up and those fads substituted. We should not forget what these patriots went through. They offered their lives in support of the principles which they cherished so dearly, and many of their compatriots perished for the cause of constitutional liberty. Their institutions which have lasted for 136 years were wrought in the crucible of misery, deprivation and blood, while the fads of to-day are cherished in the lap of luxury.

In order to give you an idea of the blessings which this great man, George Rogers Clark, the subject of our discourse to-day, has brought to the states and people, I would ask you to take the map of the United States, beginning at Lake Erie on the Pennsylvania line and follow the west line of Pennsylvania south to the Ohio river and then follow the Ohio river to the Mississippi, thence northwesterly with its course to British Columbia, then with British Columbia follow the Great Lakes eastward to the place of beginning, and I said you had the garden of America; but I now say you have the garden of the world. For alluvial land, mineral resources, timber, rivers, lakes, harbors, fisheries, fruits, stock raising, climate—everything. These are the lands which George Rogers Clark bought and laid down for settlement for the people of the United States, and especially to be enjoyed by the inhabitants of the respective states comprising this territory. Few stop to think that the lands acquired by his conquest are as great in area and greater in fertility, than the thirteen original states. Four times since the acquisition of these lands, we have taken up the sword in defense of the flag, and four times the Northwestern Territory has furnished her quota of brave men for the common cause.

When we think of Lincoln, of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Stanton, Custer, of New Rumley, who never lost a gun nor surrendered a color, and that great array of soldiery who marched to the front and held the government inseparable, we can see that near one-half of this soldiery was furnished from these; and here again the acquisition of Clark is emphasized. In these great states the hum of industry is heard on every hand, at every mile a school house, church spires from every village, hill and vale; a network of steam and electric railways and its commerce has already surpassed any other like area in the whole world.

But let us turn to the picture we have before us today of the man who was the forerunner of the establishing of the rights of the Union in this great country. When we consider him justly he should have a place by the side of George Washington.

Little Gloria Wilson Redmon drew aside the flag which unveiled the portrait of her great great grandfather. The address was made by Hon. Rees G. Richards, depicting Judge Wilson as an editor, a legislator and a jurist, concluding:

When we consider that, for thirty years in this community James Wilson so devoted his life and energy to the up-building of society, to defusing the principles of virtue and knowledge,

thus molding public sentiment and directing the thoughts of men toward a better and higher civilization, is it not well, that we here honor his memory and commend it to this and coming generations as a precious heritage? No stain of want of fidelity to truth and justice mars the noble career of his long and useful life. His descendants who honor us by their presence, and the absent ones, even he who occupies the exalted position of chief magistrate of this great Republic may well be proud of their lineage and cherish the name and memory of James Wilson.

The proceedings were enlivened with some beautiful vocal numbers by Miss Marian Forsythe with Miss Dargue as accompanist, the audience joining in "America," at the close.

Friday was set apart the commemorating events of the Civil and Spanish wars. Being the semi-centennial of the farthest point north reached by an invading force during the Rebellion, the fourteen monuments indicating the pursuit of General John H. Morgan through Jefferson county, were appropriately dedicated as were the bronze cannon already described as addenda to the Stanton monument.

The proceedings began with a re-union of the Jefferson County Soldiers and Sailors Association at Turner Hall with an exceptionally large attendance. Addresses were made by Rev. S. F. Ross and Dr. J. W. Collins of Toronto; Hon. John McElroy of Washington; Congressman W. B. Francis of Martins Ferry; Hon. D. S. Ferguson of Troy, O.; Hon. Daniel Ashworth, of Crafton, Pa., and Gen. A. M. Rowe, of Boise, Idaho, with musical selections by Miss Mame Connor, of Toronto. A warm fraternal welcome was extended to Col. R. C. Morgan and Col. Cicero Coleman.

The military parade started at 11 o'clock A. M. with Capt. A. A. Franzheim as chief marshal, including two companies of 17th U. S. Infantry with local band, Du-


quesne Greys of Pittsburgh, with band and drum corps, Steubenville Cadets and Spanish War Veterans, carriages with guests, all of whom were greeted with great enthusiasm.

The large afternoon meeting at the Stanton monument in front of the Court House was presided over by Hon. F. H. Kerr, who formally presented to the county the bronze cannon received from the Government, the Morgan-Shackelford markers and the Maine tablet. All these including the Wilson portrait were formally accepted by W. C. Brown on behalf of the County Commissioners. Mr. Brown took the position that the Civil War was one great step in the progress of evolution of civilization which is still in progress. It has its present form in the laws for the regulation of railroads, manufactories and relations generally between employer and employe.

Hon. John McElroy, of Washington, D. C., delivered a most eloquent address on the passing of the cavalier, indicating that Morgan and his men were among the last exponents of knight errantry, which, through the influence of Scott's novels, was so popular in the South.

At the conclusion of Col. McElroy's address, the Maine memorial tablet on the front of the Court House was unveiled by Miss Helen Franzheim.

Colonel Daniel Ashworth, of Pittsburgh, concluded the exercises with one of the strongest speeches of the entire celebration. He traced the composition of the people of the great Northwest, the part they had taken in the development and preservation of the country, and paid glowing tributes to Stanton, the great War Secretary, and the heroes of the Maine



JEFFERSON COUNTY COURT HOUSE.

Steubenville, O.

Decorated for Three Wars Celebration.

The industrial and auto parade on Friday evening under Marshals William Hartshorn and Ross Anderson, made a most creditable showing, and the designs were most artistic and effective.

Among the features of the week were the re-union of the Wilson family at St. Peter's deanery, luncheon tendered by the ladies' committee at the Country Club, and the reception of Prof. A. M. Rowe, Adjutant General of Idaho, by his former pupils.

An informal promenade and dance at Stanton Park Casino on Friday night furnished a delightful social termination to a round of busy functions.

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